Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia

Assessing Migrants' and Community Needs and Managing Risks

Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia – Assessing migrants' and community needs and managing risks – Astana, 2017

The regional field assessment "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Assessing migrants' and community needs and managing risks" (2017) is the fruit of a collaborative effort of Government officials, a team of international and national experts with the support of the IOM missions in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Geneva and IOM Regional Office for Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia under the auspices of the Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center). IOM Kazakhstan, Sub-regional coordination office for Central Asia, had the overall management and coordination of the project. The assessment was made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of IOM and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

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Abbreviations

ASPR	Automated system of personalized registration of the population, vital events and migration
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ATC	Anti-Terrorism Centre
BPRM	(US State Department) Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
CA	Central Asia
CEMRS	Centralised External Migration Registration System
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Common Security Treaty Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAR	Dignity and Rights
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EDB	Eurasian Development Bank
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus group discussion
FMS	Federal Migration Service
GBAO	Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (Tajikistan)
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
ICC	Information and Consultative Center
IIN	Individual Identification Number
ILO	International Labour Organization
IO	International organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KR	Kyrgyz Republic
MCI	Monthly calculation index
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHSD	Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MICIC	IOM Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster
MLSD	Ministry of Labour and Social Development of the Kyrgyz Republic
MLSP	Ministry of Labour and Social Protection

MNE	Ministry of National Economy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
PPP	Peacebuilding Priorities Plan of the Kyrgyz Republic
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RATS SCO	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
RF	Russian Federation
RK	Republic of Kazakhstan
RT	Republic of Tajikistan
SAMK	Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan
SCNS KR	State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCRA KR	State Commission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic
SEECA	South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia
SES	Single Economic Space
SFID	State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
SMS KR	State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic
STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
TB	Tuberculosis
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRCCA	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
US$	United States Dollar
VE	Violent extremist

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This regional field assessment was prepared by a team of international and national experts with the support of the IOM missions in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. IOM Kazakhstan, Sub-regional coordination office for Central Asia (IOM CA), had the overall management and coordination of the project. The assessment was made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of IOM and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

This report is the fruit of a collaborative effort of Government officials, international and national experts, IOM mission focal points from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

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Introduction

The combination of economic downturn in Russia and Central Asia and the facilitation of conditions for entry, residence and employment of Central Asian migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan has had significant impact on the volume and directions of migration flows in the region. On the one hand, declining remittances and difficulties in securing sustainable income in their home countries have stimulated greater interest in new destinations, pressure for family reunification or women becoming the primary breadwinners taking up the migration route. On the other hand, while new legal opportunities (introduction of patents in Russia and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union) have helped regularize the status of many Central Asian migrants, certain categories of migrants remain particularly vulnerable in legal and socioeconomic terms – in particular, those who were unprepared for the imposition of a re-entry ban to Russia.

The IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID Dignity and Rights regional field assessment "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration", published in 2016, identified a range of vulnerabilities, to which migrant workers were subject prior to and following the imposition of re-entry bans: legal (inadequate rights awareness and exposure to exploitation), economic (reduced income and indebtedness) and socio-cultural (reliance on informal networks for support).

The IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID Dignity and Rights in-depth regional field assessment, which followed in 2017 on "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Assessing migrants' and community needs and managing risks", is seeking to establish the precise needs of vulnerable migrants and capacities of state institutions and non-state entities to address these vulnerabilities and leveraging the potential for the vulnerable migrants' successful re-integration into the local labour market. In addition, risk factors limiting chances for migrants' re-integration and implications for their welfare were identified and weighted. The risk analysis considers the impact of state policies, measures aiming to reduce shock of re-entry bans, employment and integration services in the regions of migrants' origin as well as the involvement of home and diaspora communities.

The IOM CA/Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev Center)/USAID Dignity and Rights (DAR) Regional Field Assessment 2017 (Phase II) on "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Assessing migrants' and community needs and managing risks" is based on the available official data and has covered the current volume and composition of return migration of Central Asian workers and assessed the overall change in the flows of remittances. It has also tracked the long-term dynamics of various migrant flows and indicated changes in migration balance of Central Asian countries. The regional field assessment has analyzed the economic conditions determining chances of integration/reintegration of migrant workers returning to countries of origin or moving to Kazakhstan. It has reviewed recent changes in legal and administrative conditions for returnees' re-integration and migrant workers' integration and presented

long-term grounds for radicalization, which have been noted by government officials and experts on the issue in the three countries under study.

The sociological component of the regional field assessment identified various types of vulnerabilities, reported by Central Asian migrant workers while in migration and upon return. It has indicated most vulnerable groups among returning migrants and identified their immediate/integration/reintegration needs. Moreover, the assessment has provided a framework for understanding the possible link between re-entry banned migrants' vulnerabilities (deterioration of socio-economic status, alienation from the state and community) and their long-term radicalization potential. It has also elaborated risk factors, which increase the potential for radicalization of various population segments in Central Asia and identified additional risk factors, which may affect migrant workers. It has emphasized the need for building trust between migrants, the state, migrant diasporas and local communities so as to build migrants' long-term resilience to extremist messaging.

The analysis serves to inform a wide variety of instrumental stakeholders (state institutions, international and non-governmental organizations, community and diaspora leaders) in raising the level of protection of migrants' rights, especially the most vulnerable ones. It seeks to contribute to the effective identification of gaps and needs in elaborating the legal framework, developing operational measures and enhancing institutional cooperation that would help prevent, address and sustainably resolve migrant vulnerabilities. It is guided by the principles of the ***Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in line with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda*** by referring to relevant international norms, principles and standards. A crucial element of the GCM is raising the level of effective protection to migrants, especially the most vulnerable ones. Several GCM themes are of direct significance in this context: ensuring human rights of all migrants, preventing all forms of discrimination, addressing drivers of migration as well as issues related to irregular migration, including provision of regular pathways, and enhancing protection and assistance rendered to vulnerable migrants, including victims of trafficking, exploitation and smuggling.

The regional field assessment has been made possible through close engagement of state institutions, non-governmental organizations, national and international experts, IOM offices in Central Asia, IOM Regional Office in Vienna and IOM Headquarters in Geneva, leaders of communities and diasporas as well as Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrants and their families in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is hoped that this process has resulted in a multifaceted perspective on the issue of specific needs for re-integration assistance and elaborating effective mechanisms for ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration in Central Asia. The acknowledgment of these various perspectives is in the long run essential for reducing vulnerabilities experienced by migrants and for maximizing benefits of migration for all relevant stakeholders.

Conceptual and methodological framework

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the framework underlying the findings of the assessment, defining the key terms applied in the analysis and outlining the methods for collecting the data and approaches used to interpret the results. References are made to relevant literature and linkages are presented to Phase I of the assessment.[1] Phase II builds on and provides an update on the trends identified in the previous stage, covering three main aspects: socioeconomic impact of return migration to Central Asia, sociological assessment of vulnerabilities of returning migrants at various stages of their movement (in migration, upon return, in re-emigration) as well as the identification of risk factors and challenges facing migrants, their households, local communities and state institutions involved in the process of reintegration of returnees. Accordingly, the assessment has been divided into components, which apply different methods to:

produce a comprehensive picture of returnees' re-integration needs and socio-economic development factors;

provide framework for assessing the impact of economic and rights-based interventions;

assess impact of measures and policy changes for observed groups; and

reveal migrants' perception of their status, needs and expectations prior to the intervention and their self-evaluation of the changing socio-economic and cultural position.

Phase II of the assessment applies the notion of "vulnerability" as a central concept, putting migrants' subjective evaluation of their status into focus as a reference point for identifying their needs for assistance. The subjective evaluation is placed in the context of the socioeconomic trends and factors identified in the course of the analysis of the quantitative data, obtained through official requests to authorities and from public sources as well as of the positions, expressed by the key stakeholders: state officials, experts, community and spiritual leaders and NGO representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both the subjective and objective perspectives have been taken into account when an overview of key challenges and opportunities to effective (re)integration of returning migrants has been completed (risk analysis).

In addition, this report considers implications of the socioeconomic and sociological findings for elaborating the general grounds and specific factors, making potential of various population segments higher for radicalization. As the assessment of radicalization potential is based on the analysis of secondary sources, reflecting a variety of stakeholder perspectives, it does not allow for establishing a direct link between the occurrence of vulnerabilities among various subcategories of return migrants and the likelihood of their radicalization. For this reason, radicalization component is presented in a separate chapter, which also discusses the framework for understanding factors and mechanisms of radicalization that could act on returning migrants and their environment (in migration, upon return and in re-emigration).

While the assessment presents a broad picture of vulnerabilities, it draws a limited set of conclusions (Fig. 1). The limitations are both due to the methods used (qualitative assessment of vulnerabilities) and to IOM's general approach under "do no harm" principle, according to which the assessment should under no circumstances compromise on migrants' trust.

The following sections outline the conceptual basis, re-

1 "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration." Astana, Kazakhstan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). November 2016.

view literature sources and go over the methods used in the socioeconomic and sociological components of the assessment as well as underlying risk analysis whose findings have been published as a standalone document.[2]

Fig. 1. Scope of the Phase II assessment: what the report does and does not

Socioeconomic impact of return migration

The report **does**	The report **does not**
Present current volume and structure of return migration based on available official data	Forecast the scale and makeup of returning migrant workers
Analyze economic conditions for reintegration in countries of origin and Kazakhstan	Determine the chances of integration of specific categories of migrants in given locations
Review recent changes in legal basis and state programs for returnees' reintegration	Evaluate the impact of current assistance on specific target groups' reintegration success

Sociological view of vulnerabilities

The report **does**	The report **does not**
Identify vulnerabilities, reported by migrant workers to happen so far in migration and upon return	Test the level and kinds of vulnerabilities in Russia through fieldwork there
Indicate most vulnerable groups among them and determine their immediate needs	Establish a direct link between vulnerabilities faced by some re-entry banned migrants and their potential for radicalization and violent extremism
Provide a framework for understanding the possible link with long-term radicalization potential	

Risk analysis

The report **does**	The report **does not**
Identify possible risk factors to realization of 'theory of change'	Predict likelihood of emergence of specific risks or assess their impact on various groups
Analyze fieldwork findings for their implications for reintegration success	Evaluate impact of assistance programs or assess their effects
Consider risks from perspective of migrants, communities, governments, NGOs, donors	Establish the link between migrants' reintegration failure and their radicalization potential

2 IOM Central Asia, "Risk analysis on Return Migration and Challenges in Central Asia – 2017", available at: http://www.iom.kz/images/books/2017-risk-analysis-eng.pdf

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF RETURN MIGRATION TO CENTRAL ASIA

BACKGROUND

Since 2014, Central Asia has seen a large influx of return migration and broader shifts in migration pathways due to the double influence of a regional economic downturn linked to low oil prices that weigh on Russia's economy on the one hand, and the strict imposition of administrative sanctions (re-entry bans) on migrant workers found to be living or working in Russia in an irregular condition on the other. Since 2013, entry bans ranging in duration from three to ten years are being administered on a large scale to foreign nationals who have committed administrative offences during their stay in Russia. Many of those affected are migrant workers from the Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Early studies have identified the ban's negative effects on the livelihood of migrants, whose sustenance often depends on their income earned abroad and who regularly remitted money home to their families.[3] Additional evidence for socio-economic deterioration following the involuntary return of large groups of migrant workers to Central Asia was supplied by findings under Phase I of the Regional Field Assessment,[4] which show that particularly vulnerable migrant groups with fewer economic and social resources are often unsuccessful in their attempts to adapt to this new and unexpected situation.[5] The assessment also demonstrated the social and economic impact of return migration on the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) as well as on the new country of destination (Kazakhstan). The policy, legislative and administrative responses to return migration of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were reflected and specific recommendations for improving conditions of (re)integration of returning migrants were offered. The current Phase of the assessment provides an update of both the macroeconomic trends, legal and administrative measures as well as draws conclusions on the effectiveness of these measures.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As was established during Phase I of the regional field assessment, return migration pose a set of challenges and opportunities on the national, community as well as individual level that are influenced and shaped by the larger institutional and economic framework in both the migrants' home countries and alternative destinations, the returnees' migration experience, and their individual success in reintegrating into the local labour market and the community at large. On the individual level, the impact of return can be defined as the sum of the material and immaterial resources migrants transmit before and during their return. The importance of remittances goes beyond the mere transfer of money while abroad, but has broader eco-

3 "Tajik Migrants with Re-Entry Bans to the Russian Federation." Dushanbe, Tajikistan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). January 2014.
4 "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration." Astana, Kazakhstan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). November 2016.
5 Ibid.

nomic, social as well as political and cultural significance. On the community level, the concrete impact of return migration depends both on the composition of groups that predominantly return and on their reasons for doing so. Since the majority of Central Asian migrant workers in Russia follow a strategy of seasonal migration, leaving for periods of intensive work and returning home intermittently for brief intervals, their ban on re-entering Russia forces them to adjust their short- and medium-term plans and either search for employment in their place of origin, move internally within their home country, or migrate to a third country. The potential for success of each of these strategies depends to a significant degree on the individual migrant's skills set, resourcefulness and capacity to adapt. Especially during an economic slowdown such as the current one, however, it is likely that the return rates among low-skilled migrants will be highest because they are employed in the most precarious jobs. Under such circumstances, the impact of return migration cannot be established without taking into account the **institutional level**. In this context, it is vital for both the countries of origin and of new destination to have a proper infrastructure in place that provides returning migrants and their families with support and economic opportunities in order to ensure their successful integration.

Migration has contributed significantly to poverty alleviation and the socio-economic development of Central Asia. But it has also led to a greater dependence of households, local communities and even national economies on migrant remittances. If the trend toward increasing emigration falters, such as is now the case with the economic downturn in Russia and the introduction of stricter migration policies vis-à-vis many Central Asian citizens, the potential for economic development in their countries of origin is likely to come under strain. The literature on return migration furthermore shows that if migrants have to leave before their migration goals have been accomplished or because their migration project has failed, as is likely the case with many re-entry banned and administratively expelled Central Asian migrants, they are prone to incur difficulties with re-integrating upon return.[6] Any long-term strategy that the migrants may have had for themselves and their families can be seriously jeopardized by the inability to follow through on their plans, especially if they have incurred debts, e.g. for the construction of a house or the education of their children, or if they have made investments in the hope of a continuing stream of remittances from abroad. Rising return rates could potentially stimulate growth as they bring with them an economically productive population with new and improved skills. However, they might also have an impeding effect on development insofar as returnees tend to be economically less successful at home, where they do not have the same access to the labor market as abroad, and where many of their skills cannot be applied because of lacking infrastructure and a suboptimal economic climate.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE

In analyzing the different levels that interact in shaping the effect of large-scale return migration movements, the goal is to derive hypotheses that can be tested in the context of the Theory of Change, and subsequently used to refine it. Research undertaken as part of Phase II of the Regional Field Assessment[7] will serve to evaluate these hypotheses and make evidence-based arguments about the causal relations linking targeted interventions to desirable outcomes as well as the likelihood of their success. Reintegration barriers and other impediments to achieving a positive impact of return migration identified in the literature will be taken into account and guide the analysis of (re-)in-

6 OECD (2009) „Return Migration: A New Perspective", International Migration Outlook
7 "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Assessing Migrant and Community Needs and Managing Risks (2017)"

tegration potentials of returning migrant workers in Central Asia. While general assumptions about integration needs of vulnerable returning migrant groups have been developed and verified during the first research phase, the aim now is to arrive at a better understanding of reintegration barriers and opportunities for selected most vulnerable migrant categories, so as to better harness the full development potential of return migration. This literature review will help to achieve this goal by elaborating the larger dynamics that influence reintegration prospects in Central Asia and through establishing parameters for assessing the impact of assistance measures.

ASSESSMENT AREAS

Regional impact of return migration

Factors stimulating return migration

Phase I of the **regional field** assessment has shown that migration dynamics in Central Asia are deeply tied up with broader economic developments as well as regulatory frameworks in the region. Russia's economic boom in the 2000s provided millions of Central Asian migrant workers with the opportunity to earn salaries several times higher than in their home countries, and the visa-free agreement that is in place between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation significantly simplified such migration processes. Correspondingly, prolonged bouts of economic recession in Russia drive down the number of immigrants who, due to diminishing returns, decide to stay at home.

The years following the 2007 global financial crisis offered a particularly stark illustration of this phenomenon, while the economic recovery starting in 2010 and the corresponding rise in migration numbers that even surpassed pre-crisis levels demonstrates the close correlation between the scale of migration movements to and from Russia and the macroeconomic trends. The current economic slowdown since 2015 seems to very much fit this pattern, but two differences should be noted. Firstly, low oil prices, which account for much of Russia's economic output, may continue to be depressed in the mid- to long-term owing to the so-called "shale oil energy revolution" that has allowed to tap into oil and gas resources heretofore unprofitable, and thus led to the transition from a demand-driven to a supply-driven crude oil market. Secondly, the economic recession coincided with a tightening of immigration laws in Russia, most notably the stringent imposition of several-year long bans on re-entering the country for foreigners who incurred administrative offences.

These factors make a prompt return to pre-crisis levels of migration bound for Russia unlikely, and could in addition noticeably alter migration dynamics across the region. The continuing trend of increasing immigration to Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser degree, Tajikistan, is one instance of such changing dynamics, and could likely be a reaction on the part of the very migrants who are unable or unwilling to return to Russia to adapt to the new situation. At the same time, however, overall decreases in migration between Central Asia and Russia far outstrip the growth of the relatively recent migration route to Kazakhstan. This suggests that a significant group of migrants may be compelled to stay in their countries of origin. The resulting increase in the numbers of returned migrants in Central Asia can become an additional burden for their home countries' economies, whose capacities for job creation remain limited and which are additionally struggling with the repercussions of a regional economic slowdown.

Impact on home countries

While the preliminary assessment in Phase I has served to identify broader return migration trends

and factors through reviewing legal, economic and social conditions for (re)integration, the in-depth assessment of Phase II will determine and conceptualize (re) integration barriers and opportunities for the selected most vulnerable categories of migrant workers. The goal is to establish both the precise make-up of the returned migrant population and which regions of the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and alternative destination (Kazakhstan) returning migrants are currently most concentrated in order to provide forecasts for the volume and composition of return migration to these regions.

Given the slow recovery of the regional economy and the continuously low levels of remittances, economic vulnerabilities are likely to have deepened over the past year. Figures released by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation show migrant remittances in 2016 stagnating at the very low level of the previous year.[8] While Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remain the three main destinations for remittances from Russia, overall levels have declined for Uzbekistan (from $3 billion to $2.74 billion) and Tajikistan ($2.2 billion to $1.9 billion). Only remittances to Kyrgyzstan have seen a slight improvement (from $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion), which provides further evidence for the positive impact of Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 on its migrant workers in Russia. It should, however, be noted that even the improved 2016 figures remain far below pre-crisis levels, when remittances accounted for 30% of the Kyrgyz Republic's GDP.

Regional migration trends

The increase in money transfers to Kyrgyzstan is certainly also related to the fact that Kyrgyz[9] migrants are the only Central Asian migrant group that has seen a significant enlargement from 2015 to 2016. While Tajik migration has been stagnating (860,988 Tajik citizens on February 1, 2015 vs. 866,667 on February 1, 2017), and the number of Uzbek migrants in Russia has seen a further drop (1,785,892 vs. 1,513,694), Kyrgyz migration increased by 5.5% over the same timespan (562,403 vs. 593,760).[10] Pending the receipt of similar data for Kazakhstan, these statistics give reason to assume that Kyrgyzstan's regional integration enhanced the resilience of its migrant workers abroad. At the same time, Russia is currently banning 110,000 Kyrgyz citizens from entering the country, which effectively bans them from benefiting from the eased migration regulations under the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and might render them and their families particularly vulnerable if no gainful employment can be found at home or in a third country. Tajik migrants face a similarly dire situation, although bilateral agreements between Russia and Tajikistan resulted in the lifting of bans for 106,000 eligible Tajik citizens.[11]

These preliminary findings provide for a complex and country-specific picture that will need to be tested against more in-depth information to be gathered through supplementary statistics as well as expert and official interviews. Overall, migration dynamics in the region continue to mirror economic trends in Russia, which is currently undergoing its longest recession in almost two decades. Not all migrant groups are equally affected, however, and there is reason to assume that Kyrgyz migrants fare better due to the favorable conditions of work and stay in Russia under the Eurasian Economic Union Agreements. The situation of re-entry banned migrant workers, likely to be the most vulnerable group among all migrants, remains difficult to forecast. While both Kyrgyzstan

8 See http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=itm_44615#CheckedItem

9 "The terms "Kazakh", "Kyrgyz", and "Tajik" with regard to migrants refer to their country of origin and not to their ethnicity unless specifically noted to the contrary."

10 Official data by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, retrieved from http://www.ranepa.ru/images/docs/monitoring/ek-monitoring/monitoring-2017-march.pdf

11 See the section on Tajikistan of the socioeconomic chapter.

and Tajikistan have shown increased efforts to lift the ban of as many of its citizens as possible, and the first set of bans that were administered in 2013 have already expired, there is no reason to assume that Russian authorities will suspend this measure in the near future. Russia's economy is set to exit recession this year, and although this is likely to lead to an increase in immigration in a procyclical fashion, a large number of Central Asians barred from re-entering Russia will be unable to benefit from this economic upturn. This makes it indispensable to assess their opportunities for reintegration in their countries of origin as well as the chances for their integration into alternative countries of destination, most notably Kazakhstan.

Impact of legal and policy measures

While Phase I of the **regional field** assessment has established the conceptualization as well as the weight of return migration as an issue in state policy through identifying key approaches to re-integrating returned migrants in the different countries under assessment, Phase II will seek to evaluate the impact of legal and policy measures on alleviating migrants' vulnerabilities. Taking into account both measures that have been introduced to regulate and facilitate returning migrants' (re-)integration as well as other legal and policy measures that have had an impact on migrants' integration opportunities, this part of the assessment will serve to analyze the extent to which such measures have addressed the socio-economic vulnerabilities of various categories of returning migrants and their family members in order to establish parameters for assessing the impact of future assistance measures.

Re-integration capacity of low-skilled and poorer migrants

As it has been argued above, an essential element of assessing the impact of return migration is the mapping of key socio-economic characteristics of the returned migrant population. The potential for success of official interventions and measures aimed at supporting returnees in their integration depends on the match between returned migrants' needs and capabilities on the one hand, and, on the other, structural factors (including government policies) providing for their reintegration. While policy measures and government priorities in the field of (return) migration have been established in Phase I of the regional field assessment, and further interviews with government officials have served to determine the scope and conditions of eligibility of assistance programs, core characteristics of the returned migrant population are assessed through official statistics or, wherever such statistics are unavailable, gauged through hypotheses derived from the literature on return migration, which are backed up by expert and official interviews as well as sociological interviews with migrants. Return migration in the region has attracted increasing attention from scholars and policy makers over the past years, and a number of key variables that shape its impact on the migrant's home society have been singled out. Briefly, they can be summarized as depending on who returns, for how long they return, and how prepared they are for their return home.

The temporal quality of return is in many ways the easiest to establish for our target group of most vulnerable migrants, since it is dictated by the duration of the re-entry ban. Shifting from seasonal to temporary return necessitates a change of strategy for this migrant group, and three general options are possible: firstly, the migrant waits out the ban's expiration while looking for other sources of income at home in the meantime; secondly, the migrant abandons ideas of further emigration and invests into a long-term stay at home; and lastly, the migrant opts for emigration to a third country. While the third group, insofar as it concerns migrants who seek out Kazakhstan as an al-

ternative destination, will be assessed separately, the first two groups pose a distinct set of needs and opportunities. Returnees who decided to forgo plans of further emigration are more likely to make long-term investments to earn their livelihood at home, while those seeking to cope with the period of unemployment are more prone to risky behavior like taking out loans to sustain their and their families' livelihood or sending family members abroad to make up for the loss of income.

Within these groups, a further and more consequential typology of return migrants can be made according to their resourcefulness and access to various forms of capital. Although the vast majority of Central Asian migrants works in low-skilled jobs, there are distinct groups within this population that differ according to their social and economic mobility and overall skill level. Most researchers agree that the return of relatively skilled and successful migrants in significant numbers can reverse processes of "brain drain" and stimulate economic growth on the household and community level, and even on the national level if met by favorable economic and policy conditions.[12] At the same time, however, even the return of a privileged subsection of the migrant community can have negative effects on their home country's development – especially when they return from a country undergoing a severe economic downturn. In this scenario, migrant households have to face the double challenge of making up for dried-up remittance flows, while the returnee risks losing productive assets gained abroad and is likely to face difficulties transitioning back into the local labour market after a prolonged stay abroad.

Such negative outcomes of return migration are likely to prevail in case of return of predominantly low-skilled and poorer migrants. Since they for the most part lack the capital and resources to make a living at home, this group of migrants depends significantly on outside assistance. Even if such assistance can be secured either through state support or through kinship networks, large-scale return of poorer migrants is likely to have a threefold negative effect on their local communities: firstly, through the loss of their remittances and the depletion of disposable household income over the course of the migrant's long-term presence at home; secondly, through driving up competition for low-wage jobs that can lead to serious wage depression; and lastly, through putting additional strain on social services (e.g. healthcare, education, employment services) and infrastructure (e.g. housing, land, water).[13] Only in conditions of labour scarcity would an extensive return of poorly skilled migrants be a stimulus for the local labour market. But since the lack of employment opportunities in their home countries, characterized by rapid population growth and a relative scarcity of arable land, led many Central Asians to emigrate in the first place, this scenario remains unrealistic.

Taking these assumptions and hypotheses about vulnerable returned migrants' needs and capabilities into account, and testing them against government statistics and experts' and officials' estimates will help to arrive at evidence-based evaluations of the impact of legal and policy measures on migrants' vulnerabilities. Using them as guiding assumptions in determining individual and group vulnerabilities will narrow down the target group of this assessment in addition to establishing parameters for assessing the impact of future assistance measures.

12 Robtel Neajai Pailey (2016) "Long-Term Socio-Economic Implications of 'Crisis-Induced' Return Migration", Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative Research Brief.
13 Ibid

Dynamics of vulnerability and socio-cultural impact

The results of the Phase I **regional field** assessment indicated a clear link between the vulnerabilities related to Central Asian migrant workers' legal status, inadequate protection of their civic rights in addition to poor enforcement of their rights in the workplace on the one hand, and their withdrawal into informal channels of resolving their day-to-day problems on the other hand, which might result in the willingness to use intermediaries and networks. This in turn could make them a target for criminal groups as well as, in certain cases, expose them to dependence on support from radical organizations. The triggers might be of economic, social or cultural nature. In Phase II we seek to validate these hypotheses on the link between socio-economic vulnerabilities of individuals and groups and their susceptibility to various types of radicalization, including those attributed to the deterioration of personal and group welfare and those linked to subjective self-assessment.

Relative deprivation as a factor of radicalization

While Central Asian migrants' use of informal networks and intermediaries to navigate their day-to-day lives, organize and ease interaction with employers, landlords and state representatives is well documented in the literature, the effects of such a reliance on unofficial channels during a prolonged economic slowdown have received less attention. In Phase I of the research, we have found evidence that migrants who lose their socio-economic standing become all the more dependent on informal network, while being unable to offer much in return for services and support. This opens the road to exploitative relationships and might make Central Asian migrants susceptible to accepting support from criminal networks, including radical groups. It remains unclear, however, which groups of migrants are the most vulnerable to violent extremists' messaging, and in case of foreign recruitment to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Daesh), the literature suggests that those who are most likely to join a violent extremist organization are not the economically and socially most destitute members of society. Quite on the contrary, the inevitably scattered and partial evidence that is available seems to suggest that radical messaging is most successful with those who are subjected to relative rather than absolute deprivation.

The simplistic understanding of the link between an individual's socio-economic deprivation and their susceptibility to become radicalized has recently been complicated by a World Bank study on economic and social inclusion to prevent violent extremism.[14] Pointing out the larger economic context of a global slowdown following the 2007 financial crisis, widespread and persisting economic recession, and the inability to return to pre-crisis levels of growth in which the rise of radical groups like Daesh and their apparent attraction to a large group of foreign fighters has been occurring, the study notes the undeniable socio-economic dimensions that have engendered the current upsurge of violent extremism. This ongoing economic trend has been exacerbated by the uncertainty on commodity markets, most notably in oil-exporting countries, which suffer from historically low oil prices that leave state budgets depleted. Against this backdrop of high unemployment rates and slowing growth, the World Bank study finds that the lack of social and economic inclusion in their countries of residence is one of the factors that led people to join radicalized groups. The sample on which their analysis draws,

14 Devarajan S., Mottaghi L., Quy-Toan Do, Brockmeyer A., Joubert C., Bhatia K., Abdel Jelil M. (2016) "Economic and Social Inclusion to Prevent Violent Extremism." Middle East and North Africa Economic Monitor (October), World Bank, Washington, DC.

which is based on leaked Daesh personnel records, however shows that foreign recruits have a significantly higher level of education than average residents of their countries of origin. As the report states, foreign recruits are "far from being uneducated or illiterate", and a large majority of them were employed before joining Daesh. This finding gives further support to studies arguing that absolute poverty is not a driver of radicalization, and it underpins anecdotal evidence that many Central Asian militants fighting with Daesh do not conform to the stereotype of poorly educated and socio-economically desperate prey for extremist groups.[15] Rather, the strongest predictor of susceptibility to adopt radical views is to be found in relative deprivation and socio-economic exclusion of educated parts of the population. It furthermore presents an important caveat to simplistic understandings of the processes that lead to radicalization, which single out lacking education and a low socio-economic status as its main drivers.

If relative socio-economic deprivation is central in determining the appeal of joining violent extremist organizations, this has important policy implications. While absolute poverty alleviation would require large-scale measures with wide coverage, relative socio-economic deprivation can be addressed through targeted measures. Ensuring a positive business climate and providing for job creation measures can be effective pathways to socio-economic inclusion as a major way to counteract the threat stemming from violent extremism. These can be further supported by the active involvement of community organizations and religious leaders as a means to prevent the alienation and marginalization experienced by many Central Asian migrants both during and after migration. Strong community bonds in Central Asia among kin and neighbours typically serve as mitigating factors – although they can also facilitate recruitment into radical groups, as has been the case with entire families or even villages collectively joining Daesh[16] – and whenever migrants withdraw from these networks as a result of their socio-economic exclusion, such positive impact might be lost. Involving migrant community support structures in Russia and Kazakhstan as well as community and religious leaders in migrants' countries of origin, and supporting them in reaching out to such vulnerable groups of the population could significantly improve the overall quality of their socio-economic (re-)integration and thus dampen one of the key drivers of violent extremism.

DATA COLLECTION

Desk research

As in Phase I, background information was collected first through desk research of publically available documents, reports and studies. This initial review helped formulate questions, which would be posed to respondents at interviews and define the sets of data, which were requested from relevant state institutions. It also served to identify information gaps, which needed to be filled through interviews and requests for further information.

During Phase II, we refer to the types of sources of information that were used in Phase I. However, the manner in which the information has been analyzed and presented differs. In Phase I, we sought to identify general trends with regard to the volume and directions of return migration, identify key approaches used by Central Asian states to re-integration of returning migrants and outline the general regulatory framework for re-integration. Phase II builds on the data collected in Phase I but it seeks to probe in greater depth the effects of the socio-economic factors and

15 Lemon E. (2015) "Daesh and Tajikistan: The Regime's (In)security Policy." The RUSI Journal 160 (5): 68–76; Noah Tucker (2015): Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC.
16 http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/central-asia-and-islamic-state-the-russian-connection/

Table 1. Sources of information in desk research component

	Purpose	Sources	Types
Literature review	Conceptualize re-integration barriers and opportunities for selected most vulnerable categories; establish parameters for assessing the impact of assistance measures; identify mechanisms of group and individual radicalization relevant to the investigated case	Public and internal: central, regional and local authorities	Case studies; surveys; existing evaluations
Strategic and operational documents	Identify the institutional, administrative and operational framework for addressing the issue of re-integration and prevention as well as reduction of radicalization; test the relevance of the measures to migrants' needs, eligibility criteria	Public and internal: central, regional and local authorities	Official strategy documents, internal budgets, procedures, executive regulations
Laws	Observe the legal conditions for re-integration of the most vulnerable groups, noting the interplay of norms and operation of law "on the ground"; identify the current measures and gaps in the system of prevention and reduction of radicalization as pertinent to the target group under study	Public and internal: official texts and their interpretations	Laws and executive regulations, legal opnions and analyses, court rulings, secondary literature (legal assessments)
Official statistics	Disaggregate trends in migration flows, remittances and socio-economic position of migrants by regions (subnational) and category of migrants (age, gender)	Official requests; ad hoc requests	Time series; cross-regional comparison; contrasting position of categories/groups

of the adopted legal and administrative measures on the actual chances for re-integration of the most vulnerable groups of returning migrants (Table 1).

Field research

Phase I included a significant component of in-depth interviews with officials and experts, which helped identify state activities and priorities in the area of return migration as well as pose hypotheses on the link between migrants' socio-economic and socio-cultural status and potential for their long-term radicalization. Phase II examines the linkage between the impact of socio-economic trends and of adopted mitigating measures and the actual conditions for re-integration of returned migrants on the local level. For this reason, a two-stage approach was adopted. First, a number of semi-structured in-depth interviews was held with the key stakeholders (state officials, experts, community and spiritual leaders as well as assistance providers) to assess the general re-integration conditions in selected locations and their impact on the most vulnerable groups. Then several focus groups or round tables were organized with the participation of some of the interviewed persons and other relevant respondents to test the initial hypotheses, put the findings in a broader perspective and identify the linkages between various sets of data.

Compared to Phase I, a larger and more diverse group of respondents was consulted in the in-depth assessment, including the total of 98 respondents in the three Central Asian countries under study and in Russia (Table 2). Given the focus on conditions of re-integration and role of communities, 38 of the respondents were representatives of non-governmental and international organizations or community and spiritual leaders. While the positions of state bodies were featured broadly (42 respondents), they were complemented by the opinions voiced by experts, both on socioeconomic, spiritual and security issues.

Table 2. Categories of respondents of interviews in socioeconomic/sociopolitical and radicalization strands of the assessment

Country	Field trips (no. of interviews)	Category of respondents			
		Officials	NGO/ International Organizations	Community/ Spiritual Leaders	Experts
Kazakhstan	6 (24)	8	10	4	2
Kyrgyzstan	4 (28)	13	9	2	4
Tajikistan	7 (42)	20	9	4	9
Russia	1 (4)	1			3
Total	**18 (98)**	**42**	**28**	**10**	**18**

SOCIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITIES OF RETURNING CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANTS

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Vulnerabilities, adaptabilities and conditions of reintegration of re-entry banned migrants

According to the IOM Glossary in Migration a vulnerable group is defined as *"any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental disasters, or economic hardship, than other groups within the State; any group or sector of society (such as women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples or migrants that is at higher risk in periods of conflict or crisis)."*[17] In order to create effective policies and actions that address the specific vulnerabilities of migrants, this very broad definition needs to be further refined within a particular context.

In Phase I of the sociological assessment, vulnerabilities of migrant workers from Central Asia have been categorized under (1) economic (reduced income and indebtedness), (2) social and network related (reliance on informal networks for support), as well as (3) rights based and legal (inadequate rights awareness and exposure to exploitation).[18] In Phase II of the regional assessment, we focused on the vulnerabilities and adaptabilities of mainly re-entry banned migrants and on the sources of these vulnerabilities and adaptabilities. Based on interviews conducted with re-entry banned migrants in the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and a new destination country (Kazakhstan) vulnerable groups of re-entry banned migrants were defined as: 1) those who happened to be the most subjected to economic hardships once they were forced to stay in the countries of origin, 2) and to discriminatory practices or became irregular migrants in the new destination country Kazakhstan.

The sociological assessment of Phase II aims to understand vulnerabilities, sources of vulnerabilities, adaptabilities and (re-)integration needs of Central Asian migrants banned from re-entering the Russian Federation in their countries of origin - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - and in a country of new destination - Kazakhstan. Moreover, in Kazakhstan, re-entry banned migrants from Uzbekistan were interviewed as well. The sociological component of the regional assessment also studied how assistance programmes provided for them by IOM missions in respective countries were helpful to reduce their vulnerabilities. Thus, the following questions were answered:

Which categories of migrants are particularly vulnerable and what are the sources of their vulnerabilities?

What are the (re-)integration needs of vulnerable re-entry banned migrants?

How effective are the assistance programs in reducing the re-entry banned migrants' socio-economic vulnerabilities?

17 IOM (2011) Glossary on Migration 2nd Edition, International Migration Law No. 25, IOM, Geneva.

18 For detailed discussion of the three categories of vulnerabilities of migrant workers from Central Asia see IOM (2016), „Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration."

How to improve the effectiveness of the assistance programs to vulnerable re-entry banned migrants?

Consequently, the sociological assessment shows concrete examples of the vulnerable groups and the sources of their vulnerabilities or adaptabilities. The term "adaptability" is used as a synonym for successful "reintegration" of returned migrants in the home countries and their successful "integration" in the destination country while "reintegration" refers to a condition of economic, social, cultural and political re-inclusion or reincorporation of returned migrants in their home countries.[19] In the course of the Phase I and Phase II of the assessment, unemployment and economic hardships that Central Asian returnees face in their countries of origin were identified as a major challenge in their successful reintegration. This, in turn, has a negative impact on social and cultural aspects of reintegration. "Integration" in the destination country is here understood to be the outcome when a migrant, in addition, to achieving economic aims, is able to cope well with the legal, social and cultural conditions of the receiving country. Detailed conceptual framework of the "integration" in the context of the Phase II of the assessment is presented below following short introduction of theory on successful reintegration of returnees and of key concepts for understanding vulnerabilities and adaptabilities of re-entry banned migrants both in the countries of origin and destination.

The starting point of the analysis is Cassarino's[20] theory that implies that all phases of the migration cycle have to be taken into account in evaluating the potential for successful reintegration and sustainable return of migrants. According to him the following aspects should be considered in the analysis: (a) the context of reintegration in the home country of the migrant, specifically, in terms of the existence of adequate return and reintegration programmes; (b) the type of migration and the duration of stay abroad, which should neither be too long, in order not to lose social networks back home, nor too short, in order to acquire sufficient human and financial capital abroad; and (c) the factors and conditions that motivated return and, thus, affect the preparation for it. The notion of "preparedness" is crucial for successful reintegration of returnees in home countries. Accumulating human, financial and social capitals while in migration will determine the degree of preparedness for return of a migrant and will affect his or her successful and sustainable reintegration in the home country.[21] In addition, political and economic conditions should facilitate the process of reintegration of returned migrants in home countries. This may in particular take on the form of reintegration programmes.[22]

Additionally, reference is made to Bourdieu's theory of capital that stresses individual's tangible and intangible assets that can constrain or enable to reach his or her economic and social goals. Unlike chance or luck, which is supposed to make a person rich or famous or raise his/her social status in short period of time, capital:

> *in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally 'possible or impossible.*[23]

19 Return Migration and Development Platform Glossary, http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/glossary-2/.
20 Cassarino J.-P. (2004). "Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited". International Journal on Multicultural Studies, 6(2):253–279; Cassarino J.-P. (2008). "Editorial introduction: The conditions of modern return migrants". International Journal on Multicultural Studies, 10(2):95–105.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Bourdieu P. (1986), "The Forms of Capital", (pp. 42-43). In J. E. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education, (pp. 241-

This assessment applies Bourdieu's theory of three types of capital that exist in the social world: economic capital, which refers to economic resources such as money, property and assets; cultural capital, entailing such resources as education, language and intellectual skills, style of dress and material possessions of a person that are status symbols (e.g. piece of art or luxury car); and social capital, which stands for social obligations ('connections'), that derive from membership in social networks or other social structures and is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital.[24] Thus, all forms of capital can be transformed into one another.

The analysis also relies on Becker's concept of "human capital" which includes health, education, training, skills and values of an individual that can help raise his earnings and social status.[25] Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital is the closest to human capital, specifically in terms of emphasis on education, skills and values but does not comprise the health of the individual. Therefore, the concept of human capital is used instead of cultural capital, as the first one is more holistic concept than the second one. Analysis of possession or absence of one or all of the capitals by the re-entry banned migrants will allow us to grasp an understanding of the sources of their vulnerabilities and/or adaptability potential. Moreover, it is expected that this framework may be instrumental for elaborating more effective policies and assistance programmes for the vulnerable banned migrants. The policy implications of the sociological findings are explored in greater depth in the section on recommendations included in this report as well as in the risk analysis, published separately.[26]

Integration of Central Asian migrants in Kazakhstan

The integration of migrants is one of the central issues in academic and research discourse. The need to integrate migrants in the host society can be dictated by commitment to fundamental democratic principles, such as respect for human rights, as well as by government interest in maintaining social stability that cannot be achieved if a significant part of the population is marginalised and excluded from the public life.[27]

In the context of migration movements the concept of integration can be understood as inclusion of new groups of people into the existing social structures and economic activity of the destination country. This process affects both the host society and migrants themselves requiring reciprocal efforts and changes on behalf of either side. It is reflected in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU that were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 2004 and form the foundations of EU initiatives in the field of integration. The first principle states that 'Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States'.[28]

Another similar definition of integration refers to *"processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate economic, social, cultural and civic participation and an inclusive sense of belonging at the national and local level."*[29] Successful integration of migrants means *"increasing similarity in living conditions and ethnic-*

58). New York, Greenword Press.

24 Ibid.

25 Becker G. S. "Human Capital." The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 2008. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved February 1, 2017 from the World Wide Web: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html

26 IOM Central Asia, "Risk analysis on Return Migration and Challenges in Central Asia – 2017", available at: http://www.iom.kz/images/books/2017-risk-analysis-eng.pdf

27 Arango J. 1999. Immigrants in Europe: Between Integration and Exclusion, in: Metropolis International Workshop, Proceedings, September 28-29, 1998. Lisbon: Textype-Artes Gráficas, Lda., 1999. P.233.

28 Common Basic Principles (2004), https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/main-menu/eus-work/actions.

29 Spencer, S. 2011. The Migration Debate. Bristol: Policy Press, 2011. P. 203.

cultural orientations between immigrants and the native population, and a decrease in ethnic stratification."[30]

At the same time, some authors of academic papers note a gradual shift in the original meaning of integration. They argue that *"the lack of clear understanding of the essence of migrant integration and classification of its components has become one of the reasons for the declared failure of migrant integration policy implemented in the last decades in the European countries. Indeed, at some point Europeans began to avoid the term 'integration', replacing it with another notion – 'inclusion'"*.[31] For instance, researchers studying migration processes in Holland note *"a shift from the multiculturalism of the 80s and 90s toward an assimilatory approach demanding adaptation to mainstream Dutch values and beliefs."*[32]

Nowadays, development of new integration models and mechanisms encounters certain challenges, namely rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the societies not yet adjusted to earlier waves of migrants at a time when immigration flows are growing driven by the needs of the market.[33]

Integration of returning migrants in their countries of origin has some unique features. The existing literature on returning migrants mainly explores factors that contributed to shaping varying levels of preparedness for return home. Some of these factors indirectly relate to circumstances that hinder migrants' integration in the new country of destination. However, since in those papers returning migrants are studied in the context of return to their country of origin, understanding their motives brings little benefit to explaining the behaviour of returned migrants in the country of 'alternative and/or unplanned destination' (author's quotation marks).[34]

On the on the other hand, studies of informal practices employed by Central Asian migrants in Kazakhstan do not take into account newly emerged phenomena of alternative migration to Kazakhstan and re-entry banned migrants. They point out that the enforcement of specific provisions of national legislation has been the main reason for the existence of 'undocumented' migrants, which, in turn, limits the capacity of the government to bring migrant workers within the law and integrate them in the legal domestic labour market.[35]

The IOM publication of the Phase I regional field assessment findings covered in more detail the challenges of integrating migrants from Central Asian counties in Kazakhstan, including migrants returned from Russia and those who are banned from re-entering Russia.[36] It identified the irregular status of migrants and their lack of information on how to regularize it as the main barriers to integration.

Consequently, the 2017 sociological component of the Phase II regional field assessment focuses on factors that cause vulnerabilities of migrants, i.e. those circumstances that make it difficult to gain

30 Heckmann F., Lüken-Klaßen D. The Impacts of Rights on Family Migrants' Integration in Europe: Literature Review. 2013. P.5.
31 Iontsev V., Ivakhnyuk I. Migrant integration models in modern Russia. CARIM-East Research Report 2013, p.2.
32 Ivanescu C., Suvarierol S. Work Package 2: Literature Review on Family Migrants. The Netherlands. Unpublished Working Paper for the IMPACIM Project. Erasmus University Rotterdam. 2012, p.9.
33 Massey D.S., Sanchez R.M. Identity, Integration, and Future // Brokered Boundaries. Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times. New York: Rassel Sage Foundation. 2010.
34 Chobanyan H., Return Migration and Reintegration Issues: Armenia www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-RR-2013-03.pdf; Chobanyan H. Nekotorye voprosy reintegratsii vozvrashchayushchihsya v Armeniyu migrantov [Some questions on reintegration of migrants returning to Armenia] http://www.ysu.am/files/02H_Chobanyan.pdf (in Russian); Cassarino J.-P. Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited. International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No.2, 2004. P. 253-279; Cassarino J.-P. Return migration and Development. The Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies. L.-NY: Routledge, 2016, P. 216-222; Cassarino J.-P. Conditions of Modern Return Migrants – Editorial Introduction, International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS) Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 95-105.
35 Davé B. Informal practices and corruption in regulation of labor migration in Kazakhstan. Interim report for Exploring informal networks in Kazakhstan: multidimensional approach. IDE-JETRO 2013.http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Report/2012/pdf/C24_ch2.pdf
36 Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration. Regional Field Assessment in Central Asia 2016. Astana, 2016. P. 45-47. http://www.iom.kz/images/inform/FinalFullReport18SBNlogocom.pdf.

regular employment and legal status guaranteeing decent conditions of residence and social assistance as needed, as well as conditions that strain relations with local communities, government and non-governmental institutions. It is also essential to examine strategies employed by migrants to overcome those unfavourable factors so that they can be included in the migrant integration projects under development.

DATA COLLECTION

The sociological assessment used qualitative inductive approach for assessing vulnerabilities of re-entry banned migrants and their (re-)integration needs. "*Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis*."[37] Also Iterative process was applied when gathering and analysing the data, which resulted in a reflexive process. Thus, several rounds of fieldwork were carried out to collect data, followed by a preliminary analysis of the cases sampled until saturation was reached - when no new information or new themes were emerging from data analysis.

Fieldwork consisted of in-depth, individual, group interviews and focus group discussions with Central Asian migrant workers, returned migrants (both who received or was going to receive IOM's reintegration assistance or who did not receive it), their family members, NGO or community and religious leaders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for the purpose of the sociological assessment.

In-depth interviews aimed to reveal migrants' vulnerabilities, adaptabilities and (re-)integration needs by doing inquiry into all cycles of migration experience, life after ban and personal and family information of migrants and about their social networks. **Expert interviews** with NGO representatives, community and religious leaders were conducted on the questions of impact of migration and return migration on migrants, their families and communities and on what kind of difficulties re-entry banned migrants are facing and what kind of coping strategies they use. The **Focus Group Discussions** (FGDs) intended to elucidate different perspectives of people from various backgrounds (re-entry banned and other migrants, their family members, NGO and community leaders) on the issue of migration, returning migrants and their vulnerabilities in their communities. More specifically, the general goal of the focus group discussions can be divided into the following more specific goals:

- Understand how migrants build their strategies to migrate, adapt, return and/or face difficulties and situations of risk or high vulnerability;
- Understand the migrants' communities' perceptions of re-entry banned migrants and their vulnerabilities;
- Analyse common practices and community meanings in connection with the use of networks, migration, relevant opportunities and dangers.

The sociological assessment used **nonprobability sampling** method in which every respondent was chosen for interview on purpose and every interview was important for the analysis. The main principle of nonprobability sampling was to interview Central Asian re-entry banned migrants who received or did not receive (re-)integration assistance in their countries of origin, namely in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan or in Kazakhstan – in the alternative destination country. Moreover, we selected respondents who

37 Patton M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). P. 306. London: Sage.

belong to deferent age groups, gender, ethnicity, education, profession/work experience, marital status, household composition and are from different regions or from city or village in the country under study. In Kazakhstan, we interviewed not only re-entry banned migrants but also other vulnerable categories of migrants from Central Asia.

