

***Ministry of Economic Development  
And Co-operation (MEDaC)  
and  
International Organization for  
Migration (IOM) in Ethiopia***

***Terminal Evaluation of Return of Qualified African  
Nationals (RQAN)***

***July 2000  
Addis Ababa***

***B & M Development Consultants PLC***

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **A. Introduction**

Since 1970 African countries have experienced loss of qualified and skilled manpower to industrialized countries. This loss of human capital or brain drain has been caused by “push-in” and “pull-in” factors basically attributed to political, economic and social spheres. The push factors which make Africans migrate to developed countries are fear of political persecutions, internal wars, and civil strifes and poor qualities of life in Africa. The pull-in factors include better employment opportunities, and training, freedom from political, religious and ethnic persecutions and better quality of life.

Ethiopia has lost a large number of highly qualified and skilled human resources over the last three decades. The brain drain in Ethiopia basically started in 1974 when the Derg. Regime came to power. The political persecutions and economic hardship during the oppressive Derg Regime drove out many Ethiopians as refugees mainly to industrialized countries. Students and university lecturers who went abroad for further studies and civilians on official and business trips abroad failed to return due to both pull-in and push-in factors.

The enormity of such brain drain and the shortage of highly qualified and skilled manpower to implement the development efforts in Africa has necessitated to reverse the brain drain. In this respect the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has been trying to address the issue through its “Return of Highly Qualified and skilled African Nationals” (RQAN) Programme since 1983 with a financial assistance from the European Union under ACP Lome Convention.

The overall objectives of RQAN, as stated in the phase III of the programme, is to : contribute to enhancing the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries.

Programme Goal :       The selective return migration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans in order to contribute to fostering the receiving country’s human resources capacity.

Project Purpose: - To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialized countries in their return and reintegration process;  
- To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans residing in other African countries;

- To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed; and
- To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified and skilled nationals.

Phase III of the programme aims at returning 899 African nationals to the eleven target countries of Angola, Cap Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and to others designated as non-target countries.

Ethiopia was included in phase III of the programme during 1995 – 1998 as one of the target countries to return 45 (initial target) highly qualified and skilled Ethiopians from industrialized countries, subsequently raised to 55 and finally to 71.

The purpose of this study is, therefore, to carry out a Terminal Evaluation of the programme in Ethiopia.

### ***Methodology of the Study/Evaluation***

The methods applied for the evaluation exercise are:

- Review of RQAN reports and files, relevant documents from concerned agencies.
- Use of structured questionnaires to be filled/ used for interviews of stakeholders: returnees, employers, government counterpart, members of the support groups on a sample basis, IOM Resident Representative and staff, and relevant officials and other agencies operating similar programmes.

### ***B. Programme Preparation and Design***

The programme for RQAN III was based on the previous two phases as modified by the recommendations of the Harare evaluation seminar in 1992. The Harare seminar recommendations for phase III of RQAN programme included:

- A more stringent selection to ensure that the candidates have at least two years of work experience and a master's degree;
- Identification of priority sectors of recipient countries;
- Making the programme demand - driven rather than supply-driven;
- Attention to be given to self-employment in the private sector;
- Formation of support group comprising representatives of relevant stakeholders;

- Designation of counterparts by recipient Government to build appropriate institutional capacity; and
- The active involvement of recipient countries in the preparation and design of the programme.

The design of RQAN phase III country programme for Ethiopia was, however, mostly based on the modalities of the two previous phases, and lacked a direct involvement of participating counterpart institution (MEDaC), which would have minimized some of the operational problems faced during the implementation period. Furthermore, there was lack of in-depth analysis of the special characteristics and needs of the country to match programme objectives with those of national objectives, and assessment of priority sectors and specific requirements of human resources, which have formed the basis of design of the programme for Ethiopia.

### ***C. Relevance of the Programme***

Despite lack of in-depth analysis of the special conditions of the country and assessment of sectoral priority and human resource requirements in the design, the programme for Ethiopia has been relevant. The political and economic changes from socialist system to democratic and free market based system, reconstruction and rehabilitation of physical and institutional infrastructure damaged during internal wars and civil strifes, introduction of structural adjustment programmes, civil reforms and privatization, and the enhanced role of the private investment created the urgent need for highly qualified and skilled human resources and thus make the programme relevant.

### ***D. Efficiency of the Programme***

The IOM Addis Ababa Office has done its best in placement, follow –up and monitoring activities of returnees with different level of success. In other words, the office has made commendable efforts in placement of returnees in priority sectors, including their distribution among public, private and NGOs with realistic flexibility under the existing local constraints. On the other hand, the present arrangements and procedures of counterparts and support group have failed as an effective strategy in institutionalization (capacity building) of the programme.

Comparison of average office and staff cost for the IOM Addis Ababa at US\$ 2,440 per returnee during 1995 – 1999 was much lower than the average cost of US \$ 4,028 and

US\$ 3,188 per returnee for Ethiopia and participating African countries respectively during the first two years of the programme period (1995 and 1996).

The average direct operating cost of US\$ 8,716 /returnees during the period was lower than the budgetary provision of US\$ 10,500 per returnee. This average actual cost was also lower than the average direct operating cost of US\$ 8,803 and US\$ 9,000 per returnee for Ethiopia and participating African countries respectively during the first two years of the programme (1995 and 1996).

The total actual expenditure for direct operation cost to finance the recruitment, placement and re-integration of 66 returnees was US\$ 575,257 compared to the estimated budget of US\$ 745,500 for the revised target of 71 returnees. That is, an expenditure of 77.2% of the estimated budget to realize 93% (66) of the expected target returnees. The saving from the estimated budget was 22.8% while the saving per actual returnee was 17%.

The results of sample survey taken on the returnees and employers showed that the programme has been successful in terms of its relevance, making effective utilization of the knowledge and experience and full time of the returnees, their contributions in the transfer of know-how and skills and institutional capacity building to their employing institutions as well as their re-connections to their relatives and old friends, including new friends, and their career prospect. All the returnees consider their decision to return as correct.

The only major weaknesses of the programme pointed out were (1) inadequacy of the salary to cover cost of living, (2) discriminatory custom duty charges on vehicles in favour of those employed outside government ministries and (3) inadequacy of re-integration assistance by IOM Office. The latter is basically associated with housing accommodation and duty on vehicles, which are beyond the power of IOM

### ***E. Effectiveness***

The initial indicative target for Ethiopia was 45 returnees during 1995 –1998. This target was revised upward to 71 while the period was extended from 1995 –1999. As mentioned earlier, the actual number of returnees was 66 or 93% of the revised target. Of the remaining 5, one failed to return during 1999 due to his contractual commitment upto the quarter of 2000, while the other four due to failure of the employing institutions to get budgetary provisions.



The profiles of the returnees showed that 70% of them were holders of PHD/ MD, 21% MA/MSc and 9% BA/BSc. Gender wise 88% of them were male, while 2% of them were female. Their average age was about 41 years. On the average they stayed abroad for 12 years, (five years learning and seven years working experience).

In terms of professions, 64% of the returnees were specialists in science and technology related subjects while 36% in business administration, economics and other social sciences. 34 of the total returnee (51.5%) were employed by university and colleges, 16 (24.2%) by private sector including the self-employed returnees, 9 (13.6%) by government offices, while 7(10.6%) by NGOs. Among the returnees 46 (70%) were matched by IOM while 20 (30%) were pre-matched (found jobs by themselves).

Despite the Harare recommendation to make the implementation of the programme demand-driven, it has remained supply driven. This is because the promotion of the programme and recruitment of candidates have been simultaneously but independently being carried out with the identification of job- vacancies and the inevitable problems of job matching or job-brokering between candidates and job-openings. This has resulted in dropping out candidates and job-vacancies remained unfilled. Notwithstanding the placements of all candidates who met the criteria, given the shortage of skills in all the priority sectors, the programme was successfully responsive to the demand in the priority sectors in Ethiopia.

In light of the above, the overall implementation of the programme in Ethiopia has been successfully effective.

The self-employment component has not been implemented as expected. This is due to less number (only 3) of about 9(66 x .14) expected targets picked up by the programme. Of the three, only two participated in the loan programme and both borrowers failed to service the loan on schedule.

The government counterpart and support group were given briefing workshop/ training to familiarize them with the IOM procedures and guidelines of recruitment, placement, follow-up and monitoring of the programme. They have also participated in the implementation of the programme by assisting and counseling the IOM office in approving placements and screening candidates. But the institutionalization (development capacity building), of the programme through involvement of the counterpart and the support group has not been successful to facilitate the immediate take over of the programme by the government.

Both the employers and the returnees have found the programme relevant and effective and they are keen for the continuation of the programme.

These Consultants, therefore, fully recommend the continuation of the programme and thereby keep up the momentum that began. Details of our recommendations for the continuation of the programme are given at the end of this report.

## 1. BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Introduction

Since 1970, African countries have witnessed an accelerated loss of their qualified and skilled human resources to the industrialized countries. The human capital flight to the industrialized countries succumb to, inter alia, the ‘pull-in’ and ‘push-in’ factors involving political, economic and social spheres. Apart from those who left their countries for education and training and decided to remain abroad after completion of their studies, already qualified and skilled Africans also migrate to the industrialized countries for political, economic and/or social reasons.

The ‘push’ factors that take African nationals to the developed countries may be actual or fear of political persecutions, internal wars and civil stifies. Even in peace and reconstruction periods in their countries, refugees in neighboring countries are tempted to immigrate and settle in the industrialized countries because of the ‘pull-in’ factors. The pull-in factors often include employment opportunities and training, freedom from actual or feared political and/or religious oppression / persecution and better quality of life.

Available figures on brain drain from the African continent (obtained from the internet) reveal the enormity of the problem. The following data from a recent World Bank study show the implications of the situation to the human capital capacity and development prospects of Africa:

- An average of 23,000 academics and 50,000 other management staff leave Africa every year;
- 40,000 African Ph.D- holders do not live in their home countries;
- Only 20,000 scientists (.35 per cent of the world total) work in Africa, and the research facilities are declining.

**A recent study undertaken by Aredo (1997) noted that “the number of foreign doctors working in the United States is equivalent to the annual output of thirty medical universities in the USA”. The number of expatriates currently working in Africa is estimated to be about 100,000 continent; involving an expenditure of**

**about US \$4 billion per year, that is, nearly 35% of the continent's official development aid goes to payment for expatriate expert services.**

According to the estimate made in 1998, estimate points that the flight of educated individuals from Africa reaches above 30 per cent of the total. The overall tendency has been a higher rate of migration for higher skilled levels, 'better educated than the average population'. Migration of skilled labour to developed countries is seen as having adverse effects on the sending countries where it retards economic development and leads to the pauperization of workers..." (Ricca, in Aredo: 1997).

For instance, the number of Ethiopian Diaspora in the USA, who reside in Washington D.C. area, was estimated at 250,000 in 1995. About 188,000 refugees were also said to be seeking asylum in neighboring African countries (UNHCR). The same document indicated that Ethiopia stood 18<sup>th</sup> in total number of asylum seekers in the industrialized countries.

Although not all refugees from developing countries can be considered qualified or skilled, some indications of brain drain trends could be found from other sources. According to UNDP report (1995), Ethiopian tertiary level students who pursued their studies abroad accounted for 17% of students at home. This figure is said to be equal to the average obtained for Sub-Saharan Africa.

A 1996 data on migration of Ethiopians to the USA indicate the prevailing patterns and trends. An estimate of about 49% of total Ethiopian immigrants numbering 25,160 are employed in a professional or technical capacity. Between 1981-96, Ethiopia actually stood ninth in the rankings of countries with migrants entering into the USA. (About 34,138 Ethiopian visa applications were approved during this period).

During the period 1968/69 – 1995/96, there were a total of 18,357 scholarship learners. The total number of non-returnees during the same period was 6,425, suggesting that each year an average of 238 skilled individuals sent for scholarships do not return to Ethiopia. These non-returnees are mainly specialists in the social sciences and technology fields.

African countries coming out of conflicts, engaged in establishing democratic structures and processes face the challenge of formulation of strategies and implementation of development

programs for which qualified manpower/ 'human power' is a pre-requisite. Mobilization and effective utilization of African's resources and external aid requires efficient human capital. Obviously, the continuation of the present trend of capital loss is detrimental to Africa's development efficiency while benefiting the already developed countries.

The enormity of the problem and implications for the continent have necessitated putting the brain drain issue on the development agenda for Africa. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been involved in addressing this issue through its Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) program since 1983. The program seeks to reverse the brain drain situation, through 'brain gain' mechanism targeting selected countries and so far implemented in three phases.

The overall objective of the RQAN is to contribute to enhancing the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries. Specific objectives (also valid for Ethiopia) of the program are:-

- To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialized countries in their return and reintegration process;
- To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans nationals residing in other African countries;
- To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed / self-employed;
- To assist and encourage Africans in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals; and
- To enhance the social and cultural re-integration of the returnees.

The RQAN, therefore, seeks to reverse the brain drain in targeted eleven African countries, including Ethiopia. To this end IOM commissioned B & M Development Consultants PLC to evaluate the overall program objectives focusing on phase III of country program in Ethiopia covering the period 1995 to 1999. This report is, hence, prepared as per the agreement concluded between the two parties.

## **1.2 Objectives**

The general objective of this study is to evaluate the overall program objective of prompting the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Ethiopian returnees in the development of their country – describing and assessing its main features.

The specific objectives of this study are:

- To evaluate the assistance provided to highly qualified, qualified and skilled Ethiopians residing abroad in their return and re-integration process. This involves assisting the returnees to be engaged in meaningful and gainful employment/self employment, and enhancing their social and cultural integration as well as supporting the voluntary return of professional and make effective use of their skills;
- To review and comment on the Ethiopian country program, particularly on the public bodies which initiated participation in the program, the specific objectives and targets of the program, how priorities were identified, whether employers needs have been met, effective utilization of expertise of the returnees, relevance of the program to the country to meet the existing needs, etc;
- To evaluate the activities undertaken by IOM and MEDaC in facilitating returnees and their integration;
- To evaluate the program's outputs against set-up targets;
- To assess cost-efficiency of the RQAN program in Ethiopia.

The Terms of Reference for the study are given in Annex 6

### **1.3 Methodology of the Study/Evaluation**

To achieve the above objectives, the Consultants, deployed a team composed of two Economists, (Bekele Geletu and Merga Afeta) a Sociologist (Wz. Fetenu Bekele) and a Statistician. The team employed a combination of methods for the evaluation exercise, as mentioned below:-

- Review of RQAN reports and files, relevant documents from concerned agencies (a list of references is given as Annex 5 );
- Use of structured questionnaires for all stakeholders: returnees, employers, members of support group, counterparts. Due to shortage of time and other constraints faced see (1.4) the Consultants managed to interview 15 returnees based on random sampling, 9 employers, 9 members of the support group, the only one counterpart, IOM Resident Representative and her Staff, the Academic Vice President of the Addis Ababa

University, a GTZ official, a UNDP Programme officer and the project manager of the Dutch Programme for returnees.

- Focus group interviews with Heads of institutions/units of major beneficiary institutions; Key government counterpart institution officials' Support group members, IOM program officer and the IOM staff, the counterpart at the Delegation of EU\* to Ethiopia, returnees and employers. (List of Persons and Institutions contacted is given in Annex 4).

#### **1.4 Scope of the Evaluation/Study**

The scope of this study is limited to assessment of the RQAN in Ethiopia, particularly the activities under taken in Ethiopia under Phase III of the IOM Program. The period under review for this phase in Ethiopia is 1995 to 1999.

#### **1.5 Limitations**

The time given to carryout the evaluation study was too short - 30 calendar days. Tracing the returnees was made difficult due to the absence of an up-to-date addresses for them from IOM. Timing of the study for accessing returnees and employers at the Addis Ababa University, the major employer of returnees, was a factor which cut into the time of the Consultants. Preparations for graduation, end-of-year budget closure, etc. necessitated repeated visits to returnees and employers to secure interviews and complete questionnaires.

Some employers were not too keen either to grant interviews or fill the questionnaires or absent during the evaluation study. Logistics support from IOM was not forthcoming, as envisaged in the TOR. Power rationing for use of computers also cut into the time of the evaluators.

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\* The official at EU delegation could not be interviewed as he was on leave.

