



Evaluation Report: Guatemalan Repatriates Project (GRP)

Prepared for: The International Organization for Migration

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About MANAUS Consulting

MANAUS provides consulting services to companies and organizations working with corporate responsibility and international development projects. MANAUS works with businesses, nonprofit organizations, and multilateral institutions to help them understand the impact their programs and initiatives are having on beneficiaries and their communities.

MANAUS Consulting was commissioned to evaluate the Guatemalan Repatriates Project and determine whether the project was effective in successfully assisting and reintegrating repatriates upon return to Guatemala. A member of MANAUS Consulting visited the project in Guatemala and San Marcos to observe its implementation and understand the scope of its results.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration of Guatemalans to the United States of America (U.S.) has increased exponentially in recent years, increasing by 78% between 2000 and 2010. At the same time, the number of Guatemalans who are repatriated from the U.S. has also grown significantly—from 4,778 to 40,647 between 2002 and 2012. Guatemalan repatriates face many challenges upon their return to Guatemala, such as debts, difficulties to find work, family separation, and psychological issues. To respond to this reality, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched and implemented the Guatemalan Repatriates Project (GRP) between September 2010 and October 2013, with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The project aimed to provide basic assistance and socioeconomic reintegration services to repatriates, promote the development of a national migratory policy, and strengthen the government's capacity to prevent and combat human trafficking.

This external evaluation aimed to determine whether the GRP implemented planned activities and achieved expected results. The most relevant findings of the evaluation are the following:

- **The provision of basic assistance, reintegration services, and counter-trafficking activities were the most effective project activities.** The comprehensive attention provided to repatriates upon arrival and reintegration services—particularly psychosocial assistance and technical and financial support for entrepreneurship—were considered by beneficiaries and project counterparts as extremely beneficial. These activities reduced repatriates' vulnerability and helped them adjust to life back in Guatemala.

The project also contributed to the improvement of the capacity of the government to respond to cases of human trafficking, particularly considering that legal instruments and government agencies created to deal with human trafficking issues are new developments in the country. The support of the project to local organizations specialized in assisting victims of human trafficking also made an important contribution to the protection of victims and prosecution of offenders.

- **The project design set objectives that relied on other external stakeholders and not solely on activities carried out by the IOM.** The GRP was successful in achieving most proposed objectives, but not all. For instance, the project was not effective in developing a national migration policy. The enactment of laws depends on multiple local actors and is directly tied to the complex political context of Guatemala. The development of a new migration policy did not rely on IOM alone and required a responsive government for the achievement of this specific objective. Therefore, IOM could not feasibly secure the approval of such policy. Setting objectives that go beyond the control of the IOM in Guatemala constrained the organization's capacity to achieve some set project results.
- **The project did not put in place the necessary mechanisms to guarantee its sustainability.** The GRP aimed to address the issue of repatriation by directly and indirectly assisting repatriates, influencing policymaking and developing new legal instruments, providing capacity-building activities to the government, and supporting various civil society organizations. However, the project did not properly set mechanisms to secure or at least increase the possibilities of these project benefits to be sustainable without the GRP.

Beyond internal and external limitations, the evaluation found the GRP to have significant benefits for Guatemalan repatriates. The increasing rate of forced repatriations and the impact of irregular migration in Guatemala make it imperative that projects like the GRP exist. In this sense, the assessment also found that the cessation of the project is not only a setback for repatriates that will no longer access the GRP services, but the lack of project sustainability is also an important limitation to the efforts and mission of the International Organization for Migration in the country.

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the activities and services delivered by the Guatemalan Repatriates Project. The assessment specifically focused on the relevance of the project design, project implementation process, delivery of expected results, and the sustainability of the project. The evaluation employed various qualitative methodologies including the revision of secondary data sources—e.g. project documents and project collected indicators—and primary data gathered through stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions. The assessment was executed by MANAUS, an international development consulting firm, between July and September 2013.

The report is structured around five sections. The first section provides background on the project by briefly describing migration flows of Guatemalans to the U.S. and trends of repatriation across time. This section also outlines human trafficking issues in the country and their relation to irregular migration. Lastly, the background section discusses the political-legislative and socioeconomic context in which the project was implemented.

The second part of the report summarizes the key objectives of the GRP along with the principal areas of action to assist repatriates. This section briefly outlines the specific activities and expected results per project area. The third section of the report describes the methodologies used in the evaluation, the techniques utilized to analyze the information gathered, and the methodological limitations of the findings of the evaluation.


The fourth section lays out the most important findings of the project. A discussion on the extent to which the GRP achieved its objectives and desired results is presented. This section also gauges the relevance of the project design to address the issue at hand, the effectiveness of the project implementation process, and the degree to which the project properly monitored its progress. Later on, this findings section focuses on examining the contribution of the project to expand the provision of basic assistance and reintegration services to repatriates, build the capacity of the Government of Guatemala and other local actors to prevent, assist victims, and prosecute trafficking cases, and develop a national migration policy. Lastly, this section examines the extent to which project activities and results are sustainable without the GRP.

The last section of the report presents the most relevant conclusions of the evaluation and focuses on key learnings identified throughout the implementation of the project.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the number of Guatemalans living in the U.S. reached over 1.5 million in 2010. The repatriation of Guatemalans from the U.S. has significantly increased over the past ten years as well. In 2012, over 40,000 Guatemalans were repatriated from the U.S. and another 38,000 were repatriated by land from Mexico.¹ The number of Guatemalans repatriated from the U.S. is expected to reach 50,000 people in 2013.² Guatemalan repatriates face many challenges upon arrival. They are repatriated to families and communities that depended on their remittances and may face challenges such as debts, underdeveloped job markets, and family separation.

Figure 1. Number of Repatriated Guatemalans from the U.S. (2002-2012)



Source: IOM Guatemala (2013). Guatemala Migration Profile 2012.

The inadequate assistance and reintegration of repatriates can generate adverse social and economic consequences for the country. Many repatriates may end up working in the informal sector, which means they do not contribute to the costs of public services the Guatemalan State provides. Other repatriates may join organized crime, exacerbating the social problems of a country already struggling to deal with high levels of violence.

Guatemala is also an origin, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children affected by human trafficking, particularly for sexual and labor exploitation. Although irregular migration does not necessarily lead to human trafficking, these two issues are closely related. When people migrate irregularly, they have a variety of needs (food, shelter, money, protection, etc.) that makes them vulnerable to false offers or to be left in the hands of organized crime.

The capacity of the Government of Guatemala to respond to the migration phenomenon and human trafficking is limited. In the case of irregular migration, the country does not have an adequate national policy to tackle its socioeconomic causes and consequences. As for human trafficking, specific legal instruments and specialized agencies were created recently and the capacity of these institutions to respond to the problem is still under development.

¹ International Organization for Migration (2013). *Guatemala Migration Profile 2012*.

² Estimations provided by José A. Zaldaño, Head of the Operations Division at the General Directorate of Migration (July 2013).

In this context, IOM launched the Guatemalan Repatriates Project (GRP) to provide assistance to repatriated Guatemalans, prevent abuses against their rights, and support their socioeconomic reintegration into society. The GRP also sought to combat trafficking in persons by improving the capacity of the government to prevent and respond to this issue across the country.

Emigration in Guatemala

The emigration of Guatemalans to the U.S. started in the 60s and was mainly caused by factors such as academic opportunities, the demand for labor for certain services (e.g. domestic service, restaurants, landscaping, construction and agriculture), better wages, and the relative ease to emigrate. This first migration flow increased considerably with the 1976 earthquake that led to dire human and material damages in Guatemala. In the 80s, Guatemalan migration flows increased due to the economic crisis and the intensification of the internal armed conflict. During this time, Guatemalans entered the U.S. under new immigration statuses, including as refugees, asylum seekers, and/or under exiled status.