In all three countries under study, researchers got contacts of the respondents from IOM staff or with the help of IOM staff through NGO partners. Focus group discussions with re-entry banned or non-re-entry banned migrants, their family members or other community members were organized with the help of NGO partners and Information and Consultation Centres (in the case of Kyrgyzstan). Additionally, with the help of IOM missions in respective countries, researchers conducted FGDs and expert interviews with NGO representatives, community, and religious leaders (see Table 3 for numbers of interviews). Details of sampling in each country under study are presented in an annex.

Table 3. Respondents of sociological interviews and focus group discussions

Countries under study	Individual/ in-depth interviews	FGDs with migrants and migrant communities	FGD with NGO, community and religious leaders	Interviews with NGO, community, religious leaders; with employers and intermediaries
Kazakhstan	43	6 FGDs with 32 respondents		11 expert interviews with NGO workers; 5 interviews with diaspora leaders and 3 interviews with employers who use CA migrants' labour
Kyrgyzstan	67	9 FGDs with 99 respondents	1 FGD with NGO and community leaders	2 interviews (with community and religious leaders)
Tajikistan	65	5 FGDs with 55 respondents	1 FGD with NGO and community leaders	4 interviews with NGO, religious and community leaders and with an expert
Total	**361 respondents from interviews and FGDs with migrant workers**			

RISK ANALYSIS ON RETURN MIGRATION AND CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA

OBJECTIVES AND KEY TERMS

Although return migration is an issue of fundamental importance for Central Asian countries, it is very much under researched. In particular, it lacks studies on effectiveness of migration policies of both countries of origin and destination, future ways to go, linkages between migrants' vulnerabilities and wider risks and opportunities for the region. Risk analysis provides an additional perspective for interpreting the results of the socio-economic and socio-political and sociological field work (interviews) conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in February-May 2017 to capture the influence of different political and social environments, and their linkages with migrants' vulnerabilities on possible future interventions aimed at improving migrants' rights observance, migration management (with particular emphasis on integration and re-integration) and the prevention of violent extremism in Central Asia. It is based upon 90 expert interviews and in-depth qualitative interviews with 350 migrants conducted in Kazakhstan (perspective of destination state), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (perspective of countries of origin).

In particular, the risk analysis provides an analytical strand to validate the 'theory of change' developed for the needs of the IOM CA/Library of the First President/USAID DAR Regional Assessment Phase I (2016) through investigating potential risks/challenges that may hamper the positive (re)integration of returning migrants and stimulate possible migrants' radicalization. In our particular case, it was decided to bring into play the risk perspective as a most suitable approach for validating the 'theory of change' in highly dynamic and challenging migratory-related context of Central Asia.

Thus, this analysis applies two key notions: "theory of change" and "risk", defined as follows:

Theory of change: theory of change is an outcome-based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programmes intended to support change in their multidimensional contexts. Theory of change draws its methodological credentials from a long-standing area of evaluation. There is no single definition of what theory of change is and there is no set methodology.[38] It is up to the concrete initiative or programme which tools it will apply. In very broad terms, theory of change is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context, in a given period of time. Experts agree that the theory of change concept first of all concerns critical thinking over many underlying assumptions about how change may happen in a programme.[39] We understand theory of change as a planning tool exploring set of beliefs, assumptions and risks and how the desired change may occur.[40]

Risk: In recent years the situation in labour migra-

38 Vogel I., Review of the use of 'theory of change' in international development, Review Report, UK Department of International Development, April 2012; Hivos ToC Guidelines, Theory of change thinking in practise: a stepwise approach, November 2015.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.

tion in and outside Central Asia has become complex, requiring a broad range of policy measures to adequately respond to the emerging issues. The economic downturn in Russia has left a lasting impact on Central Asia, not least on migration movements in the region. Retuning migrants find themselves in particularly precarious legal, economic and social status. Specific vulnerabilities of this group need to be in focus of attention when planning migration projects and/or programmes with broader PVE activities, and specific attention should be paid to identifying the individuals who could become more vulnerable and therefore possibly a target of extremist and/or crime organizations. In those circumstances, any pursuit for a positive change encounters difficulties and is plagued by many risks.

The analysis applies a most suitable for migration research definition of risk characterizing risk as "*the probability of an action taken by a particular party resulting in an undesirable impact or consequence for that party*".[41] In other words, risk is a probability of failure of a certain action undertaken by an actor (migrant, state etc.). By avoiding or modifying these actions the actor concerned could avoid or mitigate their undesirable outcomes. Risk definitions usually consist of three crucial components: (1) undesirable outcomes, (2) the likelihood of an occurrence of these undesirable outcomes where adverse circumstances/conditions that contribute to the failure are in particular analysed and (3) how these outcomes are perceived by an affected actor.[42]

Risk concept is a very important but fairly new research approach in studies of migration or development policies, being more often used in sociology or economic theory of migration. In sociology, anthropology and economy risk has been usually studied at the individual level in the context of different migrants' vulnerabilities and adopted migration strategies.[43] Risk research on the macro level (state level or international relations level) is rather derived from the management studies and is usually aimed at forecasting levels and impacts of irregular migration.[44]

Methodological approach

Research approach and tools: For the purpose of this analysis, we look at each pillar of the 'theory of change' to see whether the proposed actions and goals are realistic and can be achieved, and what risks may transpire on the way to accomplish those goals. 'Theory of change' used here proposes a framework for a set of actions to comprehensively address re-entry banned returning migrants' vulnerabilities and reduce possible radicalization potential of that group in the four vital entry points of intervention: (1) involvement of communities before, during and after migration, (2) providing employment opportunities and integration services in destination states, (3) reducing the post-ban shock through targeted support in counties of origin and (4) governments' policies to promote safer labour migration (for details see Fig. 2.) By filtering possible risks by likelihood and impact we will attempt to assess what are the weakest and the strongest elements and approaches within each pillar.

Validation of risk factors influencing the possible implementation of the 'theory if change' was done through a deductive method, in which the 'optimal' situation that was to be achieved (as stipulated in the

41 Renn O., Concepts of Risks: A Classification, in: S. Krimsky, D. Golding (eds.), Social Theories of Risk, Westport: Praeger 1992.
42 Giersch C., Political Risk and Political Due Diligence, Global Risk Affairs, March 2011; A.M. Williams, V. Baláž, "Migration, Risk and Uncertainty: Theoretical Perspectives", Population, Space and Place 2012.
43 Massey D. et al., "Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal", Population and Development Review 1993, Vol. 19, Nr 3; C. Zimmerman, A. McAlpine, L. Kiss, Safer labour migration and community-base preventions of exploitation: the state of evidences for programming, The Freedom Fund and London School of Hygin and Tropical Medicine 2015.
44 See: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) annual risk analyses for practical application by border management agencies; for details of application of risk concept in migration studies see: M. Jaroszewicz, M. Kindler, Irregular migration from Ukraine and Belarus to the EU: a risk analysis study, Centre for Migration Research of Warsaw University, April 2015.

Fig. 2. 'Theory of change' four pillars developed in Phase I DAR research



Table 4. Main sources of information: desk review and field assessment

Type of research	Purpose	Materials
Desk review	To identify all possible risk factors and to identify best examples of re-integration and PVE assistance, to inductively gain knowledge on risk filtering and the likelihood and magnitude of certain categories of failure	Literature review, strategic and operational documents, laws, official statistics
Field assessment	To identify migrant's vulnerabilities and (re)integration needs, current policies and assistance frameworks, to collect experts' opinion on risk situations (including political, security, economic and social) and find out from various stakeholders (governmental officials, NGOs, community leaders, diasporas) what they consider best possible interventions	Protocols from sociological strand with interviews with migrants, Individual and group interviews with state officials and practitioners, focus groups with officials and practitioners

'theory of change') would be contrasted with a range of risk factors identified primarily through reference to the findings of the desk and field research, as shown in Table 4. Where no empirical data could be invoked, identification of risk factors has been supplemented by inductive methods, by application of similar case studies and trends' extrapolation. In parallel, current and potential opportunities for achieving the objectives under each pillar of the 'theory of change' were identified through reference to existing and feasible good practices.

The next stage of analysis involved risk filtering, which revealed main potential risk factors that may hamper or make impossible the implementation of the applied model of migrants' (re)integration and prevention of violent extremism. Filtering was conducted deductively – by selecting the risk factors with higher likelihood and impact that could severely impact envisaged interventions. The most promising opportunities will be also proposed.

'Theory of change' was also verified against other more universal intervention frameworks, in particular ***IOM Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster (MICIC)***[45] or IOM (re)integration effective approaches' best practices. In particular MICIC principles and guidelines aimed at improving abilities of states, international organizations, civil society and private sector to respond to the needs of migrants in countries experiencing emergency situations can bring added value to the 'theory of change' application including better preparedness for various risks and possibility to quickly react to the changing circumstances (for details see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Relationship between 'theory of change' and IOM MICIC framework



In our case of particular consideration are the subsequent MICIC principles followed by best guidelines and best existing practices:

Principle no. 3. States bear the primary responsibility to protect migrants within their territories and their own citizens, including when they are abroad;

Principle no. 4. Private sector agents, international organizations, and civil society play a significant role in protecting migrants and in supporting States to protect migrants;

Principle no. 5. Humanitarian action to protect migrants should be guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

Principle no. 7. Migrants strengthen the vitality of both their host States and States of origin in multiple ways.

45 IOM, Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster, June 2016, https://micicinitiative.iom.int/repository-practices.

Principle no. 8. Action at the local, national, regional, and international levels is necessary to improve responses.

Principle no. 9. Partnership, cooperation, and coordination are essential for between and among States, private sector actors, international organisations, civil society, local communities, and migrants.

Principle no. 10. Continuous research, learning, and innovation improve our collective response.

Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia

KEY ISSUES

1. RETURN MIGRATION TRENDS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION

1.1. IMPACT OF RE-ENTRY BANS

In 2016 and 2017 the negative impact of return migration due to the imposition of bans on re-entering Russia has decreased. This is mainly related to a certain liberalization of Russia's migration policy that has introduced some remedial mechanisms enabling to remove certain categories of Central Asian citizens from re-entry ban list, particularly those banned for administrative infringements. This refers to both Kyrgyz citizens, who are allowed on a constant basis to appeal their re-entry ban since Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Tajikistan with recent one-month amnesty in Russia that permitted to remove around 100,000 Tajik citizens from the list. Under these conditions, Uzbek migrants remain in the most vulnerable situation due to the lack of such opportunities.

Following the removal of certain categories of migrants from the re-entry ban list, the numbers of Kyrgyz and Tajik migrants subject to the ban declined significantly. However, as many as 51,000 Kyrgyz and 152,000 Tajik migrants remain banned, having to wait out the expiration of their ban, and new bans are being imposed. Despite Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, re-entry bans to Russia issued to Kyrgyz migrant workers remain an issue. Moreover, the bans' negative effects in Kyrgyzstan are most likely to be felt the hardest by vulnerable populations in the countryside, where women are disproportionally affected by unemployment and where poverty rates lie above the national average (Batken Region, Jalal-Abad Region, Naryn Region), or have even increased compared to previous years (Chuy Region).

In turn, the largest group of banned migrants are Uzbek nationals who have so far not been covered by regularization schemes. Those among the re-entry banned migrants who chose alternative destinations often find themselves to be vulnerable in legal, economic and social terms, risking irregularity, exploitation and economic deprivation. Their negative experience of contacts with authorities in Russia discourages them from turning to the authorities of a new destination country (e.g. Kazakhstan) for assistance and limits opportunities for aid through informal channels.

1.2. RETURN MIGRATION TO TAJIKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN

Tajikistan: increasing return migration. Despite its recent recovery, the protracted slowdown of Russia's economy as well as the application of re-entry bans in 2014-2016 brought about certain changes in migration patterns from Tajikistan. Firstly, the scale of movement between Tajikistan and Russia has been steadily falling, as a significant number of migrants chose to weather the economic hardships in the destination country. As a result, the overall stock of Tajik migrants in Russia remains stable, with ca. 867,000 Tajik citizens present in Russia in early 2017 compared to ca. 861,000 at the beginning of 2016.

Fig. 4. Migration balance for Tajikistan



Source: Migration Service of the Republic of Tajikistan 2017

Secondly, the gap between departures and returns has narrowed considerably (Fig. 4). The number of Tajik citizens declaring employment abroad as the reason for departure has been steadily falling since 2014, and in the first three months of 2017, there were 22% fewer migrant workers leaving for work abroad compared to the same period of the previous year. This trend, however, varies by gender. While from 2015 to 2016, an 11% decline was noted in departures of Tajik men, a nearly 27% rise was observed among women departing for work, with some regions showing nearly a doubling departing of departures by women (Khatlon Region and GBAO).

At the same time, an increase in return migration was noted in 2016 (437,000 compared to 388,000 in 2015) and the number of citizens leaving for work abroad continues to decrease (although less strongly than from 2014 to 2015, at the height of Russia's economic crisis) from ca. 550,000 to 517,000. Although the feminization of Tajik labour migration remains a continuing trend, almost the entire increase in return migration is due to a surge of women migrants returning home to Tajikistan. This may suggest that women have been more vulnerable to economic hardships.

Kyrgyzstan: Eurasian pull factor and increasing diversification. According to the State Migration Service of Kyrgyzstan, as many as 780,000 Kyrgyz citizens live and work abroad. The primary push factors are economic: according to UNDP data, a quarter of Kyrgyz nationals live in poverty. Although poverty rates have recently declined in some migration-prone regions (Jalal-Abad or Osh), the situation has deteriorated or remained challenging in other areas (e.g. Batken, Chuy or Naryn region). Women have found it particularly difficult to improve their lot, as in nearly all the regions of the country, they are more likely to be unemployed than men (especially in Batken, Jalal-Abad, Osh and Naryn regions).

Emigration from Kyrgyzstan appears to be an established strategy to cope with the limited economic opportunities at home. This is shown both in the overall rise in the scale of outward movement, the consolidation of migration to the primary destination (Russia) and the search for alternative destinations.

Unlike the other countries under study, Kyrgyz migration to Russia and Kazakhstan increased for the second year in a row despite the regional econom-

ic downturn, showing the positive impact of Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union on migrants' resilience. Close to 594,000 Kyrgyz citizens were registered in Russia at the beginning of 2017, which represents an increase of more than 30,000 compared to the previous year, and Kyrgyz migration to Kazakhstan similarly picked up from ca. 114,000 in 2015 to 157,000 in 2016. Kyrgyzstan has also been successful at diversifying its migrant destinations: As many as 27% of the country's external migrants have chosen destinations other than Russia. Half of them moved to neighbouring Kazakhstan, but increasingly they choose more distant destinations, such as Turkey or South Korea.

1.3. KAZAKHSTAN AS A NEW DESTINATION COUNTRY

Regional distribution and determinants of labour immigration. The strong increase in registered migration from other Central Asian countries to Kazakhstan (by close to 50% from 2014 to 2015) continued in 2016 despite a continuing slowdown in the country's GDP growth. An additional 320,000 migrants resulted in an unprecedented rise of the registered temporary registrations of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek nationals, exceeding 1,265,000 by the end of the year (Fig. 5).

The highest concentrations of migrants (following statistics on temporary registration of foreigners who claimed work as their reason for entry) can be found in South Kazakhstan, Almaty, Mangystau and Astana. The key sectors of foreign employment are: construction (Astana, Almaty, South Kazakhstan region), agriculture (South Kazakhstan region, Almaty region) and trade (other regions).

Especially for migrants from neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, moving to Kazakhstan for work presents a comparative advantage over going to Russia: distances are much shorter, thus keeping travel expenses low; patents can be obtained for brief periods ranging from one to three months and are renewable for up to one year, which allows for significant flexibility in planning migration projects; and many Uzbek

Fig. 5. Registered immigration to Kazakhstan from Central Asian states



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2017

and Kyrgyz migrants can rely on kinship ties across the border in Kazakhstan to provide them with work, housing and other forms of material or immaterial support.

Strong increases in Uzbek and Kyrgyz immigration. *Uzbek migrants* form by far the largest group by all metrics: more than 1,000,000 were temporary registered in 2016 (33% more than during the previous year), and more than 300,000 received work permits (almost three times as many as in 2015!). Their rise in number is almost entirely responsible for the significant increase in work permits issued by the Kazakh authorities, which have also almost tripled compared to 2015 and increased more than fourfold in comparison with the year of their inception in 2014. A vast majority of 80% of all Uzbek migrant workers applied for permits to work in construction. Approximately four out of five Uzbek citizens applying for a work permit reported a monthly income of up to 40,000 Kazakh tenge. Less than 10% of applicants from Uzbekistan were women. *Kyrgyz migrants* are not captured in migration statistics anymore since Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU, but registration statistics show an increase to more than 150,000 (ca. 40% more compared to the previous year). The majority of them settled in either the two metropoles Almaty and Astana or regions bordering on Kyrgyzstan, for the most part in Almaty and Zhambyl regions.

Emerging Tajik immigration. *Tajik migrants* remain the smallest group of registered foreigners in Kazakhstan that fall within the scope of this study. According to data provided in the Migration Service of the Republic of Tajikistan (supported by data from the Tajik Embassy in Kazakhstan), 10,957 Tajik nationals entered Kazakhstan in 2015 and 12,373 in 2016 (i.e. an increase of 1,416 people); another 5,076 went to Kazakhstan in the first five months of 2017. Figures provided by the Migration Service of the Republic of Tajikistan show the total number of Tajiks who arrived in Kazakhstan during 2015–2016. Thus, Kazakhstan has not yet become an alternative to Russia for migrant workers from Tajikistan (as is the case for migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan).

Since Tajikistan lacks both a common border with Kazakhstan and well-established kinship and diaspora ties comparable to those of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationals, Tajik migration to Kazakhstan is mostly limited to urban centers, with more than two thirds seeking out Almaty and Astana as destination cities. 73% of all Tajik migrants applied for a work permit in the construction sector, and 11% of all applicants were women. Compared to migrant workers from Uzbekistan, Tajiks reported higher average monthly wages in 2016, with two thirds claiming an income of up to 40,000 Kazakh tenge and another third earning up to 60,000.

1.4. DROP IN REMITTANCES FROM CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANTS

Remittance inflows from Russia vary by country of migrants' origin. Devaluation of the Russian and Central Asian currencies slashed migrants' incomes in 2015, which was reflected in the dramatic decline of remittances to the region by as much as 33% in Kyrgyzstan, 43% in Tajikistan and 46% in Uzbekistan (Fig. 6). In 2016, remittance levels continued to decline in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, albeit less drastically (by 13% in Tajikistan and 10% in Uzbekistan). Household incomes continue to be negatively affected as in 2016 average remittance transactions to Uzbekistan were over a quarter lower than in 2014 ($297 compared to $403) while those to Tajikistan decreased yet further, descending to 44% of the 2014 levels ($101 relative to $228).

The rise in Kyrgyz emigration, stimulated, inter alia, by the Eurasian integration, has been reflected in a 26% increase of remittances from Russia, which ex-

Fig. 6. Dynamics of remittances from Russia to Central Asian countries



Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2017

ceeded $1.7 billion in 2016. This trend translated into a higher value of average remittance transactions that nearly returned to the 2014 level ($221 in 2016 compared to $229 in 2014). It should, however, be noted that in terms of the total flows, even the improved 2016 figures (nearly $2 billion) stand at 11% below pre-crisis levels, when remittances amounted to 30% of the Kyrgyz Republic's GDP.

Declining remittances from Kazakhstan. Regarding remittances from Kazakhstan, data for 2016 display a year-on-year decrease by 30% for all three countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), mirroring the Kazakh tenge's depreciation since mid-2015. Compared to the analogous period in 2015, remittances by private individuals to Uzbekistan decreased from $159.1 million to $100.5 million. Money transfers to Kyrgyzstan fell by a similar rate from $62.6 million to $44.7 million over the same period. For Tajikistan, the overall amount is lower given the smaller number of migrants in Kazakhstan, but it also dropped by close to 30% from $15.8 million in 2015 to $10.8 million over the corresponding period in 2016. As Kazakhstan shows continuing signs of economic growth and increasing migration rates, these numbers are likely to increase in the short to medium term.

2. POLICY AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO RETURN MIGRATION

2.1. POLICIES SUPPORTING MIGRANTS ABROAD

Priority of reducing the group of re-entry banned migrants. Governments of Central Asian migrant-sending countries were mainly preoccupied with effective lifting of as many migrants as possible from the Russian re-entry ban list. Significant successes have been achieved in this regard, such as the extended registration timespan of 30 days for Kyrgyz citizens in Russia, and the removal of the bans from 106,000 Tajik citizens in Russia. In the Kyrgyz case, it is expected that the simplification of the regime of residence (extension of registration-free period to 30 days and provision of registration for the duration of a valid work contract) will reduce the number of migrants becoming subject to the ban. Regularization of Tajik migrants was in turn supported by the introduction of work patents: over the first 11 months of 2016, patents were issued to 394,800 migrants from Tajikistan, while the number of administrative offences and expulsions declined by 26% and 18% compared to the same period of 2015.

Diversifying migration destinations. While Russia remains the by far most popular and most accessible destination among migrant workers, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have managed to diversify migration destination for their citizens. An increasing number of Kyrgyz citizens find employment through 151 licensed private employment agencies in Turkey, South Korea and Arab states of the Persian Gulf. There are around 18,000 Kyrgyz working in South Korea, mostly in agriculture, industry or as drivers. The Kyrgyz government is also planning to sign either international labour agreements or establish contact via private employment agencies with Germany, Poland, Finland and other potential migrant destination countries. At the same time, the Tajik government has undertaken efforts to facilitate migration to Russia, inter alia via signing agreements with regional authorities or universities. In cooperation with local authorities in Saint Petersburg, several centres for organized labour recruitment to Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast were opened in Tajikistan. Agreements have been drafted on sending Tajik migrant workers to Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and work is continuing on a similar agreement with South Korea.

2.2. POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

Priorities in re-integration policies of countries of origin. Re-integration of returning migrants has started to feature in strategic documents developed by migrants' countries of origin. The Draft Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2030 that is under review by the government raises the need for providing assistance to returning migrants, highlighting the role of "*measures to ensure their employment in the domestic labour market and the utilization of acquired knowledge and skills*".

The priority of "*the development of a mechanism enabling the reintegration of returned migrants in the country's economy*" was included in the National Strategy for Labour Emigration of the Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan until 2015, and the development of effective re-integration programmes is noted as a priority in the country's Ombudsman's strategy for 2016-2020. However, so far no details of re-integration programmes have been elaborated in either of the two countries. Another challenge is the insufficient recognition of the issue in other state policies, such as general social protection strategies.

Impact of Kazakhstan's policies on integration of Central Asian migration. Despite an increasing number of Central Asian migrants in Kazakhstan, re-entry banned migrants are not featured as a distinct category in the country's migration legislation. So far dedicated state integration programmes have been limited to *oralmans* and legal assistance is offered by NGOs, supported by international donors.

Kazakhstan's migration policy has a mixed effect on the opportunities for integrating Central Asian migrants. On the one hand, in fulfillment of the Migration Policy Concept for 2017-2021, the country has simplified the procedure for attracting skilled foreign workers and enlarged the quota up to 4.2% of the total workforce. Moreover, the number of permits for work for private individuals (patents) rose to 330,000 in 2016, the overwhelming majority consisting of Uzbek nationals. On the other hand, the introduction of measures to counter irregular migration has had a negative impact on the status of many Central Asian migrants. Some re-entry banned migrants transiting through Kazakhstan run the risk of becoming irregular as they may not be aware of the five-day period within which they should register their stay in the country. This risk is particularly acute as in 2017 activities aiming to detect irregular migrants in their places of residence have been stepped up.

2.3. STATE RE-INTEGRATION ASSISTANCE UPON RETURN

In strategic terms the increased return migration that could be observed over the last three years did not become an occasion for the elaboration of dedicated (re-)integration policies targeting returning migrants. Neither in Kyrgyzstan nor in Tajikistan are there targeted state programmes directly addressing returning migrants. One reason for the governments' reluctance to create more comprehensive re-integration policies could be their concern that stimulating return could create additional pressure on local labour markets.

There are general job creation efforts (particularly in Tajikistan) and micro-loan programmes available (in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) but they are designed with the general population in mind, and returning migrants rarely know about their existence (e.g., only 3248 of the ca. 120,000 citizens who sought out services of Employment Centers in Tajikistan in 2016 were returning migrant workers).

Key barriers to effective job-creation are the low capacity of local labour markets to sustain long-term employment and depressed wage levels. In Tajikistan, 150,000 new workplaces were created during 2016, of which roughly half are in services, one third in agriculture, and the remainder in industry and construction (Fig. 7). However, only 71,000 of these jobs are permanent, with the rest being temporary or seasonal employment. Average salaries are increasing nominally (from 880 somoni in the beginning of 2016 to 960 somoni in the beginning of 2017), but the somoni's devaluation against the US dollar led to a de facto decrease of salaries in the country, especially in the agricultural sector. Of all re-entry banned migrant workers who returned to Tajikistan in 2016, only 2,066 were provided with jobs through employment agencies, and many returning migrants are not

eligible for unemployment benefits because they fail to meet the requirement of having worked 18 months during the three years prior to applying for benefits.

Fig. 7. Jobs created in Tajikistan in 2016: sectors and duration of employment



Source: Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of Population of the Republic of Tajikistan 2017

3. VULNERABILITIES OF RETURNING MIGRANTS: SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW

3.1. TYPES OF VULNERABILITIES

Typology of vulnerabilities. According to the IOM Glossary in Migration a vulnerable group is defined as "*any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental disasters, or economic hardship, than other groups within the State...*" In Phase I of the sociological assessment, vulnerabilities of migrant workers from Central Asia have been categorized under (1) economic (reduced income and indebtedness), (2) social and network related (reliance on informal networks for support), as well as (3) rights-based and legal (inadequate rights awareness and exposure to exploitation). Based on the interviews conducted with re-entry banned migrants in their countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and a new destination country (Kazakhstan) we define vulnerable groups of re-entry banned migrants as: 1) those who are most often subject to economic hardships once they had to stay in the countries of origin, and 2) those who are most often subject to discriminatory practices or became irregular migrants in the new destination country Kazakhstan.

Based on the sociological interviews with migrants we categorized factors contributing to economic and rights based vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants in Central Asia as follows: 'individual factors', 'structural factors', 'situational factors' and 'family and household factors' (Fig. 8).

Fig. 8. Typology of vulnerabilities



A significant role in the level of vulnerability and integration opportunities of migrants is played by the ***individual factors*** associated with their ***social capital*** (networks of relatives, friends, co-nationals or colleagues that can be mobilized in case of need); ***human capital*** (level of education, professional skills, communication and language competence, health and values) and ***economic capital*** (refers to money, property and other assets) that help to resolve difficult situations. On some occasions, these factors can mitigate the impact of the re-entry ban to Russia. For instance, those who gained construction skills in Russia and speak Russian well can more easily find jobs upon return in their home countries or in Kazakhstan.

Some migrants may also use their ***social capital*** of friends and family networks that can be useful in finding a better-earning job in Kazakhstan. This is true for ethnic Uzbeks with relatives or acquaintances in Southern Kazakhstan among the 500,000-strong Uzbek diaspora and many years of work experience in well-established teams of workers as well as for ethnic Kazakhs who live in Shymkent and its suburbs with their relatives and find jobs with their help. Being positioned in certain social networks (family, neighbourhood or village or professional) back home and the resources that they have can also help a re-entry banned migrant to reintegrate better either independently or with the re-integration assistance that IOM provided.

Most migrants do not lose contacts with their relatives by the means of sending remittances back home and contributing to well-being of family members (by paying for weddings and other life-cycle rituals, for education or by contributing to the acquisition of a place of living for a family member). As a result, when they return and are forced to stay due to the ban they still enjoy belonging to the close circle of relatives. Moreover, possession of certain skills, resources and tools can also help a re-entry banned migrant to build new networks with other people or reinforce existing networks, combine their skills and resources, and cooperate in one type of business successfully. IOM's re-integration assistance to these types of re-entry banned migrants proved to be effective in their reintegration and decreasing their economic vulnerability.

The migrants were not able to gather ***economic capital*** while they were in Russia that they could invest back home or for securing stable income back in their countries of origin. Most of their earnings that they would send to their families back home would be used by the family members for everyday life needs, for school expenses of school age children or for organizing feasts dedicated to different life cycle events such as weddings or funerals. Thus, when their only economic strategy – migration – failed they also faced problems with unemployment and inability to have decent income due to the economic situation in their home country.

Structural factors are objective economic, legal or socio-cultural conditions that affect vulnerabilities or well-being of all Central Asian migrants or some groups among them (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) both in their countries of origin and in the countries of destination. In the countries of destination they include statutory rules, procedures and instructions for the registration of foreign nationals, regularization of their employment status and provision of social and legal support.

Many of the interviewed re-entry banned migrants reported that they would become irregularly resident or employed as they did not have sufficient awareness of the legal procedures ***in the destination countries***, such as Kazakhstan or Russia. Difficulties in securing residence registration were in particular attributed to the need for intermediaries who are often unwilling to comply with all the procedures or lengthy process of medical assessment. In turn, in the ***countries of origin*** of re-entry banned migrants under study – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the structural factor that contributes most to their vulnerability upon return is the econom-

ic context (lack of jobs, especially for the lower-skilled returnees, low salaries and limited market for their services or products).

Situational factors are factors that can occur suddenly and the individual has little control over them, which, in turn, can contribute to the vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants. For example, a sudden sickness or death of a close person of a migrant will force him/her to make extra expenses and postpone or cancel his/her projects for a certain period of time. Some Central Asian migrants who became unexpectedly stranded in Kazakhstan due to ban to re-enter Russia found themselves to be particularly vulnerable. They exhibited a combination of structural and situational factors. Those re-entry banned migrants whose passports were taken away by the employer could eventually become irregular and as a result stranded in the country, not being able to leave for home or find a job in a new destination country. When detected, those migrants become subject to an administrative court procedure, resulting in a fine or expulsion. Usually unable to settle the situation on their own, those migrants contact diasporas and NGOs for help.

Economic vulnerability of some migrants is aggravated by ***family and household factors***. The first one is the large number of dependents. This was one of the main factors of low impact of re-integration assistance provided for migrants in Tajikistan. Another category of highly vulnerable re-entry banned migrants consisted of migrants with seriously sick family members; orphans who exhibited low social and human capital. Moreover, another group of migrants whose vulnerabilities are affected by family and household factors are divorced/widowed women or women who are breadwinners of their family.

3.2. MOST VULNERABLE CATEGORIES OF MIGRANTS

Groups at risk. Some categories of returning migrants are least likely to independently re-integrate into the community. Examples include breadwinners with long ban period, abandoned women with dependents, people with health problems, persons with short professional experiences or those who in a destination countries were involved in poorly paid unskilled jobs. In these cases, multiple vulnerabilities were found, when structural factors negatively coincide with situational, family and household and individual factors. For instance, in the case of ***orphans from an early age*** who do not have other siblings, greater vulnerability is a result of at least two interrelated factors: ***family*** and ***household*** and ***individual factors*** (low education, lack of skills, psychological resources and strong support groups). Their vulnerability is acute as they do not have ***strong support networks*** or ***social capital*** and ***lack psychological resources*** such as sense of self-worth and belief in their own abilities. Moreover, they do not have ***good education*** or ***possess skills*** that could be used for making a living. The migrants at risk are very likely not to integrate back into their home society, and may desperately look for new migration opportunities, often at any cost.

In the course of fieldwork, vulnerabilities of two groups in the countries of origin were considered in greater depth: youth and women (Fig. 9).

Youth. In Kyrgyzstan, young male re-entry banned migrants were identified who do not have higher education and recently started their own family and see themselves as breadwinners as one of the most vulnerable groups. A lack of professional skills combined with limited economic opportunities in the countries of origin put the young newly married male migrants under pressure to provide for their families. At the same time, they also cannot re-enter Russia where

Fig. 9. Vulnerabilities of youth and women in countries of origin

Youth

- Mostly poorly educated
- Have no skills
- Unemployed or limited chances for employment back home
- Pressure to support their newly started families (breadwinners)
- Possess no house or other private property
- They are waiting for the expiration of the ban and do not search for jobs in the home country because they are hopeless to find a job with decent salary

Women

- Divorced/widowed young women with or without dependents
- Female breadwinners whose husbands are ill and do not share family's financial burdens
- Employed as general workers in Russia they do not gain new skills that would allow them to find jobs back home
- Divorced women tend to have no private property as they did not have control over earnings in Russia but worked for the benefit of ex-husband's family
- Face stigmatization for being divorced and for lost reputation while in migration in Russia

Source: IOM CA analysis of public data and interviews with migrants, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, January-May 2017

they planned to earn money for their young families. This is especially common among some young Uzbek males in southern Kyrgyzstan, who, unlike most men in Tajikistan that were interviewed during the monitoring trip, were not ready or willing due to cultural dispositions to let their wives work to help sustain the family. We assume that it is the case because the economic hardship of the first group was not as dramatic as the situation of some of the Tajik men, as they were the only breadwinner of a very large household. Moreover, young males possess no house or other private property. They are waiting for the expiration of the ban and they do not seek employment in the home country due to low salaries.

Women. Divorced or widowed female migrants with or without dependents are another category of the most vulnerable re-entry banned migrants. Divorced women with dependents are experiencing economic hardships and feel desperate the most. Usually, their family members are not capable of providing them with financial support and they cannot find work in their country of origin due to a lack of professional skills or due to a lack of employment opportunities providing decent salaries. Moreover, a majority of interviewed re-entry banned women in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have their own property unlike most of interviewed men. Female migrants who are the breadwinners of the family because their husbands are not capable of providing for the family are also among the most vulnerable re-entry banned migrants. For them, migration had been a solution and life strategy to provide for their families when their husbands failed to do so.

Apart from the vulnerable cases, there are women who have relatively high levels of economic, social and human capital. They are usually married to a man who

is a successful breadwinner, over 40, or young women who have relatively well-off parents and no or few siblings who can also claim their parents' property. At the same time, such women from relatively well-off families after marriage feel a pressure to work for the 'common future' with the spouse as it is shameful for the man to use his wife's property.

3.3. MIGRANTS' COPING STRATEGIES AND NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE

In the ***country of destination (Kazakhstan)***, migrants were found to be using the following strategies to address their vulnerabilities:

- To leave Kazakhstan as soon as possible and return home (but it is not feasible due to the inefficiency of a system to inform migrants in advance about a possible ban and missing infrastructure to ensure their safe return home, possibly on credit terms);
- To find employment as soon as possible in Kazakhstan to earn money for the journey home (at the moment it is an extremely challenging task due to the complexity of the registration procedures and an inevitable involvement of informal intermediaries) as soon as possible;
- To opt for Kazakhstan as an alternative country of destination (there is no standard system for recruiting migrants with undocumented or low qualifications to work in Kazakhstan).

Interviews with migrants indicate that diaspora organizations appear to be the most accessible of all public institutions, as intuitive behaviour in critical situations pushes migrants to look for compatriots and hope for their assistance. However, reliance on diasporas may lead to dependence. Therefore, experts believe that it would be much more effective for a diaspora organization and an NGO with a legal or social mission to join efforts in identifying vulnerable migrants and providing assistance to them. This way it would be possible to preserve all the strengths of the diaspora organization as an institution attractive to migrants and enjoying their confidence. At the same time, potential negative aspects will be minimized through the separation of functions: the diaspora organization finds vulnerable migrants; the NGO having no ethnic preferences assesses each case using formal evaluation instruments and provides help when needed.

In ***Kyrgyzstan***, it was determined that the key factors of successful re-integration were access to investment funds (economic capital), supportive social networks (social capital) and own skills, competences and resources (human capital). However, difficulties were noted with regard to those factors. In economic terms, the most successful migrants could to some degree improve their life standards back home and invest in their children's future, but did not manage to secure a stable income and faced problems with unemployment. Social networks helped migrants find employment, but could not protect them from deceitful intermediaries or employers. Economic situation in the country limited employment and decent earning opportunities as well as expansion of the business projects due to limited capacity of local markets.

A significant factor in re-integration chances was often the individual motive for migration and the economic and social standing at the time of the decision to migrate. The case of some beneficiaries of IOM assistance in southern Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that rich social and human capital reduced the negative impact of the ban status on their economic and psychological well-being, enabling the beneficiary to make effective use of the assistance. In contrast, challenges were faced even after receiving assistance by those migrants who:

- did not plan their business projects efficiently, which resulted mainly in limited ability to produce or provide products and services and to find markets for the products and services;
- were affected by *force majeure* situations;
- had health problems themselves or needed to support persons with health problems;
- have a large number of dependents, or
- lacked social networks or family ties (orphans).

In ***Tajikistan***, three main strategies were employed by re-entry migrants to deal with the effects of the ban:

- **monetizing the knowledge and skills** acquired in the country of destination. Migrants who are skilled (construction workers, car mechanics, confectioners) were the most prepared to re-integrate but need support with setting up their own private enterprise;
- **waiting for the expiration of the ban**. This passive attitude reflected low adaptability of some re-entry banned migrants who considered their stay at home as a temporary phase in their lives;
- **changing the country of destination**. For this group migration remains the only known and possible strategy for survival. However, the new country has no (or only weak) social networks that they used to turn to during their trips to the previous country of destination (Russia). Also, migrants are not aware (or have little knowledge) of the rules and procedures to be followed to legalize their stay in the new country of destination (Kazakhstan).

As part of a re-integration project, IOM Kazakhstan and IOM Tajikistan provided assistance to Tajik migrants who received a re-entry ban, including helping them to return home from Astana and to minimize their economic hardships. Based on the assessment of their needs, beneficiaries received support for self-employment, consisting of building tools, equipment for setting up a food outlet or a tailor's shop or livestock (cows and calves). Interviews with the beneficiaries show that the opportunity for self-employment addressed the key push factor that had stimulated their decision to emigrate in the first place, as none of the 40 respondents expressed interest in going abroad in search of employment.

The overview of the identified needs of re-entry banned migrants in the new country of destination and in the countries of origin suggests that a comprehensive approach is needed, in which all factors of vulnerability are tackled, covering the structural, situational, family and individual levels (Fig. 10). This could help address the common scenarios, in which multiple types of vulnerability affected individuals and households, reducing the effectiveness of more narrow measures.

The analysis of the individual stories of the 35 assisted cases in Kyrgyzstan and 9 cases in Tajikistan suggests that beneficiaries who were successful in using IOM assistance shared certain characteristics – exhibiting lower levels of multiple types of vulnerability. In contrast, those who displayed higher levels of vulnerability faced greater challenges in using assistance effectively (Fig. 11).

Fig. 10. Measures addressing various types of vulnerability



Structural

Create opportunity for self-registration, clarify and impose the definition of labor exploitation, extend the registration period.

Situational

Provide information on the border (registration, work permits, access to health system and social benefits), assist in sending stranded migrants home

Family

Expand direct assistance programs in countries of origin, provide legal and vocational trainings for migrants' families, put more focus on women and youth

Individual

Facilitate legal assistance for migrants with expired /without documents, launch integration and health programs, particularly targeting women and youth

Source: IOM CA analysis of public data and interviews with migrants, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, January-May 2017

Fig. 11. Vulnerabilities as determinants of integration success

Factors of successful cases

Those who have been doing well with the help of the assistance are those:

- Managed to plan better their business ideas and thus received assistance for it
- Possess relevant skill and knowledge for running a particular kind of business
- Have strong social networks
- Have higher education
- Managed to make use of the skills they learned in Russia
- Make useful cooperation with other people who are involved in the same sort of business.

Factors of unsuccessful cases

Those who have been facing challenges are those who:

- Did not plan their business projects efficiently, which resulted mainly in limited ability to produce or provide products and services and to find markets for the products and services
- Have health problems or someone close in the family has health problems
- With very weak social networks and family ties (usually they are orphans)
- A large number of dependents in the family of the beneficiary
- *Force majeure* situation: One beneficiary's computer shop in Osh burned due to electrical fires

4. RADICALIZATION

Combination of factors at play in radicalization of migrants. The grounds for possible migrants' radicalization are very complex. They combine both ideological and socio-economic factors and concern the socio-cultural situation both in the countries of destination as well as in countries of origin. Purely economic grounds include: poverty and unemployment, inability to feed the family. Social grounds combine both a more objective perspective, for instance constant experiences of mistreatment multiplied by the subjective perspective of an individual migrants, such as feelings of injustice and the inability to make life meaningful. Ideological factors are based on the dissemination of radical ideas by extremist groups both in Russia and Central Asia as well as the absence of possibilities for religious development in secular states.

Role of religion. The religious situation in the region and its links with on the one hand migration and on the other religious extremism are very complex. The growing role of religious and spiritual communities and leaders is evident in many parts of the region, however its impact on social stability is complex. On the one hand, the CA countries could build bridges with informal groups to promote social justice, including fair treatment of vulnerable groups (e.g. women and children). Experts and spiritual leaders have also highlighted the need to raise standards in religious education institutions.

Addressing changing domestic grounds for radicalization. The general growth of interest in the religion among the general population is combined with a low level of religious knowledge in general and the temptation to look for quick solutions in fundamentalist religious groups. Those include mainly radical Salafism popular in western Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan, Wahabism in the Fergana Valley, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, there is also a growing concern over some extreme organizations using legal religious organizations like TablighiJamaat as a cover. The picture of the religious situation in Tajikistan and particularly in Uzbekistan is less clear. Thus, an urgent issue is addressing the deeper roots of growing popularity of extremist Salafi ideas among young people in a comprehensive manner through acknowledging a variety of factors at play: lack of education and job perspectives, declining authority of traditional religious leaders and institutions, weakening of the family due to migration phenomenon, limited advancement prospects for women in more traditional rural areas.

Socioeconomic position of migrants and their radicalization potential. Income-generating activities and steady employment have a decisive positive impact on the welfare of both migrants and their families as usually migration of one of the family members is the only source of income for large households. Expert interviews have revealed that there is a link between the lack of knowledge of the destination country's language, feelings of alienation, mistreatment by the law enforcement agencies and potential radicalization. However, the link between migrants' vulnerabilities, economic hardships

and potential radicalization is very complex and nuanced as most experts note that the combination of socioeconomic and ideological factors is essential to the onset of radicalization.

Radicalization mechanisms in migration. Expert interviews did not confirm the thesis that Central Asian migrants get radicalized in the home countries or that they bring back the radicalization threat to their countries of origin. Instead, typically radicalization takes place in Russia, involving certain vulnerable groups (Fig, 12): young migrants without social ties experiencing social stigma, for instance divorced women, abandoned children, but also people who had contacts with criminal networks or youth gangs in the past. Some reports concerned young uneducated people free of control both from the family and from the state joining extremist organizations in Russia after being recruited at mosques run by North Caucasian or other ethnic groups. It is not however yet clear if/how their behavior changes when they come back to the Central Asia. Most likely those migrants prefer not to come home, being afraid of the possible repressive measures, and they often choose further migration to Turkey or Syria.

Changing grounds for radicalization of migrants. Officials and experts note that the changes in the environment in the destination countries have brought about a shift in the strength of socioeconomic and ideological factors of radicalization (Fig. 13). On the one hand, the removal of barriers to migration, improved economic prospects for the majority of migrants and opportunities for legal status have helped address some of the objective vulnerabilities. On the other hand, ideological factors could become more prominent with the growing threat of social tensions in the wake of recent attacks in Russia coupled with the rising interest in targeting migrant communities among extremist organizations.

Fig. 12. More vulnerable groups among migrants

Low social resources

- Lacking support from social/community networks
- Low levels of religious education or prospect for advancement
- Criminal record or ties to criminal networks

Women and youth

- Divorced or abandoned women, widows (esp. with re-entry ban)
- Unaccompanied migrants' children separated from parents
- Orphans who leave facilities and lack parental support

Source: Analysis of public data and interviews with officials and experts, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, March-May 2017

Deradicalization approaches. Central Asian countries have generally adopted a 'security' approach to deal with the threat of violent extremism. This approach concentrates on tracking, isolating and apprehending agents of radicalization by law enforcement agencies. Recent examples include legal amendments that strip persons involved in extremist activities of their citizenship or tracking funding of such activities. Experts note that to be successful, this approach needs to be complemented by a set of 'integration' measures, seeking to reduce broader socio-economic and ideological grounds for radicalization. Good practices involve raising awareness of the extremist discourse and involvement of spiritual leaders, but experts point to the need for targeted programs for rehabilitation of former fighters and their families.

Fig. 13. Changing grounds of radicalization of Central Asian migrants in Russia and/or at home



Source: IOM CA analysis of public data and interviews with officials and experts, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, March-May 2017

5. IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS

INVOLVEMENT OF COMMUNITIES

Limited trust, raising migrant right awareness: Where it comes to NGOs, it appears that it is the most reliable channel for assistance provision; however few migrants know about NGOs activities. Moreover, assistance offered by NGOs is very limited, mainly targeting legal and medical support. In general NGOs lack capacities/resources to provide job counseling advice and provision of micro grants or loans.[1] Consequently, it may be expected that if the local communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are systemically involved in promoting safe migration and conducting migrants' awareness campaigns, migrants will make more rational migration decisions. Such involvement might be particularly crucial in assisting migrants to look for safer transport possibilities and legal employment opportunities abroad, consistently consider migration path and invest in obtaining skills and professions required abroad.

Misused trust, alienation: Certain categories of more vulnerable migrants, for instance re-entry banned migrants, are forced to rely only on community-based networks, which in turn may deepen their specific vulnerabilities. Alienation, abuse of rights in the workplace reduce migrants' trust in the ability of the state to stand up for them, and eventually they turn to non-state actors (including, informal ones) for help. The interviews revealed that migrants' negative experience of contacts with authorities in Russia discourage them from turning to Kazakh authorities for assistance and limit opportunities for aid to informal channels.[2] We found out that bus drivers from local communities transporting migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan usually take away passports from the migrants and return them only at the final destination in Russia. They hand over migrants to other intermediaries or future employers, often against migrant's will.[3] When a migrant finds out that he/she is on re-entry ban list and may not enter Russia, bus drivers may bring a migrant to the alternative workplace where he/she is severely exploited.[4] However, harsh economic conditions back home may induce the migrant to exploit this risky migration path once again.[5] Although highly risky, social networks are crucial for migrants' strategies and their absence may be even more destructive. Migrants from Tajikistan in northern Kazakhstan who are returned from the Russian border cannot rely on any community-based networks therefore without assistance from NGOs or international organizations they have no opportunities to return home.[6]

Limited dialogue and limited opportunities: Diaspora organizations both in Russia and in Kazakhstan have very restricted possibilities to help vulnerable migrants due to their limited human and financial capacities as well as insufficient transparency and accountability vis-à-vis migrants. They usually refer

1 Kyrgyzstan, Focus group with NGOs, 10-13 April, Tajikistan, Focus group with NGOs, 13-14 April 2017.
2 Kazakhstan, Expert interviews March & May 2017.
3 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment in Kazakhstan.
4 Kazakhstan, Expert interviews, March, May & June 2017.
5 Ibid.
6 Kazakhstan, Expert & NGOs focus groups, March 2017.

migrants to the NGOs or assist them financially only in the most critical situations like deaths.[7] In many cases, community members, not being aware of possible risks provide migrants with the contacts to informal intermediaries, who are the only possible migration-related network they have. With very imperfect information on possible migration options accessed via community-related channels, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan and Russia usually turn for assistance to the informal networks, including relatives and private intermediaries who have been found at times to exploit migrants.[8]

Absence of migrant rights awareness: Majority of Central Asian migrants interviewed by IOM experts have very low level of awareness of their rights, low level of education and fairly random access to services that would help them to defend those rights. A study prepared in 2016 by the Committee for Human Rights under the President of Kazakhstan has revealed that 10% of surveyed migrants in South Kazakhstan sought legal assistance and mere 0.1% of all cases involving migrant workers lodged appeals to the higher court.[9] NGOs, community leaders and other groups that could increase migrants' awareness, may also lack proper knowledge and legal comprehension. Local community leaders may have low level of legal knowledge and other migration-related awareness, and they don't have regular contacts with governmental authorities/NGOs/IOs working with migrants. Diaspora organizations both in Russia and in Kazakhstan have very limited opportunities to help vulnerable migrants, also in legal terms and are not sufficiently equipped to protect migrant rights in courts/state institutions or in relationship with the employer.[10]

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND INTEGRATION SERVICES IN DESTINATION COUNTRIES

This sub-section formulates the rationale, challenges and opportunities for putting in place, in addition to existing employment opportunities, dedicated integration services for Central Asian vulnerable migrants in the destination state. Although Pillar 2 is mainly concerned with the situation in Kazakhstan as a destination state, attention has also been paid to the needs of migrants in Russia insofar as they were confirmed through the desk research or during interviews with returning migrants.