## **2. PROGRAM PREPARATION AND DESIGN**

### **2.1 Design Methodology**

The preparation and design of Phase III of the RQAN program that targeted eleven African countries, including Ethiopia, was based on the experiences of Phases I and II. The 1992 Evaluation Seminar held in Harare (Zimbabwe) recommended additional modalities for the Third Phase of the Program. These include, among others:

- A more stringent selection to ensure that candidates have at least two years of work experience and a master's degree;
- Identifying priority sectors of recipient countries;
- Rendering the program to be demand- rather than supply-driven;
- Giving attention to self-employment in the private sector;
- Establishing support group comprising of major local actors;
- Building appropriate government counterpart structure/institution;

As the 1997 Mid-term Evaluation Team observed, the design of the RQAN program undertaken by IOM did not benefit from experiences in planning techniques (logical framework approach, critical path analysis and resource scheduling). There was a lack of direct involvement of the 'Executive Counterparts' in participating countries which would have minimized some of the operational problems encountered during implementation.

Among the other critical issues from the Harare Evaluation was the lack of proper analysis of the problems to be addressed. The specific priority sector and manpower needs as well as the special characteristics of each participating country was not given as much attention as the operational problems of the preceding phases of the program. The participation of all stakeholders in the design of Phase III would have enriched and grounded the program more in the realities of the target countries. As a result, it appears that an opportunity lost for identification of alternative strategies and assessment of risks involved through proper analysis of the specific country context.

### **2.2 Budget Approval**



The budgetary proposal prepared in 1992 by IOM for Phase III was approved in 1994. The budget covered 11 instead of 15 target countries with reductions of allocations for recruitment, placement and institution building and counterpart training on a per-country basis.

As the Mid-term Evaluation Report noted there was lack of involvement of all stakeholders in the preparation of a four year budget( January 1995 – December 1998). Among the speculations for the delay in approval of the 1992 financial proposal was the reluctance of some participating countries to agree to stipulated financial arrangements, including disbursement and concern of EU members states about the relevance and cost-effectiveness of the program.

### **2.3 Initiation of RQAN Program for Ethiopia**

Information on the genesis of the RQAN program in Ethiopia has not been easily forthcoming. It is not quite clear on who initiated the country program.

Nevertheless, at the time of preparation of Phase III, the magnitude of migration of Ethiopians, the refugee situation and the need for skilled manpower seems to have supported targeting Ethiopia. An intensive mobilization and advocacy work was also undertaken by IOM to convince the Ethiopian Authorities to sign the agreement for participation in the RQAN Program as one of the eleven target countries.

However, the fact that Ethiopia did not benefit from the experiences of the preceding phases and the non-participatory manner in which the program design and preparation of the financial proposal were planned seem to have contributed to the delay in the start up of the program in the country. Indications are that there is a problem of 'lack of ownership' affecting the general implementation process.

According to the information from the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC) in 1997, the Ministry was assigned as a Counterpart by the then Ministry of External Economic Co-operation (MEEC). MEDaC in turn delegated its Human and Social Affairs Department, the Head of which ("Executive Counterpart") assigned the Labor and Social Affairs Team to follow up implementation of the Program.

Some major restructuring in the civil service took place at about the time of the Government's signature to participate in the program. Merging of ministries, dec-centralization and regionalization were major policy changes with consequences for program start up, ownership and continuity.

The abolishing of 'Franco Valuta' on importation of goods was a significant policy change that affected the final agreement and provisions stipulated for returnees and their reintegration. A clause in the agreement document (Art 5), on government agreement to grant duty-free privileges to returnees (on import of personal belongings) had to be removed before government signature.

Responsibility for the RQAN program, as mentioned above, seems to have been shifting with no clear Terms of Reference given to the person assigned for the job. It appears that the Labor and Social Affairs Team is of the opinion that the task should have been given to the Employment and Labor Market Team as the 'most appropriate' body. MEDaC is the national counterpart, which chairs the meetings of Support Groups in which the different sectors are represented. Nevertheless, there is no clear terms of reference either for the Ministry or the Support Group

#### **2.4 Coherence of the Program with National Objectives**

Although there was no in-depth analysis of the special characteristics and needs of the country to match the program objectives with that of the national development objectives, the return and reintegration of qualified and skilled nationals falls within the broader manpower needs of the country. That is, the existence of deficiency in manpower capacity in Ethiopia is not disputable.

The returnees program fits in well with the country's program of assistance to and re-integration of displaced nationals. Commitment to this is confirmed by the country statement made at the Harare Seminar which states that "After many years of civil strife and conflict... Ethiopia must now focus its attention on the assistance and resettlement of the thousands of Ethiopians displaced by the war."

Furthermore, despite the absence of a coherent national manpower development strategy, the return and reintegration of qualified and skilled Ethiopians in the different sectors and specific institutions is coherent with the country's human capital requirements.

With Ethiopia's adoption of a free market economy, the private sector subsequently emerged is in dire need of qualified and skilled manpower. The attention given to self-employment of returnees in Phase III of the RQAN program is quite coherent with the Country's development objective.

## **2.5 Intervention Logic**

The overall objective "contribute to enhancing the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries" is, of course, too broad. While the country needs all the qualified and skilled manpower it can get, a scrutiny into the impact of 'contribute to' country's development, 'enhancing the role and utilization' does raise critical questions. It is not realistic to expect that the rather insignificant number of returnees would have significant impacts on the development sectors of the country. The duration of their services (time frame), monitoring system in place and other factors in play raise the validity of attributing impacts solely on returnees' 'contributions'.

'Enhancing' their role is dependent on the contributions of IOM and the Government which needed to be more specific. Where the expected meaningful integration is not there, for instance, minimum need of accommodation and comfort facilities, the effective contribution to and impact on the country's development may be too ambitious objectives.

Relating to the Program Goal, "...fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity, absorption of returnees in key sectors of the country's economy can be a measurable indicator, despite the lack of baseline information on national human resources requirement. However, 'fostering' assumes that government commitment to and efforts to facilitate would be in place.

"Assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals" pre-supposes that all the pre-requisites for this would be in place. This is not stated clearly. Furthermore, many factors, including national strategy with respect to

addressing the brain drain issue such as the push factors for specific activities and commitment by the Government (Hold: the push factors are under the control of government,..)

Similarly, the specific objective related to “...enhance the social and cultural re-integration of the returnees...” needs more clarity as to what is involved. Assessment of achievement of this objective is bound to be more subjective.

As noted by the Mid-term Evaluation Team of 1997, the results describe goods and services provided by the project rather than the ‘utilization of these by the intended users. This shows the existence of confusion between purpose and results along with lack of clarity of goal and definition of purpose leading to the ‘concentration on the numbers and mechanics of the return process’...

Concerning the new trust of the RQAN program (whereby emphasis is given in Phase III) for self-employment in the private sector, the objectives need to be clearly specified and concrete measurable indicators developed for assessment. Assumption on policy support and a whole host of factors enhancing and/or deterring ‘gainful and meaningful’ employment in the private sector, both as self-employed and recruited by private enterprises are critical to achievement of this specific objective. The number absorbed in the private sector, the demand registered for these ‘highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals’ by the sector and prospects for meeting the terms of the returnees need to be further clarified as well.

## **2.6 Objectives Verifiable Indicators**

Indicator for achievement of program goal would be that returnees are absorbed in key sectors of the country’s economy in accordance with its priority manpower needs. Quantitative indicators are developed for verification of specific objectives which are **annexed** to this report.(Annex 7)

## **2.7 Sources of Verification**

Verification sources include both internal and external evaluation reports; periodic reviews and terminal evaluation reports of IOM. IOM’s computer files, questionnaires and interviews administered with stakeholders are also means of verification.

### **3. RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAM**

As mentioned above, there was no in-depth study of the specific situation, priority sectors and specific human power requirements undertaken which should have formed the basis for the design of the program in Ethiopia. However, despite this, the similarities of the political, economic and social development features of many of the African countries support the inclusion of Ethiopia as a participant in the RQAN Program of IOM.

The political economic change from socialist to free market orientation, the physical and institutional infrastructure being put in place (including reconstruction, rehabilitation of war damages) in line with the wave of democratization and decentralization, and a call for massive development of human capital as well as the ‘capital gain’ envisaged through the RQAN program, albeit limited for the moment, is one way of meeting the country’s needs for qualified and skilled human capital.

Because of the brain drain to developed countries, Ethiopia, like the other African countries, faces deficiencies in qualified and skilled manpower. This has its effects on efficient and timely utilization capacity with respect to foreign-assisted development programs. The increasingly high proportion of foreign capital going to financing expatriate experts required for formulation and implementation of Africa’s development programs clearly indicates the shortage of locally available manpower capable to fill the positions. The relevance of a reversal of the ‘brain drain’ through an intensively pursued RQAN program, where both the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are systematically addressed cannot be questioned.

The Program envisages a closer linkage with the requirements of the on-going civil service reform and a general sensitivity to the structural adjustment program (SAP) in the country. To effectively implement the major policy changes with respect to restructuring, de-centralization, regional development and privatization the need for qualified and skilled manpower is quite obvious. The RQAN’s prospects of regaining the human capital, however limited, can add to the human resources capacity of the Country.

Programs with similar objective (of reversing human capital flight from Africa) include the UNDP sponsored TOKTEN program, the German and the Netherlands programme.

IOM has made efforts to coordinate its activities with some of these initiatives, particularly with that of the TOKTEN. The RQAN program is also expected to be sensitive and responsive to manpower implications of Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) – civil service reform, privatization, etc. for better complementarity.

## **4. EFFICIENCY**

### **4.1 Means and Costs Analysis**

This involves analysis and determination of level of cost effectiveness with which physical means and financial costs were utilized in implementing the activities of the program so as to attain the results of the objectives of the program. In other words, this is an analysis of how the project means were efficiently utilized to transform project activities into results. That is, cost comparison to other initiatives, internal cost allocations, etc. In this respect the cost effectiveness with which the returnees were recruited and placed, support groups were formed and counterparts trained would be evaluated. Annex II of the Financial Agreement reproduced here below lists 16 activities relating to expenditure by cost codes of the program budgets.

Basically these activities could be grouped under three main headings.

- Recruitment activities,
- Placement and re-integration activities, and
- Institution capacity building activities.

The Consultants, however, were not able to disaggregate expenditure data into the above three types of activities because IOM did not keep expenditure records against budget headings separately for Ethiopia.

**TABLE 4.1 SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE AGAINST COST-ESTIMATE AND FINANCING PLAN JANUARY 1995 – NOV. 1996**

Budget Items	Amount in EU
<b>Direct cost</b>	
1. Direct support to returnees	
Direct support to returnees from industrialized countries to target countries (Average direct cost = 8,500 ECU per returnee) Cost of indicative minimum number of returnees for 11 target countries 610 x 8,500	5,185,000.00
b) Direct support to placed cases on an intra-regional basis (Average direct cost = 6,000 ECU per placed case) cost of indicative minimum number of assisted cases for the 11 target countries 89 x 6,000	534,000.00
c) cost of cases exceeding the indicative minimum number, plus cost of returnees to other countries 300 x 8,500	2,550,000.00
d) Direct support to self-employed cases / Additional direct support of ECU 4,500 /case to self-employed in liberal professions (14% of overall number of returnees) 140 x 4,500	630,000.00
	<b>8,899,000.00</b>
<b>SUB TOTAL 1.1</b>	
2. direct program activity costs for the recruitment and placement of returnees (costs are calculated on the basis of the activities which are presented in Annex III)	
a) Direct support costs for pre-departure assistance/ programme information dissemination, identification, pre-selection, recruitment and counseling	692,740.00
b) Direct support costs for job identification and placement	738,168.00
c) Direct support costs for the project monitoring and follow-up of the reintegration process.	738,163.00
d) Direct support costs for activities related to self employment	179,430.00
e) Collection and assessment of available manpower plans of development priorities in the field of socio-economic development	13,628.00
<b>SUB TOTAL 1.2</b>	<b>2,362,120.00</b>
3. Institution building/Counterpart training	136,276.00
<b>TOTAL 1.</b>	<b>11,397,396.00</b>
<b>II Indirect/administrative cost</b>	
1. African ACP countries (General office/communication/transport)	1,053,741.00
2. Industrialized Countries (same as above)	139,200.00
<b>TOTAL II</b>	<b>1,192,941.00</b>
<b>III. Evaluation, monitoring (technical and managerial back-stopping) and auditing</b>	
1. Evaluation	
a) Monitoring and surveys (including mid term)	14,340.00
b) Back-stopping missions	64,800.00
c) End of project evaluation seminar	81,000.00
2. External auditing (one)	20,250.00
<b>TOTAL III</b>	<b>180,390.00</b>
<b>TOTAL I-III</b>	<b>12,770,727.00</b>
Contingencies +/-5%	659,273.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,430,000.00</b>
TO DEDUCE : Advance contribution from Regional Cooperation Lome III:	-730,000.00
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>12,700,001.00</b>



Source: Financing Agreement 1994

Owing to lack of disaggregated data, the present analysis of cost effectiveness for Ethiopia is limited to total staff and office cost by mission (without distinguishing between direct program activity costs, and institution building and counterpart training), and direct support to returnees.

#### 4.1.1 Staff and Office Costs of AA Mission

According to the information obtained from the Addis Ababa IOM Office, all the budgetary and actual expenditures for RQAN program in Ethiopia, with the exception of staff and office costs, have been kept at head office in Geneva and or Nairobi office. The annual budgets and actual expenditures for staff and office for AA Mission, and cost per returnee are as given in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2 Annual Staff and Office Costs for IOM Addis Ababa Regional Office (value in US\$)**

Year	No of returnees	Average cost/ returnee	Annual Budget	Annual Expenditure
1995	3	-	-	-
1996	12	3,333.33	40,000	40,000
1997	13	2,307.69	30,000	30,000
1998	15	2,000.00	30,000	30,867
1999	23	2,727.27	60,000	60,176
Total	66	2,440	160,000	161,643

#### Source : Compiled from IOM Addis Ababa Office

As shown in Table 4.2, the annual budgets had been almost identical with the actual expenditure. It seemed that they have been careful not to exceed their budget, and/or any excess or shortfall would have been transferred to or filled by other projects implemented by IOM AA Office. Presently IOM AA Office is implementing about 19 projects sponsored by different donors (USA, Canada, Norway etc.)

Such transfer of excess or shortage of funds among different project headings seemed to be made by the Geneva office. Thus the exact amount of annual budget and actual expenditure of staff and office cost by country may not be known including how much staff time and office space are allocated among different projects.

These Consultants could not be able to compare cost effectiveness with other participating countries but the Mid - Team Evaluation Team showed that the average staff and office costs per returnee for Ethiopia at \$4,028 was above average against \$3,188 for all participating African countries for the period of 1995 - 1996. This was the period when the project commenced, and it was probably why the cost per returnee had declined to US\$ 2,440 since then. We share the view expressed by the Mid - Term Evaluation Team that the overall cost effectiveness appeared to have been due to the supplementary funding by IOM, rather than to any improvements in efficiency.

#### **4.1.2 Direct Operating Costs for Ethiopia**

Direct operating costs for Ethiopian consisted of :-

- Air fares for returnees and family ;
- Shipping costs (luggage and personal effects);
- Scientific or professional equipment and literatures;
- Integration Assistance; and
- Salary Supplement .

The maximum direct support costs per returnee was EU 8,500 or US\$ 10,500 at the time of the Financing Agreement. Thus the budget for Ethiopia to assist 45 returnees (initial target numbers) was  $45 \times 8,500 = \text{EU } 382,50$  or  $10,500 \times 45 = \text{US\$ } 420,000$ . Out of the total returnees, 14% were expected to be self-employed with an extra loan allowance of EU 4,500 or US\$ 5,551 for each on the basis of revolving fund. That is, about 6 returnees were expected to be self-employed with a total extra loan assistance of US\$ 33,345. Later on the loan component was raised to US\$11,000 per returnee. That is, to a total of US\$66,000.