Guatemalan migration intensified significantly during the 90s. On one hand, there was widespread deterioration of social welfare in Guatemala—e.g. lack of access to housing, education, and health. On the other hand, the U.S. experienced a significant economic growth that led to an increase in the demand for labor in various sectors, such as construction and agriculture. But it is between 2000-2010 when Guatemalan migration to the U.S. grew exponentially, increasing from 225,739 in 2000 to 1,044,209 Guatemalans in 2010.³

In 2012, the number of Guatemalans repatriated by air from the U.S. reached 40,647 people. Another 38,514 Guatemalans were repatriated by land from Mexico.⁴ As of July 2013, the number of Guatemalans repatriated by air from the U.S. had already reached 29,210 people and the government expects this figure to reach 50,000 repatriates by the end of the year.⁵

In general, Guatemalan migrants have the following characteristics:⁶

- They are from the departments of San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango, Quiche, and Guatemala City.
- They have low levels of education: elementary (20%), middle school (18%), high school (11%), and university (1%).
- Most are men—only 7% of migrants are women.
- The main reasons for emigrating are: improving their economic conditions (52%), finding employment (37%), and family reunification (3%).
- Most migrants (58%, 2010 est.) travel to the U.S. through Mexico using the services of a smuggler (*coyote*) and paying approximately US\$ 5,000⁷ for the smuggling services.

THE GUATEMALAN REPATRIATES PROJECT

The Guatemalan Repatriates Project (GRP) was launched in September 2010 to provide assistance to repatriated Guatemalan citizens. The GRP was launched with the support of the U.S. Agency for

³ International Organization for Migration (2013). *Guatemala Migration Profile 2012*.

⁴ General Directorate of Migration (2013). *Deported Guatemalans in 2012*. Retrieved on 08/01/2013 from [DGM](#) website.

⁵ Statistics provided by José A. Zaldaño, Chief of the Operative Division at the General Directorate of Migration (July 2013).

⁶ International Organization for Migration (2013). *Guatemala Migration Profile 2012*.

⁷ For reference, Guatemala's GDP per capita is US\$3,368 (2012 est., World Bank).

International Development (USAID). By providing technical assistance, material support, and reintegration services, the GRP aimed to prevent human rights abuses against Guatemalan repatriates and support their social and economic reintegration into society. A second phase of the project, launched in March 2012, incorporated counter-trafficking activities that focused on improving the government's ability to respond and combat this issue. The project had a total budget of USD 2.5 million.

In order to achieve its goal, the GRP focused its activities on the following five components:

- 1. Expand the provision of basic services to repatriated Guatemalan citizens upon arrival.** This component involved assessing the individual needs of repatriates for appropriate assistance, providing short term lodging services to repatriates on an as-needed basis, strengthening protection shelter centers for repatriated unaccompanied minors, and providing specialized assistance programs for victims of human trafficking. Basic services to repatriates included the provision of refreshments, local and international phone calls, hygiene kits, transportation, and counseling services to reduce the psychological impact of the repatriation.
- 2. Expand the provision of training and job placement services to repatriated Guatemalan citizens and build public-private alliances to support the economic reintegration of repatriates.** This component incorporated specialized assistance for social and economic reintegration, such as the development of a Center for Referral and Opportunities (CRO), the implementation of public information campaigns to raise awareness of repatriates' needs, provision of psychosocial support, implementation of job placement services and income generation projects, and provision of basic job skills training through public-private alliances.
- 3. Develop and strengthen a national migration policy.** This project component aimed to promote the creation of public policies that address the needs of repatriates. To this end, this component included activities to assess the most up-to-date situation of repatriates, gather reliable and consistent statistics on the issue, facilitate inter-institutional working groups on migration policymaking, implement and analyze migration-related surveys as inputs for specialized interventions, draft assessments of the situation of Guatemalan repatriates and their communities, and strengthen civil society organizations.
- 4. Map and disseminate best practices and methodologies for successful reintegration of repatriates.** This component sought to document processes and activities identified as appropriate and successful to assist repatriates at their arrival and reintegration into society. Specific activities included developing and implementing a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system, documenting the functioning of such monitoring system, as well as assessing and documenting the implementation of the CRO model and the overall assistance and reintegration methodologies.
- 5. Improve the ability of the Guatemalan government to prevent human trafficking, provide better attention to victims, and prosecute human trafficking cases.** This project component focused on enhancing the capacity of government agencies acting to prevent and prosecute trafficking cases, such as the Secretariat Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons (SVET), and the Public Attorney's Office. This component also aimed to support organizations specialized in providing comprehensive assistance to victims. Specific activities included the implementation of monitoring units, the delivery of investigative and prosecutorial trainings to public officers, the provision of financial support to shelters, and the implementation of awareness-raising campaigns in priority areas.

The remainder of this report focuses on assessing whether the GRP implemented activities as planned and achieved its intended results.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation employed various qualitative methodologies to assess the implementation and results of the Guatemalan Repatriates Project. These methodologies included: reviewing secondary data sources, such as project documents and project indicators, conducting desktop research, as well as the collection of primary data through stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions.

Project documents supplied by the IOM were carefully reviewed to provide insights into the project's background, activities conducted to date, and documented outputs. These documents included the cooperative agreement, monitoring and evaluation plans, project quarterly reports, project work plans, and communications documents, among others. The project indicators reported in this evaluation correspond to activities conducted until the end of June 2013; therefore, indicators on activities implemented in the last quarter of the project (July-September 2013) are not included. The methodology also incorporated desktop research to understand the country characteristics in which the project was implemented and what changes occurred during the life of the project in Guatemala.

Additionally, the evaluation included interviews with IOM staff members in Guatemala and San Marcos to further understand the scope and implementation process of the project. A total of 22 staff members were interviewed, including the Project Officer, the Reintegration Coordinator, the Counter-Trafficking Coordinator, and the Public Policy Clerk. Table 1 in the Appendix lists all staff members interviewed during the field visit.

The evaluation also incorporated interviews with various project stakeholders to gather their perspectives on the project. Among these stakeholders were 24 direct beneficiaries (repatriated migrants), 10 government counterparts, four sub-grantee organizations, and two private sector counterparts. Interviews with beneficiaries were conducted through three focus group discussions: two in Guatemala and one in San Marcos. The focus group discussions in Guatemala included beneficiaries that received basic services, as well as support for socioeconomic reintegration. The focus group in San Marcos included beneficiaries that only received basic assistance upon arrival. Table 2 in the Appendix shows summary statistics of the characteristics of interviewed beneficiaries.

In the case of government counterparts, interviews were held with representatives from the General Directorate of Migration (DGM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor, National Counsel For Guatemalan Migrant Attention (CONAMIGUA), Human Rights Ombudsman, National Congress, Public Attorney's Office, and Secretariat Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons (SVET), among others. In the case of sub-grantees, interviews were conducted with Casa del Migrante, El Refugio de la Niñez, Casa Nuestras Raices, and End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography & Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT). Among private sector counterparts, interviews were held with representatives of Smart Talent and the Technical Institute for Training and Productivity (INTECAP).⁸ A full list of interviewed project counterparts is included in Table 3 of the Appendix.

Reviewing secondary data sources alongside collecting primary data allowed evaluators to have an in-depth understanding of the project and gather various perspectives regarding the project's efficacy. More specifically, the methodology allowed the evaluation team to have a solid grasp of project activities implemented, as well as activities not implemented or significantly changed, thus allowing the team to evaluate the main project results and challenges.