Possible involvement of diaspora organizations: Diaspora organizations' of Kyrgyz and Tajiks are currently stronger in Russia than in Kazakhstan. For instance, the Tajik diaspora in Russia operates in 68 regions of Russia.[11] The scope of activities of Tajik NGOs and national cultural centers is quite extensive and includes: (a) protecting rights of migrants from Tajikistan, as well as rights of Russian citizens of Tajik nationality; (b) preserving and developing the Tajik language, culture and traditions of Tajik people, as well as harmonizing inter-ethnic relations; (c) providing assistance to the Embassy of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation in organizing and conducting important political events of Tajikistan for Tajik migrants in the Russian Federation, such as presidential and parliamentary elections and referendums.[12]

Irregular employment, narrowing perspectives for legalisation: Continued downturn on the Russian labour market has induced many Central Asian migrants to search for employment in Kazakhstan,

7 Expert interviews in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-June 2017.
8 Ibid.
9 Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2016). Analytical report "Current Problems in the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers in the Republic of Kazakhstan". P. 197
10 Expert interviews in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-June 2017.
11 http://www.iom.tj/files/en_IOM_Tajikistan_Diaspora_1June2015.pdf.
12 Ibid.

which has also facilitated conditions of entry by introducing a patent system.[13] This unprecedented influx occurred during economic slowdown, producing a variety of effects: rise in irregular migration, deterioration in labour conditions, and downward pressure on wages offered to the migrants as a method of employers to reduce costs of employment.[14] These compounded the vulnerabilities, observed among migrant workers in the region, and associated with irregular status. IOM's mapping of migration flows, carried out in 2014, revealed that even in times of economic prosperity Central Asia outward migration to Russia had irregular character, mainly due to the legal constraints (difficulties in obtaining legal status) and low migrant rights awareness.[15] Similarly, analysis of Central Asian migration to Kazakhstan, implemented in 2016, concluded that the main factor underlying the prevalence of irregular status among Central Asian migrants consists in the restrictive terms for legalizing their status.[16]

Sociological fieldwork undertaken as part of this assessment confirmed that the overwhelming majority of interviewed Central Asian migrants interviewed exhibited one or more forms of job-related irregularities during their stay in Kazakhstan (in particular, failure to properly register residence). One issue related to the procedure for issuing a work patent, which may not be obtained by a migrant independently but instead needs to be secured by a Kazakhstani citizen. Another hurdle is the short period, in which a migrant needs to obtain registration and a work permit as well as to sign a work contract – limited to five days after arrival, which is a requirement that is difficult to meet by many of the re-entry banned migrants.[17] These factors reduce opportunities for legalisation of migrants' residence, resulting in additional risks for migrants including: job-related mistreatments, unsafe working conditions that undermined their health, delay or unpaid pensions and others.[18] All these factors led to the situation where migrants did not benefit from migration, but on the contrary – found it detrimental to their welfare.

Absence of comprehensive integration services: Kazakhstani state institutions do not provide Central Asian migrants with any integration services, including free legal counseling or job seeking assistance, or social assistance in case of most vulnerable migrants. Only Oralmans (ethnic Kazakhs living abroad repatriating to Kazakhstan)[19] and highly qualified migrants are eligible for employment or social services in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Oralmans can receive targeted re-integration assistance through specialized Centers on Adaptation and Integration for Oralmans. Another aspect that makes unqualified labor migrants more vulnerable is their ineligibility for participation in health and social systems due to their specific legal status (either as irregular migrants either by migrants with patents which do not provide with insurance mechanisms). Phase I research in Kazakhstan revealed that the important integration barrier for Central Asian migrants consisted in their irregular status and absence of information how the status might be regularized.[20] Only very limited integration assistance is provided by NGOs and international community.

13 In 2016 more than 300,000 Uzbek citizens received permits to work for private individuals (almost three times as many as in 2015). Kyrgyz citizens are not captured in migration statistics anymore since Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU, but registration statistics show an increase of around 40%. In 2016 in comparison to 2015 the number of Tajik citizens with temporary registration in Kazakhstan increased from 33,036 to 48,697.
14 IOM, Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy, Brussels 2010, http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_the_economic_crisis.pdf; S. Collucelo, L. Kretsos "Irregular migration, Xenophobia, and the Economic Crisis in Greece", in: S. Massey, R. Collucello (eds.), Euroafrican Migration: Legal, Economic and Social Response to Irregular Migration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 88-97.
15 IOM Central Asia, Mapping on Irregular Migration in Central Asia, 2015, http://iom.kg/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/IDFPublicationeng.pdf.
16 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p.193.
17 Analysis of the results of expert assessment on Kazakhstan.
18 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.
19 http://kazakhstanhumanrights.com/humanrightsanddemocracy/rights-of-the-oralman/.
20 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 97-100.

The Russian state institutions do not make available comprehensive integration services either, but here the picture is more complex and diversified. In major cities, city councils provide some funds/grants for diaspora organizations and NGOs provide legal assistance for migrants. In smaller cities or in rural areas the situation is much more dramatic.[21] Diaspora organizations function based on their one modest sources and in some localities there is no place where a migrant could turn for assistance.

REDUCING THE POST-BAN SHOCK THROUGH TARGETED SUPPORT

The Phase I results have recognized that combination of pre-existing vulnerabilities and the depletion of migrants' resources after unplanned return may bring about sense of shock, i.e. inability to cope with the post-ban challenges on their own.[22]

Pillar 3 seeks to facilitate re-integration of returning migrants in countries of their origin through targeted support. Access to a labour market is a fundamental aspect of re-integration. However, another important component is the social reintegration by which we understand the reinsertion of a migrant into the social structures of his or her country of origin. This includes the development of a personal network (friends, relatives, neighbours) but also the development of civil society structures (associations, self-help groups and other organizations).[23]

No stakeholders' arrangements and limited information flows: There are some bureaucratic, financial, human and other barriers that limit the effective information flow and possible launch of comprehensive re-integration measures, particularly in collaboration between the governments and non-governmental sector, between the central government and local authorities as well as local communities. among state and non-state actors. Both Kyrgyz and Taijk governments declare they are open to such dialogue, including via Almaty Process.[24] However, one barrier could be high levels of interpersonal, intergroup, as well as institutional distrust in the region.[25] Interviewed NGOs mentioned growing reluctance of state institutions to partner with NGOs.[26] Systemic distrust may be overcome by organizing regular dialogue forums on re-integration with the participation of governmental and non-governmental actors as well as by implementing pilot re-integration projects. State institutions representatives could also be invited to get acquainted with best global re-integration practices. In expert interviews corruption, economic instability, unfavorable tax conditions were referred to as a main reason why private business is reluctant to partner in economic re-integration of returning migrants alongside with the governments.[27] At the same time, both governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in their development strategies indicate as a priority a need to launch free economic areas or to promote 'economic specializations' of certain regions.[28] In cooperation with the international community under pilot re-integration platforms those concepts could be tested in the locations with high level of returning migration where special tax and credit regimes are granted alongside with targeted anti-corruption measures.

21 Expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, April 2017.
22 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 32-33.
23 IOM, Re-integration: Effective Approaches, 2015, p. 82.
24 https://www.iom.int/almaty-process.
25 http://www.iom.tj/files/en_IOM_Tajikistan_Diaspora_1June2015.pdf.
26 Expert interview in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-April 2017.
27 Ibid.
28 Analysis of the socio-political and socio-economic expert assessment on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

No targeted state-provided re-integration assistance: Re-integration of returning migrants has not received sufficient attention in national strategies or activities. Tajikistan has identified the need to re-integrate certain categories of returning migrants as a priority in the National Development Strategy till 2020. On the other hand, such a priority has not been acknowledged in strategic documents, issued by the Kyrgyz government. However, such activities are stipulated by the draft Migration Strategy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to be adopted in the nearest future.[29] Neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan have elaborated dedicated (re-)integration policies targeting returning migrants. There are general job creation efforts, particularly in Tajikistan, and micro-loans programmes available (in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). However, those programmes are designed with the general population in mind, and returning migrants rarely know about their existence. Moreover, the new working places are usually of temporary character and the salary paid is very low.

Limited information and access and to public services: Phase I research has demonstrated that migrants usually attempt to re-integrate via unofficial channels.[30] Majority of migrants interviewed in both Phase I and II did not turn for assistance to any governmental agencies except to learn about the duration of their re-entry ban.[31] While generally this could result from returning migrants' absence of trust to the state institutions, an equally important factor is their limited access to the public services. Another important social problem are the children who lack proper care, when their parents go for migration. They are often left with relatives or in religious schools with no proper access to any public service due to their unregulated legal status.[32]

GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES TO PROMOTE 'SAFE MIGRATION'

This sub-section presents rationale, opportunities and challenges involved in the implementation by the countries of origin and destination state of a set of policies that would promote safe migration, protect migrants' rights and provide migrants with legal residence and employment as a long-term radicalization prevention measure.

Limited interest in safe migration agreements/ difficulties in finding alternative migration destinations: In modern realities governments of destination states are less willing to conclude bilateral agreements on labour migration, finding them fairly slow and relatively limited mechanisms which require a long negotiation procedures. They prefer to manage labour migration through application of domestic immigration stimulation policies, seeking to attract certain categories of migrants in the deficit sectors of their labour markets. Countries of destination who however decide to conclude such agreements, usually combine them with the readmission agreements, agreements on fight against irregular migration, assisted voluntary return etc. It is worth noting though that while the tendency to conclude bilateral agreements on labour migration has been declining in Europe, it appears to be gaining popularity in Asia.[33]

Limited mechanisms to react to sanctions / discriminatory practices: While Central Asia governments are quite successful in exporting surplus labour force abroad, their successes in fighting against abuses of their citizens' rights in the destination countries are less visible (also due to obvious difficulties in securing own citizens' rights abroad). Our socio-

29 Ibid.
30 IOM Central Asia, 2016 Regional Field Assessment..., op. cit, p. 34.
31 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment.
32 Expert interview Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, March-April 2017.
33 ILO, Bilateral labour agreements: trends and good practices, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/presentation/wcms_422397.pdf; OECD, Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at the Crossroads, 2004.

logical assessment reveals that over time returned migrants who have experienced in both a destination and sending country mistreatment and abuse of rights may develop a sense of social injustice which combined with socio-economic factors may ultimately lead to the greater susceptibility to radicalization. Majority of interviewed migrants both in the Phase I and II claimed they had been mistreated or abused both in the country of destination (by law enforcement, intermediaries and employers, their fellow countrymen and diaspora organizations, criminal groups, or fell victims to the racist attacks) as well as in their home country (corruption and extortion by state institutions, raider attacks, abuses by intermediaries and criminal groups, abuses by the relatives).[34] While the direct link between a personal sense of injustice and radicalization potential was not observed in the sociological fieldwork, the psychological setup of many of the migrants is characteristic of groups that have been found in other studies to be more susceptible to extremist messaging. Those studies have revealed that main ideological message that extremist recruiters are targeting migrants with is the issue of injustice, mistreatment of migrants that could be avenged where migrants enter 'holy war' (jihad).[35]

34 Analysis of the results of the sociological assessment
35 Search for Common Ground, Radicalization of Central Asian Labour Migrants in Russia, results of applied research, presentation in Osh in April 2017.

Main recommendations

1. Reducing vulnerabilities in the new country of destination (Kazakhstan)

Issues	Recommendations
1.1. Difficulties in registration of residence Migrants (except for citizens of Kyrgyzstan) do not have any other option than to resort to the help of relatives or intermediaries in order to get registered at the place of residence. In the latter case migrants may be caught in new forms of dependency, including labour exploitation. Migrants find themselves at even greater risk of vulnerability when unexpectedly it becomes necessary for them to obtain registration once they have learned about their ban to enter Russia at the Russian-Kazakhstani border. They are forced to resort to the services of unvetted and unreliable intermediaries in order to regularize documents and find employment in a strange town.	**Migration Service Committee (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Ombudsman, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan** **1.1.1.** To provide a facility for migrants to obtain registration independently, for example, at the address of the migration police office. **1.1.2.** To intensify the cooperation on monitoring of the migrants' rights between the Migration Service Committee and the Ombudsman **IOM, NGOs** **1.1.3.** To raise awareness among migrants making use of hotlines and consultations of the mechanism of online residence registration (e-registration)

Issues	Recommendations
1.2. Insufficient incentives for regularization of status One of the main of the main challenges that can fuel corruption schemes of migrant worker registration and employment in Kazakhstan is the fact that migrants and the majority of employers fail to associate the proper regularization of documents with better migrant status and increased security against various risks. So far it has been more common and convenient for them to resort to informal employment, since it is cheaper and easier to arrange through an illegal intermediary.	**Migration Service Committee (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Ombudsman, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan** **1.2.1.** To set up a system of incentives to motivate intermediaries, employers and migrants to engage in regular employment practices and pay all appropriate fees and contributions. **1.2.2.** It should comprise information and incentive components. The information part should focus on explaining in an accessible format what resources and opportunities will be made available to migrants once they fulfilled all official regularization procedures. The incentive part should include free consultations with state migration officials, simplified migration procedures, etc. **1.2.3** To enable all migrants from non-member countries of the EAEU to regularize their status within the patent system whether they are employed by private individuals or legal entities

Issues	Recommendations
1.3. Ineffective legal and procedural mechanisms for protecting labour rights Migrant workers do not have effective access to legal procedure, necessary for protecting their rights in cases of labour exploitation. It is difficult to initiate a criminal investigation due to issues with assembling evidence in such cases as the definitions of acts punishable under criminal law do not sufficiently specify the criteria to identify them (detention, etc.). Non-payment of salaries is not easy to prove without a signed employment contract, whereas the Labour Inspection responsible for uncovering the cases of irregular employment is not allowed to visit workplaces without an explicit request from the affected migrants.	**Ministry of Justice, Public Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan** **1.3.1.** To clarify the criteria for certain legal terms ("detention", etc.) to enable the police to appropriately classify labour exploitation offences, making reference to the existing mechanisms applied in prosecuting trafficking in persons and cruel treatment, leading to social misadaptation. **1.3.2.** To introduce sanctions against employers who engage in irregular employment. **1.3.3.** To develop the system for filing complaints of all migrant workers who are victims of abuse by the Labour inspectors and Prosecutors. In particular, to ensure that the Labour Inspection officers are able to gain access to sites where migrant labour is used and to establish guarantees to migrants who report on instances of violations of their rights in the workplace. **1.3.4.** To amend the law on trade unions in order to enhance mechanisms for the protection of all migrant workers' rights **1.3.5.** To raise the level of awareness among migrant workers and victims of trafficking on their rights and feature migrant labour rights and protection from abuse in the courses offered to border guards, civil servants and migration services, private sectors.

Issues	Recommendations
1.4. Lacking support for reducing ban impact and facilitating alternative post-ban plans Migrants who were not planning to work in Kazakhstan and instead were travelling to Russia to seek employment there will not normally have any support networks in Kazakhstan, especially in the vicinity of the border crossings. In this situation migrants are unable, at such a short notice, to find somebody who could help them with the registration, put them in touch with potential employers, provide meals and accommodation while waiting for departure back home or financial support for the return ticket home.	**Migration Service Committee (Ministry of Internal Affairs), IOM, NGOs, diaspora organisations** **1.4.1.** To put in place an infrastructure to facilitate prompt registration of re-entry banned migrants in Kazakhstan or their departure from Kazakhstan (temporary accommodation, legal support) in towns close to border crossing points. **1.4.2.** To circulate information on available assistance mechanisms (hotline, personal consultations) in towns close to border crossing point through which re-entry banned migrants transit. **1.4.3.** To establish a referral mechanism for assisted voluntary return covering re-entry banned migrants stranded in the territory of Kazakhstan in the framework of current bilateral agreements or CIS agreement (the Chisinau Convention) **1.4.4.** To develop the joint actions against illegal recruitment channels within the framework of regional or CIS cooperation and share experience with migration services and law enforcement agencies of the countries of re-entry banned migrants' origin.

2. Raising migrant workers' awareness about their legal status and ways of avoiding irregularity at all stages of migration (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)

Issues	Recommendations
2.1. Limited awareness of re-entry ban status as a factor of risk for irregularity (Kazakhstan) If migrants find out about their re-entry bans when they try to cross the border from Kazakhstan to Russia, they have very little information on where to obtain registration, where to look for a job, who can help with finding employment or purchasing a ticket back home. As a consequence, many banned migrants fall into irregularity and are unable to rectify their migration status on their own.	**Border Guard under the National Security Committee, Migration Service Committee (Ministry of Internal Affairs), IOM, NGOs, diaspora organisations** **2.1.1.** To put in place an infrastructure to inform banned migrants about available mechanisms of returning home without delay; as part of it to use information stands and leaflets directly at border crossing points, in migration police offices and areas of mass congregation of migrants. **2.1.2.** The Border Guard and migration police officials could also provide verbal advice in order to reduce the time that banned migrants remain in an irregular status. **2.1.3** To conduct information campaigns on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the media and local diaspora networks in cooperation with border guards and migration services.

Issues	Recommendations
2.2. Provision of accessible legal assistance to migrants in destination countries Low awareness of the legal obligations and rights was identified by IOM as a major factor of vulnerability among Central Asian migrant workers in Russia. As part of the regional Migration Programme (2010–2015) aimed at protecting migrant workers' rights and building the potential of government employees who provide services to migrants, the IOM funded the work of lawyers (legal advisers) in Moscow. However, this line of activity is no longer underway.	**IOM, representative/consular offices of Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan in Russia/Kazakhstan** **2.2.1.** To establish affordable legal services, targeting the migrant workers from respective Central Asian countries, offering dedicated assistance on the basis of best practices elaborated by IOM. The need for continued support at a relatively low cost to migrants was brought up during the dialogue with the Kyrgyz/Tajik authorities as well as with the diaspora representatives and migrants themselves. **Embassies of Kyrgyzstan/ Tajikistan in Russia/Kazakhstan** **2.2.2.** To train the consular staff in technical standards and procedures of consular protection in emergency situations. In particular, to feature the mechanisms of issuing emergency travel documents based on international best practices.

Issues	Recommendations
2.3. Reliance on informal networks for finding employment and resolving issues in return migration (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) Only a small part of returning migrants have secured employment upon return through institutional channels. The majority continue to identify opportunities through recourse to informal support networks. This exposes them at times to fraud or exploitation.	**Employment centers, IOM, NGOs** **2.3.1.** In Kyrgyzstan, employment and recruitment centres and organizations should focus more efforts on employment in the local labour market. It is advisable that employment centres more often negotiate and enter into agreements with local employers. **2.3.2.** Considering the limited capacities of state employment agencies as well as persisting mistrust on the part of returning migrants and their families, local-level mechanisms of engaging non-governmental organizations are needed for the more effective reintegration of returning migrants. **2.3.3.** To continue the regional cooperation based on the bilateral agreements via organized recruitment channels between Kazakhstan and countries of origins.

3. Enhancing capacity for managing external labour migration flows (Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan)

Issues	Recommendations
3.1. Consolidating the legal and strategic framework for migration policy (Kyrgyzstan/ Tajikistan) Considering the importance of labour migration, both countries defined priority issues for management of their migration flows. Tajikistan has been implementing a labour emigration strategy since 2011, while Kyrgyzstan's migration strategy is in the process of adoption. The Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Kyrgyz Republic has drafted the law "On Labour Migration", which awaits approval.	**Ministries of Labour, Migration Services, Cabinets of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic/the Republic of Tajikistan** **3.1.1.** In Kyrgyzstan, to expedite the adoption of the national migration strategy and the law "On Labour Migration". **3.1.2.** In Tajikistan, to monitor the impact of activities, foreseen in the strategic documents (labour emigration strategy, national development strategy, programme aimed at reducing irregular employment, etc.) on the category of returning migrant workers and their families.

Issues	Recommendations
3.2. Setting up mechanisms for institutional coordination of migration policy (Tajikistan) In 1997, by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Inter-Agency Commission for regulation of the migration processes was set up to coordinate the work of ministries and other government agencies involved in the management of labour migration. Decisions passed by this Commission were mandatory for all government bodies in the country and their implementation was overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan. However, the commission has not been operational for over a year, limiting the capacity for coordinating the activities and as a result the activities of ministries and other agencies in addressing migration-related issues remain unchecked.	**Government of the Republic of Tajikistan** **3.2.1.** The work of this Commission should resume and the IOM should provide its support following the example of the Inter-Agency Commission on Combating Trafficking in Persons under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.
3.3. Diversification of migration destinations (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) As a result of the recent economic downturn and the impact of re-entry bans, significant reorientation of the flows from Central Asian countries of origin has been in evidence. However, so far the organized schemes for regulating the status of the migrant workers in new destinations have had limited impact.	**Ministries of Labour/Foreign Affairs, Migration Services of the Kyrgyz Republic/Republic of Tajikistan** **3.3.1.** To conduct specific studies into the opportunities and barriers to employment of own nationals in the third countries outside of the Eurasian area. **3.3.2.** To continue working on the conclusion of the already drafted bilateral agreements with new countries of destination. The priority is to conclude agreements with countries where substantial rise of employment has been observed (e.g. Turkey for nationals of Kyrgyzstan).

4. Facilitating re-integration opportunities upon return (Kyrgyzstan/ Tajikistan)

Issues	Recommendations
4.1. Absence of dedicated state re-integration programs The National Strategy for Labour Emigration of the Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2011–2015 made provisions for "the development of a mechanism enabling the reintegration of returned migrants into the country's economy". Thus far, however, this mechanism has not been established. During interviews with government officials and academics it was suggested that the IOM could assist in this task. In Kyrgyzstan, the draft Concept of the State Migration Policy points to the need to introduce measures for returning migrant workers "to ensure their employment in the domestic labour market and the utilization of acquired knowledge and skills in the homeland". However, the current programme on Employment until 2020 does not include any measures on re-integration of returning migrants.	**IOM, State authorities** **4.1.1.** When planning dedicated measures, specific vulnerabilities of certain categories of returning migrants and their families should be taken into account. The experience of IOM assistance programs could be taken into account at the stage of planning and programming state assistance. **4.1.2.** IOM Central Asia sub-regional office and its missions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could provide expert assistance in the elaboration of parameters of a migrant worker reintegration programme based on the relevant international experience.
4.2. Contracting income of vulnerable households (Tajikistan) An increasing number of heads of households stop helping their families and leave them to fend for themselves without any financial support; as a result, migrants' wives and children find themselves in a desperate situation. Abandoned families of migrant workers are a particularly vulnerable group, for women in these households often do not have any professional training or work experience, children are mainly minors and sometimes the family also takes care of dependent elderly parents.	**Ministries of Labour, Migration Services, Cabinets of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic/the Republic of Tajikistan** **4.2.1.** On instruction from the Government of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Health should expedite the development of a state-funded targeted assistance programme aimed at disadvantaged families (including abandoned families of migrant workers) that would provide for an increase in financial support and benefits available to them.

Issues	Recommendations
4.3. Particular vulnerabilities of children (Kyrgyzstan) Both interviews with returning migrants and expert consultations with officials have identified as a substantial issue of migrants' children often left without schooling and subject to abuse (violence).	**Ministry of Labour and Social Development, Ombudsman's Office, Ministry of Education of the Kyrgyz Republic** **4.3.1.** To develop mechanisms and instruments in order to integrate migrants' children left behind in Kyrgyzstan in the educational process and provide support to non-governmental organizations working with migrants' children in the country of origin.

5. Addressing factors of radicalization and lowering potential for violent extremism among vulnerable groups (destination countries/Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan)

Issues	Recommendations
5.1. Vulnerability to radicalization among migrant workers in destination countries According to the respondents from the Kyrgyz and Tajik law enforcement agencies, the spiritual leaders and experts, migrant workers from Central Asia are being recruited into radical organizations primarily in the destination countries. In many mosques in the Russian Federation, Friday prayers are already delivered in Central Asian languages since the majority of worshipers are migrant workers from the region.	**Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, State Commission on Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic** **Grand Mufti of Tajikistan, Committee on Religious Affairs of Republic of Tajikistan** **5.1.1.** In cooperation with MFA of the Kyrgyz Republic/ Republic of Tajikistan and relevant authorities of the destination countries, to carry out awareness raising campaigns among migrant workers in the mosques in destination countries facilitated by representatives of official religious bodies and law enforcement agencies of Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan. **IOM, academic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan** **5.1.2.** To commission studies exploring the factors, mechanisms and policy implications of the process of radicalization of migrant workers in destination countries (e.g. Russia, Turkey).

Issues	Recommendations
5.2. Radicalization potential of youth and women in the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) The sociological interviews as well as expert consultations have singled out a number of socioeconomic vulnerabilities, affecting youth and women in the countries of origin, that could, unless addressed, increase the likelihood of their potential radicalization. Thus, greater involvement of the non-state actors who enjoy trust among these vulnerable categories is essential.	**International and non-governmental organizations** **5.2.1.** In both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, international organizations should engage government agencies in their work with vulnerable social groups, otherwise the issues relating to the lack of trust of vulnerable groups towards government bodies cannot be effectively addressed. **5.2.2.** In order to deal with the challenges of radicalization among young people, international and non-governmental organizations should intensify their work with religious youths, since so far these organizations have been primarily engaging with "secular-minded young people" (Kyrgyzstan). **5.2.3.** Non-governmental organizations active in the protection of women's and children's rights and freedoms are advised to pay more attention to religious women who find themselves under the influence of violent religious movements and groups. For instance, leaders of religious women in Kyrgyzstan indicated that they expect help from the government and non-governmental sector.


NEED FOR SPEED

Socioeconomic and Sociopolitical Aspects of Return Migration

COUNTRY STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives an overview of the current trends and impact of return migration to two countries of origin of Central Asian migrant workers (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and of their transit movement as well as re-migration to Kazakhstan, a new country of destination. Particular attention has been given to the factors and modalities of movement of re-entry banned migrants, identified in Phase I of the assessment[1] as the most vulnerable category of returnees. Further, the manner in which the three countries have responded to return migration on the strategic, legal and operational level is discussed. The findings are presented as three national studies, reflecting the diverse challenges facing the new destination and the two countries of origin as well as a range of specific policy and administrative measures undertaken to address the issues arising from the predominantly unplanned returns. While the studies do not aim to evaluate these measures, they consider the extent to which they may help tackle the returnees' vulnerabilities, revealed in the course of the sociological fieldwork.

The national findings focus on the key new developments in the legal and administrative conditions for labour mobility between the countries of destination (Russia, Kazakhstan) and origin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) as well as in the existing and planned measures for (re-)integration of return migrants and improving their legal, social and economic status in either their regions of origin or new destinations. The strength of these "pull" factors is assessed in the context of the ongoing impact of such "push" factors as the labour market situation in the regions of migrants' return (in particular, limited job availability), persisting barriers to integration (especially for the more vulnerable groups, such as youth and women) and structural issues, affecting the socioeconomic development of these regions (poverty, limited investment, infrastructural needs).

1 "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration." Astana, Kazakhstan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). November 2016.

1. KAZAKHSTAN

1.1. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS AND IMPACT

1.1.1. Return migration trends and factors

1.1.1.1. Scale of immigration

Kazakhstan, although its economy was heavily affected by the regional economic slowdown following the drop in global oil prices, has over the past years become an increasingly attractive destination for Central Asian labour migrants lacking employment opportunities at home and not being able to re-enter Russia. While the Russian Federation remains by far the most popular country of destination for migrant workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic,

Table 5. Nationals of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with temporary registration in Kazakhstan

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Tajikistan	10,915	10,193	12,917	18,463	33,036	48,697
Kyrgyzstan	93,848	103,001	93,127	94,313	113,891	157,227
Uzbekistan	404,468	431,919	495,167	530,683	796,258	1,059,210
Total	**509,231**	**545,113**	**601,211**	**643,459**	**945,403**	**1,265,134**

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

Fig. 14. Nationals of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with temporary registration in Kazakhstan



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

an increasing share of the overall migrant population from these countries seeks employment in Kazakhstan. The observed increase in registered migration from other Central Asian countries to Kazakhstan that grew by close to 50% from 2014 to 2015 was extensively analyzed in Phase I of the regional assessment. What was impossible to assess at the time, however, was the sustainability and durability of this trend in the context of a weak economic climate across the region. However, contrary to what might be expected, the continuous slowing of yearly GDP growth rates in Kazakhstan, from 6% in 2013 to an estimated 1% in 2016[2], ensued in a steady rise of migrant numbers, especially from neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and—to a lesser extent—Tajikistan (Table 5). These developments show that the relatively recent trend of increasing migration numbers to Kazakhstan that started to become more prominent in 2015 was not just a one-off event. On the contrary, it is likely to deepen, with an increase by 33% in temporary registration numbers of migrants from Central Asia from 2015 to 2016 (Fig. 14).

Similar to what was established in Phase I of the regional assessment, migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan tend to work on a seasonal basis in Kazakhstan, with Uzbek and Kyrgyz migrants often seeking opportunities in regions close to their countries' borders with Kazakhstan. Accordingly, the highest concentrations of migrants (following statistics on temporary registration of foreigners who claimed work or business as their reason for entry) can be found in Kazakhstan's two largest cities (Astana and Almaty) and two regions bordering Uzbekistan (South Kazakhstan and Mangystau).[3] The key sectors of employment for migrant workers in Kazakhstan are construction (Astana, Almaty, South Kazakhstan region), agriculture (South Kazakhstan region, Almaty region) and trade (Almaty and Astana).

It should be noted, however, that neither the statistics on temporary registrations of foreigners nor work permit numbers translate into an accurate measure of migrant stock. If the same individual enters the country anew after having returned home and/or receives a new work permit during the same calendar year, this person is counted more than once in the statistics presented here. Due to the geographical proximity and the fact that work permits have to be renewed after a maximum of three months, it is very likely that the actual number of migrants working in Kazakhstan at any given point in time is much lower than these statistics indicate. Another limitation of this set of data is that they do not include certain categories of migrant workers, such as those who were authorized to take up employment under special programmes, for instance in preparation for the Expo exhibition.

1.1.1.2. Determining factors

The main reasons for the observed upward trend are twofold. On the one hand, the Kazakh economy holds a comparative advantage over the Russian economy, since unlike Russia, Kazakhstan never entered recession during the regional economic downturn that started in 2014. Continuous, albeit slow economic growth even led to a closing of the average monthly wage gap between Russia and Kazakhstan.[4] Such economic dynamics render Kazakhstan's labour market particularly attractive for those migrants who are banned from returning to Russia due to administrative offenses, and have made it a major country of destination, second only to Russia. Relatedly, the second reason for Kazakhstan's increasing popularity among migrant workers from neighbouring Central Asian countries is its relatively liberal migration policy compared to Russia. Following the liberalization of entry into the Kazakh labour market for foreign workers, both for the

2 Cf. http://data.worldbank.org/country/kazakhstan
3 Ibid.
4 Cf. https://isp.hse.ru/data/2016/05/20/1131910772/02_Май_Мониторинг_ВШЭ.pdf

highly-skilled through simplified procedures and for low-skilled migrants through the introduction of work permits that allow private individuals to employ up to five foreign citizens without being subject to the work permit quota, overall migration rates have steadily increased—including for the countries under study in this report. Especially for migrants from neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, these reforms have given Kazakhstan a comparative advantage over going to Russia for work: distances are much shorter, thus keeping travel expenses low; patents can be obtained for brief periods ranging from one to three months and are renewable for up to one year, which allows for significant flexibility in planning migration projects; and many Uzbek and Kyrgyz migrants can rely on kinship ties across the border in Kazakhstan to provide them with work, housing and other forms of material or immaterial support.

1.1.1.3. Migrants by country of origin

Uzbekistan

Uzbek migrants form by far the largest group by all metrics: more than one million temporary registrations were issued to citizens of Uzbekistan in 2016 (33% more than during the previous year), and more than 300,000 received permits to work for private individuals (almost three times as many as in 2015) (Fig. 15). Their rise in number is almost entirely responsible

Fig. 15. Nationals of Uzbekistan with temporary registrations in Kazakhstan



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

Table 6. Number of permits issued for work for private individuals

	2014	2015	2016
Tajikistan	980	3,743	12,041
Kyrgyzstan	773	845	n/a
Uzbekistan	69,204	103,309	302,422
Total	**70,957**	**107,897**	**314,463**

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

for the significant increase in work permits issued by the Kazakh authorities (see Table 6), which have also almost tripled compared to 2015 and increased more than fourfold in comparison with the year of their inception in 2014. This hugely successful measure made significant contributions to the national budget in the form of direct payments and helped legalize a large section of the migrant population through opening up an additional, simple route for migrants from countries with whom Kazakhstan signed visa-free agreements to regularize their work and stay in the country.

A vast majority of 80% of all Uzbek migrant workers applied for permits to work in construction, a figure that is slightly higher than the corresponding one for Tajik migrants (73%). Approximately four out of five Uzbek citizens applying for a work permit reported a monthly income of up to 40,000 tenge, the lowest figure reported among all migrant groups working in Kazakhstan. Fewer than 10% of applicants from Uzbekistan were women, which mirrors the gender makeup of other Central Asian nationals employed under the work permit system.[5]

Kyrgyzstan

Migrants from Kyrgyzstan are not captured in Kazakh migration statistics any more since Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in mid-2015, which gave its citizens equal access to employment across all member states and thus exempted them from the need to obtain permits for work in Kazakhstan. This change in legislation explains the low numbers of Kyrgyz who were issued permits in 2015 and the absence of data for 2016 (see Table 6). Migration trends within the EAEU can nevertheless be gauged through other statistics, such as the number of Kyrgyz nationals with temporary registrations in Kazakhstan (see Table 5). Overall, they reflect an increase by ca. 40% compared to the previous year to more than 150,000 (Fig. 16). Their breakdown by regions and purpose of entry shows similarities to those of Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan. More than 95% of all Kyrgyz citizens with temporary registrations came for work and business, and the majority settled in either the two metropolitan centers of Almaty and Astana, or regions bordering on Kyrgyzstan, for the most part in Almaty and Zhambyl regions.[6] In the absence of documentation of labour movement within the EAEU, these statistics suggest that migration from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan remains robust and even shows signs of stable growth despite the weak economic climate.

Tajikistan

Tajik migrants remain the smallest group of registered foreigners in Kazakhstan that fall within the scope of this study, but their number has nevertheless increased significantly from ca. 33,000 in 2015 to around 49,000 in 2016 (Fig. 17, see also Table 5), and the number of work permits issued to Tajik citizens has almost tripled from 3,743 to 12,041 during the same time span (see Table 6). Since Tajikistan lacks both a common border with Kazakhstan and well-established kinship and diaspora ties comparable to those of Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationals, Tajik migration to Kazakhstan is mostly limited to urban centers, with more than two thirds looking for Almaty and Astana as destination cities. As many as 73% of all Tajik migrants applied for a work permit in the construction sector, and 11% of all applicants were women. Compared to migrant workers from Uzbekistan, more Tajiks reported an income higher than 40,000 tenge per month. Two thirds of the Tajik migrants employed in Kazakhstan earned up to 40,000 tenge and another third reported monthly earnings ranging from 40,000 to

5 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017
6 Ibid.

Fig. 16. Nationals of Kyrgyzstan with temporary registrations in Kazakhstan



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

Fig. 17. Nationals of Tajikistan with temporary registrations in Kazakhstan



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

Fig. 18. Sum of remittances from Kazakhstan by country of destination, thousand US$



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

60,000 tenge.[7] Russia remains by far the most important country of destination for Tajik labour migrants, and although both experts and Tajik government officials remain skeptical of the prospect of Kazakhstan becoming a magnet for its citizens, migration statistics tell a different story and give reason to expect a diversification of labour movements to take place over the next years that build on networks currently being established by pioneering migrants.

1.1.2. Remittances

Regarding remittances from Kazakhstan, data for 2016 display a year-on-year decrease by 30% for all three countries, mirroring the tenge's depreciation since mid-2015 (Fig. 18). Compared to the analogous period in 2015, remittances by private individuals to Uzbekistan decreased from US$159,100,000 to US$100,510,000. Money transfers to Kyrgyzstan fell by a similar rate from US$62,630,000 to US$44,680,000 over the same period. For Tajikistan, the overall amount is lower given the smaller number of migrants in Kazakhstan, but it also dropped by close to 30% from US$15,748,000 in 2015 to US$10,760,000 over the corresponding period in 2016.[8] This decrease follows a broader trend that goes beyond the regional context, where remittances either stagnate or decrease, but also applies to the global level, where the World Bank Group pronounced a decline of money transfers to developing countries for the second year in a row, a tendency not seen in 30 years.[9] Although

7 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017
8 See http://www.nationalbank.kz/cont/BoP_2016_rus.pdf
9 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/remittances-to-developing-countries-decline-for-second-consecutive-year

remittances from Russia still exceed money transfers from Kazakhstan by an order of magnitude, the continued growth of migrant numbers underlines the importance of the Kazakh labour market for the sustenance of households across Central Asia.

1.1.3. Economic conditions of integration

Kazakhstan strives to establish a migration regime that aims to attract highly qualified specialists from abroad. Following the examples of Canada, the United States and Australia, all relevant government bodies were tasked with developing migration policies and institutional reforms that both strengthen control over migration flows from neighbouring countries and create favourable conditions for the employment of foreign specialists as outlined in the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. Accordingly, Kazakhstan follows a multipronged approach to migration that provides different opportunities of integration for different migrant groups.

Generally, state regulation of migration is guided by an assessment of the economic demand for foreign labour. Every year, a work permit quota is set in accordance with the forecast demand on the labour market, and employers submit applications for hiring foreign workers by August 1 for the following year. In 2017, this quota amounted to 0.6% of the economically active population of Kazakhstan, which amounts to ca. 48,000.[10] The quota system itself is separated into four categories according to the employee's skill level, ranging from manager-type work to qualified workers. State officials noted a decrease in applications over the past years, which translated into a lowering of the quota compared to 2014-16. This was explained due to the completion of large-scale construction projects like Expo 2017 in Astana, and to the fact that employers have to pay more for work permits for employees with low skill levels. In order to obtain a work permit for a worker in the lowest category, for instance, employers have to pay 300,000-400,000 tenge.[11] 4,232 work permits have been issued under the quota system in the first quarter of 2017, which brought 1.6 billion tenge to the national budget. The rate of highly-qualified individuals among the entire foreign workforce under the quota system rose to 9% in 2017.[12]

With the introduction of a new procedure for the employment of foreigners by private individuals in 2014, a new pathway for legal immigration was opened, which is especially relevant for citizens of the countries under study in this report. Upon submission of documents proving the legality of their stay in Kazakhstan and the preliminary payment of individual income tax, a work permit for one, two or three months is issued and can be prolonged for up to one year. The steady increase of work permits issued to citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan illustrates Kazakhstan's success in terms of combating and decreasing irregular migration and controlling regular migration flows to the country. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan enjoy a special status since their country joined the Eurasian Economic Union on 12 August 2015, which grants them equal access to the Kazakhstani labour market and exempts them from the need to obtain a permit to work in Kazakhstan.

1.1.4. Outlook for the future

Given this institutional framework and Kazakhstan's positive economic outlook with a projected GDP growth above 2%, present migration dynamics are

10 Source: Interview at the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 25 May 2017
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.

likely to continue. Another indicator for the likely continuation of current migration trends are the number of vacancies reported by Kazakh employers to national job centers for 2016.[13] Close to 24,000 vacant positions have been reported the majority of them in Kazakhstan's metropolitan centers. Their breakdown by economic sectors shows that most workers are needed in transportation (5,876 vacancies) and industry (4,303 vacancies); therefore, these two sectors potentially open to employing more migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who hold the necessary qualifications.

As Kazakhstan shows continuing signs of increasing economic growth, with projected GDP growth in the range of 2.4% to 2.9% per year during 2017-19 according to World Bank forecasts, migration numbers are likely to stabilize or even increase in the short to medium term, subject to changes in the legal environment and developments on the Russian labour market.

13 Source: Ministry of National Economic of the Republic of Kazakhstan

1.2. SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

1.2.1. Strategic priorities

Relatively high wages, convenient location and close affinity between languages and cultures make Kazakhstan appealing to migrant workers from neighbouring countries in Central Asia. In Eurasia, Kazakhstan is the second country after Russia to be a centre of attraction for human resources. Kazakhstan is the country of origin and predominantly the country of transit and country of destination for the foreign workforce.

Interviews with Kazakh experts revealed a number of factors making Kazakhstan an attractive migration destination. These include on the one hand the recent transformation of the country's economy (fast growth, attributed both to the traditional sectors, such as oil and gas exploration and related industries, but also the boom in the construction sector),which makes for the growing demand for additional human capital and workforce. The country's appeal is further magnified by its vicinity to countries with high emigration potential and the relatively low barriers to entry (visa-free regime of movement with many countries — above all, the CIS countries).

As a consequence, these factors put the following questions onto the national policy agenda: (1) regulation of labour migration; (2) risks related to irregular migration. The legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan extensively covers the first question and addresses the second one. Today Kazakhstan's migration policy aims to find a balance between attracting educated/highly qualified migrant workers, promote economic growth and raise the investment attractiveness of the country and decreasing the level of irregular migration with all its associated risks.

The Committee for Labour, Social Protection and Migration at the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan with a Presidential degree has adopted the Migration Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2021 (hence "the Concept") that seeks to ensure an informed approach to the issues of internal and external migration.[14] In particular, the Concept seeks to make labour migration more accessible in an open and transparent way and to set a new basis for regularization of migrant workers' status in Kazakhstan through providing incentives for compliance with legislation and countering fraud and discrimination against migrants. The draft Concept was agreed with all relevant government agencies and discussed with non-governmental stakeholders (including IOM).

The Concept details the directions of Kazakhstan's migration policy in line with the "Kazakhstan-2050" strategic message of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It sets as the main objective *"to satisfy the demand for qualified workforce and to minimize the negative impact of migration processes through respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"*.[15] The document sets several priority directions for state activities in regulation of migration flows. These include stabilization of emigration, repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs, stimulation of balanced internal migration, attracting foreign workforce and combating irregular migration and trafficking in persons.[16]

14 Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 602 of 29 September 2017 "On the approval of the Migration Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017–2021 and the Plan of Action for the implementation of the Migration Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017–2021", Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, 12 October 2017 http://www.enbek.gov.kz/ru/node/341198; Presidential Decree, "On the Migration Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the years 2017-2021" - http://www.enbek.gov.kz/ru/node/341198

15 Migration Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017–2021, p. 1.

16 Ibid., p. 2.

1.2.2. Recent changes in the legal and institutional framework

1.2.2.1. Attracting qualified workforce

The Concept of the Migration Policy for 2017-2021 indicates *"improvement of the mechanisms to attract the foreign workforce"* as a priority for state regulation of migration flows. Access of foreign workforce is to be allowed insofar as it does not diminish opportunities for development of the country's own labour resources. Thus, the document states that the citizens of Kazakhstan have a priority when considered for vacancies, for which they have equal qualifications and skills. In order to ensure that labour immigration would not have negative consequences on the national labour market, the Concept sets out to establish a range of flexible mechanisms that would first of all consider labour demand in the economy as a whole and in specific sectors (needs assessment). Next, the policy considers a «differentiated» approach for regulating short-term and long-term labour immigration, consisting of *"a range of selection mechanisms, conditions for entry, stay and employment"*.[17]

This differentiated demand-driven policy is a continuation of the strategic, legal and administrative changes, which were adopted recently in recognition of this objective, according to which labour migration is considered as an important factor for economic development. The recent amendments to the national legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan focused on improving the mechanism to attract the foreign workforce. Regulatory documents enacted during that time continued with the intention to simplify the entry to and residence in Kazakhstan for nationals of OECD countries.

First of all, in November 2016 changes in Kazakhstan's visa policy were introduced, simplifying the system of visa administration.[18] The number of visa categories was reduced from 14 to three, the periods of visa validity were standardized and the procedure for inviting foreigners was facilitated. Moreover, in January 2017 the list of countries the citizens of which enjoy visa-free entry to and exit from the Republic of Kazakhstan was extended from 19 to 45. The period of visa-free stay for the nationals of those 45 countries was also increased from 15 to 30 calendar days from the date of entry into the country.[19]

In 2017 Kazakhstan also simplified the procedure for attracting skilled foreign workers. Rules and conditions for employment of foreign workers at branch offices of foreign companies have been liberalised. Decree No. 1069 of the Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan removed the requirement to maintain the percentage ratio of local and foreign workers in the personnel of representative and branch offices of foreign companies with a staff count of 30 people or less.[20] The requirement for professional employees to have a mandatory minimum level of proficiency in the state language as evidenced by the certificate issued after passing the Kazakh language test (KAZTEST) has also

17 Ibid., p. 15.

18 Joint order of the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 11-1-2/555 of 24 November 2016 and of the Minister of Internal Affairs No. 1100 of 28 November 2016 "On approval of the Rules for issuance of invitations, approval of invitations for foreign nationals and stateless persons to enter the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as for issuance, cancellation and reissue of a visa of the Republic of Kazakhstan and for extension or reduction of the term of its validity".

19 Resolution No. 838 of the Government of the RK of 23 December 2016 "On introduction of amendments to Resolution No. 148 of the Government of the RK of 21 January 2012 "On approval of the Rules for entry and stay of immigrants in the Republic of Kazakhstan and their exit from the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Rules for migration control and registration of foreigners and stateless persons illegally crossing the border of the Republic of Kazakhstan and illegally staying in the Republic of Kazakhstan and of individuals banned from entering the Republic of Kazakhstan".

20 "On introduction of amendments and additions to Order No. 559 of the interim Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of the RK of 27 June 2016 "On approval of Rules and conditions for issuance and/or renewal of permits to employers for attraction of foreign workforce and Rules and conditions for intra-corporate transfer."

been abolished. The facilitation of access to the labour market was evident in the fact that the 2017 quota for attracting foreign workforce for employment in the territory of Kazakhstan was considerably increased to 4.2% of the total workforce.[21]

At the same time, the government continued to apply measures seeking to limit the share of foreign workforce in the total labour supply. Thus, Resolution No. 459 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 18 August 2016 left unchanged a rather high fee rate (24 monthly calculation indices, MCI) for issuing and/or renewing the permit for attraction of foreign workforce to Kazakhstan.[22] Moreover, the decree of the Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of 5 April 2016 set a limit to the share of foreigners in a given staff category that should not exceed 50%.[23]

The tendency for creating an attractive environment for the foreign workforce in the country is fairly obvious. However, there is no mention of the hundreds of thousands of migrants who received permits to work for private individuals. In 2016 this permit was issued to 330,000 people, considerably more than in the previous years, although it is common knowledge that large numbers of migrants continue to work without formal regularization of labour relations.

1.2.2.2. Control measures

At the same time, the Concept stresses the priority of defending the labour market from some undesirable phenomena, in particular from irregular entry, residence and employment of non-nationals. A number of specific measures are planned for 2017-2021 to enhance the capacity of state organs to combat irregular migration. These include both the controlling measures (improved passport and border controls, more effective implementation of detention and expulsion procedures) and the operational activities, aiming at identification and prosecution of irregular migrants through application of automated systems for residence registration and exchange of data among relevant state agencies.

These measures are in line with the approach that Kazakhstan has pursued in 2016-2017 when several controlling measures were introduced in order to combat irregular migration.[24] A key role is played by the enforcement agencies – Ministry of Interior Affairs and Committee of National Security – while policy making is added to the portfolio of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection.

From this perspective, labour migration is considered as a possible channel for related risks. These include: (1) tax evasion on the part of both employers and irregularly employed migrant workers as a driver for the shadow economy (employers and illegal migrant employees alike), (2) human and drug trafficking, (3) criminal activity by migrants, (4) tipping the inter-ethnic balance due to growth of ethnic diasporas emerging in areas of concentration of migrants.

The measures combine **targeted migration policy**, **administrative controls** and **operational activities**.