The budget was later revised upward due to the increase in the number of candidates and demand for returnees from the 45 targets to 71 during the implementation period. The increase in the budget has been funded from unused funds allocated to non-target countries. Based on the revised target, the budget for direct supports for Ethiopia could have been estimated at US\$ 745,500 ( $10,500 \times 71$ )

Analysis of the actual expenditure of direct support costs for Ethiopia is as shown in Table 4.3 by years and items. As can be seen from the table, the total actual expenditure of Ethiopia was US\$ 575,257 for 66 returnees against the estimated budget of US\$ 745,500. That is, a spending

of 77.2% of the estimated budget to recruit the 66 or 93% of the expected targets. Therefore, there has been a saving of about 22.8% (US\$ 170,243). Table 4.4 shows the average cost per returnee for Ethiopia was US\$ 8,716, as against the estimated budget of US\$ 10,500. Comparison of this average cost with other participating African countries during the whole period would be difficult. We could, however, say that the average cost of US\$ 8,716 per returnee is lower than the average cost of US\$ 8,803 for Ethiopia and the average cost of US\$ 9000 for all the African participating countries during the 1995 and 1996 (Mid Term Evaluation Report 1997, Page 22). Based on the above analysis, the implementation of the RQAN III Programme in Ethiopia is, therefore, cost efficient.

**Table 4.3 Total Expenditure of Direct Cost for Ethiopia by Year (Amount in US \$)**

Year of Return	Total Support Cost	Air Fares	Shipping	Equipment	Integration Assistance	Salary Supplement
1995	25785	2288	6528	9944	3125	3860
1996	99650	9362	25544	34585	12155	12486
1997	126626	18272	19317	64352	17740	15166
1998	162829	18299	42870	56273	16815	26500
1999	160367	13197	50237	60498	9118	21836
Total	575257	61418	144496	207652	59953	79848

Source : Compiled from IOM Addis Ababa Office Paper Box Files

**Table 4.4 Average Expenditure of Direct Support Cost per Returnee for Ethiopia (US \$)**

Year of Return	Total Support Cost	Air Fares	Shipping	Equipment	Integration Assistance	Salary Supplement
1995	8595.00	762.33	2176.00	3314.66	1041.67	1286.67
1996	9059.09	831.09	2322.18	3144.09	1150.45	1135.09
1997	9044.72	1305.14	1379.78	3310.88	1267.14	1083.28
1998	9046.05	1016.61	2381.67	3126.28	934.17	1472.11
1999	8018.35	659.85	2511.85	3024.25	455.90	1091.80
Grand mean	8716.02	1586.80	2189.33	3146.24	893.22	1209.82

**Source : Derived from Table 4.3 above**

#### 4.1.3 Self-Employment (SE)


The initial estimate for SE was 6 (45 x 14). Actual returnees for SE were only three. That is, 50 percent below the initial estimated target while the overall total achievement for returnees into Ethiopia was 147 percent of the initial target or 93% of the revised target. Similarly funds budgeted for SE returnees were under-utilized by 50% of the initial target as well as the loan for

revolving fund, as only two of the three SE returnees took loans. Furthermore both borrowers failed to service their loans on schedule (see section 5).

#### 4.2 Organization Management and Monitoring

Duties and responsibilities of the main implementing actors are described/ defined in the operational plan. Figure 4.1 gives a summary of the present organizational structure of RQAN III and its relationship with the participating governments and EU.

**Figure 4.1 RQAN Organizational structure**



Source: Taken from Mid Term Evaluation Report P 24

Key to linkages

- Operational Relationship
- ..... Monitoring
- - - - - Liaison
- Non-project Relationship

##### 4.2.1 IOM

These Consultants did not have access to IOM HQ and recruitment missions, and thus could not be able to comment on their performance. We have nevertheless found that the IOM Addis Ababa office seemed to have done its best in placement, follow-up and monitoring of returnees

with varying degree of success. The Addis Ababa Mission has made commendable efforts in placement of returnees in priority sectors including their distribution among public, private and non-governmental organizations with realistic flexibility by taking into account local constraints. On the other hand, flexibility did not lead into modifications of the program design to adopt to country specific conditions. For instance, there has been questions about the soundness of the program design regarding the present arrangements and procedures of counterparts and support group which have failed as an effective strategy in institutionalization (capacity building) of the program. Although the IOM Addis Ababa office, the counterpart and the support group have been aware of such shortcomings, nothing has been done in institutional capacity building.

The performances of IOM in placement and relevant recruitment activities for Ethiopia are as tabulated below:-

**a) Placement Mission**

Key: ✓ = carried out      ~ = partially carried out      ✗ = not carried out

Activities	Carried out	Comments
1. Making contacts with public, private organizations and NGOs in order to identify priority employment sectors to be strengthened including opportunities for SE	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong towards teaching (university) and research.</li> <li>• Prioritization among priority sectors in Ethiopia has been found unrealistic.</li> <li>• Self – employment component of the program has been unsuccessful as the numbers of SE has been small and loan servicing has not been on schedule.</li> </ul>
2. Identify concrete job vacancies in the country through contacts with business circles, private and public enterprise and ministries.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient involvement of the private sector in the support group.</li> <li>• Systematic ranking of identified jobs was not realistic</li> <li>• Public and private enterprises failed to absorb returnees due to pause in the expansion program of public enterprises waiting privatization and slow progress in privatization.</li> <li>• Private sector could not develop fast as expected and reluctant to absorb highly qualified returnees.</li> <li>• Private sector also prefer to interview and test candidates before employment.</li> </ul>
6. Rendering services in performing job broker activities between potential employers and Ethiopian candidate returnees	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successfully carried out though time consuming</li> <li>• There has been poor match between candidate roster and job roster leading to wasting much time in processing candidates for whom no jobs exist and identifying jobs that can not be filled resulting dropping out job and candidate rosters. E.g. about 200 candidates were processed for recruitment of 66 returnees.</li> <li>• These have been difficulties in placing returnees in Ministries due to reluctance by FCSC and recruiting Ministries for vacant posts available.</li> </ul>
9. Obtaining support form the Ethiopia Government to speed up the transfer	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not signed memorandum of understanding on custom and immigration formalities. Existing system allows duty free to</li> </ul>

of human resources.		<p>returnees with the exception on vehicles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cumbersome bureaucratic custom procedures.</li> <li>• Exemption of Duty on vehicles are discriminatively allowed to returnees employed by government, while others are charged high duties.</li> <li>• Eventhose employed by government are discriminated due to lack of transparency e.g. some returnees who joined universities are exempted custom duties on vehicles while others are charged.</li> </ul>
10. Identifying training opportunities for returnees in cases where specific additional training is required for taking up certain jobs	✗	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nothing spent in training of returnees</li> <li>• PM tended to wait for request from returnees rather than assessing training needs</li> </ul>
11. Keeping regular contacts with returnees after their return and provide services if required in order to assist them in their re-integration process	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low response rate to follow-up survey</li> <li>• PM staff have a mixed relationship with returnees. Sample survey indicates that</li> <li>• 20% consider PM support excellent</li> <li>• 40% consider good, 20% fair, and 20% poor, in addressing their integration problems</li> <li>• Failure to assist on housing and custom is pointed out.</li> </ul>
12. Consulting regularly with government authority to further the institutionalization and sustainability of the project. (with respect to counterparts)	~	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only one counterpart is appointed but modality of institutionalization has not been developed. Did not work full-time on the project. His work was limited to chairing the support group meetings and approval of placement.</li> </ul>
13. Arranging specific training for elected government counter parts in order to involve him directly in the program implementation.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Informal training, and briefing was given to familiarize the counterpart with IOM procedures in recruitment and placement procedures but not actual formal training.</li> <li>• The counterpart has been involved in placement through chairing the support group meetings and endorsements of matched candidates</li> <li>• On-job training has not also be given to the counterpart.</li> <li>• Training component has not been well developed.</li> </ul>
14. Identifying appropriate institutions and persons to form support group	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support group has been formed, but over representation of public sector</li> <li>• Organizational representation of the public sector is reasonable but the individuals attending the meeting lacked authority/knowledge or interest to play an active role in the program</li> <li>• Attendance of the meeting has not been regular by many members of the support group.</li> <li>• There have been frequent changes in persons representing organizations.</li> </ul>
15. Assisting and providing facilities for support group meeting	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There have not been sitting and transport allowances to attend meetings.</li> <li>• Individuals attended meeting during normal working hours and at the same time required to fulfil their regular jobs.</li> <li>• There have been repeated absence and loss of interests with the exception of a few individuals like representatives from MEDaC, MSLA, etc.</li> </ul>
16. Recruiting a limited number of temporary local personal in each of the target countries in carrying out the tasks required on the spot coordinated by one the four regional IOM offices	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IOM office was established in Ethiopia with the assistance of the support group in 1995.</li> <li>• The office has been successfully operating under its capable Resident Representative.</li> <li>• But the office lacks qualified senior level local staff to effectively support the Resident Representative. Development of institutional</li> </ul>

		capacity building seems weak.
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**b) Recruitment Missions**

Activities	Carried out?	Comment
4. Making contacts through the organization's existing network with universities, professional organizations etc. to identify suitably qualified candidates in accordance with guidelines.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carried out in accordance with guidelines</li> <li>Recruitment approach is through promotion of the program rather than promotion of identified job vacancies and request from employer.</li> <li>Most candidates fall into highly qualified category (PHD, Masters and Bachelors degree)</li> </ul>
5. Identifying and selecting candidates for self-employment based on the evaluation of their professional background, training, experience, entrepreneurial capacity in close cooperation with the competent national authorities in the receiving country.	~	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Out of 66 returnees only three are SE</li> <li>Based on evaluation survey, not many returnees were aware availability of loan to assist self-employment, therefore, publicity seems to be lacking</li> <li>The loan component for SE seems not well designed and managed manly because it lacks mechanisms.</li> </ul>
6. Rendering services in performing job broker activities between potential employers and African candidates.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successfully carried out as returnees are very appreciative of RM role in matching them to jobs</li> <li>Some incidences of poor communication between placement and recruitment missions. Leading to candidates or jobs dropping out of roster</li> </ul>
7. Providing adequate incentives to retain highly qualified, qualified and skilled human resources.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although \$ 10,500 does not represent a substantial incentive only about 10 % of returnees have changed jobs.</li> </ul>
8. Purchasing of equipment and the handling of all documents related to the transfer of the selected candidates and equipment, organization of movement and reception in receiving country .	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Equipment considered helpful by returnees.</li> <li>Many returnees experienced problems with customs clearance on arrival. PM assisted in as much as possible but duty free import on vehicles does not cover returnees. This created big problems to many returnees</li> </ul>

**c) Geneva HQ**

Activities	Carried out?	Comment
3. Designing guidelines for the recruitment of African nationals in industrialized countries in order to assess the qualities of the returnees such as management leadership, capacity to transfer knowledge and technology, etc., besides formal educational qualifications, in accordance with the defined target groups of the programme.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Geneva HQ has produced guidelines for all aspects of programme implementation</li> <li>Guidelines generally considered useful by PMs and RMs, but lack flexibilities.</li> <li>Target group specification not sufficiently well-developed, lack of operational differentiation between highly qualified, qualified and skilled entailing over-representation of highly qualified returnees</li> <li>Monitoring guidelines weakened by specification of too many indicators</li> </ul>





Assessment of the Programme’s outputs against established indicators and targets for Ethiopia based on the sample survey is as tabulated below:-

a) Returnees

a.1 Target Indicators	Results/ Outputs	Comments
1. 70% of the Returnees confirm that their jobs were commensurate with the training or specialization received abroad	80% confirm that their assigned responsibilities or functions are commensurate with their training/ specialization received abroad	Targets is successfully achieved
2. 15% of the returnees consider their working conditions as good, and 40% as satisfactory	53.3% consider their working conditions as good, 20% as satisfactory, and only 26.7% as not satisfactory	Targets are successfully achieved
3. 80% of the returnees are working full time in their professions	93.3% of the returnees replied that they are working full time in their professions	Target is successfully attained
4. 35% of the returnees supervise/ direct the work of at least 5 other persons	33.3% of the returnees supervise 5 and/ or over 5 persons, 20% supervise under 5 persons, and 46.7% supervise none.	Target is nearly achieved
5. Respectively, 25% and 50% of the returnees consider that they were very or fairly effective in transferring their knowledge/technology/ skills to others	33.3 % very effective, 66.7% fairly effectively, transferring their knowledge/skills	Targets successfully over achieved
6. 80% of the returnees consider that they are making a personal contribution to the socio-economic development of Ethiopia	86.7% of the returnees consider that they are making a personal contribution to the socio-economic development of Ethiopia	Targets successfully achieved
7. Only 30% of the returnees consider that they face major problems in adapting to their new jobs.	Only 13.3% of the returnees consider that they face major problems in adapting to their new jobs while 80% state that the face no problems	Target is successfully attained.
8. 80% of the returnees are still employed in priority sectors of the economy 2 years after having first received support RQAN	33.3% more than 2 years, 13.3% less than 2 years 6.7% less than one year and no response 46.6%	Target is not achieved. The sample members may be new arrivals. This may be attributed to the fact that the sample members may be mostly new returnees rather than changes of jobs. Sampling by years of return was difficult as all returnees could not be available or reached.
9. 20% of the returnees consider as	26.7% consider as good, and 60% as	Targets are successfully over

good, and 30% as satisfactory their carrier prospects in Ethiopia	satisfactory and only 13.3% as not satisfactory	fulfilled
10. 80% of the returnees confirm that they have received good or adequate information and services from IOM to easily facilitate their professional and social-re-integration	Only 6.7% consider good, 33.33% as adequate and 53.3% as inadequate and 6.7% no response	Targets are under achieved. This indicates briefing before return/ departure to Ethiopia is weak.
11. 75% of the returnees consider their return to be positive	100% of the returnees consider their return as correct	Target is over achieved
12. Returnees who do not hold PhD degrees have at least 2 years work experience abroad	All returnees who do not hold PhD Degree have worked more than 2 years abroad	Targets successfully achieved
13. Without the IRAN program, returnees would have worked longer to save more (30%,) would have stayed abroad at (least 40%). Would have asked for a loan in order to return (at least 10%)	80% stated they would have worked longer to save more money, 6.7% would have stayed abroad, 6.7% would have asked for a loan and could have made own financial arrangement	Targets are successfully achieved.
14. Concerning the assessment of IOM services 75% considered as excellent or good	20% excellent, 40% good, 20% fair, and 20% as poor	Achievements are below targets. This is partly attributed to failure by returnees to reply to questionnaires sent to them by IOM; and partly to shortage of staff and budget of IOM Mission to visit individual returnees and assess situations of returnees at work place, difficulty by IOM to assist on housing and duty free on vehicles.
15. The briefing obtained by the returnees on professional opportunities and living conditions in Ethiopia before return there considered as :	Adequate 26.7% as not adequate 26.7% as misleading 46.7%.	Although no targets have been given on this issue, most of the returnees and employers pointed out that weaknesses in briefing the returnees
16. 15% or the returnees confirm that their initial professional expectations correspond to the employers management orientation, 50% confirm that their initial expectation matched of those	53.3% stated that their initial professional expectations correspond to the employer's management orientation 26.7% confirmed subject to some disagreement	Targets are successfully achieved

of the employers, subject to some disagreement		
17. When asked about the relevance of the RQAN program . . .	80% of the returnees responded as relevant, 13.3% very relevant and only 6.7% responded as not relevant	Program relevance is confirmed
18. When asked whether the institution building objective of RQAN program is workable . . .	73.3% responded as workable/ being attained and only 6.7% responded as not workable	Program’s objective in institution building capacity is workable.
19. When asked whether financial support given by RQAN program is adequate	33.33% responded as adequate, and 53.3% as inadequate	The majority feel that the financial support provided is inadequate

In general, the results of the present survey showed that the RQAN program has been successful from the returnees’ point of view. The only major weaknesses pointed out are lack of adequate briefings on:

- Living and working conditions,
- Customs duty on vehicles, and
- Assistance by IOM local office.

The latter is attributed to lack of visit to returnees at work place due to limitations of budget and staff and failure of returnees to reply to questionnaires and difficulty on the part of IOM to assist returnees to get housing facility and duty free privileges on vehicle which is beyond its power.