⁸ It is important to note that INTECAP was never a formal (contractual) counterpart of the GRP; however, several trainings and education courses to repatriates were provided by INTECAP with the financial support of the GRP.

Data Analysis and Methodological Limitations

The information collected through primary and secondary data sources was cross referenced to determine whether the project implemented all planned activities and the extent to which such activities produced expected results. Similar questions on project activities, benefits, and limitations were asked to stakeholders to compare responses and verify information.

This methodology provided the evaluation team with an understanding of the implementation of the project activities, accomplishment of project objectives, and outputs and outcomes achieved. The evaluation team also gathered beneficiaries' perceptions on how the project has affected their lives. Finally, the evaluation identified areas of the project that could have been better implemented to produce greater benefits.

The evaluation is limited, however, to answer questions regarding project beneficiaries and its results cannot be generalized to regional or national populations. This is because the sample of beneficiaries used in the evaluation is not statistically representative of the project's target population and the methodology did not include a comparison group to control for what would have happened in the absence of the project. Similarly, the evaluation cannot claim any causal links between the observed results and the Guatemalan Repatriates Project.

EVALUATION RESULTS

The evaluation principally aimed to determine whether the GRP implemented activities as planned and whether those activities led to expected results. To this end, the evaluation focused on eight main areas of assessment that looked into overall project objectives and results, project design and implementation, and the sustainability of the project.

I. PROJECT OBJECTIVES, RESULTS, AND UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES

The GRP achieved the overall objective of expanding assistance to repatriates in order to protect their human rights. Nonetheless, the GRP was successful in accomplishing some but not all project objectives.

In the case of the three objectives on the provision of primary assistance, services for social and economic reintegration, and building the Guatemalan government's capacity to respond to trafficking issues, the project successfully achieved its intended results. Associated activities were perceived as extremely beneficial by key project stakeholders—assisted repatriates and government and private sector counterparts.

However, the GRP was only partially effective in developing and strengthening Guatemala's migration policy. While the project did promote national dialogue on migration and highlighted the importance of collecting reliable data to produce better informed policies, it did not influence the development of a new migration policy. This was mainly because policymaking depends on various local actors and not only on IOM's activities—this project design limitation is discussed in detail in Section II, *Project Design, Implementation, and Monitoring & Evaluation*.

In the case of mapping and disseminating best practices and methodologies for successful reintegration, the project was not entirely effective. Overall project learnings and activities deemed appropriate for assisting repatriates were gathered in a best practices report that was presented to key stakeholders, including private sector and government counterparts. However, there was no systematic documentation of methodologies and processes to adequately serve and reintegrate repatriates. The project was also

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required to document the development and implementation of the CRO model, but such information was not compiled.

In regards to unexpected outcomes, stakeholders felt a noticeable, positive change in the attitude of Guatemalan migration authorities toward repatriates. More specifically, various stakeholders explained that authorities now give a “warm welcome” speech to repatriates. A DGM representative explained they hoped the speech made repatriates feel they do not need to leave Guatemala again. Interviewed beneficiaries, private sector counterparts, and IOM staff believe this change in attitude was a result of authorities observing the assistance, particularly the psychosocial assistance, provided by the GRP team at the airport.

Finally, although the project had resources limitations to serve the totality of Guatemalans repatriated, the GRP assisted more repatriates than it had originally projected. For fiscal year 2012, the project forecasted providing basic assistance to 22,000 repatriates and actually served 38,671 repatriates.⁹ In the case of reintegration services, the project anticipated assisting 1,500 repatriates and it actually supported 3,213 repatriates during the same fiscal year. As for assisting victims of trafficking, the GRP projected providing attention to 30 victims, while it actually served 140 victims of trafficking. In this sense, the project was successful in reaching and exceeding the expected number of beneficiaries.¹⁰

II. PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MONITORING & EVALUATION

The GRP was the first project of its kind in Guatemala and, as such, it faced several challenges and required a number of adjustments in terms of design, methodologies, and implementation.

Project Design & Methodologies. The project looked to address migration related issues from multiple angles: assisting repatriates directly, promoting a more appropriate legal framework to target migration, strengthening government and civil society organizations, and disseminating information to the general public. Though this was a comprehensive approach, it led to ambitious goals and activities. For instance, creating a new national migration policy depended on various local actors to which the IOM, as an inter-governmental organization, can make recommendations but the organization cannot be solely responsible for enacting public policy. In this sense, the IOM could not feasibly develop and secure the approval of a new migration policy.

According to the GRP team, the project design also outlined broad activities that made it difficult to identify proper methodologies. For instance, social and economic reintegration can imply different types of reintegration—e.g. family, community, political, and economic reintegration—and thus be addressed through various types of activities. This led to the development and implementation of many activities to address the various forms of reintegration, which ultimately prevented the project from focusing on fewer activities and being more effective in reintegrating repatriates. For instance, since economic conditions are the main drivers of irregular migration, the project could have focused from the onset on income generating activities, such as financial support for entrepreneurship. With the large number of repatriates and the weak socioeconomic conditions of the country, this design limitation affected the reach of some project activities.

Other activities outlined in the project design were appropriate for achieving project objectives, as well as

⁹ NOTE: The total number of assisted repatriates upon arrival corresponds to the statistics of repatriated Guatemalans reported by Guatemalan authorities. The GRP assumed that the project provided at least water to all repatriates that arrived at the Guatemalan Air Force. The GRP did not track the actual number of repatriates directly assisted by the project at the point of entry. This means that the actual number of repatriates served by the GRP may be different than 38,671 people.

¹⁰ Target goals from the *GRP Monitoring & Evaluation Plan - Revised Version, June 2013*. Actual statistics from the *M&E Indicators - Life of Project* provided by the GRP team on August 2013.

viable for the GRP team to implement and accomplish the expected results. These activities included the provision of basic assistance upon arrival, psychosocial sessions, execution of communication campaigns, updating and sharing knowledge on the migration phenomenon in Guatemala, and counter-trafficking activities, among others.

Project Implementation. The GRP was able to implement most of the activities of the project design and deliver the intended services to repatriates. As with any project, and particularly one executing new activities, the implementation of the GRP faced some challenges. Project activities were often delayed due to both internal and external factors. Internally, complex administrative processes, lack of staff training on administrative procedures, and high staff turnover rates significantly affected the implementation of GRP activities. IOM staff, as well as government and private sector counterparts, expressed frustration about the lengthy administrative process that needs to be followed to deliver activities, such as to purchase material, get transportation funds, and pay consultants, among others. For instance, a private sector counterpart mentioned a delay of six months in the financial support promised by the GRP for a consultancy. The complexity of the administrative processes was exacerbated by the lack of staff familiarity with the organization's procedures. IOM staff explained that there is a learning curve of one to two months for new staff to understand the internal processes of the organization, but no comprehensive training was available for new employees.