Firstly, the legislation distinguishes between various categories of migrant workers. The priority is given to migrant workers from member-states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), who can stay in Kazakhstan without registration for up to 90 days. Migrant workers from other countries who do not have a work permit or a required legal licence and who fail to pay

21 Resolution No. 898 of the Government of the RK "On setting a quota for attracting a foreign workforce for employment in the territory of Kazakhstan in 2017".
22 "On setting a fee rate for issuing and/or renewing the permit for attraction of foreign workforce in the Republic of Kazakhstan".
23 Order of the Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 259 of 5 April 2016 "On determining the percentage ratio of the number of foreign workers (managers and specialists) hired under intra-corporate transfer to the number of Kazakhstani personnel".
24 For the overview of measures undertaken until 2016, please see: "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration." Astana, Kazakhstan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). November 2016

relevant taxes are expelled from the country.[25] At the same time, effective 10 June 2016, the nationals of the EAEU states as well as those whose visa-free residence period was not limited (e.g. Uzbekistan) could no longer prolong their residence registration during their stay in Kazakhstan.[26]

Secondly, the Government has launched mandatory registration at the place of stay (at fixed place of residence) for all people, citizens and foreigners alike (including migrants). Since 7 January 2017 both tenants and landlords have been brought to justice for lack of registration. The Migration Police Department of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been put in charge of registration of the population with its staff working at the Public Service Centres. To obtain registration all that is needed is an identity document and a statement from the landlord that s/he does not object to the registration procedure. Registration must be done in Public Service Centres or online through e-Government resources – in the case of foreigners the owner of the rented apartment must perform all the procedures and holds full legal responsibility as a landlord.

Finally, the Police have been regularly raiding apartments in towns and cities around the country. In the course of the raids, it has been revealed that in a large number of apartments hundreds of different people, including migrants who needed any registration at the place of residence to get a job, were illegally registered as living in them. The raids also uncovered many prostitution haunts with irregular migrants.

1.2.2.3. Institutional framework

The task of the elaboration of the national policy in the field of labour migration has been placed in the competence of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP). Coordination with other ministries is ensured through the operation of the Committee on Migration, headed by the Ministry.[27] The legislation requires also that relevant state bodies cooperate regularly in various mandatory procedures, such as the annual determination of migrant labour quota, which commences with the identification of needs by the local authorities, which are aggregated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and implemented by MLSP.[28]

The state system of migration governance is being reorganised with a view to improve the efficiency of the state governance system. The Ministry of National Economy (MNE) and the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development (MHSD) of the Republic of Kazakhstan were reorganised. Under Decree No. 412 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 5 January 2017 "On further improvements to the state governance system of the Republic of Kazakhstan", some functions and powers in the area of migration policy were transferred to MNE and MHSD, while certain functions and powers of MHSD pertaining to migration policy were transferred to the Migration Service Committee newly formed within MIA.[29] The Commit-

25 Resolution No. 175 of the Government of the RK of 6 April 2017 "On approval of Rules for enforced expulsion from the Republic of Kazakhstan of a foreigner or a stateless person" regulates the legal and financial aspects of the expulsion procedure across the state border of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

26 Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 838 of 7 April 2016 amending Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 148 of 21 January 2012 "On the approval of the Rules for the entry and stay of immigrants in the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as their departure from the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Rules for migration control and the registration of foreigners and stateless persons illegally crossing the border of the Republic of Kazakhstan, illegally staying in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as persons who are denied entry to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan".

27 Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan.- Regulation on the Committee for Labour, Social Protection and Migration at the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 3 March 2017, https://www.enbek.gov.kz/ru/node/122456

28 Appendix 2 to Order No. 802 «On approval of the Rules for setting quotas for hiring of foreign workers in the Republic of Kazakhstan", 15 December 2016 http://egov.kz/cms/ru/law/list/P1600000802

29 Resolution No. 110 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 6 March 2017 "On some matters concerning the Ministry of Interior Republic of the Republic of Kazakhstan».

tee regulates immigration in particular by issuing residence permits to foreigners.[30]

The Concept of the Migration Policy for 2017-2021 places strong emphasis on reorganizing the institutional response to migration so as to improve the state bodies' capacity for forecasting, stimulating and monitoring migration flows in line with the country's demographic, economic and social needs. The interviewed officials, both on the central and local levels, stress that the implementation of the comprehensive tasks, enumerated in the Concept, will need to be matched by the sustained development of human capital within the state administration.

1.2.3. International cooperation

The current framework of the national migration legislation is aligned with the international obligations of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is the party to fundamental UN covenants and conventions on human rights. The Republic of Kazakhstan has ratified 24 International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, including all eight fundamental and four priority conventions. At the same time, the country is not signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.[31]

Migration legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan is complemented with bilateral and multilateral international agreements (mainly, on the issues of labour migration, visa-free travel, etc.) and other international acts and regulations.

Being a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Republic of Kazakhstan has signed a number of multilateral agreements on labour migration. On 17 March 2017 at the 73rd meeting of the CIS Economic Council held in Moscow Kazakhstan participated in the decisions "On the Concept of a phased formation of the common labour market and management of migration of the workforce of the CIS member states" and "On priority measures for the formation of the common labour market and workforce migration management for 2017-2020".

Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) also raises certain questions as to the labour activity of nationals of the member states within the territory of the Union. For instance, the interviewed experts highlighted the numerous contradictions (in terminology as well as in the meaning) between the Treaty on the EAEU and the national legislation of the member states, including Kazakhstan, with respect to migrant workers. They also pointed out that as a supranational body, the Eurasian Economic Commission has not yet developed common rules for keeping a record of EAEU migrant workers and does not collect labour migration statistics in a coordinated manner. These shortcomings could be addressed through the development of a single harmonised EAEU legal framework. The respondents noted a number of legal issues that need to be resolved in this context (Box).

Legal issues requiring resolution at the EAEU level

- pension provision for migrant workers (their right to participate in funded pension schemes);
- elaboration of a targeted approach in migration policy;
- inclusion of migrant workers in the state

30 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, Legal Provision on the Migration Service Committee of the Ministry of Interior, 13 March 2017, http://mvd.gov.kz/portal/page/portal/mvd/mvd_page/min_activity/mvd_materials/mvd_migration_service_committee/mvd_about_migration_service/4F29B75FCD117CBFE053030F110A84CC

31 UN, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 15 September 2017 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=it&clang=_en

procurement system (facilitated by NGOs);

- wider availability of legal counselling (enhancing the activities of NGOs in raising awareness of legal and social matters among migrant workers);
- fostering cooperation between participating NGOs and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

Source: Interviews with experts, Kazakhstan, March-May 2017.

1.2.4. Assessment of effectiveness of measures

All the discussed measures have a certain impact on migrants and their standing in Kazakhstan. The requirement to have a mandatory registration has made migrant workers more dependent on both the employer and the landlord. They have also become more vulnerable in the context of social behaviour not to be considered as suspect; migrants are subjected to checks during regular police raids and sometimes irregular as well as legalised migrants may fall victim of misunderstanding or unpleasant bureaucratic procedures to establish their identity and determine their migration status.

We may expect that the new measures focused on stricter control over registration address corresponding to the actual place of residence would affect all categories of migrants resulting in some of them leaving the country and others making steps to legalise their status since to remain irregular is becoming more and more challenging. During interviews with migrants in 2017 it was found that the majority of them had registration or were keen to have one but in almost all the cases it was a fake registration obtained by intermediaries, not by the migrants themselves.

Overall, national mechanisms for protection of migrant workers' rights require further adjustment. For example, most of migrants in Kazakhstan are unskilled workers; so the excessive emphasis put by the Government on attraction of highly qualified labour pushes unskilled migrants outside of the scope of law, thus marginalising them and making their labour activity illegal.

Furthermore, in line with the ratified international instruments, migrant workers must be guaranteed a set of social and labour rights, including insurance and legal support. In view of the recent reorganization of government agencies with the transfer of some of the migration-related functions to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the establishment of the Migration Service Committee, it is necessary to point out the intensified efforts to improve the efficiency of migration controls as well as the fact that it is advisable to set up a single body focusing not only on control functions but also on the questions of adaptation of internal and external migrants in Kazakhstan, and their well-balanced distribution throughout the country.

Ensuring the integration and protection of rights of migrant workers (including returning migrants and irregular migrants) requires further improvements to Kazakh migration legislation, strengthening of international cooperation between Kazakhstan and the countries of origin and destination and expanding the interaction of the government and civil society. The migration policy should take into account and be based on the interdependence and interrelation of socio-economic, cultural, moral, domestic and other factors according to their potential. Improving the capacity for managing migration flows also is contingent on ensuring that the migration statistics, currently collected and analyzed by several institutions, are integrated and made available to all the relevant agencies.

2. KYRGYZSTAN

2.1. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS AND IMPACT

2.1.1. The scale and directions of return migration

2.1.1.1. Migration to EAEU countries

Available official data[32] give reason for optimism concerning Kyrgyz migrant workers' situation. Unlike the other countries under investigation, Kyrgyz migration to Russia and Kazakhstan increased for the second year in a row despite the regional economic downturn, showing the positive impact of Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union on migrants' resilience. Almost 594,000 Kyrgyz citizens were registered in Russia at the beginning of 2017, which represents an increase of more than 30,000 compared to the previous year, and Kyrgyz migration to Kazakhstan similarly picked up from ca. 114,000 in 2015 to 157,000 in 2016.

This dynamic encapsulates the main dilemma facing Kyrgyz migrant workers. Following the ruble's and the tenge's devaluation and the economic slowdown in Russia and, to a lesser extent Kazakhstan, employment abroad has become less lucrative. At the same time administrative barriers were removed under the EAEU agreements that grant Kyrgyz migrants the same rights as Russian and Kazakh citizens. In that respect, the accession of Kyrgyzstan into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in mid-2015, unlocked new realities and expectations for Kyrgyz migrant workers. While de jure migrant workers from a member country should have been entitled to the same rights and privileges as citizens of other countries of the EAEU, de facto, the rights and privileges were not quite universal, as a number of migrants reported reluctance of Russian employers to hire Kyrgyz nationals on a legal basis for economic and bureaucratic reasons. Despite all these, the number of Kyrgyz migrants has been steadily increasing its presence in the Russian market.

2.1.1.2. Diversification of migration destinations

Russia remains by far the most popular and most accessible destination among migrant workers, both due to well-established networks and the established Kyrgyz diaspora in Russia and the favourable legal environment under the EAEU. At the same time, the continued difficulties in integrating into the Russian labour market and limited conditions to find fulfilling employment in Kyrgyzstan, have induced migrants to seek other (at times irregular) opportunities elsewhere. Given the absence of supporting networks and undeveloped legal framework, "migrants from Kyrgyzstan may fall victims to labour and/or sexual exploitation in Turkey, UAE and other countries".[33] These developments have been noted with concern by the Kyrgyz authorities.

The Kyrgyz government actively explores possibilities for diversification of destinations for their migrant workers. Currently, there are negotiations being held

32 Russian data were used pending the receipt of the official statistics from the Kyrgyz authorities.
33 Interview with an official from the Prosecutor General's Office of the Kyrgyz Republic (11 April 2017).

with Finland, Germany, Norway and Poland to send migrants for seasonal work in agriculture, sewing and to work in the green economy. An increasing number of Kyrgyz citizens find employment through 151 licensed private employment agencies in Turkey, South Korea and Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The largest group of Kyrgyz migrant workers (about 18,000) has made use of recruitment schemes in the Republic of Korea, working in agriculture, industry and auxiliary works. With the introduction of visa-free travel arrangements between Russia and South Korea, Kyrgyz migrants who also hold Russian nationality go to South Korea. More recently, it was reported, that there has been an increase in cases of Kyrgyz migrants with forged visas being apprehended by Korean law enforcement officials.[34]

However, attempts of the Kyrgyz government to diversify labour migration streams are still at an early stage. The expectation from the household, community and the government is that the migrant will be able to earn money and acquire skills that will benefit the Kyrgyz Republic in mid and long run. Thus, for instance, the government promotes the idea of creating a business association that will translate into employment opportunities by the migrant communities that worked in the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, one significant barrier is affordable money transfer operators are not widely available in non-CIS countries and that complicates the issue of sending remittances.

2.1.1.3. Numbers of re-entry banned migrants

Compared to the previous year, in 2017 the number of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia increased from 550,000 to 616,000 people.[35] However, over the past year the number of Kyrgyz migrants with re-entry bans to Russia has not reduced significantly: at the beginning of 2017, according to the head of State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, 106,000 people were still black-listed. This is only 4,195 fewer individuals compared to 2016.[36]

As of April 1, 2017, there were 106,029 Kyrgyz citizens on the re-entry ban list, 51,578 out of them were forced to leave the Russian Federation by a court decision and 1,682 Kyrgyz citizens received a permanent ban.[37] Thus, only 52,769 Kyrgyz citizens might be subject to re-entry ban removal negotiations with Russian counterparts. According to the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, about 44,000 Kyrgyz citizens' ban will expire soon and new people appear on the list with much lower dynamics, mostly due to employment irregularities.

Despite the government's efforts to reduce the number of migrants from Kyrgyzstan on the "black list" and to improve terms of their registration and employment, the number of Kyrgyz re-entry banned migrants remains more or less stable. In this respect, the issue of re-integration of returning migrants continues to be relevant. Thus, the status of Kyrgyz citizens banned from re-entering Russia due to administrative infringements remains largely unresolved. Although their number keeps diminishing — a decrease by 50,000 compared to two years ago — there remains a significant number of re-entry banned migrants that are vulnerable to its negative effects on socio-economic grounds. Many migrant workers end up in the re-entry ban list as they fail to reside at the place of registration as usually employers register them at their construction site but the actual place of residence of migrants is different. When this discrepancy

34 Корейге айланган дар Сеулда соттолууда, https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyz_migrants_south_korea_visa/28416743.html, (accessed 11 April 2017).
35 Oktyabryov V., 616 thousand nationals of Kyrgyzstan work in Russia (in Russian), https://www.pnp.ru/social/na-zarabotkakh-v-rossii-nakhodyatsya-616-tysyach-grazhdan-kirgizii.html, (accessed 03 June 2017).
36 http://kenesh.kg/ru/news/show/3070/k-kontsu-2017-goda-neobhodimo-vivesti-iz-chernogo-spiska-43-tisyach-kirgizskih-grazhdan (accessed 12 July 2017).
37 State Migration Service of Kyrgyzstan, 2017

is detected by the Russian law-enforcement agencies, migrant workers are liable to expulsion. This situation has not changed neither before Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU, nor after its entry.

Overall, while the Kyrgyz government is in constant and often successful negotiation (especially when it comes to minor administrative infringements) with their Russian counterparts to remove people from the list, new people find themselves in the re-entry ban list. Moreover, the upcoming football World Cup in 2018 and a terrorist attack perpetrated in St. Petersburg on 3 April 2017 complicated the issue of mass removal of Kyrgyz migrant workers from the re-entry ban list.

2.1.2. Environment for labour migration

Although the current official unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan is rather low – 2.3%,[38] the real numbers are much higher due to the fact that not all unemployed are registered. The analysis of external and internal migration flows demonstrates that the main push factor remains higher salaries in places of destination. Internal migration in Kyrgyzstan is rather noticeable as people migrate from rural areas to large cities, mainly to Osh and Bishkek, in search of higher salaries and better opportunities. As for regional dispersion, the highest level of unemployment can be observed in Batken (10.9%), Naryn (9.3%) and Issyk-Kul (9.1%) regions. The lowest level of unemployment can be observed in Talas (3.3%) and the city of Osh (3.9%). The majority of migrant workers originate from Southern Kyrgyzstan. This may be explained by the disparity in poverty rates, which in Southern Kyrgyzstan clearly exceed the country rate – 32.1%. In fact, in Jalal-Abad (45.1%) and Batken (41.2%) the poverty rates are the highest within the country.[39]

In terms of gender distribution, the unemployment rate is higher among women – 9% compared to 6.5% among men. This is mainly due to two key factors: Firstly , there is the traditional stereotype that men are the breadwinners. Secondly, there are fewer job opportunities for women than for men. The rates of female unemployment are relatively higher in many regions compared to unemployment among men, with the highest rates reaching 16.5% (Batken) and 13.7% (Naryn). In comparison the highest levels of registered unemployment among men stood at 8.9% (Chuy) and 8.7% (Issyk-Kul). The disparity is also visible in the regions with the lower overall rates as in Talas (5.6% among women compared to 1.3% among men) or in the city of Osh (5.6% among women compared to 3.1% among men).[40]

2.1.3. Remittances

Remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan increased between 2015 and 2016. It should, however, be noted that even the improved 2016 figures remain far below pre-crisis levels, when remittances accounted for 30% of the Kyrgyz Republic's GDP. The precise dynamics of the flows is difficult to ascertain due to the differences between estimates provided by Russian and Kyrgyz institutions (Fig. 19). According to the Central Bank of Russia, the remittances flow has been gradually improving reaching US$976 million in 2016 compared to US$230 million in 2015, while the average amount of transferred funds in a single transaction doubled in 2016 as well. However, the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan provides different figures for the dynamics remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan. According to these data the total inflow of remittances dropped in 2015 by a quarter, amounting to US$1,622 million.

38 National Bank of Kyrgyzstan, 2017
39 Ibid.
40 Integrated selective survey of households' and labor force's budgets, 2015.

The significant discrepancy between Russian and Kyrgyz figures might be partially attributed to the different methodology of calculating remittances, i.e. the Kyrgyz side calculates most transfers from Russia as remittances, while the Central Bank of Russia applies a more restrictive definition when calculating remittances. However, it is important to note, that the dynamics of observed remittance levels for the last three years remain the same across both sources. In addition, state agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic have not developed a model for analysing remittances from other transfers. For instance, some trade transaction payments between private individuals are also sent through money transfer operators but on paper appear as remittances of individuals, including from migrant workers .

2.2. SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

2.2.1. Impact of accession to the EAEU on protection of migrant workers' rights

2.2.1.1. General conditions of labour migration

As demonstrated in Phase I assessment, the stricter rules of entry to the Russian Federation introduced by the Russian authorities and the practice of "blacklisting" migrants for administrative and other offences forced many Kyrgyz migrants to return home. This phenomenon required a response from the Kyrgyz authorities, who consider labour emigration a stabilising factor for the socio-economic and socio-political situation in the country. The authorities chose to address the phenomenon of return migration through negotiating an amnesty for Kyrgyz migrants with their Russian counterparts. In other words, removal of nationals of Kyrgyzstan from the "re-entry ban" list remains the main objective of the Kyrgyz state migration service. In this regard, significant success was achieved in 2016 when nearly 70,000 people (including those with expired bans) were taken off the "re-entry ban list". Officials in the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic (SMS KR) remain optimistic about reaching positive outcomes in negotiations with Russia on reducing further the number of Kyrgyz migrants on the "re-entry ban list".[41]

The accession of Kyrgyzstan to the EAEU also encouraged the Kyrgyz authorities to continue its policy of ensuring more favourable conditions for its citizens in the Russian labour market. The Kyrgyz government hopes that the simplified procedures and better terms of registration and employment of citizens of Kyrgyzstan they will facilitate their integration in Russia.

With Kyrgyzstan joining the EAEU, pursuant to Section 26 of the Treaty "On the Eurasian Economic Union", the advantages that significantly simplify the procedure for stay and employment of migrant workers within the borders of the EAEU member states have now come into force (Box).

Benefits of Kyrgyzstan's accession to EAEU to its migrant workers

- workers and their family members can stay in the country for up to 30 days without registration. For stays of over 30 days from the date of entry it is necessary to obtain registration with the competent migration authority at the place of residence;
- registration is valid for 90 days from the date of entry;
- when being hired the worker signs an em-

41 Interview with an official from the SMS KR (10 April 2017).

Fig. 19. Amount of remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan in million US$ (2013-2016), Central banks estimates



Source: Central Bank of Russia available at http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/default.aspx?Prtid=svs&ch=ITM_52284#CheckedItem; Central Bank of Kyrgyzstan, 2017

ployment contract or a civil law contract;

- registration is issued for the duration of the employment contract or the civil law contract;
- certificates of education and qualifications issued in Kyrgyzstan are recognised when being hired for work;
- from the first day of employment the worker's income is subject to a 13% income tax, the same as paid by Russian citizens;
- migrants can enter into a new employment contract or a civil law contract within 15 days without departure from the territory of the state of employment;
- social security and medical care are provided to workers and their family members on the same conditions and in the same manner as those applied to the nationals of the state of employment.

In addition, the government has plans to settle questions pertaining to "*the registration of migrant workers at their actual place of residence, their social protection, terms of stay for migrants who run private business ventures, exemption from the need to fill in a migration card*", etc.[42], since it is for breaching these and some other procedures[43] that migrants are put on the "re-entry ban list" in Russia.

Despite Kyrgyzstan joining the EAEU, the problems relating to Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia are being addressed mainly through separate negotiations between the two countries. So instead of seeking systemic solutions to the problems of migrant workers so far the policy has relied on operational measures. For instance, following bringing into force a ban on

42 http://kenesh.kg/ru/news/show/3070/k-kontsu-2017-goda-neobhodimo-vivesti-iz-chernogo-spiska-43-tisyach-kirgizskih-grazhdan (accessed 12 July 2017).
43 According to the SMS KR officials, many employers do not wish to sign an employment contract with Kyrgyz migrants to avoid paying taxes, and this is the norm for the times of economic crises. Interview with an official from the SMS KR (10 April 2017).

migrant drivers not holding a driving licence issued in Russia from 1 June 2017 (amendments to the Federal Law "On Road Safety" and the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation), nationals of Kyrgyzstan employed as taxi, bus, minibus and lorry drivers, along with other migrants, were left out of work.[44] The situation and employment opportunities of migrant workers in Russia as their host country still depend on many unforeseeable, random and uncertain factors. According to Kyrgyz migration officials[45], the introduction of a special registration regime for migrants for the duration of the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 created a lot of problems for migrants and pushed many of them into irregularity. Migrants did not have enough time to obtain the necessary registration given that, pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation[46], all foreign nationals who crossed the Russian border between 1 June and 12 July 2017 were required to register with the migration authorities within 24 hours. The same decree also provides for an enhanced registration procedure for foreigners during the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2018 in Russia. Hence, not only experts but even state officials in Kyrgyzstan believe that next year, during the world football championship in Russia, more stringent measures will be put in place aimed at reducing the numbers of migrants in Russia.[47]

Considering the fact that there are still serious obstacles that undermine the integration of Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian labour market and that Russian authorities often resort to the practice of additional restrictive measures (resulting in migrants being "black-listed") as a means of controlling migration processes, it appears that the issues of return migration will remain high on the agenda for the foreseeable future.

2.2.1.2. Impact of the Eurasian Economic Union accession on migrants' welfare

Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union has had mixed effects on migrants' welfare. In general, the status of the Kyrgyz migrants has been improved since the accession. Kyrgyzstan started an initiative within the EAEU to prevent "forced removal" of citizens of one member state from the territory of another member state. Although, the parity on the initiative is hard to reach, the Kyrgyz government was able to reach some concessions for its citizens. Firstly, the registration timespan for the Kyrgyz citizens in Russia has been extended to 30 days. Secondly, diplomas and degrees obtained in one member country are recognized throughout the EAEU.

The Kyrgyz government's efforts dedicated to supporting this vulnerable group of returned migrant workers are focused on improving the normative and legal basis of migrants' work and stay in Russia, thus enabling them to return to Russia once their ban is lifted and enjoy more rights and greater legal protection, which ultimately works as a safeguard against further administrative sanctions like re-entry bans. Currently, the negotiations are being held to factor in labour migration within the EAEU into the national pension schemes. Thus far, migrant workers were dropped out from social systems in the country of origin and the country of destination. A potential introduction of

44 Kyrgyz migrants losing jobs in large numbers following new developments in RF (in Russian), http://vesti.kg/obshchestvo/item/46336-kyirgyizskie-migrantyi-massovo-teryayut-rabotu-iz-za-novovvedeniy-v-rf.html. In this context, it is worth noting that the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Almazbek Atambayev emphasised that the integration of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia required a systemic approach: "Today I put a question to Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev, prime-minister of Russia]. I asked him why this issue has been resolved for Belarusians but not for us? He gave instructions to the effect that driving licences issued in the EAEU countries are valid in Russia". On Atambayev's request, Kyrgyz driving licences will be again valid in Russia (in Russian), http://kabarlar.org/news/91956-po-prosbe-atambaeva-voditelskie-prava-kyrgyzstancev-snova-budut-deystvitelny-v-rossii.html, (accessed 25 June 2017).

45 Interview with officials from the SMS KR (12 June 2017).

46 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 202 of 9 May 2017 "On Specifics of Reinforced Security Measures for the duration of the FIFA World Cup 2018 and the FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 taking place in the Russian Federation" (in Russian), https://rg.ru/2017/05/10/prezident-ukaz202-site-dok.html (accessed 19 May 2017).

47 Interview with a government official (11 April 2017).

an employment record book that is recognized by all member states may restore migrant workers' rights and claims to the social system, including pension.

2.2.2. Strategic framework for reintegration

2.2.2.1. Migration policy framework

The Extended Migration Profile of the Kyrgyz Republic, compiled in collaboration with IOM , indicates that at the legal level the institutional mechanism for the management of migration processes consists of a wide range of agencies, each one of them performing specific functions. However, in practice some of these bodies are not engaged in the implementation of the migration policy.[48] For this reason, government bodies in charge of employment do not consider returning migrants as their target group. Officials at the Ministry of Labour and Social Development of the Kyrgyz Republic (MLSD KR) commented that *"no specialised reintegration programmes exist for returning migrants and migrants can make use of the ministry's services, the same as any other citizens of the country"*.[49]

One of the principal documents that at the time of writing this sets out migration management measures in the Kyrgyz Republic is the Decision of the Defence Council (nowadays Security Council) "On Measures to Regulate Migration Processes in the Republic in Current Conditions" adopted on 4 July 2016. This document highlights some serious issues faced by Kyrgyzstan, including the presence of a large number of unregistered foreigners in the country, a critical mass of people who do not have land plots to build private housing, difficulties with gaining access to basic services that by law are provided at the place of residence and not at the place of stay.

The Decision of the Defence Council also invokes more systemic migration-related problems and outlines the following measures:

Objectives of Kyrgyz migration policy according to the Defence Council (2016)

- to reduce internal and external migration;
- to attract funding in the form of long-term loans on preferential terms for the implementation of irrigation projects, primarily in the border regions;
- to change the procedure for the preparation and implementation of national and local budgets in order to address regional disparities in the level of development;
- to develop a mechanism for the provision of preferences to foreign and domestic investors participating in projects in poorly developed parts of the country;
- to elaborate and initiate the realization of the National project for the development of the border regions in 2017–2023 in order to retain the population in those parts of the country;
- to update and approve the Programme for Employment Promotion and Regulation of External and Internal Labour Migration until 2021;
- to complete the implementation of the Centralised External Migration Registration System (CEMRS);
- to develop an automated system of personalized registration of the population, vital

48 National Institute for Strategic Studies of the Kyrgyz Republic and International Organization for Migration. Kyrgyzstan — Extended migration profile 2010–2015, Bishkek 2016.
49 Interview with an official from the MLSD KR (10 April 2017).

events and migration (ASPR);

- to define mechanisms for arranging mandatory guardianship over the children of migrant workers;
- to develop mechanisms for implementing the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On External Migration" with regard to imposing temporary restrictions on leaving the country for citizens subject to military conscription.[50]

The measures to facilitate voluntary resettlement of ethnic Kyrgyz in the country are outlined in more detail than the issues of re-integration of returning migrant workers. One of the legislative changes introduced in 2017 was the Law "On Amendments to the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic 'On External Migration'"[51] whereby foreign nationals and stateless persons are now required to obtain registration at the place of stay within five working days of crossing the border of the Kyrgyz Republic. Pursuant to the Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation of 19 June 2015 on the rules of stay for citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic in the territory of the Russian Federation and for citizens of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, Russian citizens are exempt from the registration requirement for the first 30 days of the date of entry.[52] So, bearing in mind that, according to representatives of the MFA of Kyrgyzstan, nearly 5,000 Kyrgyz citizens also hold a Russian passport[53], returning migrant workers may face problems with registration as soon as they enter Kyrgyzstan.

2.2.2.2. Reintegration in other state policies

For the time being the reintegration of returning migrant workers is still not receiving priority in the state migration policy. The present-day Kyrgyz youth sees migration as the main avenue to personal fulfilment. Moreover, for many people in the country working abroad is no longer a means of boosting savings — it is the only way out of a desperate financial situation.

Migrants returning to Kyrgyzstan, when they are no longer able to work in Russia, need social support and adaptation. Because the state migration policy is being implemented more or less independently from the measures to improve the socio-economic situation of the population, returning migrants are "lost" among other social groups and do not receive targeted public services that would take into account specific factors of their vulnerability. The isolation (lack of integration) of the migration sphere from the socio-economic development policy is also evidenced by fact that the Programme for development of social protection of the population in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2015–2017[54] and the Action Plan[55] for its implementation do not mention any measures intended for vulnerable groups of migrants.

Similarly, the issue of migration and support for vulnerable migrants does not feature in the State Agency for Local Government and Inter-Ethnic Relations under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (GAMSUMO) Strategy for 2017–2022[56], designed to build the capacity of representative and executive bodies in local government.

50 http://www.president.kg/files/docs/Photofiles/o_merah_po_regulirovaniyu_migratsionnyih__protsessov_v_respublike_v_sovremennyih_usloviyah.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017).
51 Ministry of Justice of the KR, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/111450 (accessed 1 April 2017).
52 SMS KR. http://ssm.gov.kg/news/view/97 (accessed 11 July 2017).
53 Interview with an official from the MFA KR on 10 April 2017.
54 Ministry of Justice of the KR, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/97348 (accessed 18 June 2017).
55 Ministry of Labour and Social Development of the KR. Action Plan to implement the Programme for development of social protection of the population in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2015–2017 (in Russian). http://www.mlsp.gov.kg/?q=ru/prs, (accessed 11 June 2017).
56 State Agency for Local Government and Inter-Ethnic Relations under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. GAMSUMO Strategy for 2017–2022 (in Russian), http://www.gamsumo.gov.kg/ru/programs-and-strategies/ (accessed 11 June 2017).

The 2016 SMS KR Report[57] states that the return of migrant workers in the future remains "an open question" but it is obvious from the document that no specific action is envisaged in this area. No targeted programmes aimed at creating a favourable environment for the return of migrant workers or measures for the re-integration of re-entry banned migrants have been put into place.

2.2.3. Assistance to returning migrants

2.2.3.1. Institutional basis and state activities

In recent years the key development in laying institutional foundations for migration management was the establishment of the Migration Coordinating Council under the Kyrgyz Government by Order No. 254 of the Prime-Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic of 6 May 2016. The main objective of the Coordinating Council is to coordinate the work of the state agencies, non-governmental and international organizations in developing proposals on improvements to migration legislation and regulation of migration processes, in preventing and countering human trafficking and in elaborating an effective mechanism of cooperation between government bodies on migration matters, etc.[58]

Following Resolution No. 96 of 2 March 2016[59], the Kyrgyz Government established the Representative Office of the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation with a team of 6 staff members. Its primary functions and tasks are: (1) protection of rights and legitimate interests of migrant workers-citizens of Kyrgyzstan and members of their families in the host country; (2) settlement of employment disputes arising from non-observance of terms of employment of migrant workers-citizens of Kyrgyzstan by employers as well as legal representation of interests of migrant workers-citizens of Kyrgyzstan; (3) assistance to citizens of Kyrgyzstan detained in temporary reception centres in the host country and facilitation of a prompt departure of expelled citizens to Kyrgyzstan; (4) activities aiming to remove citizens of Kyrgyzstan from the list of foreign nationals banned from entering the host country; (5) helping migrants-citizens of Kyrgyzstan to obtain the registration in the host country; (6) conducting awareness-raising campaigns among migrant workers-citizens of Kyrgyzstan on migration issues; (7) work with representatives of government bodies and non-governmental organizations in the host countries on issues of migration and easing access to the labour market in the host country; (8) engagement with non-governmental associations of the Kyrgyz diaspora on migration issues in the host country.[60]

To add to the above, the 2017 SMS KR Operational Plan[61] envisages the introduction of mechanisms of social protection and re-integration for special categories of migrants, victims of trafficking and individuals who became disabled while working abroad or returned with an acquired social disease (HIV, STD, tuberculosis).

As migrant workers seldom migrate through official channels (with an exception of their recruitment to South Korea, Turkey and other countries facilitated by licensed private employment agencies), the government agencies of Kyrgyzstan usually have to deal with the aftermath effect of the migration, including

57 SMS KR. http://ssm.gov.kg/reports/view/5 (in Russian) (accessed 11 June 2017).
58 http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/215168
59 Official website of the Government of the KR, http://www.gov.kg/?p=71751&lang=ru (accessed 9 April 2017).
60 Official website of the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation. Representative Office of the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic at the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation (in Russian), http://kyrgyzembassy.ru/?page_id=14653#.WWo7ToTyjIV (accessed 07 July 2017).
61 SMS KR. http://ssm.gov.kg/about/view/7 (accessed 2 June 2017).

re-entry bans, expired or lost documents or repatriation needs. In this regard, the Kyrgyz government attempts at fostering regular meetings with diaspora groups and organizations to exchange information. For instance, diaspora groups and consular staff attend meetings of the Council for Communications with Compatriots Abroad under the government of the Kyrgyz Republic. In addition, State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic organizes meetings with diaspora representatives in Russia on a frequent basis.

Officials at the SMS KR see the solution to the situation caused by Russian restrictive measures in the diversification of alternative destinations for foreign employment of Kyrgyz nationals. According to their data, approximately 150 licensed organizations provide employment services on the basis of a public-private partnership, whereas the state employment service organises training courses.[62] Furthermore, the Information and Consultative Center (ICC) of the SMS KR is developing a database of potential migrant workers, employers and vacancies. In total, as at 30 December 2016, the ICC provided advice to 15,501 individuals, of whom 5,535 were women.[63]

Since March 2017 the Mayor's Office in Bishkek has been opening consultation centres with the intention of providing additional social assistance to socially vulnerable groups of the population. These centres offer consultation services and organise the distribution of sponsored humanitarian aid in the form of food parcels and clothing.

2.2.3.2. Non-state initiatives

One of the international programmes currently under implementation directly involving returning migrants is the USAID Project "Dignity and Rights". This project is being implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)/The UN Migration Agency and among other lines of activity it provides consultations and services to returning migrants in an Information and Consultative Center (ICC), a subsidiary entity under the State Migration Service of the Kyrgyz Republic. Nonetheless, with limited human and financial resources the ICC does not have the capacity to reach out to larger numbers of banned migrants since those who live in remote parts of the country cannot travel to Bishkek and Osh where the ICC offices are located. With support from USAID and IOM, the SMS KR developed a mobile application "Migrant's Handbook"; in addition, special information terminals were installed in busy public areas that can be used to find information on rules and procedures for travelling and living abroad, on safe migration, risks of human trafficking and on how to protect oneself from various types of exploitation as a migrant.

IOM has also supported, between 2015 to 2017, pilot direct assistance activities in Southern Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (to a lesser extent) providing small funds for micro business development and income generating activities, awareness raising and information dissemination on "safe migration" as well as trainings of government and non-government counterparts on how to provide direct assistance to re-entry banned migrants. The regional migration program was funded from the US Government, Bureau of Populations, Refugees and International Migration (PRM-PIM) and has assisted close to 200 re-entry banned migrants returning back to Southern Kyrgyzstan from the Russian Federation. The project aimed to build the capacity and educate government and non-government stakeholders on how to identify and address the needs of returning re-entry banned migrants ensuring proper socioeconomic and socio-political integration and thus adding to the stability in the region. It also aimed in increasing awareness of other international donors to the needs of returning migrants thus designing sus-

62 Interview with an official from the SMS KR (10 April 2017).
63 SMS KR, The Information and Consultative Center Progress Report as at 30 December 2016 (in Russian). ssm.gov.kg/uploads/download/022c5f7f7465b7956ead304b3d717cd8.docx (accessed 19 June 2017).

tainable programs to address their needs.

The Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund set up in 2014 in order to leverage the opportunities arising from the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the EAEU can potentially contribute to the reintegration of returning migrants from an economic perspective. The Fund provides loans to business projects at low interest rates. Over two years the Development Fund financed 582 projects for a total amount of US$167.3 million.

One of the major interventions into the socio-economic life of the country was supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) as part of the Peacebuilding Priorities Plan (PPP) of the Kyrgyz Republic with 10 peacebuilding projects realised. The IOM joined efforts with UN Women and UNFPA to implement the project "Building the evidence base to facilitate responsive gender policy and programs for equality and lasting peace in Kyrgyzstan".[64]

Furthermore, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations supports Kyrgyzstan in the following priority areas: enhancing capacities to assess, plan and implement action for achieving sustainable food and nutrition security; strengthening institutional capacities, legal frameworks and support services; enhancing capacities for strengthening a socially sensitive market economy to reduce rural poverty, especially among households headed by women. In 2010–2015, FAO carried out 50 projects with a total expenditure reaching US$16 million.[65]

2.2.4. Effectiveness of measures

2.2.4.1. General assessment

According to representatives of local NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, the effective progress in improving the socio-economic situation of the population, including the re-integration of migrant workers, is hampered by a whole range of factors. In their opinion, migrant workers who are willing to build their own businesses at home come up against various corruption schemes in the system of public administration. Moreover, constant changes in the structure and functions and responsibilities of government bodies complicate the operation of NGOs trying to help migrants.[66]

Interviews with migrants, officials and practitioners have helped identify some barriers to effective assistance to prospective, current and returning migrants – in particular, the limited scope of aid provided by Kyrgyz consulates in Russia and absence of dedicated re-integration programs upon return.

Kyrgyz migrant workers' needs in Russia that were identified in the course of interviews with migrants and their families, such as lack of funds to pay for the journey home or need for treatment due to ill health, require adequate assistance that is currently provided by the Kyrgyz diplomatic missions to a limited extent. The consular offices are represented in all major Russian cities and are mandated to render legal assistance and protect Kyrgyz migrants' rights in Russia. However, according to an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan (MFA KR),[67] Kyrgyz consulates in Russia have no established mechanism of assisting migrants who find themselves in a desperate situation and in need of help with travel arrangements to return to Kyrgyzstan. Issues include the fact that the consulates are usually understaffed and/or lack experienced lawyers as well as that diplomatic missions have budget constraints to send stranded migrants back home. Therefore, they are eager to attract external finance to establish an emergency fund

64 http://kg.one.un.org/content/unct/kyrgyzstan/ru/home/we/unpbf.html (accessed 22 May 2017).
65 http://www.fao.org/3/a-au213r.pdf (accessed 12 June 2017).
66 Interview with human rights organizations on 10 April 2017.
67 Interview with an official from the MFA KR on 10 April 2017.

that will particularly target stranded/re-entry banned migrants. In effect, only local diasporas occasionally provide help to migrants in these circumstances.

Returning migrant workers have not been identified as a separate priority group for socio-economic reintegration at home. While, as Kyrgyz citizens, they have access to a range of social services, employment measures and support mechanisms, they have not been covered by any dedicated reintegration programs for returned or re-entry-banned migrant workers. An area of particular concern is the situation of re-entry banned migrants, who lack resources to return home. In the absence of dedicated support programs, the stranded migrants mostly obtain help from diaspora groups, NGOs and international organizations (for example, IOM and FAO).

2.2.4.2. Socioeconomic re-integration challenges

Returning migrants and their households, especially the most vulnerable ones (women and children) are faced with a range of issues upon return to Kyrgyzstan. Some of them (unemployment or lack of custody) are of immediate nature; others (pensions, education) point to the long-term vulnerabilities. While these challenges are common to the country's population, they may have a particularly devastating impact on the returnees who often have limited economic, social or cultural assets.[68]

Lacking or limited **employment** opportunities is the fundamental socioeconomic problem encountered by returning migrants at home. Women are especially in the risk group as the rate of unemployment among

68 See the sociological chapter for the discussion of the interplay of factors of vulnerability, contributing to the deterioration of migrants' ability to re-integrate into the country of return.

them is very high.[69] In 2016 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development of the Kyrgyz Republic identified 5166 families and 6171 children as living in difficult circumstances. In response, the ministry has developed individual family support plans and individual child protection plans.[70] Also, the ministry provides information on existing vacancies in the labour market and on opportunities for the unemployed to receive microloans.[71] However, as noted in the Programme for development of social protection of the population in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2015–2017, interest rates remain high and obtaining a loan is still problematic for socially vulnerable groups.[72]

It should be added that the Regional Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2018–2022 adopted by Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 194 of 31 March 2017 sets out plans for "*opening processing companies in order to reduce unemployment and, as a consequence, to bring down the scale of migration among the most active, working-age population*".[73] As a whole, the Regional Policy Concept includes the following objectives: renewal of the main types of local resources; regional integration through the creation of a common market; introduction of mechanisms to stimulate regional development through specialisation of the regions; building capacity in the regions to expand opportunities for future development and search for sources and mechanisms of development.[74]

Government sources highlight the need to support returning migrants who acquired professional knowledge and skills abroad and are willing to start their own business at home. On the other hand, officials in the SMS KR pointed to the fact that after Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU some factories and plants preferred to move production to Russia.[75]

Social integration of **migrants' children** remains one of the burning issues as these children are one of the most vulnerable groups in Kyrgyzstan. The UNICEF Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic Yukie Mokuo noted that abandoned children of migrants are left at risk of abuse and neglect, without appropriate care and protection.[76] With its Decision "On Measures to Regulate Migration Processes in the Republic in Current Conditions" the Defence Council of the Kyrgyz Republic emphasised the need to put in place mechanisms for arranging mandatory guardianship over the children of migrant workers to promote responsible parenthood.[77] According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Development of the KR, "*at present 300,000 children in the country receive a monthly allowance for low income families. The poverty rate is 30%.*"[78]

The question of **pension** provision for migrant workers is being raised not only by migrants themselves; government officials also agree that it requires a solution. Contributions paid by migrant workers to state pension funds stay in the country of employment and the time of foreign employment is not counted towards pensionable service in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz state pension authority and its Russian counterparts are working on a draft Agreement on cooperation in social insurance matters that would provide for transfer of pension benefits to citizens of the Kyr-

69 Interview with an official from the MLSD KR (10 April 2017).
70 MLSD KR, http://www.mlsp.gov.kg/?q=ru/content/v-2016-godu-vyyavleno-5166-semey-i-6171-detey-okazavshihsya-v-tzhs (accessed 9 July 2017).
71 Interview with an official from the MLSD KR (10 April 2017).
72 MLSD KR, http://www.mlsp.gov.kg/?q=ru/prs (accessed 8 July 2017).
73 Government of the KR, http://www.gov.kg/?page_id=92323&lang=ru (accessed 17 July 2017).
74 Ibid.
75 Interview with an official from the SMS KR (10 April 2017).
76 https://24.kg/obschestvo/53121_chetvero_izpyati_detey_kotoryie_jivut_naulitse_eto_deti_vnutrennih_migrantov/ (accessed 15 July 2017).
77 Official website of the President of the KR. On Measures to Regulate Migration Processes in the Republic in Current Conditions, (in Russian) http://www.president.kg/files/docs/Photofiles/o_merah_po_regulirovaniyu_migratsionnyih__protsessov_v_respublike_v_sovremennyih_usloviyah.pdf, (accessed 12 July 2017).
78 In Kyrgyzstan 300 thousand children from low income families receive benefits – Ministry of Social Development (in Russian), http://old.kabar.kg/rus/society/full/107121 (accessed 12 June 2017).

gyz Republic and the Russian Federation to the place of their permanent residence in accordance with the principle of proportionality. This means that "*to determine an individual's pension rights for the pensionable service accumulated in those two states each state calculates and pays a pension corresponding to the length of service worked in this state in accordance with its national legislation*".[79]

79 Social Fund of the KR, http://socfond.kg/citizens/11-Piensionnoie-obiespiechieniie-trudovykh-mighrantov/ (accessed 11 July 2017).

3. TAJIKISTAN

3.1. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS AND IMPACT

3.1.1. The scale of labour migration

3.1.1.1. Scale and composition of migrant worker outflow

According to the data provided by the Migration Service of the Tajik Ministry of Labour, beginning in 2014 the total number of registered migrant workers leaving Tajikistan for abroad has been steadily falling (Fig. 7). For instance, there were 282,400 (or 35.3%) fewer migrant workers in 2016 compared to 2013. In 2016 their numbers dropped by 35,288 or 6.4% compared to 2015. In the first three months of 2017, there were 22% fewer migrant workers leaving for work in other countries compared to the same period of the previous year.

At the same time, in 2016 significant shift in the gender composition of the migrant worker population was observed. While compared to 2015, a 10-% decline was noted among male migrant workers, the number of women leaving Tajikistan for work increased by over a quarter. This is a continuation of a long-term trend, in which the proportion of women in the total number

Fig. 20. Registered departures of migrant workers from Tajikistan by gender, 2013-2016



Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2017

Table 7. Number of migrant workers who left the Republic of Tajikistan in 2015–2016, by region

Regions	Total number		Men		Women	
	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016
Republic of Tajikistan	552,596	517,308	487,929	435,457	64,667	81,851
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO)	26,438	18,568	24,533	15,261	1,905	3,307
Sughd Region	171,755	155,472	147,473	133,937	21,535	24,282
Khatlon Region	206,762	229,818	192,144	193,216	14,618	36,602
City of Dushanbe	50,170	17,488	39,955	14,013	10,215	3,475
Towns and Districts of Republican Subordination*	97,471	95,962	83,824	79,030	13,647	16,932

* These include 13 districts of the Karotegin region.

Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2017

Fig. 21. Registered returns of migrant workers to the Republic of Tajikistan by gender, 2013-2016



Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2017

Table 8. Number of migrant workers who returned to the Republic of Tajikistan in 2015–2016, by region

Regions	Total number		Men		Women	
	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016
Republic of Tajikistan	388,600	436,974	347,961	353,504	40,639	83,470
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO)	27,409	20,693	25,076	17,268	2,333	3,425
Sughd Region	34,559	114,523	31,048	84,196	3,511	30,327
Khatlon Region	180,424	198,280	167,203	168,708	13,221	29,572
City of Dushanbe	52,236	17,400	40,829	12,400	11,407	5,000
Towns and Districts of Republican Subordination	93,972	86,078	83,805	70,932	10,167	15,146

Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2017

of migrant workers has been growing in recent years. For example, in the early 2000s they represented only 5% of all migrants, but 12.5% in 2013 and 15.8% in 2016.

As seen in Table 7, against the background of general reduction in the size of the labour migration from Tajikistan (down by 35,288 people between 2015 and 2016), the number of female migrant workers increased by 17,184 in the same period. This rise is especially noticeable in the Khatlon Region (by 2.5 times) and in the GBAO (by 1.7 times) which indicates that women in these parts of the country take a more active part in labour migration.

3.1.1.2. Registered returns to Tajikistan

At the same time, 436,974 migrant workers returned to Tajikistan in 2016, which is 48,381 individuals (12.4%) more than in 2015 (Fig. 21). 353,504 (80.9%) of them were men and 83,470 (19.1%) were women. Thus, in 2016 the scale of returns increased while the volume of outflows decreased, putting the country's registered migration nearly in balance. Especially striking is the doubling of the returns of Tajik women between 2015 and 2016.

The dynamics of returns varies by regions of the country (Table 8). While the Khatlon and GBAO regions maintained stable rates of return, significant changes were observed in the Sughd region and the capital city. These appear to correlate with the shifts in gender composition of the inflows. The rate of return among female migrants to the Sughd region increased tenfold in 2016. Meanwhile, returns of men to the Dushanbe city decreased by over two-thirds in that period.

Given the first signs of recovery in the Russian economy, strengthening of the rouble, falling inflation rate and, as a result, a certain growth in real-term income, it is possible to say that labour migration to Russia is likely to increase. In a survey conducted by the Social

Fig. 22. Registered departures and returns of migrant workers from Tajikistan to Kazakhstan (all persons) in 2015–2016 and in the first 5 months of 2017



Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2017

Fig. 23. Registered departures and returns of migrant workers from Tajikistan to Kazakhstan (women) in 2015–2016 and in the first 5 months of 2017



Source: The Migration Service of the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan

Demography and Economic Sociology Centre in the Institute of Socio-Political Research under the Russian Academy of Sciences, 48% of Tajik migrant workers stated that they would like to stay in Russia permanently. In 2001–2011 almost 145,000 Tajik nationals received Russian citizenship.[80]

3.1.1.3. Kazakhstan as a new destination for Tajik migrant workers

98% of the total number of Tajik migrant workers were employed in Russia[81] in 2011. In 2017, the share remains largely unchanged – with a small fraction, registering their departure for Kazakhstan (Fig. 22).