**a(ii). Social and Economic Re-integration**

Questions posed to returnees	Replies	Remarks
1. Is the remuneration (salary and allowances) you get adequate to cover your living costs?	100% replied not adequate	Despite such low salary, 100% of them said decision to return was correct
2. How long did it take you to find housing accommodation ?	26.7% replied less than 3 months, 6.7% three to six month, 6.7% six to 12 months, 60.0% more than 12 months	This shows that the majority face problems of getting housing accommodation
3. How long did it take you to find schooling for your children ?	20% less than two months 80% more than three months	This shows that there are problems of returnees finding schools for their children.
How do you rate, the existing availability of health facilities	53.3% said easily accessible 26.7% said it is difficult 20% not replied	
4. How do you rate the qualify of health facilities ?	33.3% said good 60% said poor & very poor	The majority feel that health facilities are poor.

	6.7% did not reply	
5. How do you find the cost of health services ?	53.3% said affordable 26.7% not affordable 20 % no reply	Health services costs are affordable by the majority.
6. Have you found recreational facilities adequate?	20% said yes 73.3% said no 6.7% did not reply	Recreation facilities are inadequate for the majority.
7. Have you joined local voluntary self-help Community Associations	<b><u>Idir :</u></b> 20% said yes 73.3% said no 6.7% did not reply <b><u>Ikub :</u></b> 26.7% said yes 73.3% said no <b><u>Returnee Association</u></b> 13.3% said yes 86.7 said no  <i>Any other community Associations</i> 53.3% said yes 40.0% said no 6.7% no reply	Only a few returnees in the sample did join voluntary self-help Associations probably due to lack of housing accommodation as most of such associations are based in residential areas, or are to the fact that they are new arrivals.
8. Have you been able to have access to information and networking for social and professional activities	<b>Social activities :</b> 26.7% said yes 46.7% said no 26.7% did not reply <b>Professional activities :</b> 73.3% said yes 26.7% said no	Most are involved in professional activities
9. Have you been re-connected with relatives and friends ?	With relatives 100% said yes, With old friends 93.3% said yes, With new friends 85.7% said yes	Fully integrated.
10. How would you describe your relationship with extended family ?	40% said supportive 6.7% demanding 46.7% both supportive and demanding 6.7% no reply	Relationship with extended family is both supportive and demanding.

Most of the returnees face problems of housing accommodation and schooling for their children. This may be one reason for leaving their families behind. The availability of housing accommodation has probably affected their participation in self-help community associations. Despite this, most of the returnees seem to be re-integrated based on individuals initiatives and re-connections to relatives, old friends and making new friends.

**a (iii). Self – Employment**

<b>Target Indicators</b>	<b>Results</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1. 70% of the self-employment cases are still professionally activate 2 years after having received the fist IOM Support	100% are still professionally active	Only 2 received loan support
2. 60% of the self-employed cases are on time with or have employed repayment the IOM loans	All of them are in arrears and none of them start to service the loan	One borrower faced liquidity problems and requested rescheduling, while the other one refused to service the loan because he started litigation with IOM on loss of shipment of personal effects/ equipment.

**b) Employers**

<b>Target Indicators</b>	<b>Results</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1. The employers confirm that shortages of such qualified personnel existed at the local and national levels (at least 40% and 25% respectively), prior to IOM services.	22.2% confirmed that shortage existed at institutional levels, 11.1% at national levels and 55.6% at both institutional and national levels prior to using RQAN	Generally assumption were almost correct because shortages have existed both at national and institutional levels prior to the program. However, the situation has not been changed by the introduction of programme.
2. The employers confirm that the recruitment of highly qualified personnel residing abroad was an essential prerequisite for the development of new activities (at least 25%) or a contribution to the development of on-going activities (at least 50%)	22.2% confirmed the recruitment as essential prerequisite for the on-going activities, 55.6% essential for the on-going and new activities	Assumptions have been almost correct
3. Respectively, at least 20% and at least 50% of the employers rate the results of the work of the personnel recruited under the project as excellent or good	55.6% confirmed the performance of recruitment through the project as excellent and 20.2% as good	Targets are successfully achieved
4. Respectively, at least 40% and 60% of the employers rate IOM's role in the identification of highly qualified manpower as excellent or good	33.3% rated the role played by IOM in identification of highly qualified Ethiopians excellent 11.1% as good and 55.5% did not respond to the question.	This implies that IOM recruitment procedures tend to be not job driven.
5. Respectively, at least 50% and 40% of the employers rate the programme's ability to meet manpower needs required as excellent or good.	33.3% rated the excellent program's ability to meet the country's manpower need, 11.1% as good, 55.5% no response.	The program's usefulness is accepted, but its ability to meet all the manpower needs of the country is insignificant.

6. At least 50% of the employers confirm that the returnees processed under the project have career prospects with in the organization	88.9% rate the carrier prospects of the returnees as good,	Target is over achieved.
7. When asked about the problems faced in recruitment of the returnees and their full utilization ...	33.3% stated no problems while 66.7% did not respond to the question	We can thus conclude that there was no problem faced by employers in recruitment and in making full utilization of returnees
8. When asked to suggest improvement on recruitment of returnees...	22.2% suggested to improve living conditions to the returnees. 11.1% suggested to give adequate briefings to the returnees before their return, and 11.1% suggested IOM assistance to returnees should be improved.	Thus the need to assist returnees is recognized by the employers
9. When asked as to the relevance of the program to the country's needs...	77.8% said it is relevant, and 22.2% did not respond	The employers recognize very well the relevance of the program
10. When asked as to whether the organization /employers made effective use of the returnees...	100% said they made effective use of the returnees	The returnees were effectively utilized
11. When asked whether recruitment was done according to priority/ need	77.8% said yes, and 22.2% did not respond	Same as above, employment was according to need/priority
12. When asked if they obtained all the number of returnees requested	Only 11.1% of the employers said yes, 33.3% said no and 55.6% did not reply	This shows that the program can not meet all the manpower needed, but could ameliorate (improve) the problems
13. When asked whether they are satisfied with the recruitment procedures or arrangements of returnees	88.9% said yes, and 11.1% did not respond	Most of the employers are satisfied with the recruitment procedures, although it did not meet all their needs/demand


Similarly the employers confirm that the program in Ethiopia has been successful. It has assisted them to meet some of the shortage of, if not all, highly qualified manpower they need. They also suggested to improve the briefings to be given to the returnees before their departure on living and working conditions in Ethiopia especially on housing problems and duty on the vehicles to be imported into the country.

## b) Promotion Recruitment and Placement

Phase III of the RQAN is differentiated from phases I and II of the program as it has a requirement that placement should be demand driven. As pointed out by the Mid – Term Evaluation Team, this has not been done by IOM because the practice followed is “ to ensure that identified job vacancies are in the identified priority sectors, and shortages of suitably qualified personnel exists to fill the vacancies.” Recruitment missions simultaneously but independently identified potential candidates through general promotion strategy, that is, promotion of the program but not specific job vacancies. Job brokering activity is limited to matching candidates roster to the job roster resulting in ad hoc placement of candidates whenever a match could be made (see figure 4.2). For instance, the Addis Ababa University, the largest single employers of the returnees, complained that the IOM Mission is sending them large number of candidates (applications) who could not fit to fill the relevant job vacancies. This process is repeated although the University had already placed advance request for specific professions to fill specific vacancies. Such practices confirm the comments made by the Mid Term Evaluation Team that:

- “The return process is largely driven by the supply of candidates than the demand for skills, contrary to the requirements of RQAN programme III;
- There is a poor match between the candidate rosters and job rosters, meaning that much time is wasted in processing candidates for whom no realistic jobs exist, and in identifying jobs that are not filled”; and
- In the case of Ethiopia out of about 200 candidates handled, only 71 returnees succeeded to meet the return criteria during the program period.

Figure 4.2 The Matching process



Source: Mid – Term Evaluation Report, P. 28

The requirement to make an “optimum distribution” of returnees among priority sectors, public /private/self-employment as well as matched /pre-matched in placement in defined target ratios

is unrealistic under the present conditions in Ethiopia as there are large shortages in the all the priority sectors.

The best alternative should, therefore, be to identify job-vacancies in priority sectors and then promoting/advertising these vacant jobs with a view to attracting prospective candidates. However, job openings and filling times may not coincide with the timely availability of suitable candidates. Despite these weaknesses, the recruitment and placement procedures in Ethiopia worked very well by bringing highly qualified professionals required in the country. That is, the important issue in reality is not optimum allocation but filling vacant jobs in priority sectors. In Ethiopia's case such an approach can be interpreted as demand driven.

The Geneva HQ which has the responsibility of developing the guidelines for program implementation introduced operational guidelines on supervision and backstopping service in July 1995. The guidelines outlined procedures on how to select, recruit and place candidates including provision of direct support, sustainability and institution building organizational structure, monitoring and evaluation. This schedule of the guidelines, as revised during 1996 is listed as follows.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Intra-Regional Component	Feb 1996
2. Application of the RQAN Significant Factor Criterion	Feb 1996
3. Returnee Follow -Up Monitoring and Evaluation	March 1996
4. RQAN Bridging Funds and Phase III Mid-term Surveys	April 1996
5. Instructions for Completion of Activity Indicators Workbook	May 1996
6. Gathering Pre-Departure Briefing Information	July 1996
7. Application of Activities Indicators in Mission-level Programme Management	Aug 1996
8. Priority Sector Review	Oct 1996
9. Placement Mission-Recruitment Mission Collaboration	Nov 1996
10. Self- Employment Component	Nov 1996
11. RQAN III Strategic Planning Workbook-Instructions for Completion	Nov 1996

The new guidelines are useful, but their application was found difficult by the local office due to time constraint and shortage of staff. The MTET found that the guidelines have not sufficiently reflected country differences, and are not oriented towards institutionalization. Thus they



recommended that IOM's policy of decentralization be speeded up for RQAN. These consultants could not find implementation of the above recommendation.

#### **4.2.2 Support Group and Counterpart**

The Support Group was established in 1995. The group consisted of 28 members selected and appointed from different public institutions, chambers of commerce, universities, delegation of EU, IOM, and GTZ. The Representative from MEDaC, who has also been the counterpart has been chairing the meeting of the support group. (See Annex 1 for the list and their frequency of attendance)

##### **a) The Support Group**

The support group had, as observed from the records of their meetings,:

- Facilitated the establishment of IOM Office in Addis Ababa;
- Made a broad identification of economic priority sectors, identified job vacancies in the priority sectors, and types of professionals required in the public and private sectors, and made a revision of the priority sectors;
- Held eleven meetings during 1995-1998 and discussed various problems and issues in placement and re-integration of the returnees, including establishment of a working group to work on the next phase. But the working group was disbanded after holding 4 or 5 meetings without results; and
- Assisted the IOM office in facilitating placement, and re-integration of returnees, (see also next section)

However, members were not efficient means of making placement, and as most placements were pre- matched or matched by IOM, with the role of the support group limited to approval only. With the exception of a very few, most members were not active outside the meetings in assisting promotion of the program. In general, institutionalization and capacity building through the support group has not been successful. (See 5.2 page 49 below)

##### **b) The Counterpart**

MEDaC is the designated organization for the implementation of RQAN III – Ethiopia Country Programme. Its representative called “ counterpart” has been fully participating in the program.

The counter part acted as the chairman of the meetings of the Support Group and rendered full support to the Resident Representative of IOM in placements and re-integration of returnees. Together with the other members of the Support Group, the counterpart had been given full briefings by the IOM Resident Representative. The counterpart and members of the Support Group have also participated in the two- days familiarization workshop on the RQAN program, but no formal training on the RQAN programme was given to the counterpart. Thus the issue of Institutionalization and capacity building aspect was not implemented.

### *c) National Authorizing Officer*

The National Authorization Officer (NAO) had not played a direct role in the implementation of the programme despite the use of NIP and RIP funds. Funds from NIP were disbursed directly to IOM on installments without authorization from NAOs and thus the NAO officer is not playing any role in the monitoring the program.

#### **4.2.3 The European Union**

The role of the EU had been weak in closely following up the implementation of the program because disbursements of funds simply followed unusual agreement schedules. Communication between the various stakeholders in Brussels had not be effective. The representative of the delegation attended only one meeting of the support group. Thus as stated by the Mid – Term Evaluation Team, the implementation of the program “slipped through the supervision net” of the EU to some extent. Indeed the Addis Ababa IOM Office had regularly briefed and consulted the Delegation.

#### **4.2.4 Plan of Operations**

Following the requirement in the TCA to prepare in consultation with EU, the following plans were produced by IOM

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Period Covered</u>
Operational Plan	March 1995	Programme Duration
RQAN III Acceleration Plan	Dec 1995	December 1995
Revised Activity Planning Sheets for RQAN III	Jan 1995	Programme Duration
Rolling Plan	Jan 1996	Programme Duration

Operational Plan

July 1996

Jul – Dec 1996

The Operational Plan which was submitted in March 1995, consisted of :

- a description of programme objectives and monitoring arrangements,
- a revised logframe matrix,
- organizational structure and responsibilities of each of the main actors involved, and
- a schedule for reporting, follow-up surveys and backstopping.

The document was scanty and too short. Involvement of the EU was not effective in preparation of the plan.

In December 1995 the operational plan was revised in response to the visit by the backstopping expert to Geneva HQ. The main addition was to intensity promotion of the program. The revised plans were perhaps too detailed but still remained too general – because no country specific actions were elaborated, many of the activities were ‘ongoing’, and no quantitative or time bound targets were provided. Indeed, responsibilities were clearly identified.

The latest revised operational plan was the one for July to December 1996. In the opinion of the Mid – Term Evaluation Team “the format and style of this document is different from the previous plans, and does not follow the logframe structure. In fact it appears to be more a plan for implementing the new guidelines, than an overall operational plan for the programme. Both the operational plan and guidelines require efforts which could not justify the results to be achieved, and do not take into account the availability of budget and manpower of the PM. For instance, some of the activities specified in the operational plan stated were:-

- Collect all available information on on-going and planned activities related to target countries’ economic development, manpower and human resources development labour market strategies, and structural adjustment of the economy;
- Analyze these data with respect to their implications for RQAN’s placement objectives; and
- Incorporate knowledge gained of the current impacts of macroeconomic and labour policies and activities, and of indications towards future trends into RQAN placement strategies.

A complete labour market analysis for Ethiopia should not be necessary for the placement of 60 -70 returnees. Apart from this, the data does not exist. To divert IOM AA budget and staff to carry out such sophisticated exercise could have adversely affected their normal placement and follow-up activities.

#### **4.2.5 Financial Management**

The budgetary and accounting procedures of IOM do not follow the requirements of the RQAN III budget, as IOM has its own accounting and budgetary procedures. There are no data showing sources of expenditures by country. Thus we are unable to evaluate the financial management of the Addis Ababa IOM Office related to RQAN Programme.

However, MTET's description of the system of financial management of IOM is as follows:

- Funds from each of the NIPs and RIPs are disbursed from Brussels direct to IOM in Geneva according to the disbursement schedule contained in Article 3.5.2 of the FA.
- IOM deposits all funds in a single account in Geneva
- ECU are converted to US dollars
  
- Each mission (including the RQAN Unit in Geneva) submits an annual budget for staff costs and office costs only, by project (including RQAN)
- Geneva HQ revises budgetary allotments by project.
  
- Each mission (including the RQAN Unit in Geneva) submits a monthly budget for staff costs and office.
- On a six-monthly basis, Geneva HQ consolidates all RQAN expenditures using IOM accounting procedures, then allocates these expenditures to the RQAN budget headings. This information is presented

for the whole programme and not by country.

#### **4.2.6 Internal Monitoring and Evaluation**

Arrangements for internal M&E were set out in the TCA, and defined in details in the Operational Plan. These were:-

- a databank to enable Geneva HQ to monitor the matching and reintegration process.
- follow-up and mid-term surveys data to be entered into the databank.
- technical and managerial backstopping and monitoring.

Each mission should submit a monthly report to Geneva HQ. The Geneva HQ compiles six –monthly reports and sends to the relevant representatives of participating governments, to delegations, and to the EU in Brussels. The monthly reports were descriptive and repetitive and did not give the overall picture/ progress of the program and the six monthly reports were not country specific.

##### **a) Databank**

The recommendation by the MTEM to computerize data has not been implemented. Each mission should have a databank which contains information to be used for both monitoring and evaluation. But all the data at IOM Addis Ababa Office are kept in various paper box files. Many man-days of work were spent by the Consultants to generate the information required from the paper box files.