The administrative system also impacted the recruitment of project staff, which led to delays in project implementation. For instance, reintegration activities were delayed for almost six months due to the lengthy recruitment process to hire staff to work on these activities. At the same time, staff turnover was high—approximately 15 members of a staff of 20 left over the life of the project, including Project Area Coordinators and the Project Officer.¹¹

Externally, the implementation of the project was affected by the initial reluctance of government counterparts to cooperate with the IOM. For instance, the General Directorate of Migration (DGM) initially rejected requests for meetings with the IOM and prohibited the access of the GRP staff to the Guatemalan Air Force. It was not until the end of the project's third quarter (June 2011) that the team was able to access the airport and set-up a space to assist repatriates. For some time, DGM was also not willing to share information regarding repatriates—i.e. number of repatriates per flight, number of females, number of minors, etc.—making it difficult for the GRP team to adequately prepare for the assistance of repatriates.¹²

Project Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E). The project put in place a monitoring system, *Sistema de Acompañamiento, Monitoreo y Evaluación* (SAME),¹³ to track the number of repatriates assisted and their contact information, as well as to keep records of implemented activities and the type of services delivered. The monitoring plan was based on 13 indicators and the preparation of periodic reports.¹⁴ Although the M&E system was implemented and quarterly reports were prepared, the overall monitoring and evaluation practices of the GRP were weak. This was mainly due to the ambiguous definition of indicators, the limited ability of indicators to assess outcomes, absence of staff trained on monitoring and evaluation, and the absence of a mid-course corrective evaluation.

¹¹ Information provided by GRP senior staff and IOM administrative staff. It is important to note that the size of the project staff progressively increased from 5 members to 20 members over the life of the project, and the 15 aforementioned members did not necessarily leave at once.

¹² The GRP team initially requested statistics on repatriates to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and this institution directed them to DGM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but these entities were not willing to share the information.

¹³ SAME is a system originally developed by IOM Colombia and was adjusted to the GRP activities.

¹⁴ Note that the number and definition of project indicators have changed over the life of the project as new activities were added and/or reformulated.

The indicators selected to track the progress of the project were in general poorly defined. For instance, Indicator 5 “Number of assistance locations increased and improved in order to generate job opportunities and training” may account for locations increased, locations improved, and locations increased and improved. This means that the indicator may account for the same location more than once—when it was created and every time it is improved through the provision of materials or equipment. Furthermore, the indicators are limited to counting implemented activities or delivered services, but they do not assess the extent to which the activity or service was successful in assisting repatriates. For example, the GRP tracks the number of repatriates that received reintegration support, such as training on how to develop CVs or referrals to jobs, but it does not track for how long repatriates stayed employed or whether the employment was enough to secure the economic stability of the repatriate.

Most of the GRP staff does not have background in monitoring and evaluation, and there was no M&E Coordinator dedicated to tracking project activities and results. Each staff member tracked indicators applicable to their specific area of work. Due to the ambiguity of the indicators, lack of training, and staff turnover, indicators were not consistently tracked. Despite the fact that the GRP is gender-focused, most project indicators were not disaggregated by gender until the fifth quarter of the project (October-December 2011). It is important to mention that many of these indicators were set by the donor and not by the GRP team. Still, the lack of consistency in the reporting of indicators impeded the proper tracking of project activities and results.

Some of these monitoring issues, as well as others related to administrative processes or project design constraints, could have been identified in a midterm evaluation. As per the Year 2 Work Plan, a midterm assessment was to be implemented to “establish and adjust, if necessary, coherence between the objectives, needs, and resources in order to achieve the initial project goals.” Nonetheless, this midterm evaluation was never carried out. These weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation system certainly limited the capacity of the IOM to adequately monitor the progress and assess the results of the GRP.

III. PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO EXPANDING THE PROVISION OF BASIC SERVICES TO REPATRIATES

The basic assistance provided by the GRP was beneficial to reduce the vulnerability of repatriated Guatemalans. Basic assistance at the point of entry was particularly impactful in the case of repatriates that arrived to the Guatemalan Air Force,¹⁵ as there were no other organizations providing comprehensive assistance in Guatemala City prior to the implementation of the GRP, in the scale required. Basic assistance included refreshments, psychosocial attention, communication and transportation services, hygiene kits, and temporary shelters to adults and unaccompanied minors through project sub-grantees. Through this assistance, the GRP was able to deliver the following benefits:

- Psychosocial attention helped reduce the high levels of anxiety with which most repatriates arrived, as well as identify more serious psychological problems or even cases of human trafficking.
- Refreshments ensured repatriates were nourished and hydrated enough to continue their journey to their home communities. This service also allowed the psychosocial team to briefly speak with

¹⁵ The GRP provided direct, basic assistance to repatriates at three main points of entry: 1) La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City (later at the Guatemalan Air Force); 2) El Carmen border point between Guatemala and Mexico; and 3) Quetzaltenango, the main entry point of unaccompanied minors. Because of logistical and security issues, the GRP provided support in El Carmen through counterparts that already had a point of assistance in the area, such as Casa del Migrante and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

repatriates and assess specific needs.

- The transportation fund, approximately \$125 per flight,¹⁶ supported repatriates who could not return to their communities on their own means. This service was an important complement to the transportation assistance provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Local and international phone calls helped repatriates communicate with relatives or friends in Guatemala or the U.S. As in the case of refreshments, this activity allowed the psychosocial team to identify other immediate needs of repatriates or simply take their contact information for reintegration services referrals.

Through Casa del Migrante, the GRP provided temporary shelter to repatriates in Guatemala City and the department of San Marcos in the border with Mexico. This organization offered shelter for up to 72 hours, food, basic medical care, local and international calls, and receipt of remittances. Although brief, this timeframe allowed assisted repatriates to partially recover from the reality of being back in Guatemala, communicate with their families, receive money, and plan for the upcoming days. As of July 2013, Casa del Migrante had provided shelter to more than 843 repatriates in Guatemala City and 2,500 repatriates in San Marcos.¹⁷

In the case of unaccompanied repatriated minors, the GRP assistance was provided through Casa Nuestras Raíces, an organization of the Social Welfare Secretariat with extensive expertise in working with this population. Casa Nuestras Raíces provided shelter for repatriated children and adolescents—both in Quetzaltenango and Guatemala City—while their families were contacted. Casa Nuestras Raíces also provided medical and psychological assistance, food, cleaning kits, and clothing, among other services. As of July 2013, Casa Nuestras Raíces had assisted 1,043 unaccompanied minors.¹⁸

In focus groups with beneficiaries, assisted repatriates explained that this basic assistance upon arrival was particularly beneficial from an emotional standpoint. Beneficiaries indicated that refreshments, phone calls, and transportation services helped calm their anxiety and gave them some guidance on what to do and how to contact their families. In the case of shelter services, repatriates explained that this assistance gave them time to think about what options they had to start a life in Guatemala and helped them understand the risks of irregular migration.

As of the end of June 2013, the GRP had assisted 84,224 repatriated Guatemalans—94% men and 6% women. This proportion is consistent with the actual rate of men and women who are repatriated from the U.S. annually—93% and 7% respectively.¹⁹ The number of assisted repatriates exceeded the projected number of beneficiaries for these activities (59,000 repatriates).²⁰

¹⁶ The transportation fund was \$40 per flight at the beginning of the project and progressively increased to \$125 per flight.


¹⁷ Statistics provided by Marco A. Lima, Religious Delegate at Casa del Migrante on July 2013.

¹⁸ Statistics provided by Mariapaz López, Director at Casa Hogar Nuestras Raíces on July 2013.

¹⁹ International Organization for Migration (2013). *Guatemala Migration Profile 2012*.

²⁰ Numbers from the *GRP Monitoring & Evaluation Plan - Revised Version, June 2013*. NOTE: The total number of assisted repatriates upon arrival corresponds to the statistics of repatriated Guatemalans reported by Guatemalan migration authorities. The GRP assumed that the project provided at least water to all repatriates that arrived at the Guatemalan Air Force. The GRP did not track the actual number of repatriates directly assisted by the project at the point of entry. This means that the actual number of repatriates served by the GRP may be different than 84,224 people.