The analysis of Fig. 22 and 23 shows that in 2016 compared to 2015 the number of migrant workers leaving Tajikistan for the Republic of Kazakhstan increased only by 1,416 individuals (of which 218 were men and 1,198 were women). The number of migrants returning to Tajikistan from Kazakhstan also remained largely unchanged over the same period. In the first 5 months of 2017 this tendency continued. This data suggests that the Repu blic of Kazakhstan has not yet replaced the Russian Federation as an alternative destination for Tajik migrant workers (unlike for nationals of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan).

3.1.2. Numbers of re-entry banned migrants

According to official statistics provided by the Tajik Ministry of Labour, at the end of 2015 the total number of re-entry banned migrants to the Russian Federation amounted to 333,391. Despite the current progress - ban term expiration, early removal from the ban list due to the efforts of the expert working group and joint Russian-Tajik commission — there is still a large group of Tajik migrants banned from entering the Russian Federation. As of March 2017, the number of migrant workers from Tajikistan with temporarily re-entry bans to Russia stood at 258,065 people.

During the visit of the President of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Tajikistan in February 2017, the countries reached an agreement to remove bans from Tajik nationals who committed only insignificant administrative infractions rather than criminal offences. At the end of March 2017, the working group of the Tajik Ministry of Labour and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced an amnesty for 106,000 banned migrant workers from Tajikistan. Thus, on 1 May 2017 the total number of re-entry banned migrants amounted to 152,000 people. More lists of Tajik nationals eligible for possible amnesty are being considered.

As an interim measure towards migration amnesty, on 21 December 2016 the Russian State Duma passed, in the second and third readings, the Federal Law on "mitigation of punishment for foreign nationals who breached migration rules". According to the RIA News Agency, this law would apply to foreigners who violated migration legislation in Moscow, Moscow Region, Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Region. It removed the mandatory requirement to deport offending migrants from the country and instead leaves this decision to the judge's discretion; the fine of 7,000 roubles is still to be paid by every offender. Deportation is now mandatory only for a repeat migration law offence within 12 months in the named regions of Russia.[82] On 30 December 2016 the Sputnik Informa-

80 Ryazantsev S. «Трудовая миграция из Центральной Азии в Россию в контексте экономического кризиса» [Labour migration from Central Asia to Russia in the context of the economic crisis], http://migrant.ru/trudovaya-migraciya-iz-centralnoj-azii-v-rossiyu-v-kontekste-ekonomicheskogo-krizisa/

81 Chudnovskikh O. Report «Статистика трудовой миграции в странах сети МИРПАЛ» [Labour migration statistics in the MIRPAL countries], MIRPAL, 2011, p. 93

82 http://ru.sputnik-tj.com/migration/20161222/1021360191/vidvorenie-migrantov-deportatsiya.html

tion Agency reported that the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin endorsed the law.[83] This initiative of the Russian authorities only demonstrates that Russia is not interested in mass outflow of migrant workers.

3.1.3. Remittances

Another trend identified in the course of the interviews is a steady decrease since 2013 in the share of remittances from Russia in the GDP of Tajikistan: 49.6% in 2013; 36.6% in 2014; 28.8% in 2015 and 27.1% in 2016.[84]According to the official website of the Central Bank of Russia, the volume of remittances from Russia to Tajikistan amounted to US$4,173 million in 2013; US$3,854 million in 2014; US$2,220 million in 2015 and US$1,900 million in 2016 (i.e. US$2,273 million or 2.2 times less in 2016 compared to 2013).[85]

Every year since the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord was signed in 1997, the GDP of Tajikistan has been growing at a steady pace (showing 10% growth in some years). Due to the impact of the global economic crisis the GDP growth did slow down but remained relatively high: 6.5% in 2015 and 6.9% in 2016. The analysis of these figures leads to a conclusion that remittances from Russia continue to influence the size of Tajikistan's GDP but they are no longer crucial (the economy continues to grow steadily even after a sharp drop in remittances). Moreover, in interviews at the Ministry of Economic Development and the Center for Strategic Studies it was noted that the Tajik business community also contributes to remittances as do native Tajiks – now Russian citizens.

Further information on the volume and structure of remittances from Russia was provided in a 2017 study commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Development.[86] The report concluded that the actual scale of remittances in 2015-2016 was lower than the estimates provided by either the Central Bank of the Russian Federation or the World Bank.[87] Among the factors diminishing the volume of disposable income that Tajik migrants could remit were: the variation in actual salary levels for migrant work, the cost of obtaining a labour patent or the relatively high rate of rent asked from migrants.[88]

The bulk of remittances is spent on everyday needs of migrants' families, children's education, medical care and house building.[89] However, a study of living standards of migrant workers' households in Tajikistan has shown that 25% of respondents wanted to open a shop or a stall at the market, about 8% would like to buy a car that can be used for income-generating activities, 6% were willing to open a small manufacturing business and 3% – a café or a restaurant. It also found that 54% of respondents were not prepared to keep savings in banks, another 25% would do it if bank interest rates are raised and 11% if the state provides guarantee for the safety of deposits held by banks.[90] In view of the current banking crisis the recipients of remittances are even less likely to deposit them in banks.

83 http://ru.sputnik-tj.com/migration/20161230/1021423512/putin-zakon-migrant.html
84 Data from the Institute of Economy and Demography under the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan.
85 https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20170313/kak-podderzhivayut-tadzhikistan-migranti
86 Toshmatova M. Analysis of cross-border remittances to Tajikistan in comparison with the official statistics. Structure of remittances' expenditure by their recipients in the Republic of Tajikistan and recommendations for the investment of remittances in long-term development of the national economy. [In Russian]. Dushanbe 2017.
87 Ibid., p. 28.
88 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
89 According to a 2013 household survey, 59.7% migrants who returned to Tajikistan between 1991 and 2011 declared their primary plans to spend remittances on food or other necessities. Ibid., p. 33.
90 Ryazantsev S. «Трудовая миграция из Центральной Азии в Россию в контексте экономического кризиса» [Labour migration from Central Asia to Russia in the context of the economic crisis], http://migrant.ru/trudovaya-migraciya-iz-centralnoj-azii-v-rossiyu-v-kontekste-ekonomicheskogo-krizisa/

3.1.4. Vulnerable categories of migrants

During an interview at the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan it was highlighted that one of the major present-day challenges in the country is families left behind by migrant workers. This social phenomenon is a negative consequence of labour migration. Over the last few years, especially due to the negative consequences of the global financial crisis and the resulting sharp drop in migrant workers' income, the volume of remittances has also fallen significantly, as discussed in previous chapters. An increasing number of heads of households stop helping their families and leave them to fend for themselves without any financial support; as a result, migrants' wives and children find themselves in a desperate situation. In effect, abandoned families of migrant workers are a particularly vulnerable group, as women in these households often do not have any professional qualifications or work experience and are deprived of job opportunities due to sociocultural norms, children are mainly minors and sometimes the family also looks after dependent elderly parents.

At the initiative of the IOM office in Tajikistan and as part of the project "Reducing negative economic and social impact of labour migration through improving the system of protection of migrants' children left in Tajikistan", the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan examined this issue and established that families left behind by migrant workers are in fact vulnerable in the majority of cases and do need social support from the government. Following this, by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan this category of the population was added to the list of vulnerable groups in need of social assistance.

The Resolution provides for the families to receive certain benefits and other kinds of support:

- In some parts of the country families are paid 400 somoni per year and in 28 towns and districts they are exempt from payment of electricity charges for up to 250 kWh a month.
- In schools pupils from these families (from 1st to 9th grade) receive 40 somoni each.
- Members of these families are entitled to free medical examinations at healthcare institutions.

Certain groups of patients (HIV and TB infected individuals), including migrant workers, are also supplied with food and personal hygiene products free of charge.

Given the minuscule amount of financial support available at the moment, on instruction from the Tajik Government, the Ministry of Health is developing a state-funded programme of targeted assistance aimed at disadvantaged families which includes increasing financial support and benefits available to them.

Another difficulty that complicates the life of migrant workers in host countries is the requirement to undergo a medical assessment procedure. As per the Russian migration regulations, when applying for a job, along with other documents migrant workers should provide a medical certificate in a standardised format confirming their health status. Furthermore, as part of a work patent application procedure, migrants are required to submit medical certificates to their local migration service office stating that they do not suffer from illegal substance addiction, do not carry infectious diseases and, in particular, are not infected with the disease caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV infection). However, this requirement is difficult to meet as medical documents issued in Tajikistan are not recognised in Russia, so migrants have to undergo medical assessments once arrived in Russia which takes considerable time and money as these services are not free of charge. Thus migrant workers may not have enough time to complete all assess-

ments and obtain all the required certificates within the time limits stipulated in the Russian legislation for finding employment (indeed, just to apply for a work patent 8 separate documents must be submitted to the migration authorities). As a result, migrants risk being issued with a re-entry ban for breaching migration regulations.

As Tajik migrants work in severe Russian climate conditions and often in hazardous industries where basic occupational health and safety rules and regulations are not observed (with employers trying to economize on safety and regulatory authorities turning a blind eye to it), migrant workers are vulnerable to the risk of workplace injury (or sometimes even work-related death) and occupational diseases. For migrant workers this may mean a more problematic social integration back into the community.

In order to mitigate this risk and save migrants' time and financial resources, the Government of Tajikistan proposed conducting medical assessments in pre-selected healthcare institutions in Tajikistan with the intention that their medical certificates will be recognised in the Russian Federation. The Tajik Ministry of Health is willing to equip these institutions with modern equipment and employ qualified staff. But this question remains unresolved for many years as the Russian Government does not accept this proposal.

Another serious risk factor affecting migrant workers from Tajikistan is their exposure to infectious diseases in host countries, including HIV infection and tuberculosis. Importantly, as many early stage diseases do not show any obvious signs or symptoms, migrant workers may not be aware of any illnesses they have or of any infections they carry. One of the most serious risks faced by migrant workers is that if a migrant is diagnosed with a health problem in Russia, he or she will not be able to find a regular employment and will be forced to return home or to live and work in Russia with irregular status.

In view of the above risk factors, there is a need in Tajikistan to strengthen preventive efforts in identifying diseases and illnesses at an earlier stage in migrant workers. At present this poses a significant challenge given the limited capacity of healthcare facilities to assess large numbers of migrant workers due to shortages of family doctors and nursing staff. It is essential to increase the workforce capacity of primary healthcare institutions and equip them with diagnostic equipment in urban as well as rural areas. Since financial resources are currently very limited, to address this problem external funding should be considered.

3.1.5. Reintegration into the labour market

In order to assess the conditions for labour market reintegration of returning migrants, the availability of employment in Tajikistan needs to be considered. On the one hand, the registered unemployment rate remains low, standing at 2.4% in 2017 (up from 2.3% in 2016). Even official statistics show that in 2016 the working population in the Tajik labour market only increased by 6000 people. Employment opportunities are also more limited in some regions. According to official data, in more developed parts of the country (Dushanbe and Sughd Region) the official unemployment rate is significantly lower than the national average (by about 1%) and the unemployment rate in other regions (4.2–4.6% lower than in the GBAO and 2.8–3.1% lower than in the Districts of Republican Subordination). According to this statistic, the highest level of unemployment is registered in the GBAO (5.9%), that is 2.5 times above the national average and 4.5 times higher than in Dushanbe and the Sughd Region. On the other hand, this could indicate that the unemployed in these parts of Tajikistan are more likely to get registered with local employment services.

Efforts have been made to integrate economically in-

active population into the labour market (Box).

Creation of jobs in Tajikistan in 2016

150,000 new jobs were created in Tajikistan in 2016, of which 49,400 were in agriculture (32.9%), 9,400 in manufacturing, 22,100 in construction, 900 in utilities sector and 69,100 (46%) in services (commerce, education, healthcare, transport, finances). Out of the total number of jobs 36,046 were located in the Sughd Region, 50,967 in the Khatlon Region, 12,026 in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, 27,405 in Dushanbe and 24,497 in the towns and districts of republican subordination. However, only 71,100 , or 47.2%, of the new jobs were in permanent employment. 37,400 were temporary jobs, 37,800 jobs were seasonal and 4,600 were reinstated jobs. It should also be noted that 62,700 jobs were lost in the same year.

Source: Ministry of Labour of Tajikistan.

According to the data of the State Agency for Labour and Employment, in Tajikistan as a whole 8,900 vacancies are submitted to the employment service on average every month.[91] For each vacancy advertised by employers there are 8 people registered with the employment service. These figures reveal that the number of newly created jobs is insufficient to provide employment for rapidly expanding workforce in Tajikistan.

Low wages represent another problem affecting Tajikistan. Data provided by the Tajik Ministry of Labour shows that as of 1 January 2017 the average monthly salary was 960.17 somoni, which is in nominal terms 80.9 somoni, or 9.2%, higher compared to the same period of 2016. Overall, in 2012–2016 the minimal wage doubled and the average salary rose by 76% in different sectors of the economy. As evident from these figures, the nominal wage growth rate is rather high; however, the falling exchange rate of the Tajik somoni to the US dollar over the same period of time meant that average monthly salary in 2016 was just over US$120 compared to almost US$150 in 2015.

Among the regions of the country, the highest salaries are paid in Dushanbe (1619.48 somoni), 1.7 times higher than the national average monthly salary and 2.3 times higher than in the Khatlon Region. By stimulating a more rapid wage growth in the GBAO, Sughd and Khatlon Regions, the Government of Tajikistan is trying to correct this imbalance.

It is also important to note a large degree of differentiation in salaries between various sectors of the economy and regions of the country. For example, the pay in the farming industry is 7.9 times lower than in the financial sector and 7.1 times lower than in construction. Furthermore, some industries of Tajikistan experience substantial wage arrears. As of 1 November 2016, the total wage arrears in the country amounted to 23.476 million somoni (over US$3 million), which is 12.7% more than in the same period of 2015. 43% of this these arrears (almost 10 million somoni) are in the manufacturing industry.

All these negative factors significantly reduce the chances of jobless people, including returned migrant workers, to find employment and impede their re-integration back at home.

The State Agency for Labour and Employment was established and operates within the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan. In 2016, out of 119,709 individuals seeking help with the labour and employment authorities 39,874 people found employment (2.4% more than in 2015); 3,642 people were granted loans on beneficial terms

91 In 2016, out of the total of 8,900 vacancies offered on average every month, 2,850 were available in the Khatlon Region, 2,513 in the City of Dushanbe, 2,223 in the Sughd Region, 1,285 in the Towns and Districts of Republican Subordination and 29 in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). Data of the State Agency for Labour and Employment under the Ministry of Labour of Tajikistan.

Table 9. Returned migrant workers contacting labour and employment services

Regions	Number of migrants who contacted employment services	Men	Women	Found employment	Underwent vocational training	Sent to public works	Started their own business	Received professional orientation	Received social services
GBAO	603	493	110	37	87	46	4	429	603
Khatlon Region	773	732	41	120	145	39	27	442	773
Sughd Region	702	621	81	130	128	33	26	317	634
Towns and Districts of Republican Subordination	1,115	1,022	93	51	194	44	65	438	789
City of Dushanbe	55	54	1	5	8			42	55
Total	**3,248**	**2,922**	**326**	**343**	**562**	**162**	**122**	**1,668**	**2,854**

Source: The State Agency for Labour and Employment under the Ministry of Labour of Tajikistan

totalling 11.052 million somoni (including 122 returned migrant workers who received 370,000 somoni); over 10,000 job-seekers were in receipt of unemployment benefit (4.141 million somoni in total); 6,218 individuals were sent to paid public works; 18,540 were trained in new skills for free in training centres and 12,723 individuals (including migrant workers) had their professional skills certified.

According to the Ministry of Labour reports, during 2016 the Ministry's educational institutions trained 105,815 people (4,606 or 4.5% more than in 2015) but there is no statistic available as to how many of them found jobs. The ministerial report acknowledges that the employment rates among these people are low and that there is a need to match the number of people in training with the actual demand for workforce on the Tajik labour market. In addition, it was noted that the level and quality of training provided at these centres does not meet the current labour market standards and requirements owing to three main negative factors: shortage of qualified specialists in the industry, lack of professional teaching materials and modern teaching equipment.

In line with the anti-crisis program initiated by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Minister of Labour, Migration and Employment issued a decree instructing relevant bodies in the Migration Service and the State Agency for Labour and Employment to register all returned migrant workers seeking help with them, to provide them with the necessary information on employment opportunities, new skills training, existing skills certification and setting-up own business. According to the data provided by the State Agency for Labour and Employment, 3,248 returned migrant workers (2,922 men and 326 women) contacted its offices in 2016 (Table 9). 343 of them found

jobs, 562 were provided with training in new skills, 162 were sent to paid public works, 122 individuals received help in setting up own business (along with loans at preferential rates), 1,668 had professional orientation counselling.

At present, out of all returned migrant workers 394 individuals are registered as unemployed with the employment services. However, it should be noted that many returned migrants who find themselves jobless at home are not entitled to unemployment benefit due to the fact that according to legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan this benefit is paid to nationals formally registered with the employment services who, before contacting employment authorities, worked for at least 18 calendar months in the last 3 years and paid the mandatory social tax in the country. Bearing in mind that migrant workers live outside of Tajikistan and many of them were never employed in the country and did not pay any social tax, they do not qualify for the unemployment benefit.

In line with the project "Empowering migrants through improving access to social assistance and the reintegration system in Tajikistan" the State Agency for Labour and Employment conducted an assessment and prepared recommendations in order to assist returning migrant workers in their adaptation to the local labour market, to determine their needs in social assistance and to assess the capacity of the state authorities in addressing problems faced by migrants.

According to the Tajik Ministry of Labour, in 2016 the Migration Service and its subordinate bodies and the representative office of the Ministry of Labour in the Russian Federation were approached by 98,490 migrant workers, 14% fewer than in 2015. This is due to the contraction of the number of migrant workers from Tajikistan residing in Russia and those workers having fewer problems that require intervention (not as many re-entry bans issued and fewer cases of administrative expulsion, etc.) Nonetheless, 864 migrant workers from Tajikistan were turned back at the Russian border checkpoints during 2016 causing them significant financial losses and emotional distress.

In total 2066 re-entry banned and returned migrant workers were provided with jobs in 2016.[92] Furthermore, in collaboration with the Centre for the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project, over 2,000 migrant workers with temporary bans to enter Russia were employed in seasonal jobs clearing irrigation canals and drainage networks in the Khatlon Region and Districts of Republican Subordination. As part of the IOM Programme to support stability in jamoats (rural administrative entities) in 5 GBAO districts and 7 districts of the Khatlon Region, these groups of migrant workers received grants to start small and medium-sized enterprises and create jobs.

3.1.6. Barriers to integration

The World Bank report "The skills road: skills for employability in Tajikistan"[93] stated that two-thirds of individuals face significant barriers to learning about job vacancies. Information is a key element in the quest to successfully match labour supply and labour demand. Workers should have the ability to learn about vacancies and assess the nature of the jobs that are offered. In Tajikistan, however, 68% of the respondents drawn from the general worker population indicated that they do not have the means to find out about job vacancies in the event that they would be looking for a job. In other words, there is scope for improvement in accessing labour market information in Tajikistan, for instance through public employment services.

Every two years the Programme for Employment Promotion is approved in the Republic of Tajikistan in

92 Data of the Ministry of Labour of the Republic of Tajikistan.
93 2014, p.31.

accordance with which the Government assumes certain commitments to create new jobs, to ensure social assistance for unemployed citizens and migrant workers, to provide vocational training, to issue microloans for opening own business and self-employment, etc. But, as it appears from this report, the Programme affects only a small part of the unemployed citizens of Tajikistan and migrants (approximately 50,000-70,000 people) and its capacity is clearly rather limited.

A. Babayev at the Institute of Economy and Demography under the Tajik Academy of Sciences highlighted in his analytical review "Problems of returned migrant workers in the Republic of Tajikistan" that one of the factors stopping returned migrants from opening and expanding their own business is the lack of initial capital and difficulties in obtaining loans on good terms. In times of economic crisis, lending institutions pay utmost attention to the quality of their loan portfolio and avoid risky borrowers, whereas the majority of returned migrants fall into this category. Repayment guarantee funds that could cover potential risks for financial organizations are hardly present in Tajikistan.

Interviewed senior officials at ministries and government agencies, as well as NGO representatives and experts pointed out that they did not receive from migrants any reports regarding threats to their life or property while they were in Russia or after their return home. Furthermore, they confirmed that returning migrants found cultural reintegration to be relatively smooth as they did not encounter any widespread psychosocial problems as the home communities warmly welcomed them back so that they tended to feel more secure and protected than in their migrant destinations. At the same time, the respondents noted some persisting barriers to returnees' economic welfare. For instance, if a retuned migrant worker remains unemployed for a long time, he or she may become a burden for other family members (or their family as a whole may become a burden for other relatives) as the latter will have to support the migrant and his/her family and, therefore, work more. The interviewees believed that the economic difficulties represented a primary push factor for re-emigration.

3.2. SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

3.2.1. Strategic priorities

It became apparent from the interviews with government officials and the study of the principal strategic documents that one of the main priorities of the national socio-economic policy is to ensure effective employment of the population and to achieve the goals of the external labour migration policy.

In order to mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis on the socio-economic situation in Tajikistan and to facilitate the re-integration of returning migrant workers, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan initiated the Anti-Crisis Program (action plan for preventing possible risks from affecting national economy). This document includes measures for social protection and employment provision, including expanding targeted social assistance programmes, vocational training and certification of acquired professional skills and knowledge for the unemployed, employment of returning migrant workers and ensuring their social protection, search for new markets for labour migration, conclusion of labour migration agreements with other countries.

In 2016 the National Development Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan, until 2030, was approved. Among its development priorities for the next 15 years, the strategy specifies the expansion of productive employment of the population, including diversification of external labour migration with due regard to the gender factor and enhancing state regulation of the return of the migrants. Provision has also been made for es-

tablishing a gender-sensitive system of pre-departure orientation for migrant workers and their families, including legal and information support, short-term vocational and language courses at resource centres, development of programmes for regular and socially protected labour migration.

The Strategy estimates that in Tajikistan the working age population will increase from 2.4 million people in 2016 to 6.8 million people by 2030. Meanwhile, the proportion of employed population will go up from 40% to 70%. For example, in the same period the share of people working in services will grow from 27.6% to 60% and in manufacturing from the current 3.3% to 15–20%. As presented in the Strategy, the Tajik labour market in fact comprises three components: regular (official) employment, informal (irregular) employment and labour migration (mostly informal and uncontrolled).

It should be noted that, according to expert estimates, 600–700,000 people work in an irregular setting; in other words, irregular employment represents over 30% of the Tajik GDP. In line with the Strategy, the new development model will put in place conditions favourable to a significant reduction in irregular employment and conducive to the growth in the official sector of the economy. It is necessary to remember that irregular employment has an adverse effect on the economic development of the country, deters investment, reduces labour productivity, tramples constitutional rights of the citizens to labour and social protection, poses a danger to the economic and social security of the nation and encourages corruption. This issue had already been recognized in 2015 when a programme aimed at reducing irregular employment in 2015–2017 was elaborated by the Tajik Ministry of Labour and approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. The programme aimed to implement the state employment policy, increase the rate of employment, safeguard the labour rights of workers, increase social insurance budget and, as a result, improve the level of social protection overall.

The Strategy for the Institute of the Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2016–2020, adopted in 2016, sets the protection of the rights of migrant workers and their families as one of its priorities. Under this priority it is envisaged:

- to develop effective mechanisms and procedures to handle applications and complaints from migrants in the countries of destination;
- to assist in elaboration of effective reintegration programmes for migrant workers in Tajikistan.

The National Strategy for Labour Emigration of the Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2011–2015 made provisions for "*the development of a mechanism enabling the reintegration of returned migrants into the country's economy*". During some interviews with officials and academics it was suggested that the IOM could facilitate the elaboration of a migrant worker reintegration programme based on the international experience and best practice (i.e. measures that were tested and proven in other countries).

In 1997, by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Inter-Agency Commission for regulation of the migration processes was set up to coordinate the work of ministries and government agencies involved in labour migration processes. Decisions made by this Commission were mandatory for all government bodies in the country and their implementation was overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan. But the commission has not met for more than six months and as a result the activities of ministries and other agencies in addressing migration-related issues remain unchecked. It is felt necessary to re-establish the operation of this Commission and for the IOM to support its actions following the model of the Inter-Agency Commission on Combating

Trafficking in Persons under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Legal advice to migrants was provided in the framework of IOM's Regional Migration Program (2010–2015) aimed at protecting migrant workers' rights in Russia. Judging by the feedback from the senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour and its representative office in the Russian Federation, representatives of diasporas and migrants themselves, this project was hailed a success since lawyers' services were found useful and efficient at a relatively low cost. After the conclusion of the Regional Migration Program, continued to receive the requests from the Embassies of the origin countries of Central Asia migrants to provide legal support and counselling to migrants. However, due to limited funding, IOM Moscow had to prioritize assistance and concentrate on providing support only to the most vulnerable cases of the migrants from Central Asia (including, victims of trafficking, single women and children).[94]

3.2.2. Bilateral cooperation

Upon request of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment prepared the draft Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Labour Migration" aimed at ensuring the protection of the rights and interests of migrant workers and after some further modification resubmitted it to the Tajik Government for consideration.

In accordance with the decisions outlined in the Minutes of the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation held on 4 March 2015, several agreements between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan were drafted.[95] At present, the Parties are holding consultations regarding specific terms of these drafted documents.

The Government of Tajikistan is also in the process of considering the question of joining the Eurasian Economic Union.

The issues of labour migration and protection of migrant workers' rights were discussed at the Tajik-Russian Inter-Parliamentary Forum held in Dushanbe in 2016 and during the meeting of the heads of migration services of the CIS countries. In an effort to protect the rights of migrant workers in Russia, memoranda of understanding were signed with the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation and with several Russian regions; cooperation has been established with Tajik diasporas; a public reception office of the Commissioners for Human Rights was opened in Yekaterinburg, Russia.

During the visit of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (27-28 February 2017), the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Russian Federation signed an agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation in the exchange on current labour market information, including on demand for workforce in the Russian Federation, and cooperation in other joint initiatives.

In April 2017 the Employment and Labour Minister of the Republic of Korea visited Tajikistan exploring the possibility of sending Tajik migrant workers to South Korea, a draft Agreement is currently being prepared on this matter. Similar agreements have already been drafted with Kuwait, Qatar and UAE.

In 2016 the President of the Republic of Tajikistan approved the National Strategy on Countering Extrem-

94 Information provided by IOM Moscow, 24 November 2017.

95 «On cooperation in labour migration"; "On readmission along with the Executive Protocol for its implementation"; "On organised recruitment of Tajik nationals for temporary work in the Russian Federation; "On cooperation in the matters of social security (pension provision)"

ism and Terrorism for 2016–2020 designed to intensify counter-extremism and counter-terrorism efforts. As one of the priorities the Strategy calls for engaging with migrant workers, including institutional and legal measures to reduce the risk of their radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations.

3.2.3. Support for Tajik migrant workers

Due to measures undertaken by the Russian authorities, it seems that the position of the Tajik migrant workers has improved. A crucial element was the expansion of opportunities for regular employment. According to the data of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, over the first 11 months of 2016 work patents were issued to 394,800 migrant workers from Tajikistan. During the same period the number of Tajik migrant workers committing administrative offences and deported from the Russian Federation dropped by 26% and 18% respectively compared to 2015.

Nevertheless, significant vulnerabilities remain as noted by some experts. According to Ryazantsev,

> All evidence seems to suggest that despite an extensive regulatory and legal framework developed and implemented in the Republic of Tajikistan, Tajik migrant workers remain one of the least protected groups of Central Asian migrant workers in the host countries. One of the main problems is the fact that the Russian Federation does not have a comprehensive programme for the socio-cultural integration and language adaptation (of migrant workers and their families) to conditions of life in a Russian environment that is new for them.[96]

To address problems faced by migrant workers, the Tajik government has established a framework for assistance. Apart from the crucial role played by cooperation with 81 diasporas, state bodies operate in the areas of migrants' work and residence. As part of cooperation in labour migration matters between Tajikistan and Russia, the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of Tajikistan opened its Representative Office in Russia. With mediation support provided by the Representative Office staff, in 2016 migrant workers from Tajikistan were able to recover salary arrears from their employers in the amount of 33.1 million Russian roubles. In that period the representative office helped to find jobs for 11,530 nationals of Tajikistan in Russia. The office also provides assistance in regularising residence and employment status of Tajik nationals in Russia.

Analysing the requests submitted by returned migrant workers to the state authorities and other bodies in Tajikistan, it was found that the vast majority of enquiries addressed to the migration service offices were concerned with the legal status of the applicant in Russia (i.e. migrant workers asking whether they had a ban to enter the Russian Federation) as the majority of migrants did not have any information in this regard. The migration service provided information to migrant workers as requested.

According to the Commissioner for Human Rights under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, between 2015 and the first quarter of 2017 the Ombudsman's Office and its representative offices throughout the country received 89 requests from migrant workers or members of their families. The main issues raised by the applicants were the removal of the re-entry ban to Russia, requests for assistance in bringing relatives home, proof of citizenship (as per request from Russian migration authorities). Migrant workers did not report any threats or risks to their lives, security

96 Ryazantsev S. «Трудовая миграция из Центральной Азии в Россию в контексте экономического кризиса» [Labour migration from Central Asia to Russia in the context of the economic crisis], http://migrant.ru/trudovaya-migraciya-iz-centralnoj-azii-v-rossiyu-v-kontekste-ekonomicheskogo-krizisa/

or property during their stay in Russia or any risks or threats encountered on their return to Tajikistan. In addition, 3,511 migrant workers contacted the Ombudsman's representative office in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia between 2015 and May 2016. In most cases they were asking for help with obtaining a new passport (after a loss or expiration of the old one) or other documents, employment matters, legalisation of documents, non-payment of salaries by employers.

The extent and types of issues facing Tajik migrants in Russia vulnerable to re-entry bans was revealed in the work of the Human Rights Centre, non-governmental organization for protecting the rights of Tajik citizens. In 2016, the Centre received 1,207 enquiries, 923 from men and 284 from women. The vast majority (91%) wanted to know their legal status in the Russian Federation (i.e. whether they were banned from entering Russia). Other queries concerned information on the grounds for a re-entry ban to Russia and length of its term (5%); the latest developments in Russian migration legislation (2%); and other legal matters (issuance of passports, birth certificates for children, family and housing issues) (2%).

3.2.4. Professional training

Returned migrant workers contacted the offices of the State Agency for Labour and Employment mainly to find out about employment opportunities, learning a new trade or gaining certification for the skills they already acquired elsewhere. At present, the Tajik Ministry of Labour runs 61 institutions of initial professional education and a system of adult vocational training (5 vocational training centres with 38 branches and 30 representative offices) that offer courses in 110 specialist areas. To assist migrant workers curricula and syllabi of these educational institutions include lessons on the Russian language, history and elements of Russian migration legislation. In addition, all the educational institutions overseen by the Ministry of Labour offer short-term Russian language courses. In partnership with Russian higher education institutions, language test centres were opened to test migrant workers leaving for Russia. The Migration Service runs 4 pre-departure orientation and consultation centres for migrant workers (in Dushanbe, Khujand, Qurgonteppa and Khorugh). Moreover, in cooperation with the Saint Petersburg City Administration, recruitment centres were set up for organised recruitment of migrant workers to manufacturing plants and factories in the city and Leningrad region.

According to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tajikistan, in order to enhance Russian language learning in state-run schools from 1 September 2016 the Russian language syllabus is extended by one extra lesson a week. As part of its Higher Education Project the World Bank assigned US$1 million to set up Russian language courses. Three universities in Tajikistan offer Russian language courses to potential emigrants and on completion issue certificates recognised in the Russian Federation.

Overall in Tajikistan the accreditation for professional training in new skills and teaching Russian language is issued to 320 educational institutions, including 18 professional technical schools, 18 secondary vocational training establishments (colleges, technical schools), 252 private training centres and 32 adult learning centres. To increase the capacity in training new job skills that are in demand on the domestic and international labour markets, the Ministry of Education gave permission to organise short-term vocational courses at all Tajik educational institutions. The Unified Classifier of Skilled Trades, elaborated by the Ministry of Education and approved by the Tajik Government, was also intended to contribute to the development of vocational education system in Tajikistan. It lists occupations that are sought after not only on the Tajik labour market, but also in Russia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states.

Senior officials in the Ministry of Education of Tajikistan claim that their top priority in the area of labour migration is to train young people in professions that are in demand on the domestic as well as international labour markets, to teach foreign languages and to prevent the radicalization of young people. Meanwhile, since the early days of forming the market economy specialist training had little relevance to the demands of the labour market. As a result, a significant discrepancy remains between supply and demand for workforce with specific qualifications.

Nowadays, the demand for specialists with university degrees is limited on the domestic and international labour markets; however, the education system continues to train graduates with higher education qualifications, creating excess supply. Finding no application for their qualifications as there are no appropriate jobs, nor decent salaries, this group of the population joins the ranks of the unemployed and contributes to external migration. Studies show that among all migrant workers temporarily working abroad 19% have higher education qualifications and almost all of them do not work in their profession. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider a reorientation or conversion of some less in-demand institutions of higher education into facilities to train modern skilled trades for the domestic and external labour markets and as much as possible engage migrant workers in the learning process who at the moment leave to work abroad completely unprepared and untrained.[97]

97 UNDP. Employment in the context of human development. National Human Development Report. Dushanbe, 2010, p. 32-33.

Vulnerabilities of returning migrants

SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW

INTRODUCTION

Based on IOM interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted with re-entry banned migrants in the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and a new destination country (Kazakhstan), vulnerable groups of re-entry banned migrants are defined as follows: 1) those who happened to be the most subjected to economic hardships once they were forced to stay in the countries of origin, and 2) those subjected to discriminatory practices or who became irregular migrants in the new destination country – Kazakhstan. We categorized factors contributing to the economic and rights based vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants in Central Asia as follows: 'individual factors', 'family and household factors', 'situational factors' and 'structural factors'.

Throughout the analysis of the aforementioned factors — on the one hand, conditions external to the banned migrant and, on the other hand, personal competences and resources — we were able to identify real-life scenarios of further action pursued by migrants after the imposition of the ban and to formulate conclusions and recommendations.

The chapter applies the typology of vulnerabilities, elaborated in the conceptual and methodological chapter, by analysing the circumstances in which re-entry banned migrant workers from Central Asia find themselves in the countries of destination (Russia, Kazakhstan) and return (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan).

1. VULNERABILITIES IN COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION

1.1. CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANTS' VULNERABILITIES IN RUSSIA

A major structural factor, determining the conditions of migrants' stay, access to employment and social services, which differentiated between the positions of migrants from various Central Asian countries was the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Union. The following sections weigh the importance of the structural factors against other determinants of vulnerability to assess migrants' abilities to cope with the challenge of a re-entry ban and its effects.

1.1.1. Vulnerabilities of Kyrgyzstani migrants in Russia

Structural factors

As described in greater detail in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical chapter, Kyrgyzstan's membership of the Eurasian Economic Union, in effect since August 2015, has removed some of the barriers to the country's nationals.

Kyrgyzstani migrants are now:

- Exempt from the requirement to acquire a patent or permission for work and can work with a work contract;
- Able to stay in EAEU member states without official registration until 30 days (previously it was until 7 days in Russia);
- Able to have the same access to social services as citizens of the host country (public healthcare, education and pensions) and they pay as much income tax as do Russian citizens.[1]

However, these changes have not resolved the issue of the application of re-entry bans to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. The number of re-entry banned migrants from Kyrgyzstan has not decreased significantly, amounting currently to 106,029 people.[2] New people are included periodically in the re-entry ban list when some are removed mostly due to expiration of the ban period. The sociological assessment, carried out among re-entry banned migrants, revealed several persistent vulnerabilities, which tend to increase the risks of migrants' falling into irregularity and diminish their capacity to cope with the shock of the ban imposition. Key among them are inadequate level of awareness of their rights and obligations, complex rules for residence registration, and subjection to mistreatment and abuse by law enforcement bodies or employers in Russia.

Awareness of rights and obligations. Interviews with

1 For detailed discussion of the effects of Kyrgyzstan's accession to EAEU on the conditions of Kyrgyzstani migrant workers in Russia see, Emil Nasritdinov and Tolgonai Kojoeva, „Effect of Kyrgyzstan's Accession to Eurasian Economic Union on the Life of Kyrgyz Migrants in the Russian Federation", accessed on 25 July 2017, available at https://www.academia.edu/32631357/Effect_of_Kyrgyzstans_Accession_to_Eurasian_Economic_Union_on_the_Life_of_Kyrgyz_Migrants_in_the_Russian_Federation and Lira Sagynbekova, "International Labour Migration in the Context of the Eurasian Economic Union: Issues and Challenges of Kyrgyz Migrants in Russia", accessed on 29 June 2017, available at http://www.ucentralasia.org/Content/Downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP-39%20International%20Labour%20Migration%20in.pdf

2 For more details on the number of re-entry banned migrants from Kyrgyzstan see the socioeconomic section of the report.

migrants and NGO leaders revealed that most migrants are not aware and informed about their rights and obligations when they go and work in Russia, which leads them to informal ways of being in the country. The fact that Russia is a Visa free country for Central Asian countries and that informality is widespread in the Russian economy must have played a significant role in the way Central Asian migrants, who also come from countries where the law is not followed strictly, have dealt with the legal conditions of the receiving country. At the same time, while informal strategies of Central Asian migrant workers until recently have allowed them to work in Russia, increasingly strict rules applied for migrant workers and issuing re-entry bans for small administrative violations have made Central Asian migrants vulnerable to be blacklisted due to their legal illiteracy and *habitus*.

Registration and its legal consequences. Some structural conditions in Russia make migrants from Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to become banned. A case in point is the law that requires living at the place where one is registered. When screening questionnaires of the re-entry banned migrants considered for the direct reintegration assistance of IOM and analyzing interviews we conducted with banned migrants, we noted that the application of the law had resulted in many migrants from Kyrgyzstan being placed on the re-entry ban list and in their expulsion from Russia. Most of the Kyrgyz migrants live with another 5-7 people in a two-room apartment in order to save money.[3] At the same time, proprietors refuse to register migrants at the apartments that they rent out to them because they do not want to pay tax for rent. Consequently, most migrants in Russia are registered at their work place but in fact, they live elsewhere. Alternatively, they do not manage to register anywhere. The Russian police suddenly make checks of the apartments where migrants live and arrest anyone who happened to be there without registration.

One re-entry banned migrant who participated in the FGD in Jalal-Abad city complained that despite Kyrgyzstan's accession to EAEU not much has changed for Kyrgyzstani migrants.

> We are very disappointed about EAEU. We were hoping that after Kyrgyzstan will join EAEU the situation of Kyrgyz migrants will improve. Why are citizens of Belarus or Kazakhstan not subject to re-entry bans and sent out of Russia? The Kyrgyz are still being sent out Russia along with the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Except for removal of the work permit, nothing changed for us. We still need to have a registration. The Russian police raids apartments where migrants live. Since I returned (due to the re-entry ban) my wife went to work in Russia. She tells me on the phone every day that they are fearful about police checks in the apartment. In case the police will check the apartment, each migrant living there has prepared 20,000 roubles[4] to pay bribes to the police. It is believed that if you give this amount to the police, they will not put you in prison or send you out from Russia.
>
> ***(Participant, FGD with migrants in Jalal-Abad city, February 2017)***

Police checks. In addition to the police raids at migrants' apartments, they stop the migrant workers in the streets, metro stations or pay sudden visits at migrants' working places and check their documents. Migrants may be detained for a number of reasons: when they do not have registration or have a fake one,

3 This appears to be an improvement compared to the situation, reported by our respondents who told us that 5-7 years ago, up to 15 people used to live in one room in Russia because renting an apartment was previously more expensive..
4 US$335 as of August 2017

or do not possess a work contract or they have violated the terms of stay in Russia. Afterwards, migrants pay fines, are placed on the re-entry ban list and according to the decision of the court are expelled from the Russian Federation. These are scenarios that re-entry banned migrants from Kyrgyzstan mentioned during interviews, FGDs or in the screening questionnaires.[5] We could often hear from banned migrants how the police in Russia treated them inhumanely and unfairly and about corruption of the police. Migrants cannot walk freely in the streets or be in public places in Russian cities. The constant stops and checks of the police force most Kyrgyz migrant workers to avoid the Russian society and hinder their integration into it. As a result, they become marginalized and focused only on their own social networks based on ethnicity, kinship or neighbourhood.

Kyrgyzstan's accession to the EAEU only partly helped address these vulnerabilities. Researchers mention that since 2015 the police have rarely asked Kyrgyzstani migrants to show their documents compared to Uzbek or Tajik migrants.[6] However, the decision to stop a migrant is reported to depend on the police officers' subjective perception of a migrant. Two participants of FGD in Jalal-Abad city mentioned that if someone speaks good Russian, looks like a city dweller and acts confidently they do not have problems with the Russian police. One of them could avoid checks of his documents by the police for several years even if he had problems with them. They would just let him go without checking his documents. He was placed on the re-entry ban list due to his debt for usage of his cell phone. However, interviews and screening questionnaires conducted with banned migrants demonstrate that many migrants from Kyrgyzstan are still subject of constant checks by police and being put on the re-entry ban list.

Due to complicated legislature and a lack of the necessary documents, many studied migrants indicated that they were placed on the re-entry ban list within 1 to 6 months of their stay in Russia both before and after Kyrgyzstan's accession to the EAEU. Some of them took loans to finance their trip to Russia but due to the ban, they had to return to their homes without earning even a penny, thus becoming indebted with almost no chance of repaying the debt. Some of them also needed several months to find employment after arrival to Russia. Sometimes, especially those who work in the construction sites, were not paid for their work for several months. As a result, the migration experience in Russia did not benefit these migrants at all, specifically those for whom it was their first migration experience in Russia. On the contrary, they faced the complications of finding a job, harassment by the police and indebtedness.

Relations with employers and economic well-being. Apart from the complications Kyrgyz migrants face with registration in Russia, they do not always get a work contract with the employer. That is so because the Russian employers are first and foremost interested in cheap labour. Therefore, they will either provide a fake work contract; or employ a Kyrgyz migrant without a work contract; or take an Uzbek or Tajik employee instead.[7] Thus, migrants from Kyrgyzstan do not necessarily work with work contracts in Russia. In turn, this can lead a Kyrgyz migrant to become an irregular migrant in Russia and hence, vulnerable to be placed on the re-entry ban list.

Recent trends. There are unexpected situations that affect the status of Kyrgyz migrants, as well as of other Central Asian migrants in Russia. Consultants working at the Information and Consultation Centre (ICC) in Osh, during an interview at the beginning of

5 For detailed discussion of reasons for being placed on the re-entry ban list see, IOM (2016), "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration".
6 See for example, Emil Nasritdinov and Tolgonai Kojoeva, „Effect of Kyrgyzstan's Accession to Eurasian Economic Union on the Life of Kyrgyz Migrants in the Russian Federation"
7 Ibid.

June 2017, told us that lately the number of re-entry banned migrants from Kyrgyzstan who are turning to the ICC increased dramatically (Fig. 24). One reason was tightened control of citizens of Kyrgyzstan after the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg in April 2017 for which a Kyrgyz-born young male of Uzbek ethnicity was named as suspect, although the suspect had been a Russian resident for more than 20 years. Another reason is a sudden introduction of the new regulation of the registration in four cities of Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi and Kazan) due to security reasons as a part of the preparation for the FIFA World Cup Russia in 2018. According to this regulation, any foreign nationals visiting one of the abovementioned cities between June 1 to July 12, 2017 should have registered within 24 hours since their arrival on Russian territory. Many Kyrgyz migrant workers went to Russia without knowing this regulation or did not have sufficient time to get registered within 24 hours because they arrive on the weekend or did not know how to do it. As a result, they were put on the re-entry ban list and expelled from Russia. In 2018, it is expected that this regulation will be effective in twelve Russian cities.

Consequently, interviews with re-entry banned migrants revealed that although many of them did not have legal awareness and literacy when in migration in Russia, certain aspects of legislature of the Russian Federation led them to work and live informally. For example, the application of the law requiring residence at the place where one is officially registered (*propiska*) has resulted in the inclusion of many migrants from Kyrgyzstan in the re-entry ban list and in their expulsion from Russia. Moreover, Kyrgyz migrants' employment opportunities and levels of wages have been negatively affected by a combination of factors, including unwillingness of the Russian employers to provide them with work contracts in the conditions of the economic downturn experienced by Russia due to sanctions of the West and decrease of oil

Fig. 24. Migrants applying to and receiving consultations at the information and consultation centres in Bishkek and Osh according to their re-entry ban status, 5 December 2016-30 September 2017



prices. Finally yet importantly, corrupt nature and the hostile attitude of many of the police officers towards migrants hinder migrants' integration into Russian society and lead them to become marginalized in the host country.

1.1.2. Vulnerabilities of Tajik migrants in Russia

Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan is not part of the EAEU and therefore, some aspects of Tajik migrants' experience in Russia is different than of the Kyrgyzstani migrants. However, due to the abovementioned challenges that the migrants from Kyrgyzstan are still facing in Russia there are similar structural and individual factors that make migrants from both countries vulnerable to be placed in the re-entry ban list. In addition, upon return to their home countries due to their re-entry ban status they face many similar difficulties. This section reviews the impact of structural and individual vulnerabilities on the position of Tajik migrants in Russia and on their capacity to deal with the shock of a re-entry ban.

Structural factors in the country of destination: Russia

Limited migrants' awareness of their re-entry ban status A major factor of vulnerability is the fact that migrants subject to the ban learned of their status only directly prior to travel or in travel. The interviews revealed the most common circumstances in which migrants found out about their ban: in the airport before regular departure for work abroad (when travelling by air); at the border between Kazakhstan and Russia (when travelling by rail or by bus) and during ID document checks in the country of destination.

> I returned home, two months later I decided to go back. To be on the safe side I went to check whether I had a ban. They said (in Tajikistan, country of origin) that I had a ban for 3 years. I do not know the reason for it.
>
> ***(male migrant, 25 years old, Khatlon)***
>
> I first arrived in 2014, took on any casual job but I did not have a permanent job. Then they caught me, checked my documents: I had the registration but not a work permit. I asked them to allow me time to find a permanent job. They took us to court (in Russia, country of destination). We paid a fine, I was deported.
>
> ***(female migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon)***

Migrants' awareness is made more difficult by barriers to access of information on the ban status. This information is available on the website of the General Administration for Migration Issues at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation[8] and on a website that is accessible only in Tajikistan.[9] The problem is aggravated by the fact that various Russian agencies may decide on inclusion on the ban list. The list of the federal executive bodies authorised to make decisions as to the undesirability of stay (residence) of a foreign national in the Russian Federation includes nine state agencies (before Resolution 631 of 25 May 2017 the list contained 11 executive bodies).[10]

8 Before May 2016 the information was published on the official website of the Russian Federal Migration Service; from June 2016 it is available on the website of the General Administration for Migration Issues at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

9 www.info.mehnat.tj

10 1. Russian MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs); 2. Russian FSB (Federal Security Service); 3. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation; 4. Rosfinmonitoring (Federal Financial Monitoring Service); 5. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service; 6. Russian Ministry of Justice; 7. Russian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); 8. Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare); 9. Russian Federal Biomedical Agency.

The migrant will be deported if he/she commits two administrative offences within a year. Migrants are constantly contacting us with the same question: they do not know why they have a ban, they find out about bans when they are already here, in Tajikistan. Firstly, migrants are not being informed; secondly, the bans are issued for administrative offences. If the law could be amended to the effect that administrative offences incur fines rather than deportation, there will be fewer deported migrants. And, effectively, there will be less uninformed individuals, since in the majority of cases migrants are not aware of any bans in connection with administrative infringements. For violations of residence regulations or illegal employment migrants are often taken to court, in which case they are told that they are being deported and on what grounds.