##### **b) Follow-up Monitoring**

Initially follow-up monitoring was conducted on a six-monthly basis through a postal survey of all returnees for 1<sup>st</sup> year and on a yearly basis after wards. The questionnaires cover two areas reintegration issues/problems; and the extent of skills and knowledge transfer. Although the questions asked on re-integration and skills and knowledge transfer were valid but the replies for questionnaires sent by mail had been poor in

Ethiopia. Later on, the six month survey was changed to annual surveys and the yearly surveys to two yearly surveys. The very few questionnaires returned have not been processed by the local IOM Office.

Regarding reintegration, the need for IOM's assistance would have been more relevant when returnees ask for assistance PM directly. Monitoring could be more effective by IOM attendance at returnee meetings or work place. The questions on skills transfer require also a baseline survey performance at the workplace. But the Addis Ababa IOM Office does not have the manpower capacity to carryout such activities.

The monthly report format was changed in October 1995 to more closely follow the activities listed in the logframe. However, the format was found difficult due to the level of details required, that is, each activities containing a series of sub-activities.

Guidelines for monitoring were substantially revised several times between March and November 1996. In May 1996 Geneva HQ distributed instructions for completion of an Activity Indicators Workbook, and in August these were followed up with guidelines on how to apply these indicators to programme level management through the use of a ratings system.

### **4.3 External Monitoring and Evaluation**

Arrangements for external M & E were set out in the TCA. The mechanisms were:

- Technical and managerial backstopping and monitoring by an external expert (to be carried out jointly with IOM staff);
- A mid-term evaluation after 18 months of implementation;
- A terminal evaluation 4-6 months before completion of the project; and
- An audit to be carried out by an external auditor appointed by the Commission.

#### **4.3.1 Backstopping**

The terms of reference for the Backstopping Expert envisaged that backstopping missions would be undertaken every 7-8 months, and that all countries would be visited with prior approval from the Commission. Ethiopia was visited during April 14 –21 in 1996. But they did produce neither Aid Memoire on their visit nor country report on Ethiopia.

The TOR for the backstopping consultants state that:

“ The main objective of the backstopping is to contribute to keeping project’s implementation on track, in particular as regards its strategic and qualitative aspects.” In this respect the backstopper is expected to carryout the following tasks:

- Supervise the project’s implementation by IOM in accordance with the operational plan, including the establishment and functioning of IOM’s monitoring system for the project.
- Regularly assess the progress made in the project’s implementation.
- If necessary, advise IOM’s project management and the Commission on required adjustments or re-orientations, either of the operational plan as such, or of its execution by certain parts of the implementation structure.”

Thus the Backstopper’s role can be interpreted as one of monitoring on behalf of the Commission, and also of provision of technical advice to both IOM and the Commission.

The Backstopper had identified or addressed many issues. However, as pointed out by the MTET the backstopping reports did not sufficiently assess the appropriateness of programme strategies. They just suggested the need to intensify activities strictly within the parameters of the programme design.

#### **4.3.1 Mid- Term Evaluation**

The mid-term evaluation was commenced 24 months after the start up of implementation, 6 months after its scheduled data. The Mid term Evaluation was successfully carried out, but failed to suggest plan of action for institutionalization of the programme.

#### **4.3.2 Terminal Evaluation**

Terminal Evaluation was supposed to be carried out 3 – 4 months before the completion of the program (Dec. 1999) but it is being done now, (June – July 2000) about 6 months after the end of the program.

#### **4.4 Examination of RQAN in Ethiopia Visa Vis Similar Efforts at the Return and Retention of Qualified and Skilled Human Resources.**

Other major similar efforts being made at the return and retention of qualified and skilled human resources are:

- *TOKTEN, Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals,*
- *The German Programme, and*
- *The Nethrelands' Programme.*

##### **4.4.1 TOKTEN**

TOKTEN was initiated and implemented under the UNDP 5<sup>th</sup> country programme cycle. The objective was to bring highly qualified expatriate Ethiopians to give their expertise to their country on a short term consultancy basis. The program was demand based as requests must be made by Ethiopian Institutions. Roster of consultancy was prepared. Request from the supply side was channelled through the Ethiopian missions abroad with the support of UNDP IPF Programme. The other terms and conditions of the programme were that:

- Expatriate Ethiopians would come to work in Ethiopia for three to six months (maximum period)



- They would be paid for around trip air tickets from the countries of residence to Ethiopia.
- They would be paid a daily subsistence allowance at the UNDP rate in Ethiopia.

There was some anticipation/expectation in the programme that returning expatriate Ethiopians would be enticed to remain in the country or would return home for good after working and seeing the social and political improvements and their country's need for their skills and contribution to the development efforts underway.

About 29 expatriate Ethiopians came and worked under the programme at a total of US \$ 400,000. Only one of them decided to remain behind while all of them went back. The programme was found to be very expensive ( $400,000 \div 29 = \$ 13,793$  per expert mostly for three months, and thus the government decided to terminate it, although there have been many requests on the supply side.

#### **4.4.2 The German Programme**

*The German Programme* was initiated by the German Government (Ministry of Economic Cooperation) in 1989 to repatriate foreigners (Turks, Vietnamese, Chileans, etc) from Germany. The programme for Ethiopia started in 1993 after the fall of the Derg Regime- under a programme named "Corporation Ethiopia Enterprise".

##### *a) Corporation Ethiopia Enterprise*

*Corporation Ethiopia Enterprise Programme is based on :*

- Participants under the programme must have lived in Germany at least for two years;
- Voluntary return of Ethiopian from Germany;
- Strong campaign/promotion to entice Ethiopians in Germany to accept the programme;

- Free air tickets including their families plus shipment costs for all their personal effects, belongings;
- They must get letters of employment in Ethiopia confirming that they start work three months after their arrival.; and
- They would be given a monthly salary of DM 800 for one year to supplement their local salary. At the end of one year, if they opted, they would ask for a seed capital to start their own business by presenting a feasibility study for their projects. If their projects are found to be viable, they would be given DM 9,000 initially, and again if proved that the project is implemented and operational through site visits, an additional of DM 9000 would be given to each project under the programme.

The programme gives another alternative option to the returnees. If the returnees opted to start their own business in Ethiopia directly on arrival, DM 9,000 (15% of their investment capital upto DM 65, 000) would be given to each as a seed money. That is, DM 9,000 per project provided that they present project studies plus air tickets including for their families and shipment costs for their personal effects. They would also get an additional DM 9,000 a year later if their business would be found operational.

*The above German programme differs from the IOM RQAN Programme in the following aspects:*

- The funding is not based on the country programme;
- It is not based on high qualifications, skills and any experience of working abroad, although some might process;
- The programme was retroactively applied to those returnees who came after 1988;
- It is based on pre-matched for employment. That is, no assistance to find employment in Ethiopia. Most of the returnees looked for their employment while in Germany usually through friends and relatives and some of the employment letters might be a fake to get the benefit of the package;
- The programme has been mostly addressed to refugees who have been stranded in Germany to encourage them return home with the political changes and new prospects/ opportunities;

- Some highly qualified and skilled and experienced Ethiopians who had already decided to return home took the advantage of the programme; and
- Similarly students and university lecturers who had been on scholarship and obligations to return took also a good advantage of the programme.

Indeed the above two packages have successfully brought about 400 – 500 returnees (GTZ Addis Office) during 1988 – 1998. Most of the self – employment component have not been successful because a few qualified to get the second grant of DM 9,000 as they failed to show the actual operations of their businesses. That is, most of the project studies they presented to get the seed money were not either genuine or failed, and the returnees found their own jobs in the market. The German programme under Corporation Ethiopia Enterprise which was being implemented by GTZ has now come to a standstill due to transfer of implementation agency from GTZ to another German Agency (DEG) by the new German Government. DEG could not reach sub-contractual agreement with GTZ. DEG is in the process of reaching agreement with the newly formed “Association of Ethiopians Educated in Germany”.

***b) Hassen State Programme (around Frankfurt)***

This programme is basically aimed at less qualified (with no advance education) Ethiopian refugees in Germany. The programme awarded DM 20,000 per returnee to purchase equipment; air tickets plus shipment of personal effects and goods purchased; and a monthly salary of DM 500 – 800 for one year. The programme stopped because it could not attract many returnees. Only 8 returnees came under the programme.

***c) Working Place Equipment Programme***

This programme has been promoted by a German semi-NGO to encourage Ethiopians to return home through finding their own

employment. The prospective employer for each returnee will get equipment from Germany to be used by an employed returnee. If the employer retained the returnee for 2 years, the ownership of equipment would be transferred to the employer. The returnees would be given air ticket plus shipment costs for personal effects and equipment and a monthly salary of DM 800 for one year. The programme attracted a few returnees and employers (usually relatives) to get some equipment like X- ray machines, ultra sound and laundry machines but did not progress much.

### ***4.4.3 The Netherland Programme***

The Netherland programme has just started with the objective of repatriating Ethiopians residing in the Netherlands. The target returnees are basically Ethiopians with low level of education and who have no official refugee status. Repatriation is voluntary. The return package is handled by IOM on the basis of commission paid by the Dutch Government.

Incentives provided to returnees consist of air ticket, shipment cost for personal effects and other belongings, Dutch Guilder 5,000 for seed money to start own business and a monthly salary of DG 900 upto one year plus intensive counseling and advice, re-integration services and any training required in the Netherlands or in Ethiopia.

A Dutch Agency is locally established to operate the programme. A steering committee comprising representatives from the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry and Dutch Embassy is established to oversee the operation of the program. About 13 returnees has started benefiting through the program. The programme is not comparable to IOM RQAN as it aims at low level educated Ethiopians.

## 5. EFFECTIVENESS

### 5.1 Returnees

#### 5.1.1 Return Target for Ethiopian Nationals

According to RQAN III, the initial indicative target for the return of the highly qualified, qualified and skilled Ethiopian nationals residing abroad was 45. The implementation period of the programme was four years, i.e., January 1995 – December 1998 and was later extended to the end of December 1999.

As mentioned earlier, IOM revised the target for Ethiopia upward to 71 due to the growing demand for programme service from employers as well as the large number of candidates on the Ethiopian Roster. This was the second revision of the target for Ethiopia, the previous having been raised from 45 to 55. According to IOM's implementation status report of March 31, 1998, the ten additional returnees have been added from the intra- regional target numbers.

**Table 5.1- Annual and Cummutative Return, 1995 – 1999.**

	No	Total	Cummulative Number	%
1995	3	4.5	3	4.5
1996	11	16.7	14	21.2
1997	14	21.2	28	42.9
1998	18	27.3	46	69.7
1999	20	30.3	66	100.0

Source: Compiled from IOM's File July 2000

Table 5.1 shows that the total number of returnees was 66 by the end of 1999 or 93% of the revised targets. Of the remaining five, four did not return because the employing institutions failed to get budgetary provisions while one could not make it before December 1999 due to contractual commitment. Apart from these five, eight processed and approved candidates have been kept for the next phase, while nine other processed ones have remained in the pending file for the next phase. Even though there is no target for Ethiopia one of the candidates was recruited through the intera-regional programme. Of the total returnees 36 or 54.6% were recruited in Washington DC while 30 or 45.4% were recruited in London.

Although due credit should be accorded to the implementors for the results achieved, it needs to be pointed out that the basis of setting a very low indicative target for Ethiopia in the TCA in the face of the general but unsubstantiated studies/assessment that many highly qualified and experienced Ethiopian nationals reside abroad, remains unclear.

### **5.1.2 Profiles of Returnees\***

The returnees are highly qualified, mostly men, and relatively young and experienced. Thus of the total returnees, 46 (69.7%) are PhD/ MD degree holders, 14 (21.2%) are MS/MSc degree holders and only 6 are BA/BSc degree holders, which is in line with requirement in the programme. In other words nearly 91% of the returnees fall in the category of post-graduate qualifications. Gender wise, 58 or 87.9% are men while women account for only 12.1%. The average age for men is 41 years. At an average age of about 42 years women are slightly older. Average number of years stayed abroad is 12 years and average number of years spent working abroad is about 7 which satisfies the experience criteria.

Ad per the present sample Survey study the reasons for staying abroad as indicated by the returnees were:

Training	66.7%
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\* See also Annex Figures 2 – 6 pages 61 – 65.

Working	13.3%
Political case	13.3%
Did not respond	6.7%

As regards factors which influenced decisions to return, 53.3% of the respondents expressed their desires to live in their own country, other reasons include: search for employment, help parents and relatives, apply knowledge to own country and institutional commitments.

In this connection, these Consultants would like to reiterate the weaknesses of the programme design for over looking gender issues as was highlighted in the Mid -Term Evaluation document. It also needs to be noted that IOM's agreement with the Ethiopian Government to undertake surveys and data collection among Ethiopian population abroad with a view to identifying qualified human resources and IOM establishing a roster of qualified Ethiopians is yet to be implemented. This would make the recruitment and related activities more effective in terms of time and even cost.

### ***5.1.3 Returnees by Profession***

The percentage shares of returnees by profession is as shown in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2 RQAN III Returnees by Profession – Ethiopia 1995 – 1999.**

<b>Category of Profession</b>		
Business Administrators and Economists	14	21.2
Lawyers	1	1.5
Engineers	10	15.2
Veterinarians	5	7.6
Sociologists and Anthropologists	8	12.1
Mining experts and Geologists	6	9.1
Physicists and Chemists	5	7.6
Agriculturists	10	15.2
Meteorologists	1	1.5



Information Technologist	1	1.5
Biologists	5	6.0
Linguists	<u>1</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Total	66	100.0

Source : Compiled from IOM Files, July 2000

As shown in Table 5.2 returnees in the business and economics profession constitute 21.2% of the returnees followed by engineers (15.2%) and agriculturalists (15.2%). Together they account for 51.6% of the total returnees. Looked in different way, science and technology related professionals account for 63.7%, while business, economics and other social science related professionals account for 36.3%.

As illustrated in Table 5.3, salaries by professional category are generally low with linguists and meteorologists getting the lowest pay.

**Table 5.3 Salary Earnings in Birr by Professional Category**

Professional Category		nth
Business Administrators and Economics	14	2166
Lawyer	1	17750*
Engineers	10	1672
Medical Doctors and Veterinarians	5	1706
Sociologists and Anthropologists	8	1388
Mining experts and Geologist	6	2061
Physicists and Chemists	5	1554
Agriculturists	10	1584
Meteorologists	1	1176
Information Technologist	1	1400
Biologists	4	1965
Linguists	<u>1</u>	<u>1007</u>
Total	66	

\* Self- employed and manages own consulting firm.

Source : Compiled from IOM Files, July 2000

#### 5.1.4 Placement by Sector

Among the returnees 34 (51.5%) are employed by universities and colleges, followed by the private sector which employs 16 (24.2%), of these only three are self-employed. Nine returnees (13.6%) are employed by government offices, while seven returnees (10.6%) are employed by NGOs. Details are shown in Table 5.4.

**Table 5.4 Placement by Sector**

Sector		%
1. Public Sector	<u>43</u>	<u>65.1</u>
Universities and Colleges	34*	51.5
Government Offices	9	13.6
2. Private Sector:	<u>16</u>	<u>24.2</u>
of which self-employed	(3)	(4.5)
3. NGOs	7	10.6

\* One returnee is employed by a private college.

Source : Compiled from IOM Files, July 2000

Universities and colleges attract highly qualified returnees as against government offices primarily because of the many opportunities to develop and practice their professions, carryout research in the universities/ independently/ in collaboration with other organizations, supplementing their income through teaching evening classes, access to housing accommodations, especially in the regions.

Table 5.4 indicates that the public sector is the major employer of returnees. The private sector generally prefers recruitment from the local labour market because it is quicker (see also section 5.3). Even then the in-take of the returnees by the private sector is by

no means small, given the relatively short time of the introduction of the economic policy reorientation which restored the pivotal role of the private sector in Ethiopia's economic development and given also the small size of the indicative target. Besides the private sector in Ethiopia is technically and financially not well developed and most of them are not at a stage to recruit returnees with PHD, MA, MSc, etc.

Since most of the returnees are employed in the public sector their monthly salaries are as per the scale of the civil service, and are, therefore, lower than salaries earned by NGOs, self-employed or payments by the private sector in general (see Table 5.5).