Figure 2. Number of Repatriates Assisted with Basic Assistance (2010-2013)



Source: IOM Guatemala, GRP Indicators (2010-2013).

In terms of sustainability, no other organization will continue to provide the same support to repatriates—at least not as comprehensively as provided by the GRP. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue providing refreshments and limited communication and transportation services. Casa del Migrante will continue to have a presence at the Guatemalan Air Force. Phones were donated to the Social Welfare Secretariat but it is uncertain whether authorities will continue to pay for international calls. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initially expressed interest in carrying out the GRP activities at the Guatemalan Air Force, but later said the organization did not have enough funds to provide transportation and phone services. Psychosocial assistance will not be provided by other public or private organizations at the Guatemalan Air Force.

IV. PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE REINTEGRATION OF REPATRIATES

Beneficiaries expressed that reintegration activities were also very beneficial. The project provided longer-term psychosocial attention, supported repatriates with processes to request basic identification documents (e.g. Documento Personal de Identidad, DPI, and/or driver’s license), provided education and financial support for entrepreneurship, facilitated the creation of self-help groups of repatriates, and established partnerships with the private sector for job referral purposes.

Beneficiaries named psychosocial sessions, assistance to obtain personal documentation, and entrepreneurship support as the activities that benefited repatriates the most. Several interviewed beneficiaries were in the process of acquiring equipment to start their businesses. Another effective reintegration mechanism was referring repatriates with good levels of English to call centers.


“I had no one else to talk to. When I arrived at the airport and was waiting to be registered, no one asked me how I felt or whether I needed anything. The sessions with Lucky [a member of the GRP psychosocial team] helped me vent and understand that I was going to get through this,” a female repatriate explained.

Among the repatriates that chose to open their own business, most focused on activities in which they had gained experience while in the U.S., such as apparel, construction, and gastronomy. All of them said they would have not opened their businesses without the emotional and financial support provided by the GRP.

In regards to partnerships with the private sector, the GRP was successful in establishing a network of companies to refer repatriates for job placements. Although referring repatriates did not mean securing a job, these partnerships helped with their economic reintegration and to raise awareness within the private sector on the reality and needs of Guatemalan repatriates.

As of the end of June 2013, the GRP provided support for social and economic reintegration to 5,752 repatriates. Through these activities, the GRP referred repatriates to various companies, including moving services companies, call centers, restaurants, transportation companies, food producers and distributors, among others. All stakeholders, including government counterparts, agreed that the IOM was the only organization providing assistance to help repatriates with social and economic reintegration.

Figure 3. Number of Repatriates Assisted with Reintegration Services (2010-2013)



Source: IOM Guatemala, GRP Indicators (2010-2013).

As previously mentioned, reintegration activities were affected by several internal factors. Methodologically, the broad meaning of the term reintegration and different staff members' views on how to define successful reintegration for the purpose of the project often led to delays in the implementation of activities. For instance, some staff members wanted to focus on community reintegration, while others were more interested in providing economic opportunities. Complex administrative processes also affected the implementation of reintegration activities. For example, processing of payments to providers, counterparts, or purchase of products/services for repatriates tended to be significantly lengthy.

The sustainability of these activities after the conclusion of the GRP is not likely. CONAMIGUA is the government entity directly responsible for assisting migrants. Although the entity has access to the contact information of repatriates, beneficiaries said they were never contacted by CONAMIGUA for job referrals or any other type of reintegration service. Other government agencies stated that CONAMIGUA is not really active in providing reintegration support to repatriates. The Ministry of Labor plans to implement some reintegration activities in the short term and is in the process of securing a space at the airport to provide information to repatriates. However, IOM staff and government authorities at the airport thought it was unlikely that the Ministry would actually follow through.

V. PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO PREVENT, PROVIDE ATTENTION, AND PROSECUTE TRAFFICKING CASES

The GRP proved to be effective in strengthening the capacity of the Government of Guatemala to prevent, provide assistance, and prosecute cases of human trafficking. Because the legal instruments and government agencies acting on human trafficking issues are new in the country,²¹ the counter-trafficking activities implemented by the GRP had an important impact in the response of the government to these issues.

Through the GRP, almost half of the country's judges (229 judges) were trained on human trafficking and the application of the newly enacted Law Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Trafficking In Persons (LVET). Additionally, the project trained three public prosecutors and eight prosecution assistants of the Public Attorney's Office's new Trafficking Prosecution Unit, created in 2012, on Forensic Oratory.²² This training aimed to enhance public prosecutors' capacity to effectively present and defend trafficking cases before judges. The project also provided capacity-building support to the Secretariat Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation And Trafficking In Persons (SVET) on the adequate monitoring of trafficking statistics and the implementation of the LVET.

The GRP was also successful in promoting collaboration among various public entities. Interviewed counterparts found the implementation of Departmental Working Groups to discuss and prosecute trafficking cases to be beneficial. Through this activity, departmental working groups were established in five departments of priority—Izabal, Quiché, Huehuetenango, Sololá, and Sacatepéquez—and involved key organizations such as SVET, the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH), the Public Attorney's Office, Departmental Governor's Offices, the National Police (PNC), the Presidential Secretariat for Women (SEPREM), the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Health, among others.

On prevention, the GRP provided financial support to SVET for the implementation of an informative campaign named *No me deajo engañar* (in English "I won't be fooled"). The campaign aimed to educate teachers on human trafficking and inform their students. The support mainly consisted of distributing materials—such as posters, pens, t-shirts, and games—and giving informative talks at the schools.

As of the end of June 2013, these project activities resulted in 33 trafficking cases under the investigation of the Public Attorney's Office.²³ Although this number may look small, it is important to take into consideration that human trafficking crimes are generally underreported, even when adequate legal mechanisms exist.

All interviewed stakeholders considered that these counter-trafficking activities would continue on after the conclusion of the project. Representatives of SVET and the Public Attorney's Office explained that the technical trainings provided by the GRP were so beneficial that they will secure funds in future budgets to continue similar trainings. In the case of departmental working groups, the two most recent working groups in Sololá and Sacatepéquez were initiated by SVET after the experience of creating the first three with the support of the GRP.

²¹ In Guatemala, human trafficking was not legally considered a crime until 2009 with the enactment of the Law Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation, and Trafficking In Persons (LVET) and the creation of the Secretariat Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation And Trafficking In Persons (SVET).

²² Forensic Oratory or Rhetoric refers to the ability to successfully communicate what is known. In most cases, public prosecutors have enough evidence of human trafficking but cannot properly present such evidence before judges.

²³ This number of trafficking cases was tracked by the IOM as cases they provided support for and hence may differ from the statistics of the Public Attorney's Office. Source: GRP Indicators (2010-2013).


VI. PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAPACITY OF OTHER LOCAL ACTORS TO ASSIST VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING

The GRP implemented various successful activities to directly assist victims of trafficking through the support of specialized organizations. One of the most effective activities was the financial support to El Refugio de la Niñez—a local nonprofit organization with substantial expertise in the assistance of children and adolescents who have been victims of sexual violence, exploitation, and human trafficking. The GRP specifically supported the creation and functioning of *Amor sin Fronteras*, which is El Refugio’s shelter exclusively for victims of human trafficking.

Through this support to El Refugio, the project provided temporary lodging, medical and psychological attention, education, comprehensive legal assistance,²⁴ and socioeconomic reintegration services such as job trainings and strengthening of intra-family relations. *Amor sin Fronteras* assists approximately 75-80 victims per year and has supported victims through 14 court cases (of which 12 led to convictions) in the four years of existence of the organization.²⁵ The GRP also provided technical support to El Refugio to assess its administrative system and produce an institutional strengthening plan. This plan has increased the possibilities of the organization to obtain direct financial support from large donors, including USAID.