Expert interview with a lawyer at the Human Rights Centre

It is no longer profitable to work in Russia. They ask for so many documents, you have to pay for everything and you have only one month to sort everything out. In the past we had more time, had to pay less money and to obtain not as many documents.

I got all medical certificates at home but they are not accepted here. Queues are everywhere.

Participants, FGD with migrants , Khatlon

Time constraints for regularization of documents

Tajik migrants are also vulnerable to becoming irregular due to failure to comply with restrictive administrative regulations. According to the law of the Russian Federation, to stay legally in the country of destination before 1 January 2015 the migrant worker was required to have: 1) registration at the place of actual residence; 2) medical insurance; 3) a work permit to work for legal entities or a work patent to work for private individuals.[11] A work patent / permit would serve as the basis for concluding a contract between the employer and the migrant worker.

Both employers and migrants themselves are trying to avoid signing a contract. In the course of the study, the majority of male migrant workers stated that abroad they used to work on building sites (49 out of 75 men). Several respondents mentioned signing contracts with the employer. For example, one respondent put it, *"They brought us to the FMS, all documents were done, we went through a medical assessment and received medical certificates. Then all these expenses were taken out of our wages (2012)"* (male migrant, 34 years old, Khatlon). It is worth noting that an employment contract signed on the basis of a work permit tied a migrant to a certain building site and moving to a different site would require a new contract.

Excerpt from an expert interview. There are a number of issues which, if addressed, could make things significantly easier for migrants:

1. Breaches of the migration regime begin from the very first days. Migrants register at one place but actually live in a different location. The current system has no provision for the registration of migration status and place of residence at the same address. If a man works at a building site, he usually lives there too. But this

11 Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 115-FZ of 25 July 2002 "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation".

constitutes a violation that could lead to a fine or deportation of the migrant.

2. It became more difficult to obtain the patent because the applicant has to pass an exam. If the migrant's Russian is not good, he will not be able to pass it. So once again they go to intermediaries who provide "help" for a fee and supply forged documents.
3. Only in Moscow all the paperwork can be done in one place, in other cities migrants have to visit several offices and the legalisation deadline is limited to only 30 days.

Private company providing paid consultation services to migrant workers

In 2015 some changes were introduced to migration regulations, according to which in order to receive a work patent limited only to one year migrants are required to submit the following documents: (a) a notarised copy of the passport; (b) a medical certificate; (c) a certificate on passing the comprehensive cultural knowledge test (Russian language, history of Russia and fundamentals of the legislation of the Russian Federation); (d) a voluntary medical insurance policy; (e) proof of tax payment; (f) certificate of registration at the place of residence; (g) a migration card with "employment" marked as the purpose of travel.[12] In addition, migrant workers provide their fingerprints.

The new rules of the Russian Federation introduced in 2015 require migrants to complete all legalisation procedures within 30 days. The patent holders are then bound within two months since the date of issue to send a copy of the signed employment contract or the civil law work contract to the authority that issued the patent, otherwise the patent will be cancelled.[13]

The results of interviews and focus group discussions highlighted a number of difficulties with independent and timely regularization of all required documents. One of the systemic barriers is a short deadline allocated by law for this procedure, as described by migrants:

> In order to get all the documents you have to rush between different places/locations because the agencies that issue the documents are located far apart. And you only have one month to do it. You need to know where to go, spend time in queues. It is easier to pay somebody (an intermediary) who knows what needs to be done.
> ***(male migrant, 27 years old, Khatlon)***

Individual factors: social, economic and human capital

The comparison of interview results, summarized in two contrasting scenarios appears to suggest that successful migration is defined by the adaptability of the migrant and his/her readiness for new experiences that enable the expansion of one's social and human capital.

> To start with, I worked as a dish washer, that paid very little. I observed how the head chef cooked, helped her sometimes.

12 On 23 July 2014 paragraph 9.8 was introduced to Article 18 of the Federal Law "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation" stipulating that migrants will be banned from work if on entry to the Russian Federation even on a visa-free basis they did not specify "work" as the purpose of travel (pursuant to Federal Law 230-FZ of 21 July 2014).

13 Since the study covered migrants who received bans between 2011 and 2017, the analysis included cases of 70 migrant workers banned for breaching the rules in force before 2015 and 19 migrant workers under the current regulations.

> The second year, when I arrived, our manager changed the head chef. The new head chef did not know all the dishes, so asked me from time to time about the menu. Then I became assistant chef. For five years I was returning to the same place. I am still in contact with everyone. My boss used to say to me: you will be fine, I believe in you, you are a smart girl.
>
> ***(female migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon)***

A positive example of this attitude is a story of a woman from Khatlon, initially with no qualifications, who came to Russia with her husband in order to pay off debts after celebrating their wedding. With her good knowledge of the Russian language and perseverance in working towards her goal, just in two years she managed to learn new skills. She was able to readjust the possible scenario of female migration experience using a combination of two assets: a human capital (knowledge of the Russian language, communicability) and a social capital (establishing a social network through her communication skills and ability to build trust-based relationships). In contrast, absence of certain assets (language, communication skills, legal awareness) have been shown to put migrants at high risk of exploitation and abuse.

> I've heard that the job centre offered employment in Astana. I found out the number and rang them. They said I would need a medical certificate, so I went through the assessment and got the certificate. I bought the plane ticket myself, although they promised that the company in Astana will pay for it. Several guys went from Shaartuz, Kulob and Qurgonteppa, about 20 people in total. We flew to Almaty then took the train to Astana. First they put us in an unfinished house, full of draughts. The food was bad. We were paid 100 tenge (approx. 60 somoni) twice each. Our documents were taken away.
>
> ***(male migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon)***

New skills acquired while in migration, i.e. the expansion of one's human capital, make migrants feel more confident both in the country of destination and back at home. This is well illustrated by the story of one respondent who learnt the trade of fireplace builder in Russia: *"When I used to go home* (to Tajikistan)*, my manager* (in Russia) *would ring me to say 'Please come back as soon as possible'. Of course, I now earn less* (in Tajikistan) *than in Russia. But I know I will be alright. I will earn some bread for myself and my family"* (male migrant, 33 years old, Khatlon). Interestingly, relying heavily on his work experience, the migrant was not concerned with having a contract while in labour migration: *"I am able to do only what I've learnt. Those papers, I understand nothing in this. When one project was finished* (in Russia), *I went straight to the next one. I was paid 50,000-60,000 in Russian money"* (male migrant, 33 years old, Khatlon).

Migrants who showed no willingness to integrate in the country of destination appear to be the most vulnerable group: *"In Russia, I only socialised with my own people. On Sundays we sat at home and did not go anywhere"* (male migrant, 28 years old, Khatlon). This behaviour is typical to a great extent of a younger generation with a poor command of the Russian language. As a rule, these migrant workers remained in an irregular status in the country of destination. Furthermore, we observed "vicious circle" in which limited human capital (insufficient knowledge of local languages, mistrust of people in an alien social culture) discouraged migrants from increasing their social capital: *"For a year I lived with my own countrymen and spoke only to them... It is easier for me to ask somebody else to sort my papers out"* (male migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon).

The scenarios presented above reveal certain persistent barriers to integration in the destination country. Failure to manage the completion of all legalisation procedures by themselves and poor proficiency in the local language induces migrant workers into self-inflicted isolation from the "alien culture" in the host country. The alienation only reinforces their tendency to seek companionship in the established ethno-cultural circle of "their own" fellow countrymen. In turn, the alienation reduces migrants' future integration opportunities as poor knowledge of the language of the host country is likely to present a barrier to migrants' ability to receive full information about legalisation requirements and a proper understanding of the process involved.

1.2. CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANTS' VULNERABILITIES IN KAZAKHSTAN

Typology of vulnerability factors

Based on the interviews with migrants we came to a conclusion that risks of increased vulnerability and adaptation capacities of Central Asian migrant workers in Kazakhstan depend in each specific case on an individual combination of the two categories of factors: structural and variable.

In this section we apply the typology of vulnerabilities, elaborated in the conceptual and methodological chapter of the report. At the same time, structural factors in the context of Kazakhstan include specific features of the registration regime applied to foreign nationals in the Republic of Kazakhstan, procedures for gaining access to the official labour market, conditions of their access to social assistance, availability of information resources on all the procedures required to achieve regular residence and employment status.

In turn, variable factors affect the root causes of migrants' vulnerability and adaptation opportunities in Kazakhstan. They depend on their country of origin, work experience in Russia, knowledge of the Russian or Kazakh language, professional skills, health status, presence of the family and support networks, etc. These factors may be further subdivided into:

Situational factors (sudden impossibility to re-enter the Russian Federation that is brought to migrants' attention only at the border, loss of the passport as a result of the abuse of power by employers and intermediaries).

Fig. 25. Overview of structural factors of vulnerability in Kazakhstan



Individual factors that include different forms of social and human capital.

Family factors (financial and physical state of the family members, especially children, capacity to support a stranded migrant in Kazakhstan).

1.2.1. Structural factors of vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants in Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan the following major structural factors expose returning Central Asian migrants to various risks:

no provision for obtaining registration and regularizing employment independently (without recourse to intermediaries and friends) in the country;

lack of understanding among migrants of the rules on how to regularize all the documents and go through all the required procedures;

weaknesses in the legal framework that hinder efficient countering of labour exploitation and prosecution of those responsible for it.

According to interviewed experts, one of the factors of vulnerability that affects all types of migrants in Kazakhstan is the fact that *"here, unlike, say, in Russia,* **an individual cannot get registered independently.** *You need a host person with residence registration (propiska). This provides significant opportunities for corruption. When a migrant arrives, he/she has to register at an address"* (female NGO activist from Astana, 40 years old). They point out that even if the law states that the registration is free, in reality it usually costs between 2500 and 5000 tenge if the hosts are not relatives. Experts believe that it will be much more reasonable to introduce a registration procedure at migration police district offices so that the money could be paid to the national budget rather than to intermediaries. This way migrants will avoid having to pay fines for not living at the address of the registered place of residence.

Another barrier is the fact that obtaining a work permit can take several days, if not weeks, as it involves medical assessments by different medical specialists and a photofluorography investigation. Then migrants need to be assigned an individual identification number (IIN), be fingerprinted at the district department of internal affairs and pay 4200 tenge per month for three months in advance.

Experts point out that migrants often avoid going through with all these procedures: *"They pay 3000 tenge for a falsified medical certificate and do not attend any assessments. Or they simply do not legalise their employment status and prefer to remain as guest visitors in Kazakhstan"* (NGO activist, Astana). Interviews with migrants depict the same picture: *"Our foreman deals with all the documents, we do not know what it involves"* (male migrant from Uzbekistan, 25 years old). The majority of surveyed migrants in the South Kazakhstan Region did not have passports on them at the time of the interview, they were submitted "for registration" to the foreman so they would get registered by an intermediary at private addresses indicating "private visit" as the purpose of entry that requires them to go back to Uzbekistan once a month.[14]

Experts highlight another legal aspect of migrants' vulnerability in Kazakhstan. *"In our legal system* **there is no clear legal definition of labour exploitation,** *unlike sexual exploitation. There is a concept of retention but no criteria are defined to apply it in practice. The police decline the statements of victims reporting their forced retention on the pretext that they could have got*

14 In the South Kazakhstan Region the border is within 150 km there and back and this round trip can be done in one day.

out or rung them. Each case is turned into a legal mishap" (female NGO activist from Astana, 40 years old). They noted reports that large groups of migrants, even if they had proper registration in Kazakhstan, were not paid their earned money, had their passports confiscated and were forced to live in isolation for several weeks. However, police investigators are very reluctant to take on such cases as the fact of exploitation is very difficult to prove.

Another factor of vulnerability is **higher fees for the official registration of migrant workers compared to unofficial costs**, which means intermediaries are unwilling to spend money on proper legalisation of migrants and lose profit. Migrants also start to copy and adopt this negligent attitude towards formally established procedures and regulations. As of April 2017 the mandatory contribution required to be paid by migrants on a monthly basis amounted to approximately 4,200 tenge (US$13). Although this amount represents less than 5% of average migrants' wages in the construction industry (about 100,000 tenge), the respondents were not prepared to pay this amount. In one of the interviews a man from Kokand who has been working with the same foreman-intermediary in Shymkent for 15 years admitted that he intentionally avoids the official legalisation procedure because to get registered through illegal channels is cheaper (2500 tenge), although the law stipulates it is free. Under the current system migrants simply do not see any advantages in legal registration, considering it too expensive.[15]

The impact of the structural factors in Kazakhstan varies by the country of migrants' origin. Experts also note that in the last two years these factors became less relevant to the nationals of Kyrgyzstan since after the country's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union conditions of their employment became significantly similar to those enjoyed by the Kazakh nationals. For instance, it is now possible to find regular employment with corporate entities and not just individuals at it was before. As a result, migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan do not tend to contact diaspora and human rights organisations in Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, the structural factors exert a particular impact on Tajik migrants who came to Kazakhstan with experience of work in Russia where they relied on well-developed support network. The interviews demonstrate that the change of the country of destination subjects migrants to higher risks of vulnerability. Russia has been a destination for migrants since the early 1990s, so there are over 20 years of history of labour migration to this country. By virtue of the word-of-mouth transfer of practical knowledge on potential problems and the availability of social networks any emerging issues could be addressed as needed. By contrast, arriving in Kazakhstan migrant workers are not aware of the local legalisation regulations and, as a consequence, find themselves in an irregular situation. Without social networks they are more vulnerable as they become hostages of their circumstances. Hence, this strategy does not solve their problem of finding employment and a source of income; instead, they are left twice as vulnerable.

Reliance on networks is particularly crucial for coping with abuse of rights in the workplace. A migrant arriving in Russia usually already has a social network of acquaintances and fellow-villagers, therefore, he knows whom to contact in case of need. In Kazakhstan the situation is different: there is no informal social network. Some of the surveyed banned migrants who travelled to a different country for work did not know anybody in the new country of destination. So when the employer unilaterally changed previously agreed terms of employment and paid virtually no wages, migrants did not know where or who to ask for help:

15 See for instance, "I've been working in Saryagash for a year now. I leave Kazakhstan every month but I always go home. I do not apply for a work patent because it is too expensive. My foreman deals with my registration" (male migrant from Uzbekistan, 41 years old).

"All of us were in this town for the first time. We do not know anybody, we have no money. We did not know what to do." They also received threats from the employer who controlled their every move outside working hours, for this reason they did not seek to contact anybody. When these migrants came across an IOM representative in a mosque, first they declined any help for a long time out of fear of being persecuted by their employer.

Another reason for migrants' reliance on informal networks of acquaintances and fellow countrymen is that they do not trust the government and do not see any benefit for themselves in legalisation (from getting access to support from the state authorities to address their problems, to healthcare, etc.). Thus, migrants (especially with re-entry bans) are left without services provided by the state institutions and are neither able nor willing to gain regular employment in Kazakhstan. However, the majority of migrants do not consider this to be a problem as they do not see how compliance with established legal norms can contribute to safeguarding of their rights. One migrant coming to work in Kazakhstan without proper documentation for many years pointed out:

> When I write on paper how many square meters of tiling I am going to do and at what price and the client and I both sign this paper — this is a proper document. And your damn contract — how do I know what it says in it?!
>
> ***(male migrant from Uzbekistan, 45 years old)***

1.2.2. Variable factors of vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants in Kazakhstan

1.2.2.1. Situational factors and their interplay with structural factors

Situational factors as circumstances that suddenly alter the status of the migrant in a situation where s/he cannot influence them nor prepare for them, are especially significant for re-entry banned migrants who learn about their ban only at the border completely unprepared for this situation, having no money, no acquaintances nor family to turn to for support. When combined with structural factors, they dramatically reduce migrants' adaptability options. For instance, when the employer removes the passport from the re-entry banned migrant taking advantage of the fact that the migrant is unable to promptly leave the country or find a job with the help of acquaintances. **Situational factors (unexpected ban to enter Russia) and structural factors (inability to get registered and find employment in a very short space of time)** create a very vulnerable environment for banned migrants: now, in order to leave the country and find regular employment, they must go through an administrative court procedure ending in the imposition of a fine or expulsion from the country for breaching the migration regulations of Kazakhstan. This **combination of situational and structural factors** creates the most vulnerable category of migrants: those with a ban who did not obtain registration in time (because they were not aware of the ban), found themselves in irregular circumstances, their passport is taken by the employer and, therefore, these migrants cannot leave the country or find a regular job.

As migrants are powerless to resolve the situation

on their own, they come to the attention of NGOs who are the only actors able to help with obtaining new documents and returning home or finding employment. In these circumstances migrants tend to contact diasporas and NGOs for help:

> … eventually I found Tajik countrymen, they helped with a temporary job, but I have to look for a new one all the time. They helped me to submit documents to the commission (that could pay) for my journey home[16]
>
> ***(male migrant from Tajikistan, 25 years old).***
>
> My documents are being reviewed at the moment, maybe I will go home in the next few days. Before that I spent months trying to earn enough money for the fine and leave because there is not much work around here
>
> ***(male migrant from Tajikistan, 21 years old).***

The life of these migrants is significantly influenced by the factor of the **country of origin**. On the one hand, we have not seen any Kyrgyz nationals in this group. Nor are there Uzbek nationals since migrants from Uzbekistan who mainly make the whole journey on coaches have spontaneously developed an infrastructure for urgent return home in case of being denied entry to Russia. There are usually several coaches waiting not far from the Russian border crossing that carry migrants to various destinations in Kazakhstan, and which may, on certain conditions, take a migrant left without any money to Saryagash or Chernyayevka in the south, on the border with Uzbekistan.

> There were six of us in one coach from the same village. Four were allowed across the border, and us two were refused, they said there is a "ban". At once our supervisor made an agreement with the driver who was leaving for Chernyayevka in three hours. The driver took our passports saying that he will return them when we pay him. He also paid for our food on the way. When we arrived in Chernyayevka, my friend's family (in Kokand) sent him money straight away, but I had to work for a month in Saryagash for his relatives to get my passport back.
>
> ***(Male migrant from Uzbekistan, 36 years old)***

On the other hand, nationals of Tajikistan encounter serious difficulties in this sort of situations as they may not take an easy direct route on land to Dushanbe or other Tajik cities.

The combination of situational and structural factors is evident in cases when Tajik migrants are informed of their ban on the Kazakhstani-Russian border. One migrant reported: *"I learnt about the ban in Aksaray… without registration you can stay there* (in Kazakhstan) *only for 5 days."* When travelling to Russia through Kazakhstan, Tajik migrants carry money only sufficient for the travel expenses. Once they are told about the ban at the border, they are left in a hard situation with no money and nobody to turn to for help. This stay, unplanned and imposed on them, requires registration with local authorities within 5 calendar days[17]; if this term is breached migrants will have to appear in court and will be expelled from the country.

The combination of **situational factors** (expiry of documents that entitle migrants to stay in the country)

16 Supported by the IOM, the NGO helps migrants to return home if they have no other means and have not committed any serious offences.
17 http://www.mfa.kz/ru/content-view/registratsiya-inostrannykh-grazhdan-v-organakh-migratsionnoj-politsii-mvd-rk

and **structural factors** (lack of facilities to issue new documents outside the country of origin) may further deepen the vulnerability of another category of migrants who are subject to some difficult personal circumstances. Those migrants may not renew identity documents issued in other countries that they use to stay in Kazakhstan and put themselves at risk of residing illegally in the territory of Kazakhstan. A case of a woman reporting consequences of abuse by her husband illustrates this scenario:

> When I was 5 months pregnant with my last child my husband started drinking, beating children, separating everything into his and mine. When he broke my daughter's arm I had enough and threw him out. In revenge he destroyed all our documents, or did something else with them. I only noticed later, after he left, that photographs and documents were missing. And that's when my problems started. For six years I struggled without documents. Then I gradually replaced them. My three youngest children have Kazakh birth certificates. I have six children, four of them live with me.
>
> ***(Female migrant from Tajikistan, 45 years old)***

1.2.2.2. Individual factors: social and human capitals

A significant role in the level of vulnerability and integration opportunities of migrants is played by the **individual factors** associated with the **social capital** (networks of relatives, fellow countrymen, co-nationals that can be mobilised in case of need) and **human capital** (level of education, professional skills, communication and language competence, previous work experience and their reputation in employers' eyes) that help to resolve difficult situations. In our context of employment in a foreign country, it is difficult to distinguish the **economic capital** from its social and human subtypes, which is why we do not discuss it separately.

On some occasions these factors can mitigate the impact of the re-entry ban to Russia as in the case of a male migrant from Kyrgyzstan who worked in Russia for 15 years, speaks fluent Russian and Kazakh and has excellent communication skills:

> Gradually I was promoted to a warehouse manager and expeditor position in a large retail chain, I had a company car and I was supervising the work of eight other expeditors–lorry drivers who delivered our goods to shops. But I had an unpaid fine and I haven't paid the car tax, so when I went on holiday I was told at the border that I was banned from entering Russia for three years. I rang my company in Moscow from Bishkek, explained the situation and they sent me a reference letter and all certificates proving my qualifications gained over the years of work there.
>
> ***(Male migrant from Kyrgyzstan, 34 years old)***

With the help of these documents (human capital) and friends in Shymkent (social capital) he was able to find a job in a large trading company (as a citizen of the member–state of the EAEU). Thus, he is the only fully documented migrant worker in our sample (he has a registration, a tax number and a work contract) and he achieved this status on his own, without any NGO assistance.

Nationals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (who speak the Kazakh or Russian language, as a general rule, with qualifications, having past experience of independent registration in Russia and highly-skilled professions — welder, bricklayer, oven-maker), also make use of their **human capital** in a similar way. One of them had a re-entry ban to Russia for not paying fines

but he became aware of it early enough. Once he returned home and went to Kazakhstan, he insisted that his foreman helped him to get a work patent, and covered the cost of it himself.[18]

Nationals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who are employed in Kazakhstan without a work patent and a work permit also rely on their good professional reputation and many years of experience with the same intermediary hoping to mitigate certain risks of irregular employment. As noted above, such reliance on networks may result in the deterioration of migrants' status as the case of a male migrant from Uzbekistan in Shymkent shows. He asserted that as many other respondents he did not need any documents because he knew *"everybody and everything in Kazakhstan"*. Stressing that he had been successfully coming to Shymkent for ten years, he was convinced that *"everybody knows me by now so employers themselves ring me and offer jobs. All these years the same supervisor dealt with my registration but this year he refused for some reason. He told me from now on I will be doing it myself. Don't know why"*. However, although he was convinced that his reputation in the supervisor's eyes would guarantee him a secure status, he was proven wrong and was left in a difficult situation without any experience of how to regularize his stay in the country. Obviously, only those migrant workers who have not been to Russia and do not have bans imposed against them are able to rely on this capital.

Uzbek nationals also use their **social capital** of friends and family networks that can be useful in finding a better-earning job in Kazakhstan. This is true for ethnic Uzbeks with relatives or acquaintances in the Southern Kazakhstan among the 500,000-strong Uzbek diaspora and many years of work experience in well-established teams of workers as well as for ethnic Kazakhs who live in Shymkent and its suburbs with their relatives and find jobs with their help. This illustrates one of the forms of social capital—the ethnicity. However, banned migrants cannot make use of this type of the social capital given that they spent several years in Russia and do not have any experience of regular contact with relatives and fellow countrymen in Kazakhstan.

1.2.2.3. Family and household factors

A **combination of individual and family factors** accounts for additional vulnerabilities of women in migration. This is apparent in situations where single women (widowed and divorced), who stayed in Kazakhstan for many years on the basis of a residence permit or a stateless status, had to support sick children who were not entitled to medical treatment or education. This places some families in desperate position as in cases of children, some of whom are over 18 years of age, suffering with serious physical and mental illnesses, require complex surgery or ongoing expensive treatment.

Increased risks may also be a result of the combination of **the situational factors with the family factors.** Re-entry banned migrants who learn about the ban unexpectedly, may not get registered in time (within 5 days) and thus lose the opportunity to get regular employment and they cannot return home because they have debts to pay (family has to look after sick children or parents). In this case: due to particular family circumstances the migrant is forced to earn his/her living away from home and cannot return. Women are hit the hardest in these situations:

> I divorced my husband many years ago, he is dead now anyway. Five years ago my 18-year-old son fell ill (epilepsy) and my mum's eyesight got much worse. I decided to go to Moscow, first worked at the market with a friend, then found a job

18 It should be noted that we only had three migrants with similar circumstances in our sample.

as a carer. Six months ago I received a call from home: my son attempted to hang himself. I dropped everything and went home, arranged some treatment for him and calmed him down. On my way back to Russia I was turned away at the border (I was caught in the raids on Moscow flats in the past). I don't know what to do now. I cannot go back home because I took out 1200 dollars in a bank loan for this trip, I need to work to pay it back but there is no work here (North Kazakhstan) or at home.

(Female migrant from Tajikistan, 50 years old)

With support from the diaspora this woman found accommodation and was looking for job opportunities but she is unlikely to find employment since she has already missed the five-day deadline for legal registration in the Republic of Kazakhstan. In another similar case of the combined situational and family factors a young woman, citizen of Tajikistan, exited the Chelyabinsk Region of Russia but was denied re-entry because of a ban imposed on her without her knowledge. She left a 7-month-old baby in Chelyabinsk and she was able to return to the Russian Federation only with the assistance of an NGO supported by the IOM:

I crossed the border in the Chelyabinsk Region and wanted to re-enter Russia straight away but I was told that the Rospotrebnadzor[19] put a permanent ban on me for health reasons. I went through medical assessments a few months before that and I did not know anything. Although, we changed place of residence... My son was waiting for me, I was breastfeeding him, but they did not let me go to him... I was shocked and could not understand anything. We were lucky that my mother-in-law could come straight away... A few days later an NGO in Astana put me in a refuge and hired a lawyer to contest the court decision in Chelyabinsk. We did it three months later and soon I will see my boy again, but every day of the last 100 days I worried about him.

(Female migrant from Tajikistan, 23 years old)

Fig. 26. Overview of vulnerabilities of female migrants in Kazakhstan



Therefore, in Russia re-entry banned women are exposed to additional risks arising from a combination of several groups of factors (Fig. 26). Structural factors create a situation where migrants have limited time to complete the legal registration process, whereas access to social services is very restricted for them. Due to situational factors women are unexpectedly informed about their ban, they do not have enough time to get registered and thus find themselves in an illegal migration status with no access to social or medical assistance. At the same time, family factors (caring for elderly and sick family members, threats to reproductive health, separation from young children) result in additional challenges for who experience great difficulties in coping with them in their irregular situation.

19 Russian Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing

2. VULNERABILITIES UPON RETURN TO COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

PREPAREDNESS FOR RETURN

Some literature on return migration has claimed that return migrants will bring with them new skills, ideas and economic capital, which can contribute to the economic development of their home countries if met by favourable economic and policy conditions.[20] According to Cassarino, accumulating human, financial and social capitals while in migration is one of the preconditions for successful re-integration back home, determining the degree of preparedness for return of a migrant and affecting his or her successful and sustainable reintegration in the home country.[21] In addition, political and economic context should be encouraging for the reintegration of returned migrants in home countries, especially in terms of existence of reintegration programmes.[22]

In order to discuss preparedness of banned migrants for return and, hence, the possibility of their successful reintegration in their home country, we investigated the following questions:

- What were the migration experiences of re-entry banned migrants in Russia?
- Did they manage to optimize their human, economic and social capitals while working in Russia and thus were well prepared for return?
- What was the degree of their preparedness for return?
- What is the economic and political context to which they return?

To analyze these questions, we applied the category of 'individual factors' and 'structural factors' that can contribute to vulnerability or adaptability/resilience of returned banned migrants.

Individual factors consist of human capital, social capital, and economic capital. Absence of one or more of these forms of capital contributes to the vulnerability of the re-entry banned migrants.

Forms of capital in the analysis

The human capital entails such resources of a person as health, education, values and skills. Social capital is the social networks and connections to which an individual belongs through kin, professional, ethnic or other forms of belonging, which can provide a person with tangible (money) and intangible (connections, reputation, information) resources that, in turn, can optimize a person's efforts to achieve his economic goals. Economic capital includes money and private property that can be converted directly into financial resources that, in turn, can be invested into profit-making activities or for increasing human and social capitals.

20 Pailey R. N.(2016) "Long-Term Socio-Economic Implications of 'Crisis-Induced' Return Migration", Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative Research Brief. See also, Cassarino, "Theorising return migration" and "Editorial introduction: The conditions of modern return migrants".
21 See Cassarino, "Theorising return migration" and "Editorial introduction: The conditions of modern return migrants".
22 Ibid.

To discuss the economic and political context to which they return we will employ the category of 'structural factors'. *Structural factors* are the factors that are objective economic, legal or socio-cultural conditions that affect vulnerabilities or well-being of all Kyrgyzstani migrants or some groups among them (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) both in their countries of origin and in the countries of destination.

This section will refer to the results of the interviews among migrants returning to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to show that almost all of the respondents **were not prepared at all to return** to their home countries due to the suddenness of return. As the return was very sudden, unexpected and compulsory, many re-entry banned migrants were surprised or in a state of shock that they could not go back to Russia and did not have specific plans for the extended period of their stay in the home country. Thus, the re-entry ban introduced a sudden break in migrant workers' life strategies and plans. This proved especially dramatic for migrant workers who had worked and settled down in Russia for a relatively long period (for 3 or more years) but did not have prospects for employment and decent earnings back home.

2.1. KYRGYZSTAN

2.1.1. Structural factors of vulnerability upon return

Structural factors that were shown to contribute to vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants upon return to Kyrgyzstan were the economic context to which they returned and faced unemployment, low salaries and limited market for their services or products as well as absence of large-scale reintegration programmes.

Wages. Almost all the interviewees and participants of FGDs, especially those with no vocational or higher education, also mentioned a lack of jobs or small salary they can earn by working, for example, as a cleaner or a teacher back in Kyrgyzstan. Even when those with a profession and skills find employment in their home country face the problem of small salaries. The case of an Uzbek male migrant who had stayed in Chita, Russia since 2011, working at a local bakery along with his wife, illustrates the strong negative impact of the ban on many migrants' economic well-being:

> After I learned that I am on the re-entry ban list and cannot go back to Russia I used my savings to buy a car in order to provide taxi services. But as you can see there are so many cars in the city (meaning cars that provide taxi services) that I do not make even 200 soms a day (US$3). Therefore, I joined my friends with whom I grew up on the same street who provide construction services since I can earn a bit more with them.
>
> ***(Male migrant, 30 years old, Osh)***

Working full-time at a bakery and additionally as a driver, he could on average earn 50-60,000 roubles (US$835–1000 as of August 2017) a month. His wife would earn 20,000 roubles (US$335 as of August 2017) a month. The migrant contrasted his good economic situation in Russia ('doing well" - *ayakta jakshy bolup ketkenbiz*) with the desperate situation upon return to Osh with his wife and three kids in April 2016 on a visit relatives and friends and failure to return to Russia several months later probably due to his expired registration in Russia. Driving a taxi in Osh could not be sufficient for securing food for his family and would have to be complemented by remittances that his parents would send monthly in the amount of 8,000 soms (US$117).[23]

23 The respondent participated at the FGD that took place at the ICC in Osh in February 2017 and in late March 2017 we conducted with him an in-depth interview. In the interview, when telling of the problems he is facing with employment and a decent earning in Osh, he mentioned to the IOM sociologist if

Even holding a job with a formal contract did not protect from economic vulnerability. A female participant of the FGD in Osh, said that as a schoolteacher at the local school in her village she could earn only 5,000 soms a month (US$73), which would not be enough for the livelihood of her family considering that her husband was also blacklisted and could not find employment with decent wages. Another blacklisted couple who participated at the FGD, who did not have a profession and worked as general workers in Russia, reported that they could not find any kind of job either in Osh or in their home village nearby the city. The wife complained that they pay to come to Osh but go back home without any results in their job search. This woman stated and other participants of the FGD agreed with her: "*In Russia one will have a work in contrast to Kyrgyzstan. The minimum wage one can get in Russia is 10,000 roubles (US$167), that one can earn by working as a dish washer but which you cannot earn here (Kyrgyzstan) even if you are with higher education and work hard*" (participant, FGD with migrants, Osh).

Another difficulty encountered upon return to Kyrgyzstan was the inability to save money due to low salaries and too many expenses, especially those related to social networking events with relatives and friends. In contrast, all interviewed migrants referred to the positive aspect of working in Russia, consisting in the possibility to save a substantial amount of money for spending it back home on such meaningful items as buying a house, a land plot or a car or paying for tuition of their children's higher education or the organization of weddings for their children or siblings. Economic re-integration of returned re-entry banned migrants is hampered by the absence of adequate reintegration programs that would accommodate their specific needs. Apart from IOM's direct assistance for reintegration of banned migrants, which is very little in comparison to the need for the assistance (110 assisted cases in 2016 and 2017 within BPRM project and 50 cases within PVE project vis-a-vis 110,000 returned re-entry banned migrants in the country) there are no return and reintegration assistance programs carried out by the government or other international organizations.

Economic and psychological effects of a re-entry ban. These economic hardships resulted in the deterioration of returnees' psychological welfare. Inability to provide for the daily needs of the family members, who were left behind and to raise own social status by acquiring material goods (house, land plot or a car) or investing in the well-being of close ones in the form of paying for their education or weddings often led migrants to experience uncertainty about the future. Anxieties concerned decline of own status, especially in the family or household, decrease in economic capital resulting from the need to sell the property or take loans as well as problems with family members due to joblessness and lack of money. Participants of the FGD in Osh agreed how joblessness that they have experienced in Kyrgyzstan after bans is negatively affecting their psychological well-being. One participant, a young Kyrgyz man expressed it as follows: "*I am afraid to say something extra at home as I feel that the family members are unhappy that I sit at home without a job. I can see it in their eyes*". Another respondent of Uzbek ethnicity in his early 40s said afterwards, "*Of course it is humiliating when a young man has to ask for his grandmother's tiny pension*". He also added, "*I am afraid that I will become sick from joblessness. I lay down on the bed, sleep, go outside to smoke and do nothing else, as there is no job. I am already physically and mentally getting sick*".

We should note, however, that the FGD was conducted

he had a job he would not have met the researchers twice in order to chat about his life. This saying can demonstrate that there is a big difference in his life and identity before and after the ban. Usually, working migrants are busy people who value time. However, the life after ban in Osh has made him dependent for assistance from whomever possible.

in February when construction, agricultural work or trade are not yet active. In spring and summer there will be more jobs in these sectors. Interviews in late March with the abovementioned Uzbek male migrant who used to work in the bakery in Russia and his friend who also participated at the FGD in Osh showed that they could find work in the construction sector due to the construction skills of the latter.

To recapitulate, structural factors that contribute to vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants (especially low-skilled ones) in Kyrgyzstan comprise the economic conditions which they face upon return, including lack of jobs, low salaries and limited market for their services or products. Moreover, except for IOM's reintegration programmes, which is limited in scale and scope, there are no other programmes aimed to address returning migrants' needs in the country. Thus, the economic and political contexts of Kyrgyzstan do not provide favourable conditions for successful and sustainable reintegration of the returned migrants with re-entry ban status.

2.1.2. Individual factors of vulnerability upon return

Education and skills. The majority of interviewed migrant workers have only unfinished or finished secondary education and originate from the rural regions of Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, many respondents came from the urban areas of southern Kyrgyzstan and reported unfinished or finished secondary education level. Generally, our study supports the findings of other researchers pointing to a divergence between education levels and jobs migrants from Kyrgyzstan have abroad as most of them are engaged in unskilled labour.[24] Most of re-entry banned migrants' experience in Russia did not help them to optimize their human capital. Especially those migrants who did general work such as cleaning, dish washing or worked as janitors, loaders or waitress, etc. encounter problems of unemployment back home as they did not gain any new skill that could be utilized in the country of origin.

Relatively successful re-entry banned migrants are those who worked in the construction sector in Russia and acquired construction skills, which helped most of them to do some extra work back home and to be able to provide for the family's basic needs. However, in winter time when they did not have many orders they also faced problems of unemployment and shortage of money, especially in remote villages where there was not much demand for the service. Moreover, most of them do not have their own tools and therefore they have to rent them from the shops which decreases the already limited profit of the person. In turn, those construction workers who have skills in interior set-up can find work more easily and are better paid for their work. At the same time, since there are a lot of returned migrants with construction skills in the communities and those who ask for IOM's assistance are construction workers there is a danger that there will be high competition and eventually lack of jobs in this sector. Economic activity opportunities in construction could be further diminished in case of declining remittances.

Health. Another vulnerability is the fact that a lot of migrants (both men and women) lost their health, carrying out physically hard work while in migration in Russia. According to the Joint Report on Migration, Kyrgyzstani migrants mostly suffer from tuberculosis, HIV, cardio-vascular diseases and complications with pregnancy and child delivery.[25] Serious health problems hinder economic activity of returnees,

24 See for example, Vinokurov E., Pereboyev V. (2013) Labour Migration and Human Capital in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Impact of Accession to the SES. In: Vinokurov E. (ed.) EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook. EDB: Almaty. Accessed on July 20 2017, available at: http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/CII%20-%20izdania/YearBook-2013/a_n6_2013_07.pdf

25 Joint Report on Migration in Kyrgyzstan, 2015. P. 15.

including those migrants who acquired construction skills in Russia. For example, a banned male migrant in his early 30s, who received reintegration assistance from IOM in 2016 in the form of opening a retail shop in Osh with necessary equipment and first products for selling was not doing well when we visited him in January 2017. Due to problems with his liver, which the beneficiary developed during his work in the construction sites in Russia, he could not provide construction services or run the shop successfully.

Many re-entry banned migrants who apply for reintegration assistance of IOM and have problems with their health do not ask for medical assistance, although IOM has funds for such assistance and informs them to take it. IOM staff in Osh told us that they, instead, insist on assisting them to start a business or income-generating activity as soon as possible. However, in the process of running the business, especially physically demanding ones, their sickness will hinder their productivity eventually. For example, we visited a 28-year-old male beneficiary with re-entry ban status in January 2017. He told us then that the welding equipment that IOM had bought for him was helpful to sustain his family, consisting of his wife and a child. However, when we re-visited him in June 2017 he reported that he had not been able to work that much due to an acute condition of hernia and a resulting surgery, which limited his productivity and reduced his earning capacity. He was forced to collaborate with one of his friends who was doing the physically hard part of the work.

Economic status upon return. The migrants were not able to gather the economic capital that they could invest back home or for securing a stable income back in their countries of origin. Most of their earnings that they would send to their families back home would be used by the family members for everyday life needs, for school expenses of school age children or for organizing feasts dedicated to different life cycle events such as weddings or funerals. The most successful ones could buy a land plot and build a house, or livestock, a car or pay for tuition of the children at the universities. Consequently, although this 'successful group' of migrants could to some degree improve their life standards back home and invest in their children's future, they, however, did not manage to secure stable income in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, when their only economic strategy – migration – failed they also faced problems with unemployment and the inability to have a decent income due to the economic situation in their home country.[26]

Some migrants told us that they at least once had come back to Kyrgyzstan with the plan not to go back to Russia or Kazakhstan. However, they re-emigrated several times since it was hard to find a job with a good salary that would enable them to meet the existing and additional needs upon return. For example, a 46-year-old Kyrgyz man first was a migrant worker in Astana where he lived with his wife and children from 1998 to 2003, running a family-owned retail business in the market. He said since both of them worked they could earn quite a good amount of money and bought two old houses in Osh. They left Kazakhstan when the economic crisis made their business less profitable. However, he re-emigrated again in 2011 to Russia as he had to pay for his four children's clothing and schooling and for his elder daughter's tuition at the university. He came back to Kyrgyzstan in 2014 in order to attend his father's funeral but he could not go back to Russia due to the ban. With the help of construction tools that IOM bought for him he was doing well and could support his family. However, since he has two more children and he will need to

26 Early studies have also identified the ban's negative effects on the livelihood of migrants, whose sustenance often depends on their income earned abroad and who regularly remitted money home to their families. See for example, *Tajik Migrants with Re-Entry Bans to the Russian Federation*. Dushanbe, Tajikistan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). January 2014, and *Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration*. Astana, Kazakhstan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). November 2016.

pay for their tuition if an opportunity will be provided he will most probably re-emigrate again.

At the same time, the re-entry banned migrants who do not own a house and are living in a large household with other family members or renting a living place are among the most vulnerable. They bear the additional burden of payment for rent or have psychological pressure from co-habiting with other extended family members and to having his or her own house as soon as possible. Moreover, the migrants who are in debt and have limited or no economic capital are in danger of losing their house or other property, which might expose them to extreme poverty.

Overall, re-entry banned migrants were found to be ill-prepared for return to Kyrgyzstan. The reasons included the sudden character of their return and for the majority of them, failure to accumulate necessary forms of capital (human, economic and social).[27] Absence of economic or human capital (health or skills) have limited their capacity for successful reintegration in Kyrgyzstan, which further exposed them to economic hardships, loss of social status in the family, and reduced their self-worth. The primary issue is the unfavourable economic context (high rates of unemployment, poverty and absence of large-scale reintegration programs in the countries of origin). Against these structural factors, the capacity for successful integration varies according to individual circumstances prior to return. For instance, those who have higher education, skills and strong social networks can cope better with the re-entry ban situation, especially if they receive reintegration support. However, poor health of the returnee that he or she had developed during migration can hinder migrant's independent reintegration in the home country as well as effectiveness of the reintegration assistance aimed at reducing his or her economic vulnerability.

2.1.3. Family and household factors of vulnerability upon return

The sociological assessment revealed that apart from individual and structural factors, there are 'family and household factors' that contribute to the economic vulnerability or adaptability of re-entry banned migrants and constrain the effectiveness of direct assistance aimed to address their economic hardships. Thus, we identified those males, who are the only breadwinners of their own large extended family in which no women work as a group of re-entry banned migrants vulnerable to economic hardships. This was especially pertinent among some re-entry banned male migrants in Tajikistan. To reduce economic vulnerability of the male migrant and his household, therefore, it is essential empowering economically female members of the household, thus ensuring holistic approach in addressing vulnerabilities of re-entry banned migrants.

Another category of highly vulnerable re-entry banned migrants are those with seriously sick family members. In addition to the loss of the main source of income that they used to have when working in Russia, they have to spend the limited income they have from unstable extra work or small pensions or child allowances on the medicines and medical treatment of the sick relative. Moreover, the care over sick relatives hinders their mobility, limiting their ability to find new employment opportunities and sources of income. A holistic approach to assistance is necessary for such migrants as well, when a well-being of a close

27 We will discuss in greater detail how Kyrgyzstani migrants that we interviewed did not form social networks while in migration that would enable them to carry out business projects after return, using their international social networks later in this chapter when we will discuss factors of effectiveness of reintegration programs.

relative is considered essential for the well-being of a vulnerable re-entry banned migrant.

Migrants who were orphaned at an early age and do not have other siblings are also the most vulnerable group of persons. Orphans who received a re-entry ban and were assisted with re-integration programs upon return to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan did not manage to improve their well-being and were still experiencing economic hardships. They do not have strong support networks or social capital and lack psychological resources such as self-worth and belief in their own abilities. Moreover, they do not have good education or possess skills that could be used for making a living. Thus, their vulnerability is affected by at least two interrelated factors: **family and household and individual factors** (low education, lack of skills, psychological resources and strong support groups). Their economic hardship is thus not only due to the unfavourable economic context and the absence of social services for such vulnerable layers of population in Kyrgyzstan but also reflects the additional vulnerability of their family status, further reducing their human, social and economic capital. It is also necessary to develop and provide for them more holistic and long-lasting reintegration assistance in order to ensure effectiveness of the direct assistance.

At the same time, if an orphan has siblings and was raised by a caring, emotionally stable and responsible relative, he can be less vulnerable than the above described kinds of orphans. Such an individual will have some human and social capital and psychological resources that will help him to be more resilient to the situation caused by the re-entry ban status and make more efficient use of the reintegration direct assistance.

Positive effect of the family on the well-being of a migrant. As noted above, the welfare and coping ability of Kyrgyz migrants is largely influenced by their relationship to and position in their family and household. Many re-entry banned migrants indicated that they decided to work in Russia for reasons related to family and household. For instance, they intended to support parents financially; to save up for their own or siblings' wedding or a house or for medical treatment of a close relative. During migration they would daily send back home most of their wages or if possible meet other pressing needs of the family and household. Moreover, out of a sense of close family ties or moral duty they felt the need to visit home in cases of death, illness or a wedding of a close family member.

Family and household factors have also been shown to play a positive role in resilience of a migrant.

> I am thankful to my father that he bought livestock for me with the remittances I would send to my family from Russia. He himself sells livestock in the bazaar. I worked there (in Russia) for 2 years and when I was back it was very helpful that my father had bought 5 horses with my remittances (jönötkön akcha). I think migrants' well-being after return depends on how parents handled their remittances. If a relative borrows the money the parent should tell him: "this is my child's money. You should return it as he himself will need it
>
> ***(Participant, FGD with migrants, Jalal-Abad).***

Thus, family and household factors play an important role for many migrants from Kyrgyzstan before, during and after their migration. They influence a migrant's decision to migrate and how his or her earnings are spent. The size of the family and the number of dependents per one migrant – breadwinner, existence of a sick family member, certain marriage status (especially, divorced or widowed women) or

being an orphan with weak social ties – are negative factors for resilience of the banned migrants that create obstacles for their successful reintegration in the home country. Therefore, when planning and implementing reintegration assistance for migrants with such family and household history it is necessary to help them holistically, acknowledging also the needs and potential of the migrants' family members. Moreover, the quote above demonstrates crucial role of the family for the success of labour migration after return in terms of securing a source of income by investing his remittances. It also reveals that not only migrant but his and her family members should be trained on how to rationally and effectively make use of the migration and remittances in order to ensure maximum possible benefits from the labour migration and be well prepared for return.

2.1.4. Interplay of factors of vulnerability

Interaction of situational factors with family and household factors. Situational factors refer to events that can happen suddenly and over which the individual has little control. Such factors can contribute to the vulnerability of re-entry banned migrants as in Kyrgyzstan we have observed the interaction of situational factors and family and household factors. For example, a sudden death of the father-in-law of a female re-entry banned migrant forced her and her family to have extra expenses and postpone for a certain period of time her business project supported by IOM.

In Kyrgyzstan, we identified ***youth*** as the group that demonstrates an ***interplay of individual, family and household and structural factors***. In particular, most young male re-entry banned migrants do not have higher education, necessary professional skills or private property. They either recently started their own family, are under pressure to get married, or if married, they are culturally inclined to see themselves as the main breadwinners of the family. The combination of limited personal capacity, low economic opportunities in the country and high expectations put the young newly married male migrants under pressure to provide for their family while being unable to re-enter Russia where they planned to earn money to support their young families. This is especially pertinent among some young Uzbek males in southern Kyrgyzstan, who, unlike most men in Tajikistan we interviewed during our monitoring trip in January 2017, were not ready or willing that their wives would be working to help to sustain the family. While cultural differences might play a role, we believe that the economic hardships of the first group were not yet as dramatic as the situation of some of the Tajik men due to being the only breadwinner of very large households.

2.1.5. Women: An exacerbated vulnerability

In the FGDs, we heard often that women can find work in Russia more easily than man, because there is always a work in the service sector, where most migrant women are employed as sellers, cleaners, dish-washers, and carers. However, after return women cannot find a job or find similar kind of job that they used to do in Russia but with low wages.

Divorced or widowed female migrants with or without dependents are one of the most vulnerable re-entry banned migrants. The divorced females with dependents are experiencing the economic hardships and feelings of loss the most. Usually, their family members are not capable to provide financial support for them and they cannot find a work in the country of origin due to lack of profession or skills or due to a lack of employment opportunities with decent salary.

As the sociological assessment of Phase I[28] indicated they also cannot rely on their husband's networks and resources for coping with unemployment caused by the re-entry ban. The re-entry ban disrupted their overall life strategy and plan. For example, one such young Uzbek female described her situation as follows:

> I received the re-entry ban when my life in Russia had become stable and better after the many difficulties and challenges I had experienced there after my divorce. I came to Osh to take my son to Russia so that we could live there together. But due to the ban I cannot go back now. It is difficult to find a job in Osh with a good salary. I found a job as a cleaner at one restaurant but the salary is only 3 000 soms (US$45). If there is no chance that I can be removed from the ban list I will probably will work there.
>
> ***(Female migrant, 27 years old, Osh).***

Thus, she was struggling to find a job that would allow her to support herself and her son in Osh. During her stay in Russia, she also used to help her family back in Osh with monthly remittances.