**Table 5.5 Salary Per month Earned by Returnees**

Salary /month in Birr	Number of Returnees	% in Total	Cumulative Percent
835	1	1.5	1.5
850	1	1.5	3.0
980	1	1.5	4.5
1007	1	1.5	6.1
1090	1	1.5	7.6
1150	2	3.0	10.6
1176	1	1.5	12.1
1220	1	1.5	13.6
1290	4	6.1	19.7
1400	2	3.0	22.7
1454	1	1.5	24.2
1500	4	6.1	30.3
1600	2	3.0	33.3
1620	26	39.4	72.7
1750	1	1.5	74.2
1800	1	1.5	75.8
1825	1	1.5	77.3

1850	1	1.5	78.8
2000	5	7.6	86.4
2100	1	1.5	87.9
2400	1	1.5	89.4
2500	1	1.5	90.9
2700	1	1.5	92.4
3000	1	1.5	93.9
4500	2	3.0	97.0
5000	1	1.5	98.5
7750*	1	1.5	100.0
Total	66	100.0	

\* Self- Employed and Manager of own Consulting Firm

The average salary for returnees is Birr 1,998 . Of the total 66 returnees, 22 or 33.3% earn below Birr 1,620 per month, 26 or 39.4% earn Birr 1,620, and only 5 or 7.6% earn between Birr 3000 – 5000 per month. The exceptionally high earning of Birr 17,750 is by one self-employed returnee. (See also Annex Figures 7 – 9 pages 66 – 68)

### 5.1.5 Demand Driven Placement

The RQAN III Programme requires that the placement of returnees recruited through the programme be demand driven as against the practice of supply driven approach during the first two phases.

However the realization of this approach poses problems for countries like Ethiopia. In the first place, the placements of candidates who satisfy the criteria established by the programme in any priority sector, given the acute shortage across all sectors, could be described as being responsive to the demand of the priority sectors in Ethiopia. (One way of overcoming this problem has been suggested by the Mid- Term Evaluators: “ Given the extent of manpower shortages in each country (including Ethiopia) and the

fact that the target number of returnees for each country (especially the target for Ethiopia) by comparison, . . . it would be more useful to interpret responsiveness to demands for manpower in terms of the extent to which manpower needs have been prioritized, and these priority needs met.”)

As shown in the sample survey 77.8% of the employers confirmed that recruitment of returnees was according to their needs/ priorities, while 100% of the employers also confirmed that they made effective use of returnees. Similarly 100% of the employers confirmed contribution of returnees to capacity building to the employing institutions, while 88.9% indicated that the returnees have career prospects within their institutions. Further 77.8% of the employers indicated recruitment of returnees have been essential for the development of both on-going and new activities, 77.8% of the employers also have confirmed the relevancy of the program to Ethiopia, although they said that programme still could not meet their manpower requirements

### **5.1.6 The Role of RQAN Programme in Influencing the Returnees’ Decisions**

Of the total 66 returnees 20 or 30.3% pre-matched (found jobs by themselves) while 46 or 69.7% were matched (placed by IOM).

The sample survey results showed that only 6.7% of those approached indicated that they would have remained abroad if they were not assisted by the programme. On the other hand, 80% responded that they would have worked for a longer period in order to finance there cost of return.

**Table 5.6 RQAN’s Role in Influencing Decisions of Returnees**

1. Would have worked longer to save in order to finance cost of return and re-integration	80.0%
2. Would have remained abroad without RQAN Programme support	6.7%
3. Would have looked for loans to finance return	6.7%

4. Would have financed own return cost	6.6%
Total	100.0

The general conclusion to be drawn from the responses of sample population is that 93.3% had plans to return, one way or another, through their own efforts. A few were planning to borrow in order to be able to return. Therefore, the programme's role appears to be effective in speeding up or shortening the time of return.

### **5.1.7 Self – Employment**

The assistance packages and performance of SE component have already been analysed earlier. The analysis in this section deals with performance of the loan package.

IOM has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Development Bank of Ethiopia (Technical Institution ) to make project appraisal and give counseling to each of the SE returnee at a service charge of US\$ 750 / project with the provision to undertake loan follow-up upon a request by IOM at US \$ 150 per loan. The Bank, after carrying out project appraisal and counseling, gave loans to two SE returnees. The terms, and conditions of loans were:

- Interest free without chattel mortgage
- The loans were scheduled to be repaid in five equal installments with a grace period of six months.

The loan was provided to cover additional equipment costs, i.e., other than those covered through direct cost assistance, plus costs of technical support.

One of the three self-employed returnees opted not to utilize the amount of loan available through the programme. Again of the two, only one of them said she used the loan made available to establish own business. The second borrower said he used the loan to pay import duty for the car he imported, and borrowed additional fund from a local bank to establish the planned and approved business.

Currently both are not servicing their debts for different reasons. One of them is willing to pay, but is not capable because of poor cash flow attributed to the overall slow down of business activities. She requested for rescheduling. The other one is not willing to repay the loan because he has a litigation with IOM on shipment of his personal effects and the equipment purchased for his business.

As per the interview held with two of the self-employed, both of them indicated that they are happy to be home again. One of them, however mentioned that his relationship with IOM is bitter. However, both emphasize the need for providing accurate information to returnees related to business start up, especially regarding those problems dealing with availability of premises, power, telephone and water connections and customs rules and procedures.

Although the number of national returnees of self-employed is small their performance is not that discouraging. One of them has succeeded to establish a thriving business through a different approach i.e. through a joint venture. The other two can not be considered failures despite temporary problems of servicing loans. Therefore, the implementation of the SE-Component in Ethiopia should be given continued support and more time to assess its effectiveness, including restructuring the terms and conditions of loans.

### **5.1.8 Summary of Realization of Assumptions**

There has been no progress in the realization of the assumptions made in the project design of the Mid – Term Evaluation. Therefore, a summary of the conclusions made by the Mid Term Evaluation team is as provided in table 5.7 below:-

**Table 5.7 Summary of Realisation of Assumptions by in Ethiopia**

<b>Assumption</b>	<b>Outputs/ Results</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Governments of recipient countries make	No personnel policies	It was unrealistic to assume to

efforts to implement appropriate personnel policies, and to render labour market regulation more efficient	implemented in response to RQAN Programme	undertake such big exercise for recruitment of less than 100 returnees no budgetary provisions were made for the task.
Governments make efforts to establish manpower plans to identify priority sectors for employment of returnees, and support IOM in identifying concrete job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN government has supported identification of job vacancies.	Same as above
Support obtained from receiving countries to facilitate the transfer of human resources	Agreement signed in February 1997. But does not extend duty free privileges to returnees.	Different rules and lack of transparency in the applications of custom charges on vehicles of returnees.
The security situation in countries of return allows for project implementation	Has not adversely affected return process	There has not been any security problems.
Working conditions are considered reasonable	Working conditions are generally good	Although they stated the salary level is low, 100% of them confirmed that their decisions to return were correct.
Support groups meet regularly	Has met 11 times since July 1995	The institution building capacity aspect was no succeeded
Government counterparts participate actively in project implementation	Active participation from counterpart	Same as above
Active participate of government counterparts in project implementation	As above	Same as above

## 5.2 Institution Building for RAQN III Implementation

Review of the implementation of the programme in Ethiopia reveals that the government has created organs, a counterpart and a support group, as required by the programme. The Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, MEDaC, has been designated as the counterpart institution of the project. The Support Group (see Annex 1 for composition) was also created and held its first meeting on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1995.



However, apart from the record of minutes and the Mid – Term Evaluation documents there is no other documented evidence available for review by this Terminal Evaluating Team on:

- How Ethiopia was involved in the programme;
- The organizational structure of the counterpart unit section within MEDaC;
- Defined functions of the unit/section;
- Budgetary and manpower allocation and other inputs by the Government, and
- Facilities at the disposal of the unit/section etc.

Therefore it needs to be noted that this situations have made the task of these Consultants difficult as the issues were not addressed also during the Mid – Term Evaluation .

### **5.2.1 Support Group**

#### **a) Formation and Membership**

The Support Group in Ethiopia was formed in August of 1995 when it held its first meeting. Its chairman, who is also a member of the Support Group is designated by MEDaC. Members were mostly representatives of government ministries and other establishments at the Federal level and nearly all were located in Addis Ababa. Although invited to membership through a letter by the Minister of MEDaC in July of 1995, none of the nine regions invited attended any of the meetings held during the implementation of the programme. As such the regions were assumed to be unfamiliar with the programme, despite their potential role of providing employment opportunities. However, universities and colleges in the major cities of regions such as Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, and the South Nations and Nationalities Regional States have already been providing employment for returnees.

The Support Group has not been systematically constituted. It had no terms of reference which reduced accountability and commitment to the programme, which in turn reduced the effectiveness of the group. Another factor which reduced the effectiveness of the

Support Group arises from the fact that many organizations with, a few exceptions, did not maintain continuity of representation. Similarly, some individuals represented attended a limited number of meetings. For instance, the average number of attendance at a meeting, i.e from 28 members, reached 17 only as shown in Table 5.8 below:

**Table 5.8 Numbers of Meeting and Attendance of the Support Group**

<b>No. of Meeting s</b>	<b>Meeting Date</b>	<b>Number attended</b>	<b>% share of</b>
1	August 30, 1995	14	50
2	October 9, 1995	16	57
3	December 1, 1995	14	50
4	February 28, 1996	12	43
5	April 10, 1996	14	50
6	June 4, 1996	12	43
7	August 27, 1996	17	61
8	December 5, 1996	15	54
9	March 27, 1997	12	43
10	October 24, 1997	15	54
11	February 3, 1998	11	35

According to the records of the minutes of the meeting only representatives of a few institutions like MEDaC, MLSA and IOM representatives attended all the meetings. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended 10 meeting's, four of which were attended by different people. Representatives of important Ministries such as Agriculture, Education, and Health and Ethiopian Management Institute, Ministry of Health attended one or two meetings even then in an on and off manner. Discontinuity in attendance reduced active participation and, therefore, the effectiveness of members.

#### **b) Survey Results on the Performance of the Support Group**

Most importantly, survey results showed that most support group members do not seem to know the history of the project due to a number of factors. In this regard results of the interview held with nine members of support group are as provided below:-

				%
1. Number of years served as member of the SG:	Greater than 2 years			55.6
	Less than 2 years			22.2
	Less than 1 year			22.2
2. Do you or your organization know about the initial specific objectives of the programme ?	Yes		No	
	44.4			55.6
3. Was you or your organization involved in the initiation of the programme?	Yes	No	No	
	22.2	55.6		22.2 Response
4. What were the initial target of the program for Ethiopia?	• To return to Ethiopians			11.1%
	• To return qualified Ethiopians			22.2%
	• Do not know			22.2%
	• No response			44.4%
5. Number of officials represented in the SG prior to your current membership	None	One or two		
	44.4%	55.6%		
6. Did the project made effective usage of the skills of returnees ?	Yes	No	Do not know	
	0%	33.3%	55.5%	

It suffices to conclude that most of the members did not know about the specific objectives of the programme, did not get involved in the initiation of the programme, and do not know the initial target of the program. The body which has no mechanisms

of its own to monitor the impact can not be effective body. In general the Support Group has not been effective.

### **5.2.2 Counterpart**

Some of the responsibilities accomplished by the counterpart designated by MEDaC are the following:

- Identification and updating of priority employment sectors; (see Annexes 2&3)
- Processing job vacancies;
- Assessing and approving candidates;
- Co-ordinating job offer; and
- Facilitating the signing of the cooperation Agreement.

Overall performance of the counterpart is shown in Table 5.9.

**Table 5.9 Summary of Counterpart Performance Against Responsibilities**

Responsibilities of the Government Counterpart	Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing guidance to implementor in order to locate the programme within the government development priorities.</li> </ul>	—
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indicating sectors of priority development as well as specific job types, including possibilities for self-employment in the liberal professions</li> </ul>	This has been carried out together with the Support Group and IOM. (see Annexes 2 & 3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assisting in over coming obstacles to programme implementation</li> </ul>	Worked closely with IOM and Support Group to solve implementation problems.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assisting to identify appropriate institutions and persons to form support groups and chair meetings.</li> </ul>	Support Group members comprising representatives from relevant institutions have been identified to assist in the implementation of the programme.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist in defining role and function of support groups and chair meetings</li> </ul>	There is no evidence to review and evaluate. Indeed he chaired SG meetings.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist in formulating training programmes for sustainability and institutionalization of the programme and establish TOR</li> </ul>	There is no evidence that this has been done.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Endorse matched candidates and jobs</li> </ul>	This has been accomplished.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Endorse six monthly report before submission to the EU delegation and commission.</li> </ul>	This has been done.

Despite the accomplishments indicated in the above table, the institution building capacity aspect has not been done. This is because the role of the counterpart was limited to advising and assisting IOM and approving job-offers and placements of candidates/ returnees. In other words, the counterpart institution cannot immediately take over the current IOM activities because it has not been involved in the **modus operandi** of promoting recruitment, placement, follow-up monitoring and evaluation of the programme.

### 5.3 Problems and Constraints Faced by the Programme

The problems and constraints faced in the implementation of the programme were:

- High demand for returnees in all priority sectors, but finding job- vacancies in specific sectors or institutions was a big problem.
- Only the universities were very clear of their demand and made confidently effective use of the programme from the beginning without formal interview and test of candidates.

- The public sector had got many job-vacancies being advertised but not keen to recruit returnees. Similarly returnees were not initially keen to join public institutions (Ministries) because they thought the salaries would be much lower. Later when the returnees were willing, to join public institutions, the institutions had been reluctant.
- Private sector enterprises had not been willing because they were not confident about returnees, whom they do not know without formal interviews and test, although some private enterprises picked up returnees.
- NGOs had also been reluctant to recruit returnees because most of the returnees were highly qualified and might not accept low local salaries; and by staying abroad too long might be ignorant of the current socio-economic conditions of the country. This is despite the fact that the returnees came by accepting local salaries and the NGOs pay higher salary than public institutions and many of the NGOs recruit even foreign expatriates let alone Ethiopian returnees. Later on some NGOs picked some returnees.
- Despite the fact that the targets have been successfully achieved, and the full utilization of returnees by universities, private enterprises and NGOs, the programme has remained supply driven.
- • There has been a problem of ownership of the programme. Indeed senior Government officials, like the speaker of the House, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education, former Minister of Health, and Commissioner of Technology and support group and the counterpart have given their full support at the official level. But public institutions advertising job opening including the Federal Civil Service Commission had been reluctant to benefit from the programme. As a result the Resident Representative started to go door to door to convince public institutions to benefit from the programme. Similarly the Resident Representative made door to door campaign in the private sector and among NGOs.
- Request made from regional universities and other public institutions like from Alemaya University did not materialize as recruitment had been diverted to other expatriate personnel like recruitment of about 200 Indians under the UNDP Technical Assistance Programme or under the US Aid Technical Assistance

programme, who were more expensive and to Americans less effective in the long run than Ethiopian returnees.

- There were no government plan, policy and strategy in the effective utilization of skilled manpower, employment and regulating labour market. Government development policies like priorities in investment promotion and utilization of donor funds were not linked to availability and utilization of skilled manpower to manage the implementation of development programme. That is, it was less realized that the problems of slow rate implementation of development projects, problems of absorptive capacity to timely and effective utilization of large amount of donor's fund were basically attributed to shortage of skilled manpower to plan, design, and manage the implementation and operation of the development projects – linking absorptive capacity to skilled manpower.
- Large number of expatriates personnel have been employed in the design and management of implementation and operation of public and private development projects like road and airport construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of factories (Wonji- Metahara Sugar Mills), privatization and restructuring studies of public enterprise, management and operation of private enterprises and NGOs at the expense of domestically available professionals and skilled manpower and prospective returnees under IOM programme.
- Government refusal to give duty free status to returnees under IOM programme unless they were to be employed by government /or come under government invitation despite the fact that all of them came under the government programme. This issue contradicts government policy statement to give priority to the development of private sector. Secondly the policy lacks transparency because there was discrimination even within returnees employed by government sector. For instance, some returnees employed by university (government owned) got duty free entry for their vehicles while others were forced to pay. Thirdly government allowed Ethiopian and foreign investors duty free vehicle import but not for Ethiopians who bring their knowledge and skills to invest in the development of country. That is, investment in transfer of technology, know-how and skills have been discriminated or less favoured than investment in capital.