The project was also effective in enhancing the institutional capacity of and coordination among civil society organizations to respond to trafficking cases. In coordination with End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography & Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT), the GRP formed a network against human trafficking to promote dialogue, increase cooperation, and influence legislation and governmental action. The network was formed by 19 nongovernmental organizations, international cooperation agencies, and civil society organizations—including several United Nations (UN) agencies, Save the Children Guatemala, La Nueva Alianza, Casa del Migrante, El Refugio de la Niñez, Fundación Sobrevivientes, Doctors without Borders, among others. As of the end of June 2013, through the support to these organizations, the GRP assisted 140 victims of human trafficking.

Figure 4. Number of Victims of Trafficking Assisted (2011-2013)



Source: IOM Guatemala, GRP Indicators (2010-2013).

²⁴ El Refugio has the capacity to accompany and provide technical advice to the Public Attorney’s Office in criminal investigations of TIP cases.

²⁵ Numbers provided by Leonel Dubón, Executive Director, and Ingrid Áreas, Development Director, at El Refugio de la Niñez (July 2013).

Counter-trafficking activities to support victims are perhaps the most sustainable of all GRP activities. Technical support to strengthen El Refugio's administrative system was fundamental to diversify the organization's funding sources. The organization expects to receive direct funding from USAID by February 2014. El Refugio also had other funding, besides those received from the GRP, which allowed the organization to function after the GRP was over.²⁶ Likewise, the network against human trafficking is likely to continue working without the support of the GRP.

VII. PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MIGRATION POLICY

The effectiveness of the GRP activities in the area of public policy was limited. This was due in part to the political context of the country. Senior staff turnover within government agencies made the capacity-building activities difficult. CONAMIGUA's operations were seized and the legislative branch had not yet selected a new senior leadership at the time of this evaluation. The lack of leadership in such an important project counterpart made it harder for the GRP to advance public policy activities. The transition in the government's administration in January 2012 also forced the GRP team to start the communication process with government authorities from scratch.

However, the limited effectiveness that the GRP had in public policy formulation was mainly due to the project design itself. The project objective of developing a new national migration policy required the implementation of activities that go beyond the sphere of action of the IOM and required contribution from many local actors. Therefore, drafting and approving a new policy on migration depended on institutions other than the IOM. In this sense, the project design set objectives that required activities that the organization could not implement, preventing the achievement of this project result.

Yet, the project implemented some activities that, although did not result in a new national migration policy, were successful in promoting a national dialogue and producing reliable information on the migration phenomenon. For instance, the GRP participated in a series of inter-institutional meetings on migration policymaking that were led by CONAMIGUA and involved other 34 government institutions. During these inter-institutional meetings, the GRP presented best practices on migration policymaking, protection of migrants' human rights, and prevention of irregular migration.

The project also coordinated meetings with the National Congress' Migrant Commission to make recommendations on new policies, particularly Initiative 4126 that aims to amend the Migration Act 95-98.²⁷ This activity sought to provide technical assistance to the Commission so that its activities are based on up-to-date migration information and thus respond adequately to its causes and consequences.

At the same time, the GRP implemented a national study to assess, analyze, and document various indicators on migration within Guatemala. This study resulted in the publication of the Guatemala Migration Profile 2012—a document intended to serve as a basis for the formulation of comprehensive public policies. The profile analyzes migratory trends, key migration drivers, and the general characteristics of migrants, as well as the social and economic implications of migration. The document also provides recommendations to improve the capacity of public institutions, enhance information systems on migration, and give continuity to the elaboration of new migration profiles.

Although the generation of more up-to-date information on migration issues and the promotion on national dialogue among public institutions can certainly contribute to the formulation of new public policies, it is uncertain whether these activities will actually result in a new migration policy. Likewise,

²⁶ Leonel Dubón, Executive Director, and Ingrid Áreas, Development Director, at El Refugio de la Niñez (July 2013).

²⁷ Migration Act 95-98 is the current legal instrument on migration.

given the complex political context, it is uncertain whether these activities will continue to be implemented by the government once the GRP reaches its conclusion.

VIII. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

Even though the GRP produced significant benefits for Guatemalan repatriates, most of these benefits are likely to diminish over time. This is particularly the case for basic assistance and reintegration activities. In part, this is due to the multiple areas the project aimed to cover. As mentioned earlier, the project was comprehensive in trying to approach the issue of irregular migration from many possible angles. The GRP could have produced more sustainable results if it had narrowed the breadth of project activities. When asked what they would do differently if they had the opportunity to start the project again, many GRP staff members stated they would focus only on providing basic assistance and reintegration support, leaving public policy and counter-trafficking activities out of the scope of the project.

Given the observed lack of capacity and/or political interest of the government to continue delivering some of the activities developed and implemented by the GRP, the project management should have looked for and engaged other organizations—national or international—that could have absorbed GRP activities and given continuity to project benefits. This lack of backup plan was caused by several internal factors. First, project staff stated they did not have time to find either alternative funding opportunities or significantly engage with organizations with capacity to undertake project activities. Second, the GRP could not hire a staff member to be exclusively dedicated to these sustainability-focused activities. Third, senior management was overconfident that USAID would provide additional funding for the project and learned that no extra funding would be provided too late into the project (Q1 2013).²⁸ This impacted the project and the Mission, considering that the GRP funds sustained approximately 75% of the Mission's operations.²⁹

Although there were some sustainability efforts put in place between February and June 2013 through a series of inter-institutional meetings with government, private sector, and civil society organizations, these activities were not successful in securing the continuation of project activities. It is important to mention that the only activity from which outcomes are likely to be sustainable after the cessation of the GRP is the assistance of victims of trafficking. The sustainability of this activity was secured through the technical support provided to El Refugio de la Niñez to strengthen its administrative system in order to request funding from other large donors. If the GRP had implemented similar sustainability mechanisms within the other project areas, it could have increased the likelihood that project results would continue to take hold.

²⁸ Information gathered through private interviews and a focus group discussion with project staff.

²⁹ Information provided by GRP senior staff and IOM administrative staff.

CONCLUSIONS

The Guatemalan Repatriates Project was in general successful in expanding the provision of services to repatriates. The project was particularly effective in assisting repatriates upon arrival and subsequently supporting them in their social and economic reintegration process. Counter-trafficking activities were also effective in building the capacity of the government and other local organizations to prevent and respond to human trafficking. As of the end of June 2013, the GRP provided basic assistance to over 84,224 Guatemalan repatriates, helped other 5,752 with reintegration opportunities, and assisted 140 victims of trafficking. In light of the increasing number of Guatemalans repatriated every year and the limited capacity of the government to assist this population, the project proved to be pertinent and overall effective in responding to their needs.

The project was also a source of valuable knowledge around the causes and consequences of irregular immigration, as well as helpful to understand the resources and processes that must exist to adequately serve this population. Regarding basic assistance upon arrival, the most important lessons from the project were the need to provide psychosocial attention, ensure minimum communication and transportation services, and make temporary shelters available to migrants. As for reintegration, the project made evident the importance of providing support for requesting basic identity documents, facilitating education training, and financially supporting entrepreneurial activities. On human trafficking, the GRP helped identify the lack of capacity of new institutions to respond to this problem and therefore the need to strengthen their capacity and resources.

Activities related to public policy highlighted the need for developing a comprehensive national migration policy to properly respond to the drivers and implications of irregular migration. These activities also showcased the importance of training authorities on updating migration information to create better informed policies, as well as the need for programs specially designed to assist migrants—not only repatriates but migrants in general (emigrants, immigrants, migrants in transit, etc.)