Divorced or widowed young women who are banned from re-entering the Russian Federation face the burden of providing not only for their children but most of the times also for their parents or other relatives who helped them to take care of the children while they were in Russia. In the focus group discussion in Jalal-Abad one Kyrgyz woman mentioned that her family, consisting of her son and her parents who helped her to take care of her child while she was in Russia is now in a dire economic situation since she is on the re-entry ban list and cannot find a job with a decent income back home. Her situation was made more difficult by the fact that she did not have her own house but was living with her son at her parents' house, which she might eventually be asked to leave by their youngest son, who according to the Kyrgyz tradition would be the heir. When the IOM sociologist talked with the woman personally after the focus group discussion, she was crying and said that she does not know what to do in her situation. Hence, although it is emotionally difficult for women to be away from their children when they go to Russia for work, they find it even more unbearable and difficult when they feel hopeless about the present and the future and when they cannot satisfy the basic needs of their children and provide more secure life for them.

The economic position of the majority of interviewed women in Kyrgyzstan was found to be worse than that of most of the male respondents as those women did not have their own property. In their own parental family, a female migrant does not inherit the right to the parents' house but her male sibling does. Some of our married female interlocutors went to Russia together with their husbands and would send their earnings to their husband's parents who either renovated their own house or spent the remittances for everyday life purposes or *toys* (life cycle celebrations) or paying off the credits. Consequently, when they could not go back to Russia again they found themselves "empty handed" but living with many other family members in one household, which created a lot of frustration and resentment among them.

Vulnerabilities of migrant women in Kyrgyzstan: a case

The case of a 24-year-old divorced Kyrgyz woman, is demonstrative of the economic and rights based vulnerability of migrant women in Kyrgyzstan. She was abducted by her future husband back then to marry him when she had just started her studies in

28 IOM (2016) "Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration."

History at the university in Osh. As a result, she had to limit her studies to only part-time classes and eventually was compelled to terminate her studies and join her husband in migrating to Russia to build a common future. The earnings they made in Russia were sent to her husband's parents who were in charge of building a house for them. Although the house was eventually built with her contribution, she did not live in that house after she divorced her husband. When we asked whether she had claimed her part of the house she said that since they lived in the same village she did not want that her family would lose their face in front of the villagers and therefore she did not do anything. Currently, she is living at her parents' house in the village, where the stigma of being a divorced woman is especially strong.

In her case, the opportunities for pursuing independent life have been limited by the re-entry ban and by the lack of necessary education or social networks to find a job in Kyrgyzstan or in other countries. However, the vocational training in computer technology she received with the help of IOM has motivated her to deepen her knowledge in computer science and acquire a profession in it. When we met her in three months after their first meeting, she told the researchers that she is working at one computer shop near her village and can earn enough to pay for her graduation exams at the university that she almost managed to graduate from. Consequently, the reintegration assistance of IOM had contributed to her empowerment and reintegration back home and helped her to be optimistic about her future.

Female migrants who are the breadwinners of the family because their husbands are not capable of providing for the family are also among the most vulnerable re-entry banned migrants. For them migration had been a solution and life strategy to provide for their families when their husbands failed to do so. We met two re-entry banned female migrants in their late forties who have been breadwinners for their families for several years. They both have husbands who do not support the family and teenage children who are still dependents. The husband of one of the women is an alcoholic, while the husband of the other one cannot work due on account of poor health and insufficient education. However, both women with the assistance provided by IOM, their own efforts and their social networks they became capable of earning more or less enough for a living. They also build plans for the future with the resources they received from IOM.

While many of the interviewed female migrants reported experiencing economic hardships, a number of women we met had relatively high levels of economic, social and human capital. However, cultural and social pressures were found to act strongly on those women's economic decisions as well. For instance, a 22 year-old Kyrgyz woman, the only daughter of her mother who by working together in Russia managed to buy two apartments in Osh, wanted to go back to Russia with her husband who she married recently. When the IOM sociologist asked her why she needs to go back to Russia since she has already two apartments, she put it:

> The apartments belong to my mother. Of course, one day they will be mine as I am her only child... But I need to go now to Russia together with my husband in order to build our common future. I cannot bring him to my apartment as it will be a shame

on him. He will be called "küch küiö"[29]

(Participant, FGD with migrants, Osh).

Consequently, this case demonstrates that due to the culture and position of the woman in the society she has to migrate again because her husband does not have his own economic resources and she should contribute to their "common future". This, among other factors leads to feminization of migration in Kyrgyzstan. However, as it was mentioned above, as a wife, a young Kyrgyz migrant woman usually works for her husband and his family's interests and does not own her earnings eventually. Therefore, it will be helpful at least to make the migrant women to be aware of the risks of being left "empty-handed" and to be advised on how to secure their and their children's rights to the financial resources gained thanks to their hard work in migration. Moreover, since most of them do not gain professional skills in Russia, it is recommended to provide professional trainings for them when they return to their home country and assist them to launch a small business related to their newly acquired profession.

2.2. TAJIKISTAN

2.2.1. Impact of re-entry bans on migrants and their families

2.2.1.1. Varying level of vulnerability among re-entry banned migrants

While examining the impact of re-entry bans on migrants we were able to identify two groups of migrants depending on their awareness about the ban affecting their vulnerability. The first group included migrants who knew that they had been put on a ban: *"I did not pay for the patent in time and my documents were inspected. I was sent to court and was told that I was given a ban for 3 years"* (male migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon). The second group consisted of migrants who had returned home temporarily for various reasons and only then learnt about the re-entry ban at various stages of migration:

a) **before the planned trip:** *"Before departure I was advised to check just in case whether I had a ban. I went to Dushanbe and requested a check. It turned out I was banned"* (female migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon);

b) **when buying a ticket:** *"When I went to buy my ticket, I was told I had a ban"* (female migrant, 28 years old, District of Republican Subordination);

c) **once arrived in the country of destination:** *"I flew to Moscow and was told there that I had a ban; I spent two days in the airport, then I was sent back"* (male migrant, 24 years old, District of Republican Subordination);

d) **at the border between Kazakhstan and Russia:** *"I went on the train. In Aksaraysk (Kazakhstan) Russian border guards told me that there was a ban and I could not enter Russia. I had to live at the railway station for 5 days. I rang my brother, he sent me some money that I used to go back home, otherwise I would have been fined as well. There were 10 of us with bans. Those who stayed then paid fines, because without registration you can only stay there for 5 days"* (male migrant, 32 years old, District of Republican Subordination).

The impact was found to be strongest among migrants in the second group, who often were heard to say *"shock", "it was shocking", "it was unexpected", "if I knew earlier, I would have saved my money and stayed at home".* Those who learned of their ban on their way to Russia through

29 A derogatory term for the man who lives at his wife's household.

Kazakhstan suffered financial losses since they usually borrowed money for the trip. Two of the migrants with over seven years of migration experience commented that in the past, when they were banned, they used to change their names. However, this strategy no longer worked: *"If I could I would have changed my name once again and left. But now I was fingerprinted for my current passport so I cannot change my name and passport again. I would do anything to be able to go"* (male migrant, 27 years old, Khatlon).

Some of the re-entry banned migrants have to deal with health problems. Once back in their homeland, they need medical treatment: *"Doctors say that I have kidney and heart problems", "I cannot walk for long, my legs start to ache. So I do not know now what kind of work I can find with this condition"* (male migrant, 37 years old, Soghd). Experts rated this category of migrants as one of the most vulnerable groups.

2.2.1.2. Socioeconomic and psychological impact of the ban

The fundamental and broad consequence of an unexpected re-entry ban is the loss of stable source of income as labour migration has become a coping strategy not only for migrants concerned, but for their households as a whole. According to a community (*mahalla*) leader in Bohtar, Khatlon region, *"life changes in homes where there is no-one left who could go to Russia. If before they could help others in the community, now they need help to survive."*

> There are 14 of us at home. I left home for work after finishing 9 years at school, my other brother followed me a bit later. We needed money to marry off our sisters, to live on something. My parents are old, my father is disabled.
>
> ***(male migrant, 28 years old, Khatlon)***

> I think all the time what to do next. It is easy in Russia, go to neighbours or friends – they are all there – and you will find work. But what can I do here?
>
> ***(male migrant, 27 years old, District of Republican Subordination)***

As long-term breadwinners in large households comprising several families, returned migrants face a pressing problem of finding a source of income. The economic strategies in response to the ban depended on the assets at the household's disposal. In some cases, when two or three migrants left for work from one household, their accumulated remittances could be used not only for consumer spending but also for investment (construction work / house renovations or purchase of land or of livestock). If one migrant received a ban, then the household consumer expenses were cut accordingly and funds were channelled to cover only everyday needs: *"We almost never have meat these days. Only once or twice a month we cook something with meat. How we will keep going – I have no idea"* (male migrant, 25 years old, District of Republican Subordination).

> If they emigrate at a very young age this means they have not laid down any roots here (in the country of origin). They do not know their own culture, and they are not accepted in the other culture. What's more, they do not want to be here.
>
> ***(an official from the Migration Service)***

Thus, the situation is the most dramatic in the cases where the household sent only one of its members into labour migration. Moreover, as a result of the enforcement of the ban and the loss of the household's main source of income, the migrant loses his/her status in the house as a breadwinner: *"We now live on my father's pension"* (male migrant, 25 years old, Dushanbe). The absence of a permanent job and

income becomes a source of stress for the banned migrant: *"I was sitting at home without work and waiting for my sister or brother to bring at least some food. I did not go out at all, I was ashamed to see anybody, I owed money to almost everybody"* (male migrant, 25 years old, Dushanbe).

The analysis of the study findings also leads us to believe that the adjustment to the post-ban mode of life is further made difficult by the tendency for migration to become a way of life for some migrants: *"I do not know what I can do here", "I am used to going and living there", "every day I count days when my ban expires and I can leave again"* (male migrant, 31 years old, District of Republican Subordination). While waiting for the ban to be lifted those migrants were found to be less willing to reintegrate as they saw their stay at home as a temporary, undesirable occurrence. According to an NGO representative in Khatlon, *"There are migrants who do not even try to settle down here, at home. They do nothing all day long hanging about in the streets or at home. Some of them start to drink. And they all are constantly checking their ban status hoping for a miracle – that the ban is removed. This is mostly true of the younger generation ."*

For older generations migration offered a mechanism to address immediate (or planned) needs: home improvements, purchase of land or financing a wedding: *"We did our calculations with my wife, worked out how much we will need to do repair works and I went to Russia... "* (male migrant, 37 years old, Soghd). In the course of interviews and focus group discussions respondents often repeated the words *"we had a thought and did our calculations", "my parents spoke to me and gave advice", "we decided".* Consequently, older migrants demonstrated a more conscious attitude to their forced stay at home by seeking to find a job.

2.2.2 Structural factors of vulnerability upon return

As discussed in the socio-economic and sociopolitical chapter, as part of reintegration measures intended for returning migrants in Tajikistan the government is creating new jobs that are advertised through district migration offices and branches of the Agency for Labour and Employment under the Ministry of Labour of Tajikistan. The effectiveness of these programs is limited by several structural factors – notably, the temporal character and inadequate remuneration. According to a representative of the Migration Service, *"our vacancies have a weakness: the jobs that are offered to migrants are predominantly casual. Also, migrants are not satisfied with the salary that employers are prepared to pay, they are used to different money. They are not satisfied with these jobs."*

> They put me in a job. I worked for a month and was paid 300 somoni in wages (according to the respondent, the agreement was for a different amount – 800 somoni). I had transport expenses to pay and food as well. This leaves only 200 somoni. But a bag of flour costs 150 somoni these days, 5 litres of oil cost 50-60 somoni. And a bag of flour won't last us a month.
>
> ***(male migrant, 29 years old, Khatlon)***

Low pay rates coupled with difficulty in finding employment and/or job insecurity resulted in the increased vulnerability of migrants who had lost the opportunity to work in Russia. In these circumstances personal competences (communication skills, willingness to change one's situation) together with a good command of the Russian language were crucial in overcoming those structural barriers and finding a new niche for employment.

When I was forced to return *(after the imposition of the ban and divorce)* I went back to my parents, they accepted me. I couldn't find a job. I was told I needed to have computer skills. So I enrolled onto a computer course as suggested at the migration service. Now I am working. It doesn't pay much, so I found a second job. Now money is better. I will continue with my studies, I will go to university. I will make sure I have a good job.

(Female migrant, 25 years old, Districts of Republican Subordination)

This is an example of a successful reintegration mechanism developed as part of a state-run project. It should be noted, however, that such stories are not common since this woman was accepted back into her parent's household after the ban and a divorce (these two events happened almost simultaneously). She was not a family breadwinner, therefore, she did not lose this status. Furthermore, her parents were prepared to invest in her education providing for her everyday needs.

In this type of situation those migrants who used to be the main income provider in the family appear to be more vulnerable. Such households may have several members of non-working age (old parents and children). It can be re-emphasised that personal competences alone (communication skills, willingness to ask others for help) can be a positive asset and enable individuals to overcome obstacles:

There are 8 of us, my father and mother are retired. In the past, when I used to send money home, my father did not work. I told everybody in the mahalla that I need work, I need to feed my family. If there is any work available people let me know. My father started coming with me as well: helping out in gardens or doing repairs for somebody. We do not have any other choice because the pay is low and it is better if there are two of us working.

(Male migrant, 30 years old, Khatlon)

While looking for employment, men can find jobs at local markets as handymen or in the fields at times of harvest or doing house repairs. For women the labour market is even more limited: *"I have no idea where I could find work. I went to the market – they don't have any work, I tried a confectionery shop – they have enough staff. So I sit at home and wait for the ban to expire*" (female migrant, 35 years old, District of Republican Subordination).

2.2.3. Individual factors of vulnerability upon return

Overall, interviews and focus group discussions show that few among the re-entry banned migrants were able to find work in the country of origin by making use of the knowledge and skills gained in migration. In the majority of cases, the limited demand of the local labour market and insecure character of employment made migrants lose their status in the family and become dependent on other family members:*"now my wife provides for me"* (male migrant, 31 years old, Dushanbe)*, "my children and I live off my parents"* (female migrant, 31 years old, Khatlon) and retreat into isolation from the community - *"I receive invitations to some events but I am embarrassed to go there"* (female migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon).

This dependency attitude observed among migrants is possibly attributable to a well-formed perception that can be defined as a "transit state" in which the life in the country of origin is perceived as a temporary spell, a period of waiting for the ban to be lifted. At the same time, this state of dependency is also viewed

and assessed by migrants as temporary -*"once my ban is removed I will go to Russia and will be sending money home again"* (male migrant, 28 years old, District of Republican Subordination).

Having first-hand experience of looking for work and living in a different country, migrant workers consider the time spent at home lasting between one to several months as "holiday time". In line with this dichotomy (work in the country of destination against family life in the country of origin) migrant workers have developed a practice of finding employment through some kind of professional social network in the country of destination. This network continues to "work" for the migrant so long as he/she is able to travel to Russia for work.

> By now I have some acquaintances to whom to go (in the country of destination). I remained in contact with them even when I went home, they are from Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, some are from the Ukraine. I worked with them. If I need work, nowadays I do not only go to my countrymen from Tajikistan, I can ring those acquaintances too.
>
> ***(Male migrant, 40 years old, Rudaki)***

A similar network is not available (or poorly developed) in the country of origin which limits the opportunities in searching for and finding jobs. Looking for work, migrants offer their services as general labourers at local markets: *"Every day I walk across the river to the bazaar; if anybody in the village needs anything doing in the house I go to their place. They pay little. But I am happy even with that"* (male migrant, 25 years old, Khatlon). In other words, the work that migrants manage to find is mostly temporary and low paid. It is worth noting that job hunting is especially hard for migrants living in remote communities, far from central towns and cities.

Changing the country of destination was identified as one of the strategies practised by migrant workers. In this particular study the new country for banned migrants was Kazakhstan. Migration for the purposes of employment has become a recognised mechanism of survival for this category of migrants: *"What else can I do? At home there is either no work, or wages are low. I am not afraid of work and if there are jobs in another country, I will go and work in that country"* (male migrant, 28 years old, Khatlon). The lack of practical information on rules of residence, legalisation and employment in the other country (Kazakhstan) gives rise to situations where migrants slip into irregularity. Given that migrants often do not have any social connections in the new country of destination, they have no means of communication with the outside world and this makes them even more vulnerable.

The study revealed that in some cases professional skills gained in Russia could ensure employment elsewhere. A migrant with a ten-year experience of residence abroad reported: *"For the first two years I worked as a general labourer, then I gradually trained as a plasterer and learnt how to do house repairs"* (male migrant, 32 years old, Khatlon). In view of the construction boom in Tajikistan, primarily in Dushanbe, the interviewed male migrants were able to transfer their building experience and skills into employment in this sector in the country of origin. Nonetheless, they still found the Russian labour market more attractive when compared with lower rates of pay and harsher working conditions in the home country: *"There are almost no health and safety systems here. The work is hard, in Russia it is done by machines and here they make people do it. The money they pay is barely enough to buy food"* (male migrant, 31 years old, Dushanbe).

2.2.4. Women: An exacerbated vulnerability

The study findings demonstrate that time spent in migration can be a period of human capital accumulation for men, whereas for women it can be associated with many losses: a) they do not acquire skills that could be used in the country of origin later; b) if a woman emigrates without a family (divorced or widowed) her reputation is likely to suffer.

> If a woman emigrates on her own, one wonders – what has she been doing there? If a divorced woman has a daughter she should be thinking about the future of her daughter. Who will ask in marriage a girl whose mother lived alone in another country?
>
> ***Interview with the head of a mahalla, Khatlon)***

However, experts point out that with the growing flows of female migration the situation could change this stereotype:

Female migrant-workers in the 90s frequently spoke about having to hide in public places if they spotted men from Tajikistan who often would question women about their stay in Russia in rather rude and indecent terms… As more whole families migrate, women going abroad is becoming a norm. Besides, in recent years the older generation, being mobile, prepared a more favourable environment for migrating women.[30]

When it comes to women in migration, their employment patterns in the country of destination often reproduce the work done in a household, namely cleaning, washing up dishes, washing clothes, working on vegetable allotments, cooking (confectioner, shawarma-chef). Once back in the country of origin, out of all these occupations and skills gained in migration a woman can monetize only the last one. In doing so, female migrants emphasised that they had been paid better in Russia for the same type of work: *"There* (in Russia) *I could put some money aside, pay for accommodation and buy some clothes for my children. Here I only earn enough to buy food and pay for transport to work and to school for my children. I do not have any savings, I cannot buy any clothing"* (female migrant, 35 years old, Khatlon). Of note, we identified only few women trained in confectionery and/or shawarma-making.

30 Women in migration: challenges and opportunities (in Russian) // Interview with M. Bakhoviddinova. http://muhojir.info/news/44

3. ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS OF INTEGRATION AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

3.1. KAZAKHSTAN

3.1.1. Migrants' coping strategies

Migrants were found to be using three main types of strategies to deal with their vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan:

- To leave Kazakhstan as soon as possible and get home. This strategy may not be feasible due to lack of a system to inform migrants in advance about a possible ban and missing infrastructure to ensure their safe return home, possibly on credit terms;
- To find employment as soon as possible in Kazakhstan to earn money for the journey home. However, at the moment it is an extremely challenging task due to the complexity of the registration procedures and an inevitable involvement of informal intermediaries;
- To go to work in Kazakhstan as soon as possible as an alternative country of destination. The limitation of this option is that no standard system for recruiting migrants with unproven or low-skilled qualifications to work in Kazakhstan has been established.

None of these strategies have been complemented with any input from government agencies responsible for regulating the migration situation and employment in the country (migration police, employment centres, refuges). They have also only been partly supported through programmes run by local NGOs with assistance from international organizations. The reason for this is the fact that the existing mechanisms of social assistance available to migrants in Kazakhstan are primarily geared towards those who have been in the country for a long time and are fully documented. Migrants with re-entry bans have very little chance of gaining this status.

Overcoming these vulnerabilities would require that government authorities, civil society institutions and international organizations join efforts in minimising the impact of structural and situational factors on migrants and strengthening the social and human capital of migrants by raising their awareness, upgrading their professional and communication skills, improving their physical and mental health.

3.1.2. Existing assistance programs

At present irregular or undocumented migrant workers are able to access some forms of social assistance only under specific circumstances. For instance, all school-age children of migrants are entitled to attend school irrespective of their parents' status. However, the child is not always enrolled into a school automatically—in this case an NGO working with migrants and the local department of education sign a memorandum of understanding. This is a common practice for the Korgau Private Foundation

in Astana.[31] This NGO also signed similar memoranda with the regional department of health so that migrants staying in the refuge can access medical help in case of emergency. Also, any migrant workers throughout the country if diagnosed with AIDS and tuberculosis can be seen by a medical professional and offered treatment. Furthermore, all migrants in Kazakhstan are guaranteed free hospital treatment for medical reasons in severe cases for the first three days while further care will be provided on a fee-paying basis. It seems advisable to extend this collaboration between NGOs working with migrants and government institutions to include re-entry banned migrants too. At the moment, this group of migrants is receiving assistance mainly from international organizations.

Since the autumn 2016 one Kostanay NGO, with the IOM support, has been implementing a project aimed at providing emergency assistance with return home to those migrants, mainly nationals of Tajikistan, who found themselves stranded at the checkpoints on the border between Russia and Kazakhstan in the Kostanay Region. This group was particularly vulnerable since as a rule, when the migrant finds out about his/her ban to enter the Russian Federation only while crossing the border, he/she is taken off the coach and left in a desperate state, usually without money and any social networks. In another scenario, an individual unaware of his/her re-entry ban to Russia crosses the border to Kazakhstan in order to renew his/her Russian migration card. Most often these migrants arrive in Kostanay where a well-established local Tajik diaspora informs them about this project and organises a meeting with the NGO representatives. Over the several months of this project almost 40 people were successfully sent home.

First, migrants are interviewed to find out whether they have been deported from Russia and whether they have the ability to travel to Tajikistan on their own. If they have neither, they are given a train ticket to Almaty and from there an air ticket to Dushanbe. The Tajik diaspora is paying for their accommodation and meals while their application for travel expenses reimbursement is being considered. Sometimes this matter is decided very quickly, in one day or within hours after the first contact. There are occasions when migrants turn to the NGO already after the period of five days provided by law to regularize their stay in Kazakhstan has already expired. In those cases, before they can be sent home there will be a court hearing with potentially an expulsion order imposed.

In summary, migrants' inability to promptly obtain the registration and find employment tends to place them at risk of prolonged irregularity, further weakening their position on the labour market in Kazakhstan. The demand for foreign workers is low in the northern parts of Kazakhstan, so migrants accept any small odd irregular jobs.

Diaspora organizations appear to be the most accessible of all public institutions, as intuitive behaviour in critical situations pushes migrants to look for "their own kind" and hope for their assistance. In most cases people go to the market in Kostanay and ask for any Tajik traders. They are directed to them at once. There are other stories too:

> From the border I got to Kostanay late at night, didn't know where to go. Asked for a mosque and was shown where it is. I explained my situation, they let me in for the night. In the morning the imam explained how to find Tajiks in the market.
>
> ***(Male migrant from Tajikistan, 22 years old)***

31 Interview in Astana, March 2017.

3.1.3. Factors of effectiveness

Interviews with experts and representatives of diaspora organizations in Kazakhstan and Russia revealed a range of factors that has limited the impact that the diaspora organizations could play in facilitating the integration and providing assistance to their compatriots in other countries.

Firstly, direct agreements of international and government institutions with diaspora organizations and allocation of funds to the latter in order to provide assistance to their fellow countrymen may create an unhealthy situation where other members of the ethnic community will be able to hold it against these diaspora organizations that they are the beneficiaries of this help and not other entities.

Secondly, according to some experts among activists of diaspora organizations in Moscow, Yekaterinburg and Kostanay, some organisations could have been established with goals other than stated and some of them may have been set up to advance some specific political, religious and other beliefs or connections with the government at home. They were critical of instances in which such considerations might determine the decision on granting assistance to a migrant. Instead, they believe that it would be much more effective for a diaspora organization and an NGO with a legal or social mission to join efforts in identifying vulnerable migrants and providing assistance to them. This way it will be possible to preserve all the strengths of the diaspora organization as an institution attractive to migrants and enjoying their confidence. At the same time, potential negative aspects would be minimised through the separation of functions: while the diaspora organization could identify the vulnerable migrants; the NGO that would have no ethnic preferences would assess each case using formal evaluation instruments and provides help when needed.[32]

At the same time, experts pointed to the record of a positive involvement of a diaspora organization, citing the experience of the "Astana's Kyrgyz" organization in helping migrants. To do so, this diaspora organization had to open the Centre for migrant worker support and training at the Zharia non-governmental foundation:

> Our office is located not far from the migration police to make it easier for migrants. We know elders at all the markets and we work with them, migrants come to them all the time. That is how migrants learn about us. Sometimes in difficult cases the migration police direct them to us: go to them, they will help, just turn around the corner.
>
> ***(Representative of "Astana's Kyrgyz" NGO in Astana)***[33]

Only citizens of Kazakhstan are allowed to set up non-governmental organizations. An NGO created by a diaspora organization can bring migration-related issues to the attention of the government bodies and other NGOs, as reported by the representative of a diaspora organization in Kazakhstan:

> We are quite successful in collaborating with the government agencies. We organize round tables together with the Nur Otan party; our events are attended by representatives of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, Civil Alliance of Kazakhstan, Department of Industry and Entrepreneurship at the Akimat. They present their employment programmes. The IOM, for example, cannot have any

32 Based on interviews with experts in Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Kostanay in March 2017.
33 Based on the interview in Astana, March 2017.

dealings with political parties but we can. Some of the round table topics are "Labour migration and social stability", "Efficient labour migration as a factor in sustainable development of Astana", "Building anti-corruption culture in the area of migration". When the Nur Otan party sponsored a small brochure for migrants, one official from the Agency for the Civil Service Affairs and Counter-Corruption suggested including their hotline number so that migrants could report any corrupt behaviour of the civil servants.

3.2. KYRGYZSTAN

3.2.1. Reintegration assistance

3.2.1.1. Profile of beneficiaries

Under the supervision of IOM sub-regional coordination office for Central Asia/Kazakhstan starting from October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017 IOM Kyrgyzstan provided direct assistance to 85 re-entry banned vulnerable migrants in Southern Kyrgyzstan/Osh region, 19 of which were women. They were selected from among 152 re-entry banned migrants that had been referred by the Information and Consultation Centers (ICC) in Osh and Bishkek and by NGO partners[34] within the All the beneficiaries received information on safe migration and legal consultations at the ICCs in Osh or Bishkek (e.g. whether a person is in the ban list, for what reason and the period of the ban).[35]

Of 85 beneficiaries, 70 had complete or incomplete secondary education, eight migrants obtained vocational education and only six of them had a university degree. Breakdown by age is as follows: 12 migrants aged from 20 to 25, 18 migrants aged from 26 to 30 and 49 migrants aged over 30. Thus, the majority of the beneficiaries is the youth and most of them left to Russia just after completing secondary school. All 85 cases are citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, 20 of them living in Batken province, 59 of them living in Osh province, five of them living in Jalalabad province and one from Talas province, but currently living in Bishkek (Fig. 27).

Almost all female re-entry banned migrants who applied and met all vulnerability criteria were considered for the assistance.[36] Low number of female beneficiaries could be attributed to the fact that women accounted for the minority of the migrant workers from southern Kyrgyzstan, where patriarchal norms prevail and therefore, men are considered as the main breadwinners. At the same time, according to IOM's NGO partners that redirected re-entry banned migrants for the direct assistance there are instances when female re-entry banned migrants cannot apply for the assistance due to prohibition of their mothers-in-law or husbands. Moreover, some re-entry banned female migrants are not mobile due to their household responsibilities and threats to their reputation thus, preventing or hindering them to travel from other regions, especially from the remote ones to Osh to seek information and assistance. Therefore, for the future programmatic activities, it is recommended to take into account the socio-economic and cultural constrains females face in their efforts to seek out assistance so that more numbers of vulnerable female re-entry banned migrants will be assisted.

34 Direct Assistance Component of the project "Addressing Migration Movements through Capacity Building in Central Asia" Phase III funded by the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Government of the United States (PRM-PIM USA) (hereinafter BPRM project).

35 This was done within the framework of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Dignity and Rights Project's pilot project called Prevention of Violent Extremism (hereinafter PVE project) that was implemented by IOM office in Kyrgyzstan.

36 One female applicant who demonstrated having high social and economic capitals (she was married and had a good functioning business) was rejected. Another woman was rejected because during interview by the IOM sociologist she indicated that she would like to migrate to Bishkek with her husband because of complicated relationship she had with her mother-in-law and because her husband was working there already and she wanted her family to be reunited.

Fig. 27. Characteristics of vulnerable re-entry banned migrants assisted in Kyrgyzstan during October 1, 2016 - September 30, 2017



Source: IOM Kyrgyzstan

Fig. 28. Types of assistance provided to returning migrants in Kyrzystan



Source: IOM Kyrgyzstan

3.2.1.2. Forms of assistance

All 85 beneficiaries received legal consultations at the ICCs in Osh or Bishkek. Afterwards a re-entry banned migrant was interviewed by a consultant at the ICCs or partner NGOs who would identify his/her vulnerability and redirect to IOM Osh. IOM Osh staff would ask additional questions to measure vulnerability and reintegration needs of the applicants (redirected by the ICCs) and afterwards send to the IOM sociologist who would provide vulnerability assessment and approve the case for receiving assistance based on the vulnerability criteria. IOM Osh staff suggested to all 85 beneficiaries getting training in short term courses in order to gain appropriate skills for running successfully the business activities they wished to start. However, only 14 beneficiaries requested assistance in organizing a vocational education for them. Consequently, 7 beneficiaries attended short term welding courses; 2 of them attended short term culinary courses; 2 migrants took short term courses of a hair dresser; 2 persons studied short term sewing courses and 1 beneficiary attended computer courses. Out of 85 beneficiaries 4 requested medical assistance in purchasing medicine and hospital treatment (Fig. 28)

The reintegration part of the assistance was developed by the beneficiaries themselves with the assistance of IOM responsible staff members and NGO partners. During the project period 75 businesses and 9 income generating activities[37] were supported by IOM (Fig. 29).

Of 85 assisted cases 34 beneficiaries received assistance in the amount of US$700 – 1000, 18 in the amount of US$400 – 700 and 15 in the amount of US$1000 – 1300. Equal number of beneficiaries – nine – received assistance in the amount of up to US$400 and in the amount of US$1300 and over (Fig. 30).

3.2.2. Factors of reintegration success

3.2.2.1. Social capital and reintegration assistance

Having social capital or supportive social networks can greatly help a migrant both when he is in Russia or Kazakhstan or back home. All the respondents reported that they had used their relatives, friends, neighbours or acquaintances' assistance to arrive in Russia and to find work there. While social networks have helped migrants to find a job, although with delays, and a place of living in the country of destination, they cannot secure the migrant from deceitful intermediaries or employers and cannot guarantee that a migrant has a regulated status in Russia, as the case of re-entry banned migrants demonstrates.

Moreover, the literature suggests that returned migrants will benefit from their transnational social networks that they will manage to establish when in emigration, which, in turn, will ensure their successful return and re-integration in their countries of origin.[38] However, the CA migrant workers that we studied did not manage to build transnational networks before their return between the country of destination and home country that would allow them to carry out transnational economic activities. One main reason is that most of them are poorly educated, they do mostly low skilled jobs and many work in Russia on a seasonal basis. Moreover, they do not manage to save their earnings and invest in business projects, instead spending remittances most of the time on daily expenses of the family or for life cycle events back home or for purchasing a land plot or a car, building or renovating a house. Thus, the migrants that we studied lacked appropriate human and economic

37 Business projects that received micro-grants under US$400 are considered income-generating activities
38 See Cassarino, "Theorising return migration" and "Editorial introduction: The conditions of modern return migrants".

Fig. 29. Beneficiaries' activities supported by IOM Kyrgyzstan



Fig. 30. Structure of the volume of assistance granted to beneficiaries



capital that would allow them to build transnational networks for conducting economic activities when they returned to the home country. Furthermore, for most of them migration to Russia has become a part of their ordinary life so that they did not plan to prepare for return by building such networks or investing in income-generating activities or business projects. They would always go back to Russia once they realised that their chances of employment or a decent income were limited in the home country after having spent some time there.

At the same time, their inclusion in certain social

networks (family, neighbourhood or village or professional) back home and their resources could help a re-entry banned migrant to re-integrate better either independently or with the re-integration assistance that IOM provided. Most migrants do not lose contacts with their relatives by the means of sending remittances back home and contributing to the well-being of family members (by paying for weddings and other life-cycle rituals, for education or by contributing to the acquisition of a place of living for a family member). As a result, when they return and are forced to stay due to the ban they still enjoy belonging to the close circle of relatives.[39]

Impact of re-integration assistance: case no. 1 from Kyrgyzstan

We visited a 47 year-old female beneficiary in her apartment in Osh where she has her sewing workshop. IOM bought her good quality expensive sewing machines. Her 30 year-old daughter-in-law, was also there. They are working together. The beneficiary worked in Russia from 2006 as a cook. In the meantime, her husband and children stayed in the village called Ak-Terek in the Özgen district of the Osh oblast. For the earned money they bought a house, livestock and organized a feast (toi) for their house in the village. Her sewing workshop was doing well. Their native village is the main place where she has customers. People buy her products for wedding and other life-cycle ceremonies. She said that she has 7 siblings and her husband has also a large family. They also have many friends. She said that because their tribe (uruu) is so large and their numerous friends and relatives' children came of age and ready to get married she could successfully sell their sewing products in her native village in Özgen. The beneficiary has diversified her products. For example, she has expensive pillow and traditional mattress cases. She also has cheap pillowcases for car use. She said that she used to work as a nurse in the hospital in Osh and she has contacts with doctors who usually buy her expensive products. The beneficiary was very optimistic and motivated about her new occupation and business. She asked IOM to help her to buy a computerized machine for designs of the ornaments on her products. In the end, she thanked IOM for its help and said: *"With your help I found here (back home) what I did not find in Russia for many years"*. This quote demonstrates how the assistance she received from IOM and her own social and personal resources helped her to succeed in her business and gave her the chance to associate herself with her own work and do something creative unlike being alienated from her own labour when she was in Russia. At the same time, it enabled her to earn enough for a living back home.

3.2.2.2. Interplay of human, social and economic capital

In the course of assessing the impact of the ban, we should also consider the motivation for migration of the person and his or her economic and social standing before the decision to migrate was taken. If the migrant had favourable economic and social status back home and decided to maintain or increase that status because it became difficult in the home country, then the re-entry ban status will not have such a dramatic impact on the economic and psychological well-being of the individual. The beneficiaries of IOM in southern Kyrgyzstan who also had rich social and human capital managed to make effective use of the re-integration assistance provided by IOM.

39 For similar findings among re-entry banned migrants in Tajikistan see, "Tajik Migrants with Re-Entry Bans to the Russian Federation." Dushanbe, Tajikistan: International Organization for Migration (IOM). January 2014

Impact of re-integration assistance: case no. 2 from Kyrgyzstan

A 52 year-old female beneficiary and her 20 year-old son were assisted in building a greenhouse on the territory of their house. They joined the elder son of the family who was already working in St. Petersburg in Russia after the intercommunal conflict that took place in Osh in 2010. During the conflict, their several retail shops were burned down and as a result, they did not have any means to pay off the loans that they took from banks and from people. In order to keep their house and to pay off the debt, the female beneficiary and her son went to Russia to work. They managed to pay off most of their debt and keep the house thanks to remittances they would send from Russia by the time they were blacklisted. Thus, the main source of their vulnerability – indebtedness – was already removed before the ban. Moreover, the family had some other sources of income in Osh, e.g., a shop that they rent out, remittances from the elder son who works in Russia and a younger son was in a retail business in Kara-Suu market – the largest market in southern Kyrgyzstan. Although the family's economic status was still lower than it was before the conflict, the re-entry ban did not cause such a dramatic negative impact on these banned migrants and their family. Moreover, their skills in trade and networking allow them to use the reintegration assistance of IOM more effectively. When we met with the female beneficiary in January 2017 she shared their plans with the greenhouse to us: "*first we will grow cucumbers and tomatoes. Then we will grow lemons as it requires less work but one can have more profit from it. On the other half of the greenhouse we will grow large decorative flowers and sell them in our shop-container*". Her husband has been in contact with one Uzbek man who has extensive experience in growing lemons and knows how to sell them to Russia. He has been learning from that man how to grow lemons and will receive his help to export them later.

Thus, most of the re-entry banned migrants after return enjoy support and acceptance by their families and relatives as while they were in Russia they maintained a close relationship with them by sending their remittances for family's needs and events. The nature of social networks (family, neighbourhood or village or professional) in their home country and their resources can help a re-entry banned migrant to re-integrate better either independently or with the re-integration assistance that IOM provided. Moreover, possession of certain skills, resources and tools can help a re-entry banned migrant to build new networks with other people or reinforce existing networks, combine their skills and resources, and cooperate in one type of business successfully. IOM's re-integration assistance to these types of re-entry banned migrants proved to be effective in their reintegration and decreasing their economic vulnerability.

3.3. TAJIKISTAN

3.3.1. Strategies of re-entry banned migrants

Summing up the analysis of the consequences of the ban, the following main strategies employed by re-entry banned migrants were identified:

1) ***monetizing the knowledge and skills acquired in the country of destination***. It should be noted that this social category is too small and diverse to be grouped together on the basis of a certain characteristic. This strategy is used by migrants who have qualified as builders or car mechanics (men)

or confectioners (men and women). Members of this group can be described as the most prepared to re-integrate but needing support with setting up their own private enterprise;

2) ***waiting for the expiry of the ban.*** This strategy can be characterised as passive and negative since it results from the low adaptability of banned migrants to their changed circumstances. As a rule, these are young migrants who consider their stay at home as a temporary phase in their lives;

3) ***changing the country of destination.*** For this group migration remains the only known and feasible strategy for survival. After these migrants receive the ban to enter Russia they are ready to go to a different country. However, it should be borne in mind that the new country has no (or only weak) social networks that they used to turn to during their trips to the previous country of destination (Russia). Also, migrants are not aware (or have little knowledge) of the rules and procedures to be followed to legalise their stay in the new country of destination (Kazakhstan).

3.3.2. Effectiveness of assistance programmes for integration of re-entry banned CA migrants in Tajikistan: case for self-employment

As part of a re-integration project, IOM Kazakhstan and IOM Tajikistan provided assistance to migrants who received a re-entry ban, including helping them to return home from Astana and to minimise their economic hardships. In order to assess the efficiency of direct assistance, banned migrants were interviewed, including during home visits.

IOM Mission in Tajikistan provided help to 40 migrants. The reintegration packages to "the most vulnerable" re-entry banned migrants through partner NGOs. These packages are anticipated to be generally of two types: (a) equipment, training and help with the marketing of services (for example, a construction brigade formed by migrants, using the equipment provided); and (b) business planning and training packages.

Migrants were selected based on meeting certain criteria's such as age (age group of 17-35), being on Russian re-entry ban list, being a resident of target districts of Shaartuz, Bokhtar and Qubodyion.[40] Three main criterions were: duration of the ban, debt, and having health problems in the family (for example one of the migrant's family member has illness or disability). Additional vulnerability criteria were added for selection of 40 most vulnerable migrants including: a) education; b) unemployment; c) main breadwinner at the household; d) family with no source of income or living on retirement pension (minimum income); e) more than one family member is on the ban list and poor living conditions. Migrants meeting more than three criterions were selected for the last stage of screening. During the last stage, migrants were visited at the houses and additional information regarding their vulnerability was collected.

3.3.2.1. Profile of beneficiaries

The average size of assisted migrant`s households is eight people with two breadwinners.

According to the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment,[41] the number of women going abroad to work is on the rise. The 2014 statistics show that

40 Selection criteria comply with the Standardized Operating Procedures of IOM

41 Since 2000 a series of institutional reorganizations has taken place: before 2007 statistics were collected by the Ministry of Labour, in 2007–2010 – by the Migration Service at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2011–2013 – by the Migration Service under the Government of Tajikistan and since early 2014 till the present day – by the Migration Service at the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment.

Fig. 31. Age profile of beneficiaries of IOM assistance



Source: IOM Tajikistan

the proportion of women among migrant workers amounted to 16–20%.[42] However, in the group of 40 assistance beneficiaries there were only two women. One of the reasons for such a low representation of women in this group of migrants is that the upper age limit was set at 35. The younger a woman is, the less likely she is to emigrate alone, without a man (father or husband) accompanying her, as prescribed by social norms requiring more stringent control over young women. The most vulnerable group of re-entry banned migrant women are divorced and widowed women, usually over 30 years of age, who leave for abroad on their own without men.

Half of the migrants (19) fall into the 26–30 years of age category (Fig. 31).

The migrants chose their preferred type of income-earning activity with the help from the IOM and NGO staff and a business consultant (Table 10).

As demonstrated in the analysis of the study findings, one of the options to address the vulnerability of banned migrants in their home country is self-employment. Assistance was provided to migrants on the basis of an assessment of their situation conducted by the IOM staff jointly with external consultants. Depending on its results, migrants received building tools, equipment for setting up a food outlet or a tailor's shop or livestock (cows and calves).

The preliminary analysis revealed the following outcomes of the assistance provided to migrants:

(a) migrants now have a constant source of income: *"The money is enough for food and for my mother's medical care. Soon we will be getting our children ready for school"* (male migrant, 28 years old, Shaartuz)*;*

42 IOM (2016). Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration. Regional Field Assessment in Central Asia. – Astana; Lokshin M., Chernina E.. Migranty na rossiyskom rynke truda: portret i zarabotnaya plata [Migrants in the Russian labour market: portrait and wages]. // Zhurnal VShE (Higher School of Economics Economic Journal). – 2013; Danzer A., Dietz B., Gatskova K. (2013). Tajikistan Household Panel Survey: Migration, Remittances and the Labor Market; Mezentseva E.. Sotsialnaya zashchita trudyashchihsya-migrantov i chlenov ih semey v Respublike Tadzykistan [Social protection of migrant workers and their family members in the Republic of Tajikistan]. Findings of a research study under the Global UN Women programme "Gender and Democratic Governance in Development – Delivering Basic Services for Women". – 2012; UNICEF (2011). Impact of labour migration on "Children left behind" in Tajikistan.

(b) employment is assured not only for the migrant concerned but for other member of the family too: *"I work and my wife works with me too. Sometimes my brothers join us also*" (male migrant, 34 years old, Bohtar)*;*

*(*c) some of the migrants have plans to expand their business and employ their fellow-villagers: *"I am going to take on some help. I have some smart neighbours so I will invite them to work for me*" (male migrant, 28 years old, Shaartuz)

In the course of the interviews, migrants-recipients of the above help often reiterated that currently they had confidence in the future because they had work and, therefore, a source of income. Along with material help they were also given some training in the fundamentals of business planning: *"I did my calculations and I can see that it is no longer viable for me to go to Russia. Here I can earn the same money that I earned there while living in one room with 10 strange people. And here I will be with my own family*" (male migrant, 29 years old, Bohtar)

It is important to note that not a single migrant out of all 40 expressed a wish to go to Russia or other country. In other words, the opportunity for self-employment makes redundant the push factor that caused them to emigrate in the first place.

"Do you think we were happy there? Yes, possibly we felt a bit freer, because we did not see domestic problems every day, there are more shops, it is warm. But we go there to work and to bring money home. There is no easy work there" (male migrant, 33 years old, Bohtar)

Table 10. Employment structure of beneficiaries of IOM assistance

Types of activity	Number of migrants
Livestock rearing (livestock growing and fattening, dairy farming)	21
Repair and reconstruction works	4
Greenhouses	4
Welding works	2
Mini-cafés	2
Video recording of weddings and other celebrations	2
Ice-cream production	1
Car service garage	1
Beekeeping	1
Dressmaking workshop	1
Bakery	1
Total	**40**

Source: IOM Tajikistan

REGIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The sociological assessment identified vulnerabilities of returning Central Asian migrant workers (in particular, re-entry banned migrants) and grouped factors of their vulnerabilities into the following categories: individual factors, family and household factors, situational factors and structural factors. Most of the times the interplay of different factors contributed to the level of vulnerability or adaptability of the migrant workers either upon forced return to home countries or in Kazakhstan as a destination country.

In Kazakhstan, structural and situational factors were found to be decisive factors of vulnerability of Central Asian migrant workers. First of all, there are no integration mechanisms for migrants in Kazakhstan except for oralmans – ethnic Kazakhs who immigrate to Kazakhstan from other countries. Short period given for registration resulted in the irregular status of most of the re-entry banned migrants, especially those stranded, in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the complicated registration procedure and legal loopholes have enabled some employers to avoid responsibility for employers while the reliance on intermediaries made migrants dependent on them, forcing them to hand over their passports. When they become undocumented, migrants may become subject to exploitation and not to be able to find another job or leave the country.

High costs for obtaining work permit have often discouraged both the employers and migrants from complying with the formal legalisation procedures. This means that migrants enjoy little or no access to social benefits in Kazakhstan. Lacking necessary human capital and social networks, the migrants are most vulnerable to discriminatory practices, exploitation and becoming irregular in Kazakhstan. Moreover, women with complicated family history and structure (e.g. divorced or widowed women, women with dependents who have health problems, etc.) are the most vulnerable migrants in Kazakhstan.

Re-entry banned migrants return to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan without being well prepared for return. They lack the economic or human capital (health or skills) to be able to reintegrate successfully. Thus, they experience economic hardships, loss of social status in the family, decreased self-worth and feeling of being lost. Moreover, the economic context is not favourable for reintegration of the returned migrants due to high rates of unemployment, poverty and the absence of large scale reintegration programs in the countries of origin. Those who have higher education, skills and strong social networks can cope better with the re-entry ban situation. Well-planned reintegration assistance matching skills and abilities of blacklisted migrants in addition to their ability to network and self-motivation can help them to have a decent income, hope for the future and reclaim respect of their family and friends.

At the same time, those who have been facing challenges even after receipt of reintegration assistance are those who:

- did not plan their business projects efficiently, which resulted mainly in limited ability to produce or provide products and services and to find markets for the products and services;
- who have health problems or someone close

in the family has health problems;

- those with very weak social networks and family ties (usually they are orphans);
- those with a large number of dependents in the family of the beneficiary.

Moreover, force majeure situation can negatively affect the effectiveness of direct assistance. For example, one beneficiary's computer shop in Osh burned down due to electrical fires.

We have also identified youth as one of the most vulnerable groups as they are mostly poorly educated, thus have no skills or profession. As a result, they are mostly unemployed or have limited chances for employment back home. They are under pressure to support their newly started families due to their cultural disposition as a breadwinner of the family. Moreover, they possess no house or other private property. They are waiting for the expiration of the ban and do not search for jobs in the home country because they are hopeless of finding a job with a decent salary.

Another of the most vulnerable groups of re-entry banned migrants in their home countries are women, especially divorced or widowed women with or without dependents and female breadwinners whose husbands do not share the financial burdens of the family due to their sickness. Moreover, since they tend to work as general workers in Russia they do not gain new skills that would allow them to find jobs back home. Divorced women tend to possess no private property as they did not have control over their earnings when in Russia but worked for the benefit of their ex-husband's family. Moreover, divorced women have to face stigmatization for being divorced and for the alleged lost reputation while in migration in Russia.

Returning Central Asian Migrants' Vulnerability to Radicalization

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the issue of potential radicalization of migrants in connection with the socio-economic and ideological vulnerabilities to radicalization both in the migrants' countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and in the country of their destination for the purposes of employment (Kazakhstan). Measures implemented by the authorities in the countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) aimed at reducing the incidence of radicalization among the population, including migrant workers, will be also analysed.

In the course of the study, qualitative and quantitative methods were used for data collection. The analysis was based on statistical data, legislative documents, official reports and scientific research findings. In addition, a series of interviews were conducted with officials, security experts, representatives of non-governmental organizations and religious leaders in Central Asia.