Lastly the returnees have faced problems of housing accommodation and schooling for their children.

Other problems have been that:

- Candidates refuse job offer;
- Offer withdrawn;
- Unable to place;
- Salary was too low, and
- No opening/ vacancy
- Job opening without budget



## **6. SUSTAINABILITY**

The combined key sectors, among other things, that will affect the sustainability of RQAN programme in Ethiopia are:

- Returnees;
- The organizational and technical competence of the counterpart that will assume full responsibility to implement the programme;
- Government support, and
- Donor support.

### **6.1 Returnees**

All indications point to the fact that returnees will remain in the country and continue their contribution to the institutional and national development of Ethiopia. Major indicators which support the foregoing are:

- Returnees are employed in priority sectors;
- None of the returnees regret the decision of coming back;
- Career prospects of returnees is rated good;
- Performance of returnees is reported to be excellent ;
- Contribution of returnees in institution building and transfer of know – how in the employing institutions is rated excellent (100%);
- Employing organizations made effective and full use of returnees, and
- Returnees are fully integrated i.e., reconnected to families, old friends, have made new friends, etc.

### **6.2 Organizational and Technical Issues**

The RQAN Programme involves four main activities: promotion, recruitment, placement and follow-up activities. The organization institutional modality /design created, in terms of the counterpart and the support group, has not been well prepared to be ready for the immediate take over of the full implementation of the programme in the next phase. Government Support through budgetary and manpower allocation as well as defining the structure, role and functional relationships with other relevant institutions has not been implemented.

### **6.3 Donor support**

As indicated earlier the programme has successfully attained its specific targets and raised the interest and expectations of stakeholders and thus the momentum should be kept up. Therefore enhanced donor support in areas of finance, technical and operational matters is critical for the continuation of the project.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **7.1 Conclusions**

The major conclusions drawn from the evaluation study are as highlighted below:-

- The programme attained its objective targets by assisting the returning of 66 highly qualified Ethiopians about 70% of them with DPD/MD 21% with MA/MSc, 9% BA/BSc.
- All of them had over an average of two years work experience abroad. All of the returnees are being employed in the priority sectors in government, universities and research Institutions (like the Agricultural Research Organizations and Nutrition and Health Research Institute), private enterprises and NGOs, although the optimum allocation among priority sectors could not be realistic.
- Both employers and returnees confirm that the programme has been successful in terms of transfer of knowledge, technology and know-how to the employing institutions and to the working colleagues and institution building capacity of employing institutions.
- Full utilization and full employment of the returnees in the fields of their training abroad and professions have been achieved.
- All the returnees consider their return correct. This is despite the serious problems they face in housing accommodation and schooling for their children and discriminative rules in custom duties on vehicles they imported.
- Practically all of them appear to have made social and cultural re-integration by being re-connected to relatives, old friends and developing new friends who supported in their re-integration particularly accommodations.
- The local salary seemed to be inadequate to meet living cost but still they seem to accept the situation.
- The programme appeared efficient in cost and effective in attainment of targets compared to other countries or programmes.

- Indeed the programme has faced various problems and constraints, it has been mostly supply driven.
- It has still a problem of ownership due to lack of effective government participation, at the implementation level despite recognition and acceptance of the programme at senior official level.
- Institution building capacity through the counterpart and the support group so as to immediately take over the implementation of the programme from IMO has not been successful due to lack of adequate preparations or readiness.
- The other problem of the program has been the assumption that the government would introduce manpower plan and utilization policy, that is, policy and strategy in employment and utilization of highly qualified and skilled professionals and skills. This has not been done. As a result employment and utilization of highly qualified and skilled national professionals remain unclear/ distorted resulting in importation of expatriates while nationals tend to be under- utilized. The recruitment of 200 Indian teachers while returnees under the programme could be available is a good example.

## **7.2 Recommendations**

Based on the analysis conducted and conclusions of the study, recommendations of the consultants are as outlined below:-

- Continue the programme to the next phase under NIP of EU with larger size to bring about 1000 Ethiopians. This is in view of the successful achievement of objective targets and the keen interest expressed by returnees and employers.
- Change the size and composition of the support group as follows:- Representatives of: MEDaC, MLSA, Addis Ababa University (represented by the office of Academic Vice President), Agricultural Research Organization, Institute of Health and Nutrition Research , Ministry of Health, a member of the returnees, Ethiopian Employers Federation, Federal Civil Service Commission, Ethiopian Investment Authority and IOM.
- Provide members of the support group with sitting and transport allowances under the programme.
- Two counterparts, one from MEDaC and one from MLSA should be seconded to the Addis Ababa IOM Office with topped up salary under the programme. These counterparts will assist the Resident Representative in recruitment, placement and follow-up re-integration, counseling and advising the returnees and enable the government finally to take over the programme. In this respect, proper and adequate arrangements should be made in

the plan of operations and budgetary provisions with time factors for final takeover of the programme by the government.

- Provide the Addis Ababa Mission its own annual budget linked to its operational plan and activities.
- Simplify the monthly reporting systems so as to give an overall picture of the progress of the programme , major problems and constraints faced , flexibilities required and actions taken with respect to placement and requirement. Reporting should include budgetary performance by line of activities. In this regard computerized database should be introduced to facilitate the activities of internal and external monitoring and evaluations.
- The backstopper should leave behind an Aide Memoire containing the major findings and recommendations on Ethiopia after making visits.
- All custom duties exemptions should be provided to the returnees including on importation of vehicles. This is in the belief that those who bring and transfer their knowledge, technologies and skills to invest in Ethiopia should be treated like those who bring their investment capital.
- The provision of housing and schooling facilities remain to be a national problems. It would be very delicate to give priority while the present local staff remain without houses. But equal priority/status should be given to Ethiopian returnees like expatriate employees by employing institutions (e.g. like present expatriate teachers,) or some supplementary support by other donors or under the programme.
- Formation of Returnee Association should be encouraged under the programme.
- The self- employment component should be restructured in such a way that decision for self-employment should be made after returning to Ethiopian. That is, after the returnees have made assessment of the actual local conditions, (office accommodations, market situations, etc.)
- The loan amount and terms of repayment be flexible depending on the sizes and types of projects, cast flow.
- Market interest rates should be charged on the loan with adequate chattel mortgage under the domestic law. IOM should pay for project appraisal, design and counseling to the Technical Institution and follow –up of the loan using the interest payment.
- Make quarterly or half-yearly assessment of job vacancies so as to be able to identify demand by types of professions and employing institutions. Then promote these vacancies among candidates rather than the programme.

- Link the programme, closely with key development project aid programmes which use larger number of expatriates, like large construction projects, privatization of public enterprises, large private investment project, public sector reforms, etc.
- Remove the optimum distribution issue to be realistic.
- Make a roster of highly qualified Ethiopians in Diaspora abroad and encourage them to get connected through internet.
- Government should introduce manpower planning, policies and strategies particularly in employment and full utilization of national professionals and skilled manpower vis-a-vis the modalities of the recruitment and utilization of expatriate labour. To this effect adequate budgetary provision should be made under the programme to conduct a study to be used as basic document for the introduction of the plan.



*Annex 1 List of Members of the Support Group by Number of Meetings Held*

Members and Organizations represented	Dates on which meetings were held*											Total No.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1. MEDaC												
<i>Mr. Legesse Mamo, Team Leader , Labour, Social Wilfare, Culture and Sports, Designated IOM Counterpart</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
2. Ministry of Trade and Industry												
<i>Mr. Ephrem Jufer , Head, Multilateral Trade Relation Division</i>	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Ms. Brikti Kebede, Acting Head, Foreign Relations Service.	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Mr. Asefa Girmamo	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Mr. Mesfin Abebe	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
3. Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce												
Mr. Abera Feleke, Head, Committee Co-ordination Department	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	
4. Ministry of Transport and Communications												
Mr. Wolde Nidaw, Siniore Expert, Maritime Transport	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Ms. Askal W/Giorgis	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	

✓ = present

x = not present

\* Dates of Meetings

1. August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1995
2. October 9<sup>th</sup>, 1995
3. December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1995
4. February 28<sup>th</sup>, 1996
5. April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1996

6. June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1996
7. August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1996 (was attended by 9 Returnees )
8. December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1996
9. March 27<sup>th</sup>, 1997
10. October 24<sup>th</sup>, 1997
11. February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1998

5. Ethiopian Management Institute													
Mr. Getachew Wondimagegnahu	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x		
6. Ministry of Agriculture													
Mr. Amare Tebekew, Team Leader, Planning and Programming Department	✓	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x		
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs													
Mr. Teklu Habye	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	x		
Mr. Esayas Gotta	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x		
Dr. Zewdineh Beyene	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x		
Mr. Abraha Girmay, Counsellor, including of NGOs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x		
Mr. Esayas Gutta	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
8. Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce													
Mr. Kassahun Jembere, Secretary General	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Mr. Takaligne Abate, Head, Planning and Trade Promotion	x	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x		
9. Ministry of Education													
Mr. Gebre Medhin Kidane	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	x		
Mr. Girma Yadessa	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x		
10. Federal Civil Service Commission													
Ms. Elizabeth Getachw, Selection & Employment, Tem Leader	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Ms. Mahtsente Yohannes	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	✓	x		
Ms. Almaze Zeleke	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓		



11. Ministry of Public Works & Urban Development												
Mrs. Tshay Berhane, Planning & Development, Head	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	
Ms. Ambaye Hagos	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	
12. Administration for Refugee/Returnee Affairs												
Mr. Danial, Programming & Monitoring Support	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
Mr. Getachew Alemayehu, Education & Counseling Officer	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
13. Berhan Returnee Association (Local NGO)												
Mr. Yihenew Hunegnaw, Secretary	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
Dr. Kebede T/Mariam, President	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
14. IOM												
Ms. Meera Sethi	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Mr. Abdul Razak Ahmed, Consultant	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
Mr. Markos Teklu	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	
Mr. William Thuring	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	
15. European Union												
Mr. Heino Marius, Economic Advisor	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	
16. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs												
Mr. Yohannes Beshah, Chief Expert, Manpower Department	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	
17. Addis Ababa University												
Mr. Degefe Dureru	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	
18. Ministry of Health												
Mr. Hailemichael Manore	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	
19. Ministry of Finance												
Mr. Lemma Chimssa, Head, Personnel Department	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	

20. Ministry of Mines and Energy												
Mr. Girma Bekele, Head, Planning Department	x	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	
Mr. Seyoum Teshome	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	
Ms. Almaz Belayneh, Statistics- Team Leader	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	
21. Health Institute												
Mr. Mekonnen Zegeye, Head, PRI- EHNRI	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	
22. GTZ – FKP												
Mr. Osman Ali	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	
23. Ethiopian Press Enterprise												
Mr. Haileloul Yilma	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	
24. Institute of Agricultural Research												
Mr. Tesfaye Zegeye	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	
Mr. Seifu Eshete	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	
25. Ethiopian Airlines												
Mr. Negussie Ambo, Expert Training & General Service.	x	x	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	
26. Ethiopian Mineral Resources Development Corporation												
Mr. Habtu Hagos, Head, Planning & Programming	x	x	x	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	
27. Ethiopian Petroleum Corporation												
Ms. Laketch Mamo, Chief of Personnel	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Mr. Said Siraj	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	
28. Prime Minster's Office												
Mr. Gebreselasse G/ Mariam	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	
29. Alemaya University												
Mr. Mengistu Hulluka	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	

**Annex 2 Priority Sectors as Broadly Defined by the Support Group**

The following initial priority Sectors and Job types have been identified on the basis of Review of various government development plans and discussions with officials of key ministries

**1. Agriculture**

**gronomists**

- Fisheries specialists
- Soil Scientists
- Forestry engineers
- Animal Scientists
- Irrigation engineers
- Ecologists
- Agricultural Economists
- Veterinarians
- Biologists
- Agro-mechanics specialists

**2. Industry**

- Chemical and Electrical engineers
- Food, textile, leather technologists
- Production managers experts
- Organization and managers experts
- Project and investment analyst

**3. Mining and Energy**

- Hydro-geologists
- Ecologists
- Seismologists
- Cartographers
- Surveyers
- Hydrolic engineers

**4. Transport and Communication**

- Transport and Communication experts
- Roads and highways specialists
- Telecom and electronic experts

**5. Trade and Tourism**

- Hotel managers and administrators
- International tour organizers
- Human resource managers

**6. Urban Development and Construction**

- Structural and Construction engineers
- Civil engineers
- Mechanical engineers

Architects  
Town planners  
Drafters  
Water and Sanitary engineers  
Environmental engineers

## 7. Social Services Sectors

### 1.1 Health

Pathologists  
Entomologists  
Pedagogues  
Psychologists  
Pharmacists  
Physicians

### 7.2 Education

University lecturers and professors  
Education planners  
English literature teachers  
Journalists

## **8. Finance:**

Bankers  
Accountants  
Computer experts and Programmers  
Financial analysts and managers  
Economic policy managers  
Statisticians  
Public finance experts  
MIS specialists  
Legal experts

Source: "Country Sheet June 1995"

The initial priority sector and job types were up-dated by the Support Group at its 8<sup>th</sup> meeting held on December 5,1996. The manner in which the up dating was done is summarized.

**Annex 3 Revised Priority Sector as were Updated by the Support Group**

COLUMN (1)	COLUMN (2)	COLUMN(3)	COLUMN(4)	COLUMN(5)	COLUMN (6)
Current/ Updated Selection of Priority sector	Occupational Areas within each priority sector in which manpower shortages are prohibitive to the sector's Productivity and growth	Occupational Areas from (2) in which shortages/ position vacancies are due to an inadequate local supply of Trained and experienced manpower	Occupational Areas that appear in Column (3) but do not now appear in your priority sector job type list	Occupational Areas that appear in your priority sector job type list but do not appear in column (3)	Recommendations for updated job type list for RQAN III priority sectors (3)
Agriculture	Ecologists Agr. economists Irrigation engineers Soil scientists Agro-mechanics Agronomists Veterinarians	ALL OCCUPATIONAL AREAS LISTED IN COLUMN 2 HAVE SHORTAGES DUE TO INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED MANPOWER AND DUE TO POLITICAL FACTORS	N/A	Fisheries specialists Forestry engineers Biologists Animal scientists	Ecologists Agr.economists Irrigation engineers Soil scientists Agro-mechanics Agronomists Veterinarians
Mines/Energy	Hydro-geologist Hydraulic engineers Seismologists Cartographers Mining Lawyers Electrical Fitters Line Men		Mining Lawyers Electrical Fitters Line Men	Ecologists	Hydro-geologist Hydraulic engineers Seismologists Cartographers Mining Lawyers Electrical Fitters Line Men

Urban Development, Housing, Building and Construction	Civil, Mechanical, Electrical Engineers Town planners Drafters Water/Environmental Engineers Town planners		N/A    N/A	Architects    N/A	Civil, Mechanical, Electrical Engineers Town planners Drafters Water/Environmental Engineers
Water Resources Development	Soil Scientists Irrigation engineers Environmental Engineers				Soil Scientists Irrigation engineers Environmental engineers
Transport & Communication	Logistics experts Telecommunication/ Electronic experts Transport/ Communication experts		Logistics experts	Roads and Highway specialists	Logistics experts Telecommunication/ Electronic experts Transport/ Communication Experts
Health	Pharmacists Lab. Technicians/ Nurses Entomologists Physicians in all areas Of specialization		Lab. technicians/ Nurses	Pathologists Pedagogues Psychologists	Pharmacists Lab. Technicians/Nurses Entomologists Physicians in all areas of specialization
Education	Professors/lecturers in Economics, Finance, Accounts, Education, Business Management, Engineering, Agriculture, Natural/ Physical Sciences		Professors/lecturers in Economics, Finance, accounts, Education, Business Management, Engineering, Agriculture,	English literature teachers Journalists	Professors/lecturers in Economics, Finance, Accounts, Education, Business Management, Engineering, Agriculture, Natural/Physical Sciences

	(Finance & Accounts specialists are needed in every economic sector)		Natural /Physical Sciences		
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## I. Annex 4. List of Officials Interviewed

### II. a. Employers

<b>Name Persons Interviewed</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Name of Organizations</b>
<i>1. Dr. Hailu Ayele</i>	<i>Vice Academic President</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>2. Dr. Mekbeb Afework</i>	<i>Head of Dept. of Anatomy</i>	<i>Black Lion Hospital</i>
<i>3. Ato Afewerke</i>	<i>Administrator Faculty of Technology</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>4. Dr. Tegegn</i>	<i>Director of the Institute</i>	<i>Health and Nutrition Research Institute</i>
<i>5. Getachew Kitaw</i>	<i>General Manager of Attonmey at Law</i>	<i>Attoney at law</i>
<i>6. Dr. Arega</i>	<i>Head of Ethiopian Language Studies</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>7. Dr. Tegegn G.Egizabher</i>	<i>Director of IDR</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>8. Dr. Kifle Dagne</i>	<i>Head department of Biology</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>9. Dr. Tesfaye Dimma</i>	<i>Head of M. Engineering Dept.</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Engineering</i>
<i>10. Dr. Hailemichel</i>	<i>Department Head ILS</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>

III.