As any other project, the GRP faced methodological and logistical constraints. Although the breadth of project activities was intended to address the issue of irregular migration and human trafficking from various angles, this limited the reach and quality the project could have delivered if it had focused in fewer objectives. Some GRP activities were too reliant on local actors and a political environment out of the sphere of influence of the IOM, which prevented the project from attaining specific results. Lastly, the project did not implement proper mechanisms to facilitate the continuation of project benefits after the GRP was finalized. Given such lack of sustainability mechanisms and the increasing deterioration of the migration phenomenon in Guatemala, the cessation of the project represents a considerable limitation to the mission of the International Organization for Migration in the country.

APPENDIX

Table 1. List of Interviewed IOM Staff Members

No	Name	Position
1	Delbert Field	Chief of Mission
2	Jenniffer Dew	Project Officer
3	Philip Burns	Senior Project Assistant (IOM San Marcos)
4	Luis R. Sanchez	Reintegration Coordinator
5	Jose Alberto Villagran	Counter-Trafficking Coordinator
6	Jose Diego Cardenas	Public Policy Clerk
7	Andre Lascoutx	Operations Assistant
8	Mario Reyes	Operations Clerk
9	Oscar Gonzalez	Operations Assistant
10	Mario Hernandez	Psychosocial Assistant
11	Lucrecia Monterroso	Psychosocial Clerk
12	Ania Silva	Psychosocial Assistant
13	Domingo Vasquez	Reintegration Assistant
14	Juan Pablo Santos	Reintegration Clerk
15	Dina Ponce	Counter-Trafficking Clerk
16	Luisafernanda Garcia	Counter-Trafficking Assistant
17	Duvalier Castañon	Counter-Trafficking Assistant (IOM San Marcos)
18	Andy Sandoval	Office Assistant (IOM San Marcos)
19	Hugo Aguilar	Administrative Assistant
20	Sindi Velazquez	Administrative Assistant
21	Mara Carrera	Resource Management Officer
22	Ottoniel Rodriguez	IT Officer

Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Characteristics of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Participants

Total number of participants:	24
Gender:	16 males and 8 females
Average age:	42 years old
Average time spent in the U.S. before being forcibly returned to Guatemala:	13 years (Range: 1 month to 33 years)
Average time back in Guatemala:	4 months (Range: 2 weeks to 11 months)
Education level:	
Complete elementary:	5 (21%)
Incomplete elementary:	1 (4%)
Complete secondary:	7 (29%)
Incomplete secondary:	7 (29%)
Higher education:	3 (13%)
Other:	1 (4%)

Table 3. List of Interviewed Project Counterparts

No	Institution	Interviewed Person(s) and Position	Relation to GRP
1	Refugio de la Niñez	Leonel Dubón, Executive Director Ingrid Áreas, Development Director	Sub-grantee
2	Casa del Migrante	Marco Antonio Lima, Religious Delegate	Sub-grantee
3	End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography & Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT)	María Eugenia Villarreal, Director	Sub-grantee
4	Casa Hogar Nuestras Raíces (San Marcos)	Mariapaz López, Director	Sub-grantee
5	Secretariat Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons (SVET)	José Cortéz, Sub-secretary against Trafficking in Persons and Exploitation	Government Counterpart and Implementing Partner
6	Ministry of Labor	Honeyda Morales, Chief of Labor Migration	Government Counterpart
7	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Luis Ovando, Technical Officer at the Guatemalan Air Force	Government Counterpart
8	National Counsel For Guatemalan Migrant Attention (CONAMIGUA)	Rosa Pérez, Technical Officer at Guatemalan Air Force	Government Counterpart
9	Public Attorney's Office	Alexander Colop, Head Prosecutor of the Trafficking in Persons Unit María del Pilar Padilla, Head of International Cooperation	Government Counterpart and Implementing Partner
10	Smart Talent	Duncan Idaho	Private Counterpart
11	Human Rights Ombudsman (San Marcos)	Carmen Flores, Education Officer	Government Counterpart
12	Departmental Governor's Office of San Marcos	José Luis Vásquez, Professional Assistant	Government Counterpart
13	Presidential Secretariat for Women (SEPREM), San Marcos	Delvina Estrada, Representative Gladis Juárez, Representative	Government Counterpart
14	General Directorate Of Migration (DGM)	José Antonio Zaldaño, Head of the Operations Division at the Guatemalan Air Force	Government Counterpart
15	Congress	Jean Paul Briere, Deputy and President of the Commission for Migrants	Government Counterpart
16	Technical Institute For Training And Productivity (INTECAP)	Yanira Escobar, Coordinator Baltazar Masa, Coordinator	Private Non-formal Counterpart

Table 4. GRP Indicators, 2010-2013 (Q1 through Q11)

Note: The following table does not include activities implemented in the last quarter of the project; therefore, all final indicators are likely to be different from the numbers presented in this table.

	Indicator	FY	Period	Total	Cumulative	Definition /Comments
Sub IR 1: Provision of basic services to repatriated Guatemalan citizens expanded	(1) Number of repatriates that received emergency assistance	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: Indicator includes provision of: a. Refreshments b. Onward transportation to return to their communities of origin; c. Communications support (phone calls) d. Hygiene kits e. Forward referral for medical assistance and temporary accommodation Comment: Definition clarified, 04/2013. Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to miscalculation. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	3	3	
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	2,614	2,617	
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	8,046	10,663	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	7,506	7,506	
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	8,838	16,344	
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	11,431	27,775	
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	10,896	38,671	
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	9,799	9,799	
			Q10. Jan-Mar 2013	9,770	19,569	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	15,321	34,890	
		Total Life of the project				84,224
	(2) Number of assistance locations improved	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	1	1	Definition: Indicator includes locations improved through the provision of necessary resources to assist returnees, (e.g. materials, equipment) Comment: Definition clarified, 04/2013. This indicator is counted cumulatively to a maximum of 7 as this is the total number of assistance locations improved during the project. The figure is not reported cumulatively as the same assistance locations may be improved during different periods of the project.
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	1	
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	3	4	
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	0	4	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	2	2	
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	2	4	
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	7	7	
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	0	7	
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0	
			Q10. Jan – Mar 2013	0	0	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	0	0	
		Total Life of the project				7
	(3) Number of victims of human trafficking assisted	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: Indicator includes: a. Incoming VOTs who receive legal advice, representation and support to participate in legal processes. b. Incoming VOTs who receive direct assistance such as counseling, temporary shelter, vocational training, medical care and reintegration support. <i>*substituted by Sub-IR5, Indicator 11 for FY13 (below). Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to changes over time in form of measuring indicator. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.</i>
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	22	22	
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	18	40	
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	11	51	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	5	5	
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	12	17	
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	19	36	
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	21	57	
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	N/A*	N/A*	
Q10. Jan - Mar 2013			N/A*	N/A*		
		Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	N/A*	N/A*		
	Total Life of the project				108	

Table 4. GRP Indicators, 2010-2013 (Q1 through Q11) – cont.