**b. Returnees**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Professions</b>	<b>Employers</b>
<i>1. Haregewoin Ashenafi</i>	<i>Lawyers</i>	<i>Self – employed</i>
<i>2. Dr. getachew Betru</i>	<i>Engineer</i>	<i>Self – employed</i>
<i>3. Dr. Meseret Techlemaram</i>	<i>Geotermist</i>	<i>Geological Survey</i>
<i>4. Dr. Yared Amare</i>	<i>Anthropologist</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University (IES)</i>
<i>5. Lemaa Mesfin</i>	<i>B. Adm. &amp; Economist</i>	<i>Jimma Institute of Health Science (University)</i>
<i>6. Dr. Alem Bezezew</i>	<i>Mechanical Engineer</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Technology</i>
<i>7. Dr. Embet Mulugeta</i>	<i>Education Psychologist</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University IDR/CENTRING</i>
<i>8. Dr. Konjit Fekade</i>	<i>Mechanical Engineer</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Technology</i>
<i>9. Dr. Yonas Admasu</i>	<i>Linguist</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>10. Dr. Yoseph Tesfaye</i>	<i>Political Scientist</i>	<i>Horn of African Peace Aid</i>
<i>11. Dr. Tesfaye Berisso</i>	<i>Soc. Anthropologist</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University (IES)</i>
<i>12. Dr. Girma Akalu</i>	<i>Research Scientist</i>	<i>Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Institute</i>
<i>13. Dr. Tenkir Bongor</i>	<i>Economist</i>	<i>Prime Minister’s Office</i>
<i>14. Dr. Tesfaye Alemu</i>	<i>Economist</i>	<i>Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation</i>

<i>15. Bruck Berhanu</i>	<i>Engineer</i>	<i>Universal Construction PLS</i>
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**IV. c. Counterpart**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
<i>Legesse Mammo</i>	<i>Team Leader</i>	<i>MEDaC</i>

V.

**VI. d. Members of Support Group**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Name of Organizations</i>
<i>1. Gabemariam Kidane</i>	<i>Panel Head</i>	<i>Ministry of Education</i>
<i>2. Almaz Zeleke</i>	<i>Team Leader of Recruitment</i>	<i>Federal Civil Service Commission</i>
<i>3. Almaz Belayneh</i>	<i>Team Leader</i>	<i>Ministry of Mines &amp; Energy</i>
<i>4. Yonannas Beshah</i>	<i>Team Leader Employment</i>	<i>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</i>
<i>5. Haptu Hagos</i>	<i>Head of Planning &amp; Programming</i>	<i>Ethiopian Mineral Resource Development Corporation</i>
<i>6. Degefa Duressa</i>	<i>Ass. Dean Faculty of Business and Economics</i>	<i>Addis Ababa University</i>
<i>7. Tecklemariam Abate</i>	<i>Acting Secretary General</i>	<i>Ethiopia Chamber of Commerce</i>
<i>8. Haile Michael Manore</i>	<i>Senior Expert of Basic Health</i>	<i>Ministry of Health</i>
<i>9. Brikiti Kebede</i>	<i>Head of Import Follow-up</i>	<i>Ministry of Trade and Industry</i>

**VII. e. Others**

<i>Dr. Meera Sethi</i>	<i>Resident Representative.</i>	<i>IOM</i>
<i>Zelalem Tesfa</i>	<i>Finance Officer</i>	<i>IOM</i>
<i>Ruth Paulos</i>	<i>Programme Officer</i>	<i>IOM</i>

<i>Osman Ali</i>	<i>Programme Officer</i>	<i>GTZ</i>
<i>Awgechew Negash</i>	<i>Manager</i>	<i>Ethio-Netherlands      Returnee</i> <i>Programme Office</i>
<i>Mandinda G. Zimba</i>	<i>Programme Officer</i>	<i>UNDP</i>

## viii. Annex 5. List of References

1. Aredo, Dejene, Addis Ababa University, *Human Capital Flight from Africa: An Assessment of Brain Drain from Ethiopia*, Presented, to the UNECA Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, February 22 –24, 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
2. ***Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Angola, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals – Phase III, 1994***
3. Dr. Sethi, Meera, International Organization for Migration Addis Ababa, *Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals*, Presented at the UNECA Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, February 22 – 24, 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
4. Teferra, Damtew, Center for International Higher Education, School of Education, Boston College Boston, USA,, *Revisiting the Brain Mobility Doctrine in the Information Age*, Presented at the UNECA Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, February 22 – 24, 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
5. Tapsoba, Sibry J.M, Regional Office for West and Central Africa Dakar, Senegal , *Knowledge Generation and Retention in Africa*, Presented at the UNECA Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, February 22 –24, 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
6. IOM, *Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, Implementation Report July – December 1999*, Nairobi, Kenya
7. IOM, *Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, Implementation Report, January – June 1998*, Nairobi, Kenya.
8. IOM, *Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, Implementation Report, July – December 1996 and January – June 1997*, Switzerland, Geneva.
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11. IOM, *Fighting the African ‘Brain Drain’*, September 1995.
12. ITAD Ltd, *Mid – term Evaluation of the Return of Qualified African Nationals Phase III 7 ACP RPR 28, Submitted to Communities*, March, 1997.
13. ***Technical Cooperation of Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Angola, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals – Phase III, 1994***

14. UNECA, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, February 22 – 24, 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

## **Annex 6.**

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of the

### **Return of Qualified African Nationals Phase III**

## **IX. Ethiopian Country Programme**

### **1. Background**

The project for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) is the continuation of a pilot initiative started in 1983 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and extended in 1987 under Lome II. The pilot phase was implemented during the period from 1983 to 1987, with 535 African professionals returned to the then 3 target countries of Kenya, Somalia, and countries of Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Following the first Evaluation Seminar held in Nairobi (1-4 December 1986), phase II was implemented between 1988 and 1992 adding Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia to the target countries, and assisting another target group of 765 qualified Africans in their return and reintegration process.

The financing agreement for phase III was signed in December 1994 and the implementation started in January 1995. The indicative target group consists of 999 professionals including 100 already returned during the Bridging phase. Phase III currently covers 8 target countries, namely Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The initial indicative return target for Ethiopia was 45. Due to the growing demand for program services from employers in Ethiopia as well as the large number of candidates in Ethiopia Roster, IOM increased the indicative return target to 71.

The Ethiopian country program is being implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Government of Ethiopia's designated counterpart (MEDaC). In view of the imminent end of Phase III by December 1999 and the on going discussions among

stakeholders on a post-Phase III country/region –specific programme, the need for an evaluation of the current Ethiopia country programme has been requested by MEDaC.

Following discussions between IOM Addis Ababa and MEDaC on the subject of an evaluation of the country programme, IOM in cooperation with MEDaC has drafted the Terms of Reference. IOM will financially support the evaluation and MEDaC will identify the consultant for the evaluation.

## **2. Overall Objective**

To evaluate the main aspects of the Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) in Ethiopian in light of the overall program objective: “to enhance the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating ACP countries.” (Ref: Agreement No. 5322/REG, ANNEX No. 1, 2.1)

## **3. Specific Objectives**

1. To evaluate the program in light of the specific objectives:

- “to assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialized or other African countries in their return and reintegration process;
- to assist returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self employed;
- to enhance the social and cultural integration of the returnees;
- to assist and encourage African countries in the establishment / strengthening of an institutional frame work to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals.”

(Ref: Agreement No. 5322/REG, Annex No. 1, 2.3):



2. To review and comment on the genesis (background) of the country-specific program. More specifically, the study will seek to answer the following questions:
  - Which public body initiated the need for participating in the program;
  - What were the initial specific objectives and targets of the program;
  - How were the priority sectors identified and updated; were they responsive to actual needs of the Government of Ethiopia;
  - How have these key sectors identified as being of priority to the economy, have made use of the role and expertise of the returnees;
  - To comment on the relevance of the country program, in light of identified problems.
3. To evaluate attainment of the program's institution building objectives in Ethiopia, looking specifically at the question of workability of institution – building objectives in the Ethiopian context;
4. To evaluate the extent to which the activities undertaken by IOM Addis Ababa successfully facilitated a reasonable level of reintegration of the returnees;
5. To assess the program's output against established indicators and targets;
6. To assess the cost-efficiency of the RQAN program in Ethiopia.

#### **4. Activities to be undertaken**

1. Thorough background reading on RQAN III to ensure a good understanding of the program's objectives and implementation strategies, through review of documentation such as:
  - The Technical Cooperation Agreement ;
  - The Financing Agreement;
  - Minutes of the MEDaC /IOM Support Group Meetings;
  - IOM international evaluation;

- Mid –term external evaluation;
- RQAN candidate files

2. In depth interviews and discussions with:

- Heads of institutions/units of major recipient institutions ;
- Key Government Counterpart institution officials, namely:
  - a) Ato Negatu Mereke, Head, Human Resources Development and Social Affairs Department , MEDaC;
  - b) Ato Abebaw Felleke, Deputy Authorizing Officer, MEDaC;
  - c) Ato Legesse Mamo, MEDaC.
- Support Group members;
- IOM Program Officer and other IOM staff involved (internal);
- The Counterpart at the Delegation of the Economic Commission to Ethiopia;
- Beneficiaries: Returnees and Employers.

3. Analysis of information obtained and writing- up of the final report ( as detailed below in Section 5)

**5. Output**

1. Based on all of the above, a draft final report will be produced within six weeks of completion of the evaluation, covering the elements contained in the terms of reference (please note that percentages given are only indicative);
  - a) Executive summary (5% of the report length);
  - b) Background of the project (5% of the report length);
  - c) Design of the project (15% of the report length) indicating an overview of the lay-out of the project;
  - d) Relevance of the project, assessing the objectives against social, political and economic features of the country (15% of the report length);

- e) Findings in line with the overall and specific objectives of the evaluation (50% of the report length). Specifically:
- The role played by the Government Counterpart in program implementation;
  - Efficiency of IOM Addis Ababa's process of candidates selection and job placement building objectives;
  - Examination of RQAN III in Ethiopia vis-à-vis similar governmental and private efforts at return and retention of qualified and skilled human resources;
  - Constraints to program implementation.
- f) Conclusion (10% of the report length).

2. The evaluation will be undertaken as per the following schedule:

- (i) 2 May 2000 Beginning of study.
- (ii) 31 May 2000 Submission of first draft to IOM and MEDaC.
- (iii) 7 June 2000 Submission of final draft to IOM and MEDac
- (iv) 21 June 2000 Present a final written report, in English, to MEDaC, Delegation of the European Commission to Ethiopia, and IOM Addis Ababa (2 copies to MEDaC 1copy to DEC and 2 copies to IOM) which will be revised and finalized by it consultant based on input from MEDaC, Dec and IOM.

## **6. Resources**

*IOM will be responsible for covering the cost of consultant fees, reproduction of the reports transport and other costs required to undertake the study. MEDaC will select the consultants and forward the names and addresses to IOM.*

### **Facilitator (MEDaC):**

- Selection of one consultant, in deliberation with IOM Addis Ababa, to carry out the evaluation
- Provision of information

### **Contracting Agency (IOM Addis Ababa)**

- Payment of the consultant's fee ( as per ceiling established by IOM Addis Ababa in consultation with SRO Nairobi)

- Access to program staff and records;
- Provide logistical support with recipient institutions and donor representatives and beneficiaries.

## Annex 7. LOGICAL FRAME WORK

Project Title: return and reintegration of qualified African nationals-Phase III<sup>1</sup>

	Logic of intervention	Objectively verifiable indicators	Source of verification	Assumption
Overall objective	Contribute to enhancing the role and utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries		- Terminate external evaluation	- Governments of recipient countries make efforts to implement appropriate personnel policies, and to render labor market regulation more efficient.
Program Goal	The selective return migration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans in order to contribute to fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity	The returnees have been absorbed in key sectors of the economy in accordance with the priority manpower needs of the country concerned	- regular assessment of the priority sectors for employment of returnees - Six-monthly reviews - External mid term evaluation - External terminal evaluation	Governments make efforts to establish manpower plans to identify priority sectors for employment of returnees, and support IOM in identifying concrete job vacancies
Project Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialized countries in their return and reintegration process</li> <li>- To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African residing in other African countries</li> <li>- To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed</li> <li>- To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- at least 80% of returnees still employed in accordance with available man power development plans after 2 years of project activities</li> <li>- 70% of returnees assisted as self employed are still operating 2 years after their return</li> <li>- at least 70 % of the returnees consider their job commensurate with their training</li> <li>- at least 70% of returnees consider that a transfer of knowledge/experience to others takes place</li> <li>- at least 80% of returnees consider that the return of qualified nationals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- IOM computer database</li> <li>- Population and sample surveys of assisted returnees (by IOM)</li> <li>- Monitoring of the reintegration process of the returnees (by IOM)</li> <li>- Technical/managerial backstopping monitoring (external expert)</li> <li>- mid-term evaluation after 18 months of project implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- support obtained from receiving countries to facilitate the transfer of human resources</li> <li>- the security situation in countries of return allows for project implementation.</li> <li>- Working conditions are considered</li> </ul>

	their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals	contributes to the development of the receiving country		
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	Logic of intervention	Objectively verifiable indicators	Source of verification	Assumption														
Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 610 (highly) qualified/skilled African nationals residing in industrialized countries recruited and placed in the participating target countries</li> <li>- 87 (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans transferred on a regional basis</li> <li>- 300 additional (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans assisted to return to non-target countries</li> <li>- 140 (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans assisted as self-employed in the liberal professions</li> <li>- Support groups created in main target countries</li> <li>- Government counterpart trained in main target countries recruitment, placement and follow-up activities</li> </ul>	<p><u>Means: (MECU)</u></p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 70%;">Direct Support</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.40</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Administrative costs</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1.20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Evaluation, monitoring, auditing</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.18</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Contingencies</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><u>0.65</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">12.43</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Advance</td> <td style="text-align: right;"><u>(0.73)</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">11.70</td> </tr> </table>	Direct Support	10.40	Administrative costs	1.20	Evaluation, monitoring, auditing	0.18	Contingencies	<u>0.65</u>		12.43	Advance	<u>(0.73)</u>		11.70	<p>Same as above and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- terminal external evaluation</li> <li>- terminal evaluation seminar for participating countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support groups meet regularly</li> <li>- Government counterparts participate actively in project implementation</li> </ul>
Direct Support	10.40																	
Administrative costs	1.20																	
Evaluation, monitoring, auditing	0.18																	
Contingencies	<u>0.65</u>																	
	12.43																	
Advance	<u>(0.73)</u>																	
	11.70																	
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- identifying priority employment sectors and concrete job vacancies in recipient countries</li> <li>- identifying/selecting candidates for self-employment</li> <li>- “job broker” services between employers and African candidates</li> <li>- Providing adequate incentives for return and reintegration of (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans in their country of origin</li> <li>- Identifying/providing specific training to returnees if required for certain jobs</li> <li>- Providing follow-up advisory services to returnees on the spot</li> <li>- Activities aimed at strengthening the project’s institutionalization and sustainability</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- regular managerial/technical backstopping monitoring</li> <li>- external mid-term evaluation</li> <li>- external terminal evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- active implication of government counterparts in project implementation</li> </ul>														