	Indicator	FY	Period	Total	Cumulative	Definition /Comments			
Sub IR 2: Training and job placement services available to repatriates expanded and Public-private alliance	(4) Number of social and/or economic reintegration services provided	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: Indicator may include provision of: 1. Initial reintegration advice and guidance (including psychosocial support, facilitation of documentation) 2. Vocation training and education 3. Small business set-up support 4. Business management training 5. Referral to private sector for job opportunities 6. Job contracts from private sector Comments: Indicator may include duplicates due to multiple assistance provision <i>Definition clarified, 04/2013</i> * Reduced projection due to end of Sub-grant to 'Casa del Migrante' Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to changes over time in form of measuring indicator. Previously, only those referred to the private sector and those receiving vocational training were counted. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.			
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	0				
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	71	71				
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	74	145				
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	727	727				
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	768	1,495				
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	857	2,352				
			Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	861	3,213				
		2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	1,021	1,021				
			Q10. Jan – Mar 2013	554	1,575				
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	819	2,394				
		Total Life of the project						5,752	
		Sub IR 2: Training and job placement services available to repatriates expanded and Public-private alliance	(5) Number of assistance locations increased and improved in order to generate job opportunities and training	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010		0	0	Definition: Indicator will include: Assistance locations increased or improved that will act as 'Welcome Centers' for repatriated Guatemalan citizens where beneficiaries will receive information and assistance (e.g. the CRO). Comment: This indicator is counted cumulatively to a maximum of 2 as this is the total number of assistance locations improved during the project. The figure is not reported cumulatively as the same assistance locations may be improved during different periods of the project. <i>Definition clarified, 04/2013</i> Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to changes over time in form of measuring indicator. Previously, the total number of referrals to the private sector was counted rather than the locations increased or improved. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.
					Q2. Jan - Mar 2011		1	1	
Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	1				1				
Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	1				1				
2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011			1	1				
	Q6. Jan - Mar 2012			1	2				
	Q7. Apr-Jun 2012			0	2				
	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012			0	2				
2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012			0	2				
	Q10 Jan – Mar 2013			0	2				
	Q11 Apr – Jun 2013			0	2				
Total Life of the project					2				

Table 4. GRP Indicators, 2010-2013 (Q1 through Q11) – cont. 2

	Indicator	FY	Period	Total	Cumulative	Definition /Comments	
Sub-IR 3: National Migration Policy Developed And Strengthened	(6) Compilation of technical recommendations for the effective development and implementation of holistic migration policy ³⁰	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: A document will be produced that maps the legal and institutional framework surrounding migration in Guatemala. An analysis of these factors will provide a series of recommendations for the effective development of a national migration policy. Comment: Definition clarified, 04/2013	
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	0		
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	0	0		
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	0	0		
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	0	0		
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	0	0		
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	0	0		
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	0	0		
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0		
			Q10. Jan – Mar 2013	0	0		
					Q11 Apr – Jun 2013		0
				Total Life of the project	0	0	
	(7) Relevant and up to date migration information produced and published ³¹	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: A document will be produced that gathers and analyzes information about migration in Guatemala. This document will create awareness of the migration situation among policymakers and stakeholders and may serve to guide the development of a more comprehensive migration policy document. Comment: Definition clarified 04/2013
				Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	0	
				Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	0	0	
				Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	0	0	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	0	0		
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	0	0		
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	0	0		
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	0	0		
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0		
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	0	0		
					Q11 Apr – Jun 2103	0	
				Total Life of the project	0	0	
	(8) Draft proposal for a National Migration Policy developed by the GoG	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: A document will be produced that contains initiatives, actions, plans, programs, projects and guidelines driven by the government to address the migrant population in the social, cultural, political, legal and economical ambit. Comment: Indicators 6, 7 & 8 will be reflected in one document. <i>Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to changes over time in form of measuring indicator. Previously, an existing draft proposal for a migration policy was counted. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.</i>
				Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	0	
				Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	0	0	
				Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	0	0	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	0	0		
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	0	0		
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	0	0		
		2013	Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	0	0		
			Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0		
Q10 Jan – Mar 2013			0	0			
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	0	0		
			Total Life of the project	0	0		

³⁰ Indicator not previously provided in quarterly reports. Original indicator entitled “Established and functioning Dialogue Table/group (CONAMIGUA)” changed with revised M&E plan in April 2012 (Q7)

³¹ Indicator not previously provided in quarterly reports. Original indicator entitled “Number of civil servants trained on migration policy through National Dialogue Table” changed with revised M&E plan in April 2012 (Q7)

Table 4. GRP Indicators, 2010-2013 (Q1 through Q11) – cont. 3

	Indicator	FY	Period	Total	Cumulative	Definition /Comments
Sub-IR 4: Map And Disseminate Best Practices For Reintegration	(9) Number of documents published and disseminated	2011	Q1. Sep - Dec 2010	0	0	Definition: Indicator will include documents produced that describe a set of methodologies and successful practices that can be implemented in future strategies by different actors. Comments: Based on project implementation experience, it is recommended that one consolidated document is produced incorporating key project components rather than separate documents. Definition clarified 04/2013. Variation between reported and corrected quarterly figures is due to changes over time in form of measuring indicator. Previously, the number of information leaflets given to returnees regarding reintegration assistance was counted. Corrected figures are now consistent with above definition.
			Q2. Jan - Mar 2011	0	0	
			Q3. Apr - Jun 2011	0	0	
			Q4. Jul - Sep 2011	0	0	
		2012	Q5. Oct - Dec 2011	0	0	
			Q6. Jan - Mar 2012	0	0	
			Q7. Apr-Jun 2012	0	0	
			Q8. Jul - Sep 2012	0	0	
		2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0	
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	0	0	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	0	0	
					Total Life of the project	

Table 4. GRP Indicators, 2010-2013 (Q1 through Q11) – cont. 4

	Indicator	FY	Period	Total	Cumulative	Definition /Comments
Sub IR 5: Gog Ability To Prevent, Provide Better Attention And Prosecute Cases Of Trafficking In Persons Improved	(10)Number of TIP cases under investigation by the Special TIP Prosecutor’s office through counter-trafficking actions supported with USAID assistance ³²	2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	0	0	Definition: Only cases in which a Public Ministry investigation is underway will be counted. The indicator will include: 1. Number of cases in which “El Refugio” is acting as plaintiff in an investigation 2. Number of cases in which IOM’s consultant to SVET supports an investigative process 3. Number of cases in which the MP receives direct material support as required (e.g. accommodation for VoTs or witnesses and other equipment) Comment: Definition clarified 04/2013
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	11	11	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	22	33	
		Total Life of the project				
	(11) Number of individuals / groups who received legal aid or victim’s assistance with USG support	2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	16	16	Definition: Indicator includes: 1. VOTs who receive legal advice, representation and support to participate in legal processes 2. VOTs who receive direct assistance such as counseling temporary accommodation, vocational training, medical care and reintegration support <i>*Total number of VoTs assisted in this project is the sum of indicator 3 and 11.</i>
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	11	27	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	5	32	
		Total Life of the project				
	(12) Number of CSOs receiving USG assistance engaged in advocacy interventions	2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	N/A	N/A	Definition: Indicator includes CSO sub-grantees who advocate on counter trafficking issues. Comment: This indicator is counted cumulatively to a maximum of 2 as this is the total number of CSOs receiving assistance during the project. The figure is not reported cumulatively as the same CSOs may receive assistance during different periods of the project.
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	2	2	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	1	2	
		Total Life of the project				
	(13) Degree to which El Refugio has improved its internal organizational capacities in select areas	2013	Q9. Oct - Dec 2012	N/A	N/A	Definition: Indicator includes actions taken based on recommendations from consultant firm in the following areas: 1. Organizational statutes 2. Organizational structure 3. Organizational climate and culture 4. Organizational financial management systems Comment: To be reported in Q12 report
			Q10 Jan – Mar 2013	-	-	
			Q11 Apr – Jun 2013	-	-	
		Total Life of the project				

³² Indicator introduced in July 2012, Quarter 8.