This regional assessment probes in greater depth the conclusions of two studies, conducted on the issue of likely grounds of radicalization among migrants from Central Asia who were considered particularly vulnerable with the introduction of new conditions of movement in 2014. Special attention was paid to persons returning to Central Asia, in particular those subject to re-entry bans to the Russian Federation. In 2015, preliminary investigation into factors acting in the countries of migrants' origin and in migration was carried out in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, involving interviews with experts and officials.[1] It helped outline the process of radicalization, linking it to a combination of internal (individual) and external (socioeconomic and ideological) factors. Respondents identified as more vulnerable certain groups among Central Asian migrants, highlighting the role of links to the diaspora and home communities as well as trust toward state and religious authorities during migration and after their return to places of origin as important deterrents to the onset of radicalization.

In 2016, general hypotheses resulting from the above-mentioned preliminary assessment were tested through analysis of interviews with migrants, officials, experts, community and spiritual leaders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as reference to public information on policy, legal and administrative measures aimed at preventing and countering radicalization in these three countries.[2] The study denied a direct link between labour migration and radicalization, noting that migration was not "sufficient to account for cases of radicalization of migrants". At the same time, the analysis of socio-economic vulnerabilities faced by migrant workers during their stay abroad and upon return and the assessment of limited re-integration opportunities set forth a thesis that a combination of factors acting on this group could help account for the greater susceptibility to radicalization of certain individuals. These included:

> *the economic downturn, the presence of radical messages in religious communites in both the country of destination and origin and the sense of social injustice and desperation, felt by certain migrants when faced with the loss of legal status and an uncertain economic future.*[3]

Phase II of the assessment takes account of the changing environment for return migration – economic recovery in Russia, realignment of migrant flows – and

1 Rapid field assessment on possible radicalization of re-entry banned migrant workers was carried out in August 2015 and presented at the High-Level Meeting of Senior Officials of the Almaty Process in Astana in September 2015.
2 IOM. Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration – Regional Field Assessment in Central Asia. Astana, Kazakhstan, November 2016.
3 Ibid., p. 36.

of the shifting threats of violent extremism, including the shrinking of the territory controlled by Daesh in Syria and Iraq and a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg. This chapter weighs the impact that a range of fundamental factors, operating both in the countries of Central Asian migrants' destination, have had on the grounds of radicalization, postulated in Phase I. Analysis of public statements and reports as well as of interviews with experts, officials and community and spiritual leaders has enabled IOM researchers to draw conclusions on the relative weight of these factors with regard to the migrants returning to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan while in migration and upon return.

At the same time, in Phase II the expert team maintained the focus on the potential for emergence of symptoms of radicalization, understood as a complex process "that can occur at various stages of migration" in Phase I.[4] Considering that the sociological interviews and focus groups with migrants did not raise the question of susceptibility to radical messages or awareness of cases of extremism, the team refrained from either assessing the likelihood of radicalization of migrants of a certain gender, ethnicity or place of origin. Nor did the experts intend to empirically identify the mechanisms by means of which the general grounds for radicalization (vulnerabilities) would be triggered ultimately leading to these categories of migrants joining extremist groups. Thus, as in Phase I, the fieldwork did not strive to identify migrant workers as a category which under specific circumstances would be more prone to becoming radicalized or to engaging in violent extremism.

One of the objectives of Phase II of the assessment was to verify the hypothesis that there is a link between factors of vulnerability of migrant workers and their susceptibility to radicalization. However, in compliance with the "do no harm" principle, the team of experts proposed to test this link through collection of secondary data and testimonies of experts, officials and religious and community leaders rather than through interviews with returning migrants. These respondents' perspectives were analysed in light of the available statistics on the trends in migration, remittances and opportunities for reintegration as well as on the measures to prevent risk of radicalization and counter violent extremism. This allowed the team to probe deeper the questions raised in Phase I of the assessment and consider the effectiveness of some of the measures from the point of view of the socio-economic vulnerabilities of the returning migrants and their possible exposure to radical ideologies.

Based on these insights, the report then identifies the relevant activities implemented by state authorities to assist returning migrants in finding satisfactory solutions to their socio-economic vulnerabilities and reduce the overall risk of radicalization for this group.[5] It is important to note that since the assessment of grounds of radicalization shifted the focus from the destination countries to the conditions of re-integration as possible deterring factors, a broader geographical perspective was adopted with regard to the target group, going beyond the re-entry banned migrants, returning from the Russian Federation, and considering the needs of other categories of returnees (both in terms of their legal status and destination of migration).

The government measures to counter and prevent violent extremism (PVE/CVE)[6] need therefore to be seen against the backdrop of the issues identified in the previous chapters of the report: migrant workers' overall legal and socioeconomic position as well

4 Ibid., p. 37.

5 It should be noted that, as in the Phase I assessment, a distinction is drawn between a complex process of radicalization that involves a set of beliefs, perceptions and attitudes and a proactive determination to engage in extremist activities. The report covers the grounds for the process of radicalization but it does not deal with mechanisms or circumstances in presence of which individuals or groups at a certain stage of radicalization can become more prone to committing extremist acts.

6 For the IOM definition of these terms, please refer to Mr. William Lacy Swing, Director General, International Organization for Migration, Statement, Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism: the Way Forward - High-level Segment Session, 8 April 2016, Geneva. https://www.iom.int/speeches-and-talks/statement-geneva-conference-preventing-violent-extremism-way-forward-high-level

as their relationship with their support networks in migration and upon return. Thus, it is important to note that as a result of the recession in the Russian economy, triggered by the global financial and economic downturn, and the subsequent depreciation of the rouble, migrant workers saw their earnings drop and many of them lost their jobs. This was happening alongside not infrequent cases of abuse and exploitation, discrimination against migrants and their families at different levels and limited access to social services, including healthcare, and non-observance of occupational health and safety rules and regulations at the workplace leading to work-related injuries.[7] Other significant factors of vulnerability of migrant workers also include unfortunate migration experience, deportation, expulsion and imposition of re-entry bans to Russia. The interviewed experts, officials, community and religious leaders noted those among determinant socioeconomic factors, conducive to potential radicalization. It is difficult to assess whether financial or non-material factors influence migrant workers the most, but respondents agree that with all probability their combination is likely to be at work.

The report also investigates the personal impact of the structural factors of vulnerability on migrants' perception of their situation, which is considered crucial in the possible onset of radicalization. Analysis of collected evidence shows that when migrants experience adverse conditions on a regular basis, it is only natural that the latter give rise to feelings of revolt, indignation and desire to oppose it in one way or another. If in this situation some "benefactors" in the form of individuals or organisations start fuelling this feeling of anger or are even willing to show them how to retaliate, these appeals often resonate with migrant workers driven to despair by their circumstances.

Relative to Phase I conclusions, some new factors are also observed that may trigger the radicalization process among migrants. It should not be overlooked that unresolved challenging issues of migration management, such as trafficking in human beings and irregular migration, give rise to new security challenges in the countries of destination as well as in the countries of origin of the migrants. In recent years extremist and terrorist organizations turned to using migrants to achieve their goals.

In line with the "theory of change" framework[8], the vital role that state policies play in affecting the potential of radicalization of the vulnerable groups is also considered. Particular attention in Phase II was given to the vital issue of trust on the part of returning migrants and their home communities toward state institutions both in the countries of destination and of origin of migrants. In this context, without ensuring that such trust is established on the local level, state counter-extremism policies could have some negative impact on the opportunities for the integration of migrants into the society, and eventually facilitate their potential radicalization. One example may be the sanctions applied towards those nationals who visited combat zones, which, according to the interviewed experts in the field of religion, if carried out without due regard to individual circumstances, may undermine their reintegration as well as alienate them in future interaction with the state.

As in Phase I, we consider opportunities for applying integration measures, involving a range of stakeholders (local governments, NGOs, donors and community and religious leaders) as one way in which such trust could be established or strengthened. However, in this Phase we shift the focus from measures, undertaken by central authorities to those that could target the local communities, serving as potential deterrents to the onset of radicalization.

7 See the sociological chapter of the report that identifies some vulnerabilities among migrants from Central Asia, namely among those who are subject to a re-entry ban.
8 See the chapter on the conceptual and methodological framework

1. POTENTIAL OF RADICALIZATION AMONG MIGRANTS

As noted in Phase I, the discussion of the question of grounds for potential radicalization of Central Asian nationals returning to their countries of origin was initially framed in security terms. Attention was paid to the immediate security implications of the return of former combatants in Syria and Iraq. The section below briefly addresses the state of the public and expert debate on the issue in 2017. At the same time, both the experts and officials began to consider the issue more broadly, addressing the question of preventing potential radicalization among the larger groups of Central Asian migrants at various stages of migration and return. The Phase II assessment concentrates on the grounds for radicalization that could act on migrants upon their return, relying on the combination of the analysis of interviews with returnees, experts and officials. Nevertheless, in line with the premises presented in Phase I, these immediate factors are considered alongside some contributing factors that may emerge prior to migrants' return. It needs to be stressed, however, that unlike the discussion of the internal factors, the enumeration and assessment of relative strength of the contributing factors has a tentative character, relying on secondary sources.

1.1. VULNERABILITY TO RADICALIZATION IN THE PROCESS OF MIGRATION

1.1.1. Issue of returning fighters

As noted in Phase I, the risk of return of former combatants from the Middle East to the CIS countries and in particular Central Asia was considered a major challenge. This question drew attention of both Russian and Central Asian officials and experts in 2017.

In April 2017, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin announced the number of individuals fighting in Syria. *"According to various estimates, about 20,000 foreign militants are fighting in Syria, of which 10,000 are from the CIS countries. About 9,000, by some estimates, just under half are from Russia. About 5,000 are from Central Asian countries. Mainly from the countries-members of the CSTO."*[9] According to Andrey Novikov, head of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre (ATC), as of June 2017 *"over 7,000 of CIS countries' nationals are wanted for offences of terrorist and extremist nature, over 2,000 of them are mercenaries, i. e. those individuals who took part in military operations within the ranks of armed groups and international terrorist organizations in the third countries."*[10]

The risk was acknowledged in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As it will be discussed in greater detail below, recently Kyrgyzstan has stepped up efforts to address

9 Путин: Около 9 тыс боевиков из России и стран Центральной Азии воюют в Сирии [Putin: Almost 9 thousand fighters from Russia and Central Asian countries are fighting in Syria], http://ca-news.org/news:1376153?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 26 June 2017).

10 2 тыс. граждан стран СНГ, прошедших боевую обкатку в рядах боевиков, находятся в розыске, - антитеррористический центр СНГ [CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre: 2 thousand of CIS countries' nationals tested in combat as fighters are on the wanted list], www.ca-news.org/news:1391202?f=cp

the challenge. Similar to other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan opted for tougher punishment of nationals who directly participated in hostilities within the ranks of extremist organizations. New amendments to the legislation now provide for the withdrawal of their nationality. This explains why no programmes have been initiated in the country so far to facilitate the rehabilitation of returning fighters or their adaptation to the society. One high-ranking official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan said that *"it is difficult to determine whether or not a migrant spent time in the combat zones"*[11], whereas representatives of the prosecutor's offices deem it necessary to make punishment harsher for citizens returning from the areas of military operations.[12]

The state authorities of Kyrgyzstan also have serious concerns that terrorists could enter the country disguised as refugees. The Kyrgyz Republic SFID report states that at present over 600 refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Ukraine live in Kyrgyzstan. "*Many members of terrorist and extremist organizations, placed on the wanted lists in other countries, use the opportunity to obtain a refugee status in Kyrgyzstan through their corruption channels and thus escape criminal justice. And then, staying in the country, they start spreading their ideology and recruiting mercenaries for Syria.*"[13]

The scale of returns of radicalized citizens to Kyrgyzstan is difficult to assess. In fact, community leaders from regions of migrants' origin tend to believe that the volume of returns is actually decreasing. The leader of a local community in the Kara-Suu district of the Osh Region stated that recently fewer nationals have been returning from Syria. "*They* (returning fighters) a*re not really noticeable. Nor do they speak much about those who died in combat.*"[14]

Similar decrease could be observed in returns to Tajikistan. In 2014/2015, and to a certain extent in the first half of 2016 the flow of Tajik nationals heading to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside the armed opposition forces against the authorities was increasing. Interviewed Tajik experts and officials agreed that by the end of 2016 a different trend was emerging: citizens of Tajikistan started to lose interest in joining religious anti-government military movements in Syria, Iraq and, possibly, in other countries. In their view, Central Asian nationals were to a lesser extent involved in large-scale military operations against Syrian and Iraqi forces. However, respondents expressed concern regarding a potential new trend — recruitment for the purposes of committing targeted terrorist acts, including in the territory of the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless Tajik officials and experts believe that despite the decline in religious radicalization of the Tajik population, the phenomenon itself still persists. When seen in comparison with the results of Phase I regional assessment, the main elements of the radicalization process abroad still hold true: propaganda by radical religious forces of their ideas, goals and objectives, search for the target audience, subsequent recruitment of a persuaded candidate who would not draw suspicion (for example, a citizen of Russia), and the use of this person to carry out certain actions, including isolated acts of terror.

1.1.2. Debate on the issue of migrants' potential radicalization in Russia

While our assessment did not seek to assess the level of vulnerability to radicalization among Central Asian

11 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
12 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
13 Report by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) on 31 October 2016, https://fiu.gov.kg/news/500 (accessed 18 April 2017).
14 Interview in the Kara-Suu district, Osh Region (08 April 2017).

migrants in Russia, the expert team considered the state of debate on the issue in two ways. On the one hand, attention has been paid to the diverging opinions on the subject in the Russian public space (briefly outlined below). On the other hand, positions of Central Asian experts and officials on the factors that could facilitate or deter the onset of radicalization among migrant workers from the region in destination countries, including Russia, were acknowledged.

Official data indicate relatively low level of involvement of migrant workers from Central Asian states in extremist activities in Russia. Based on the data provided by the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation[15], natives and citizens of the Central Asian countries represent only 5.5% (i.e. 427 individuals) of the total number of individuals (7,724) known to be involved in extremist activities or terrorism.

Recently, however, nationals of the Central Asian countries as well as Russian citizens born in Central Asia have been particularly singled out as the principal security threat in Russia where the latest terrorist attacks involving persons originating from[16] Central Asian countries directed public attention towards the situation in Central Asia. The terrorist attack that struck Saint Petersburg on 3 April 2017 drew the attention of the expert community to the question of radicalization in Kyrgyzstan, the native country of the perpetrator. Despite the fact that Akbarzhon Jalilov was a citizen of the Russian Federation and lived there for many years, Russian mass media and security services pointed to Central Asian migrants as a source of the terrorist threat in Russia. Attention was also drawn to Tajikistan, as nationals of that country were also among individuals arrested on suspicion of involvement in preparation and perpetration of this terrorist attack or even shot dead after showing armed resistance when apprehended by law enforcement officers.[17]

The domestic debate in Russia has so far failed to produce a consensus among experts or officials as to the assessment of the risk of radicalization affecting migrants. It was also limited to the extent that the conditions that could lead to the radicalization of migrants in the Russian Federation itself were not explored in depth for the most part.

Expert assessments of radicalization risks among migrants diverge. On the one hand, the head of the Centre for Islamic Studies at the Russian Institute for Innovation Development, Kirill Semyonov, does not see any distinct tendency for the radicalization of migrants from Central Asia in Russia. In turn, Igor Shestakov, chairman of a regional club of experts in Kyrgyzstan, believes that, using their networks in the Central Asian countries, extremist organizations have identified labour migration as an environment, in which recruitment could take place. International terrorist groups establish their cells in migrant communities under the disguise of providing social and financial support.[18]

According to the head of the Religion and Society Information Analysis Centre, Alexey Grishin, *"as for the risk of extremism, migration flows from the Central Asian countries are much safer compared to the movement in the opposite direction* (i.e. return from Russia – authors'

15 Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the RF, Перечень организаций и физических лиц, в отношении которых имеются сведения об их причастности к экстремистской деятельности или терроризму [List of organisations and individuals known to be involved in extremist activities or terrorism], http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act (accessed 01 June 2017).

16 Before the terrorist attack of 3 April 2017 in Saint Petersburg, another high-profile case involving a native of Kyrgyzstan was brought before the Moscow District Military Court. Kyrgyz-born Islamjon Zakhidov was trialed in a court hearing held in Saint Petersburg on accusations of joining the terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra and taking control of the Syrian city of Idlib. According to the prosecution, Zakhidov's parents divorced when he just started school in the city of Osh and he moved with his father to Syktyvkar (Russia) where he later became a Russian citizen. V Moskve sudyat urozhentsa Kyrgyzstana za uchastie v terroristicheskoy organizatsii Jabhat al-Nusra i zahvate siriyskogo goroda Idlib [Kyrgyz native on trial in Moscow for joining the terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra and taking control of the Syrian city of Idlib], http://svodka.akipress.org/news:1364493 (accessed 30 February 2017).

17 See, for example: Rossiya: Grazhdanin Sodik Ortikov obvinyon v souchastii v podgotovke tearkta v piterskom metro [Russia: citizen of Tajikistan Sodik Ortikov accused of complicity in preparation of the terror attack on the Saint Petersburg underground], http://www.fergananews.com/news/26314

18 Игорь Шестаков: Экстремистские организации обратили внимание на трудовую миграцию из ЦА [Igor Shestakov: Extremist organisations turn their attention to labour migration from Central Asia], Sodruzhestvo press-club, http://press-unity.com/analitika/9927.html (accessed 20 June 2017).

note). T*he main recruitment work with migrants takes place in the territory of Russia – they do not come here as terrorists, they catch this virus here.*" Still, A. Grishin believes that the key role in the radicalization of migrants is played by former migrants who, since the late 1990s, prosecuted by the Central Asian authorities, had to move to and settle in Russia where they gained legal status and began setting up muftiates. As a result, they represent over 70% of imams and muftis in spiritual Muslim governing bodies in the Asian part of Russia.[19]

The question of radicalization among migrant workers generates conflicting opinions not only among independent Russian experts; officials in Russian law enforcement agencies also hold opposing views. Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, says that "the core of terrorist groups" in Russia are migrants from the CIS countries who, once arrived in the country, start active recruitment work in migrant communities and find perpetrators for terrorist attacks in Russia.[20] The head of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre Andrey Novikov believes that migrant workers mainly fall prey to recruiters in the territory of Russia, the majority of them being targeted at building sites, markets and in dormitories.[21]

1.1.3. Assessment of the risk of radicalization in Kazakhstan

1.1.3.1 Changes in legal framework for preventing and countering extremism among foreign nationals

The issue of violent extremism has been recognized as an issue of growing concern in Kazakhstan. In 2016-2017, Kazakhstan promoted a stricter approach to punishments and penalties for extremist activity. On 22 December 2016 Kazakhstan adopted the legislation that focuses on more effective countering of extremism and terrorism.[22] The act granted wider powers of several State agencies, defining the competence of national security agencies in migration regulation. Moreover, provisions were made for alternative jurisdiction in the criminal procedure legislation for crimes involving illicit trafficking in arms and drugs and illegal migration.

The legislation brought in more severe sanctions by increasing the length of imprisonment for crimes related to terrorism and introducing mandatory confiscation of property of those who were convicted of extremism and terrorism. The law also changed the rules for importing religious literature and strengthened control over the use of communication devices as well as over the acquisition and storage of weapons.

In March 2017, new amendments to Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan introduced the provision for withdrawing the country's citizenship for terrorist crimes. The rationale was to reduce the possibility of foreign fighters returning to Kazakhstan from conflict zones and thus decrease the level of terrorist threat.

In an effort to improve the state's ability to monitor irregular movement, sanctions were also introduced against unauthorized residence. Owners of residential property would incur administrative liability for allowing individuals to reside at their property without

19 Россия, Центральная Азия, мигранты. Откуда и куда веет угрозами экстремизма? [Russia, Central Asia, migrants. Whence and where are the winds of extremism blowing?] http://www.fergananews.com/articles/9420 (accessed 29 May 2017).
20 Глава ФСБ РФ назвал основой террористических групп в России мигрантов из СНГ [Head of Russian FSB named CIS migrants the core of terrorist groups in Russia], http://ca-news.org/news:1375830 (accessed 12 April 2017).
21 Вербовка мигрантов в ИГ, или Синдром жертвы [Recruiting migrants to the IS, or the Victim syndrome], https://ru.sputnik.kg/analytics/20170428/1033132524/kto-gde-i-kak-verbuet-trudovyh-migrantov.html (accessed 29 April 2017).
22 Law of the RK No. 28-VI "On Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Migration and Employment of the Population".

registration. A number of clauses introduced sanctions against foreign nationals for residing not at the address of registration. Amendments and additions were also made to several legislative acts to clarify grounds for the expulsion from the country of foreign nationals who had violated the laws of Kazakhstan.

In 2016, the new State Programme for Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2020 was presented. The Programme focuses on countering financing of terrorist groups and their connections with foreign terrorist organizations in the new context. Its objectives include:

- preventing the propaganda of religious extremism, including on the internet and in social networks;
- fostering "zero tolerance" in society to any actions related to radical manifestations, especially in the sphere of religious relations;
- promoting religious education and correct understanding of the religious principles in line with the historical traditions of Kazakhstan;
- stimulating the cooperation between the government and NGOs and religious organizations.

1.1.3.2. Assessment of the level of participation of foreign nationals in extremist activities based on official data

The available data do not support the suggestion that there is a significant risk of migrant workers being involved in extremist activities in another destination country, Kazakhstan. While the overall level of registered extremism-related cases significantly increased between 2014 and 2016, the share of non-nationals in these acts has so far been relatively low.

According to the data provided by the Committee for Legal Statistics and Special Accounts at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan[23], in 2016 the rate of extremism-related crime registered in Kazakhstan grew by almost 150% from 331 to 554 (see Table 11) in all types of offences.

Nevertheless, recently a decline in registered cases of extremism was recorded. Far fewer crimes of this nature (65) were reported in the first five months of 2017 compared to the first six months of 2016 (281). It is hard to determine whether this decline can be attributed to the efficiency of the implemented measures or is due to the incomplete statistical period and data not yet finalised, but the trend is fairly obvious.

In 2016, 175 individuals were convicted of extremist and terrorist offences, of which 170 were citizens of Kazakhstan and 5 were citizens of the CIS countries. In 2015 there were no foreign nationals among those convicted of this type of crime and only 3 individuals in 2014. Therefore, it would be premature to talk about a new emerging trend. Moreover, it is not known whether there were citizens of the Central Asian states among the convicted and whether any of them were migrant workers.

1.2. POTENTIAL OF RADICALIZATION UPON RETURN

1.2.1. General radicalization trends in Kyrgyzstan

Potential for radicalization in Kyrgyzstan remains an issue, as both the indicators of detected extremist activities and evidence of radical religious rhetoric show. With regard to extremism trends, while the developments in the Middle East (military losses of ISIS) re-

23 http://qamqor.gov.kz/

Table 11. Trends in the rates of extremism-related crime in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2013–2017

	2013	2014	2015	2016	Jan–June 2016	Jan-May 2017
Incitement to social, national, clan, racial or religious hatred (Art. 164) / Incitement to social, national, clan, racial, class or religious discord (Art. 174)	39	44	82	163	99	23
Calls for the violent overthrow or change of the constitutional order or forcible violation of the unity of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Art. 170) / Propaganda or public calls for seizure or retention of power, as well as seizure or retention of power or forcible change of the constitutional order of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Art. 179)	1	2	2	6	4	
Separatist activities (Art. 180)			4	3	2	
Terrorism (Art. 233) / Act of terrorism (Art. 255)	4			10	4	
Propaganda of terrorism or public incitement to commit an act of terrorism (Art. 256-1)	27	42	81	173	84	34
Creation, leadership of a terrorist group and participation in its activity (Art. 257)	13	23	74	107	59	7
Financing terrorist or extremist activities (Art. 233-3) / Financing terrorist or extremist activity and other aiding and abetting of terrorism or extremism (Art. 258)	9	11	13	20	17	1
Recruitment or training or arming of individuals in order to conduct terrorist or extremist activity (Art. 233-4) / Recruitment or training or arming of individuals in order to conduct terrorist or extremist activity (Art. 259)	7	3	19	23	12	
Undergoing terrorist or extremist training (Art. 260)			6			1
Seizure of buildings, installations or means of communication (Art. 238) / Attack against building, installation, means of communication or their capture (Art. 269)				1		1
Total	**108**	**132**	**297**	**554**	**281**	**65**

Source: Committee for Legal Statistics and Special Accounts at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan

duced the number of Kyrgyz nationals fighting in Syria and Iraq, it would be premature to consider that the level of radicalization in Kyrgyzstan is in decline. Although since the end of 2016 fewer people are leaving for the conflict zones, statistics provided by the security services reveal significant extremism risks in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. In 2016 the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic identified and banned 27 religious extremist groups, arrested 95 individuals and curtailed 17 terrorist attacks.[24] Moreover, in 2016, law enforcement agencies uncovered 441 cases of religious extremist activity, up by 22.5% compared to 2015. During the raids 18,943 pieces of religious literature on paper or on electronic media were confiscated, whereas in 2015 only 9,594 similar materials were seized.[25] Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies are also working on uncovering and preventing financial transactions by extremist groups who could use migrants as a "convenient tool". Searching for financial information on 2,715 individuals wanted for terrorist and extremist crimes, the State Financial Intelligence Service of the Kyrgyz Republic identified 393 bank operations and 99 individuals who carried out transactions through the Kyrgyz financial system.[26]

The issue of radicalization and recruitment to extremist groups within prisons remains pertinent in Kyrgyzstan. The chair of the State Service for Execution of Punishments reported that the number of individuals convicted for terrorism and violent extremism and serving their sentences in closed-type prisons managed by this agency has already reached 180.[27]

As discussed in more detail below, deterioration in the ideological climate has been noted recently in Kyrgyzstan as some Islamic organizations and movements have taken positions far at odds with the official government position that seeks to reduce inter-religious conflicts. After the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), some extremist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, are gradually stepping up their anti-Russian rhetoric. More and more often they use anti-Russian slogans that criticise the Russian government policy with regard to the Muslim population.

1.2.2. General radicalization trends in Tajikistan

Official statistics demonstrate that risk of extremism has also been vigorously tackled in Tajikistan. In 2016 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan (MIA) succeeded in preventing 36 terrorist attacks. According to the head of this agency, these acts had been planned by terrorist groups, including Daesh, against the government authorities and civilian population. The MIA 2016 statistics show that over 50 individuals intending to perpetrate acts of terror and over 400 people on suspicion of being members of terrorist organizations were arrested in Tajikistan. Moreover, in the same year 22 individuals were returned from Syria and Iraq (80 individuals were brought back to Tajikistan in 2015) and nearly 300 individuals suspected of terrorism, extremism and forming criminal gangs were extradited to Tajikistan from other countries.[28]

At the same time, there are signs of diminishing inter-

24 В 2016 году ГКНБ удалось предотвратить 17 терактов [In 2016 SCNS thwarted 17 terror attacks], http://www.ktrk.kg/post/12575/ru (accessed 23 June 2017); ГКНБ задержал боевика, планировавшего совершить теракты в Кыргызстане [SCNS detained a fighter who was planning terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan] http://svodka.akipress.org/news:1388982?from=mportal&place=top (accessed 23 June 2017).

25 Распространение религиозно-экстремистских материалов можно объяснить ростом числа верующих и их религиозной безграмотностью, - отчет по НСУР [National Sustainable Development Strategy Report: Proliferation of religious extremist materials is likely to be linked to the rising numbers of worshipers and their religious illiteracy], http://www.for.kg/news-429318-ru.htm (accessed 31 May 2017).

26 Report by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) on 31 October 2016, www.fiu.gov.kg/uploads/588efcaff045e.doc (accessed 18 April 2017).

27 За терроризм и религиозный экстремизм в Кыргызстане отбывают наказание более 180 граждан [In Kyrgyzstan over 180 individuals serve sentences for terrorism and religious extremism], http://kyrtag.kg/society/za-terrorizm-i-religioznyy-ekstremizm-v-kyrgyzstane-otbyvayut-nakazanie-bolee-180-grazhdan (accessed 26 June 2017).

28 https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20170120/v-proshlom-godu-v-tadzhikistane-predotvratsheno-36-teraktov

est in radical organisations. In his speech at the session of the upper chamber of the parliament on 16 February 2017, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Tajikistan reported that five times fewer citizens of Tajikistan left the country to join the ranks of Islamic State in 2016 compared to 2015. However, he did not specify the exact number of Tajik nationals fighting abroad alongside Daesh and other similar movements.[29] According to data provided by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan Ramazon Rakhimzoda, in 2016 only 40 individuals joined Daesh[30], an organization banned in Tajikistan, far fewer than in 2015.[31]

The declining appeal of Daesh does not remove the threat of radicalization. Interviewed officials at the Committee on Religious Affairs, Regulation of National Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies under the Government of Tajikistan and the Centre for Islamic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan point to an increase in other risks, in particular to the growing role of ideological factor as well as the impact of the unstable situation in neighbouring Afghanistan.

The core principles, direction and content of the propaganda remain virtually unchanged from those discussed in detail in Phase I regional assessment (2016). A notable development is the growing importance of various forms of digital technology targeting mainly young people aged under 25. The main product used in this line of propaganda is video messages in different languages (Uzbek, Tajik, Russian).

As observed by the experts at the Centre for Islamic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, the authors of propaganda materials primarily seek to reinterpret the Khanafi mazkhab that is so familiar to the Tajik population so as to pass themselves off as defenders of the Khanafi mazkhab[32] while introducing radical contents into the presentation. They also attempt to create an appealing image of radical religious organisations and to incite interest in them among the target audience.

Authorities of Tajikistan consider also a range of external factors to be a growing influence on the religious radicalization of some of the citizens of the country, including those in labour migration. One of them is the support provided to radical groups in Tajikistan from abroad. In this context, while speaking at the Arab-Islamic-American summit in the Saudi capital Riyadh, in his speech at the summit, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon addressed the problem of double standards: *"In view of 'double standards' policy towards extremist and terrorist ideas radical groups benefit from the political, informational and financial support of so called public foundations and organizations and other entities. Consequently, terrorism and extremism have extended the geography of their distribution in the most horrific ways. These challenges provoked threats to and extinction of whole states, led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people and caused unprecedented demolition across many countries and territories."*[33]

The issue of immediate concern is the aggravation of the security situation in Afghanistan. Tajikistan remains vulnerable as the official government of Afghanistan and coalition forces actually control only a small part of the country.[34] In the early spring of 2017 there were reports that Daesh was gaining ground in the north of Afghanistan and according to some

29 https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20170216/genprokuror-v-pyat-raz-menshe-tadzhikov-stalo-voevat-za-ig

30 Also known as "Islamic State" or ISIL (the use of the Russian designation of this organization is prohibited in Kazakhstan since it produces an incorrect image of a territory allegedly of statehood and the power of Islam; instead, an Arabic acronym "Daesh" is used that does not convey any specific meaning and is somewhat offensive to the adherents of this terrorist movement).

31 https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20170120/v-proshlom-godu-v-tadzhikistane-predotvratsheno-36-teraktov

32 The Hanafi mazkhab (madhhab) is one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence prevalent in Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, the Balkans, Russia and other countries.

33 http://www.president.tj/ru/node/15423

34 It is worth noting that the nearly 1500-kilometer-long border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan mostly runs through the mountainous region, some parts of which are difficult to guard.

Afghan nationals, Daesh armed groups were seen in close proximity of the Tajik border in the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan.[35] Since the beginning of May 2017, a concentration of Taliban, Ansarullah and Daesh fighters has been observed in the north of the Kunduz Province, right next to the Qumsangir and Panj districts of the Khatlon Region of Tajikistan. Between 1st and 20th May 2017 Ansarullah fighters carried out 11 armed attacks on Tajik border guards.[36] These attacks clearly illustrate the fact that the activity of external radical movements in Tajikistan is gradually shifting from a long distance influence, as before May 2017, to an open armed conflict. Instability in Afghanistan also poses another danger: in these difficult social and economic conditions faced nowadays by Tajikistan's neighbour, radicals from various movements feel at home and actively pursue their propaganda.

35 Situatsia na severe Afganistana uhudshaetsia: rasskazyvaet mestnyy zhitel, kommentiruet spetsialist [Situation in northern Afghanistan is getting worse: the story by a local man, a commentary of the expert], http://www.fergananews.com/articles/9405)

36 At present about 200 Ansarullah and ISIL fighters are stationed in the Minchukur area of the Afghan Kunduz Province and more militants join them every day from neighbouring Badakhshan Province. See Sh. Sobiri, Dzhiihadisty gotovyat vtorzhenie na territoriu Tadjikistana [Jihadists are preparing an invasion into Tajikistan], 16.06.2017. http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1497562140

2. FACTORS OF POTENTIAL RADICALIZATION

2.1. GROUNDS FOR POTENTIAL RADICALIZATION IN MIGRATION

Considering that Phase II assessment has not included fieldwork in the Russian Federation, no definitive identification of the grounds of radicalization among Central Asian migrant workers in Russia has been attempted. Instead, the expert team relied on the combination of analysis of publicly available data (socio-economic indicators, official statements and reports) and interviews with officials in Central Asian states and Central Asian and Russian experts to map potential factors that could contribute to the greater likelihood of emergence of radicalization.[37] The analysis should therefore not be interpreted as a tool for establishing the mechanisms or most vulnerable groups that could be more prone to extremist messaging or to involvement in extremist activities.

2.1.1. Potential contribution of social and economic root causes

Interviews with officials and experts note the changes in the socio-economic position of Central Asian migrants as potential contributing factors to their radicalization. They indicated in particular that socially and economically vulnerable, single migrants with no established social networks might become hostage to their circumstances in the country of destination so that the conditions that they experienced in Russia could lead to social and psychological tensions. As a result, they might find radical and protest ideas more attractive.

Phase I regional field assessment (2016) posited that the economic downturn in the destination country highlighted the importance of financial incentives as an instrument of recruitment. Some interviews during the current Phase II stressed the continued relevance of this set of factors. Many state officials believe that financial reasons are the main factor driving migrant workers to join radicalised groups. A Kyrgyz official gave the following testimony: "*I spoke to our nationals returning from combat zones in Syria and Iraq. All of them say they went there to earn 'big money'*".[38] The geographical distribution of remittances analysed by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) shows that Kyrgyz nationals with a low level of education and no professional qualifications were particularly prone to be transited to Syria under the pretences of well-paid employment.[39]

The analysis of the recent changes in the economic environment appears to suggest that for the majority of migrants, the "pull" factors of the Russian economy are again determining for their willingness to stay in the country. At the end of January 2016 the exchange rate of the Russian rouble fell to its historic low of

37 See the conceptual and methodological chapter for the distribution of respondents, consulted as part of this assessment.
38 Interview with a senior official in one of the state institutions in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
39 Report by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) on 31 October 2016, https://fiu.gov.kg/news/500 (accessed 18 April 2017).

83.59 roubles to 1 US dollar but by the end of 2016 it regained a quarter of its value.[40] Strengthening of the Russian currency continued in 2017. As of 21 April 2017, the official rate of exchange was 56.23 roubles to 1 US dollar.[41] In 2015 consumer prices in Russia grew by 12.9% but in 2016 they slowed down to 5.4%, a record low in the country's modern history.[42] According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Russian GDP grew by 0.3% in the fourth quarter of 2016 compared to the same period of 2015. At the same time, the Central Bank of Russia estimates that the GDP growth rate will reach 1–1.5% in 2017 and will stay at 1–2% in 2018–2019 given the current signs of economic recovery and increasing resilience of the economy to fluctuations on global markets.[43]

The improving economic climate in Russia could therefore translate into more favourable economic conditions for Central Asian migrant workers allowing them to earn their living and discouraging them from joining various extremist organizations, including those engaged in military operations against the official authorities in the Middle Eastern countries in the hope of solving their financial problems.

At the same time, expert interviews confirm the relevance of socio-economic grounds for radicalization of some of the more vulnerable categories among migrants. From the series of interviews with Kyrgyz state officials it became immediately apparent that the country's law enforcement agencies consider current conditions in Russia to be conducive to radicalization of migrant workers. One official working in the religious sphere noted that "*local conditions in Russia push migrants towards radicalization. In Russia our people get more radicalized than here.*"[44]

As suggested in Phase I regional assessment (2016), socio-economic challenges may be contributing factors to radicalization of the vulnerable migrants when accompanied by sense of their alienation and inability to get help. Interviewed officials pointed to a whole range of such factors: the threat of nationalist extremist movements, criminal gangs engaged in racketeering, ill-treatment by law enforcement officials or other reasons that impede the integration of migrnats in diaspora communities. Cases of exploitation and fraud also affect the social and psychological state of migrants. Not only private employers but even municipal institutions do not pay salaries to migrants sometimes.[45] In this context, many respondents identified mosques to be among the very few institutions migrants turn to for help and advice. Migrants reported occasions when the imam in a mosque helped other migrants in a desperate situation. Sometimes migrants would even ask imams where and how to rent a flat or how to find a job.[46] In the countries of destination, it is not uncommon that *jamaats* (communities) at the mosques to raise funds to support migrants in need. "*Imams ask and appeal to jamaats to help migrants in need. I remember, we raised 30 thousand roubles for a migrant who had broken his leg. Sometimes imams let migrants stay for the night in mosques*."[47]

In addition, mosques and religious communities play an important integrative role. Interviewed officials

40 Seninskiy S. http://www.svoboda.org/a/28213219.html.
41 http://www.finmarket.ru/currency/
42 Consumer price dynamics: results for 2016. Analytical Centre for the Government of the Russian Federation. Bulletin on current trends in the Russian economy, No. 21, January 2017, p.3. http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/11681.pdf
43 Ivanov F. Ekonomika Rossii pereshla v stadiu rosta [Russian economy is growing again] https://rns.online/articles/Ekonomika-Rossii-pereshla-v-stadiyu-rosta-2017-03-31/.
44 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
45 Жизнь взаймы: 1,5 тысячам строителей метро и МЦК не платят полгода [Living on borrowed money: 1.5 thousand builders of the underground and Moscow Ring Railway received no salary in 6 months], https://openrussia.org/notes/705674/ (accessed 29 April 2017); Эксперт о страхах, унижениях и невидимой радикализации мигрантов в России [Expert on fears, humiliation and invisible radicalization of migrants in Russia], http://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20170619/o-strahah-unizheniyah-i-nevidimoi-radikalizatsii-migrantov-tsa-v-rossii (accessed 21 June 2017).
46 It should be noted in this context that other religious organizations in the Russian Federation (for instance, Russian Orthodox Church) also provided support to migrants and victims of trafficking from Central Asia.
47 FGD with migrants in Osh (17 February 2017).

noted that migrants come into contact with a foreign culture and an alien public order. In these circumstances, religion becomes an instrument for identity preservation. For instance, according to the director of the State Commission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic (SCRA KR), the large numbers of migrants attending sermons by visiting Kyrgyz religious scholars in Russia indicate their increased need for moral support.[48]

Another development is the tendency among some migrants to reduce their interaction with the host community. During focus group discussions in southern Kyrgyzstan more religious participants admitted that they prefer to go to work in those parts of Russia where Muslims are in the majority. They explained their decision by saying that they feel more comfortable among Muslims as they are able to better satisfy their religious needs.[49]

2.1.2. Relative importance of ideological grounds

The combination of the improving economic situation for the general population of migrants in Russia and the declining appeal of recruitment in the Middle East have been accompanied by the changing strategy and tactics of Daesh and other extremist entities. As Tajik officials stress, with increasing military cooperation of a number of states and due to the efficiency of these measures, especially in Syria and Iraq, these militant groups move away from large-scale armed confrontation with government forces in the Middle East and Northern Africa and change their tactics to targeted terrorist acts in European countries, including Russia. To carry out these attacks they need much smaller numbers of well trained, ideology-driven perpetrators.

Testimonies of both the experts and migrants reveal a certain shift in religious attitudes among Central Asian migrants. There are reports of the spread of more conservative interpretations of Islam among nationals of Kyrgyzstan emigrated to Russia. The qazi (head of the regional SAMK subdivision) of the Jalal-Abad Region strongly believes that young people join Salafi groups while they are abroad.[50] Other religious leaders also agree with this view. One religious leader in Kyzyl-Kiya, Osh Region, noted that "some migrants return as Salafi followers and, therefore, are very different from the rest of the jamaat. People often ask: who is right, us or them?"[51] Security officials in Kyrgyzstan are furthermore convinced that in Russia uneducated migrants with little religious knowledge are targeted by the propaganda of other branches of Islam (not only Salafi, but also Wahhabi).[52]

Fieldwork indicates various paths in which radical ideas could spread among migrants. Interviews with migrants from Kyrgyzstan suggested that a contributing factor could be extremist organizations that are banned from operating in Central Asian countries and in Russia. Nonetheless, they are able to promote their ideology: "*Migrants, police, ordinary people, everybody knows which mosque (in Kazan) belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir. After namaz, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists approach worshipers and start their propaganda, give out their literature*."[53]

However, migrants might be recruited in their immediate milieu as well. One high-ranking government official emphasised the role of migrants and employers from the Northern Caucasus in the radicalization of Kyrgyz migrants,[54] a fact also confirmed by recruited

48 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
49 FGD in Jalal-Abad (15 February 2017).
50 Interview in Jalal-Abad (8 April 2017).
51 Interview in Kyzyl-Kiya (08 April 2017).
52 Interview with a senior official in one of the state institutions in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
53 FGD with migrants in Osh (17 February 2017).
54 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).

Kyrgyz nationals in their statements.[55]

2.2. GROUNDS FOR RADICALIZATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

2.2.1. Kyrgyzstan

2.2.1.1. Socio-economic reasons for radicalization

Interviews and focus groups with returning migrants (with or without re-entry bans to the Russian Federation) have identified significant socio-economic vulnerabilities. In this context, a crucial issue is the availability of assistance that would address those vulnerabilities. Discussions with religious leaders suggest that unaddressed vulnerabilities may become grounds for radicalization. While the incidence of such cases cannot be ascertained, various reports collected during the fieldwork indicate the existence of a larger issue. Many returning migrants struggle to find jobs on their own and some of the socially and economically vulnerable members of the population have sought solutions to their problems by turning to religious extremist organizations.

Young people have been identified as a vulnerable category in Phase I regional field assessment (2016). In this phase (2017) we looked at some measures that could be deployed to prevent their radicalization. During a focus group discussion in Balykchy (Issyk-Kul region), members of a youth movement pointed to the importance of properly organised leisure, in which youth could attend sporting events and join sports clubs. However, it should be noted that in Kyrgyzstan sports is only in the early stages of development and requires serious investment. Those respondents then honestly admitted that when they asked for help to repair the gym that they opened using their own resources, they received only one offer – from the leader of a local criminal gang.[56] Furthermore, as it was already noted in the Phase I report, some radical religious groups open their own sports clubs eagerly attended by young people.

The case of exposure to criminal networks illustrates a broader trend, reported by sources in the Kyrgyz authorities. Law enforcement officials noted that migrants with a criminal record, unable to earn their living once they return home, stay in contact with the criminal world.[57] They expressed growing concern over the emerging nexus between criminal networks and unconventional religious fundamentalist movements.[58]

A recent study by UN Women has identified women in a variety of roles related to radicalization in Kyrgyzstan, including recruitment.[59] The authors of the study concluded that *"women from Kyrgyzstan share the propensity of women globally and supporters of violent extremism, and specific prevention strategies need to be designed to reach these women and girls before they turn to violence*".[60]

Our fieldwork confirms that a number of factors, both socio-economic and ideological, underlie women's decisions to support or join these organizations. A number of vulnerabilities have been identified in the course of sociological fieldwork. Interviewed religious and community leaders noted the link between socio-economic vulnerabilities and radicalization. For

55 ИГИЛ готовила 25-летнего парня из Оша для грабежей богатых граждан Сирии [ISIS trained 25-year old man from Osh to rob rich Syrians], http://www.turmush.kg/ru/news:1374124/?from=ru_turmush&place=newstop4d (accessed 04 April 2017).
56 FGD in Balykchy (12 May 2017).
57 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
58 «В Киргизии религиозные экстремисты сращиваются с криминалитетом?» http://www.sayasat.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45298:religios-extremists-in-kyrgyzstan-spliced-with-criminals&catid=26&Itemid=132&lang=ru (accessed 30 August 2016)
59 Speckhard A., Shajkovci A., Esengul C., Women and Violent Extremism in Supporting, Joining, Intervening, and Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan, UN Women, June 2017, http://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20eca/attachments/publications/2017/i_unw_eca_kyrg%20chapter%20final.pdf?la=en&vs=1158 (acccessed 20 November 2017).
60 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

instance, the leader of a non-governmental organization in Osh pointed to a growing incidence of early marriages that lead women to join informal *jamaats* and organizations for the purposes of gaining religious education. In his opinion, women are exposed to radical groups through those unregistered religious organizations and communities: *"Religious women (otyncha) set up their own informal religion classes. They will not study at official madrassas."* [61]

Socio-economic barriers and need for advancement may also be used as incentives. There is evidence that young women with medical degrees who cannot be locally employed are offered highly-paid jobs allegedly in Turkish hospitals but then trafficked to conflict zones.[62] Another issue of concern that could be relevant in this context is widespread violence towards women. Statistical data collected by the Kyrgyz Association of Crisis Centres shows that 83% of women in Kyrgyzstan are subjected to psychological, emotional, sexual or domestic abuse.[63]

Migrants' children with no appointed guardian or strong ties with parents also become an easy target for extremist organizations. Experts and officials consider absence of public education for many children (especially orphaned or abandoned) as a risk factor for their radicalization. The official statistics reveal that 3,045 school-age children do not attend school in Kyrgyzstan. According to the deputy minister of education and science of Kyrgyzstan, children do not go to school out of religious beliefs or because their parents migrated away from home.[64] A security expert interviewed in Bishkek concluded that madrassas in Kyrgyzstan are already run as boarding schools.[65] Abandoned children are exposed to agitation by religious organizations with destructive intentions. The Kyrgyz State Financial Intelligence Service has information that over 50 families moved to Syria, including 122 women and 83 minor children.[66] A representative of another NGO specialising in vulnerable migrants reported some cases where once graduated from boarding schools migrants' children and orphans are left without any support, abandoned to a life of loneliness and nobody cares about them.[67]

Local community and religious leaders also believe that since the state agencies do not always have the capacity to provide social assistance to vulnerable groups of the population,[68] religious organizations set up their own, alternative networks of mutual support. In the words of a religious leader from Kyzyl-Kiya:

Salafists have an informal fund (waqf). They help each other. Everyone pays a contribution. A person who received money from this fund is allowed not to repay it if the money is needed for an emergency. But if he borrowed funds to invest into business or property, he must repay it (without interest).[69]

2.2.1.2. Ideological grounds for radicalization

While socio-economic factors may play a crucial role in exposing the vulnerable segments of population to the risk of radicalization, the assistance provided by radical organizations has strong ideological undertones and

61 Interview in Osh (07 April 2017).
62 Report by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) on 31 October 2016, https://fiu.gov.kg/news/500 (accessed 18 April 2017).
63 Кыз-келиндердин басмырлоого каршы жүрүшү, http://www.azattyk.org/a/human_right_kyrgyzstan_8-march_womans-day_rights_2017/28357370.html (accessed 15 May 2017).
64 Кыргызстанда үч миңден ашуун бала мектепке барбайт, https://www.azattyk.org/a/28361854.html (accessed 11 March 2017).
65 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
66 Report by the State Financial Intelligence Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SFID) on 31 October 2016, https://fiu.gov.kg/news/500 (accessed 18 April 2017).
67 Interview in Osh (13 June 2017).
68 ICG, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°72, 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia (accessed 16 April 2017).
69 Interview with a religious leader in Kyzyl-Kiya (08 April 2017).

effectively is a manipulation of people's needs. One official expressed it as follows: *"Recruiters offer migrants a way out of the debt pit. Divine laws in place of earthly laws, religious justice instead of corruption."*[70]

On the other hand, law enforcement agencies consider economic vulnerabilities to have triggered a minority of cases of departure for combat zones. According to the Kyrgyz MIA data, out of the total number of those who went to combat zones over 70% had ideological motives and only 30% of fighters did it for financial reasons: *"I do not think they are being turned into zombies. Ideology plays an important role here."*[71]

As we already hypothesized in Phase I, socio-economic deprivation of migrants was not sufficient for triggering radicalization. Instead, the combination of personal status, self-worth and sense of alienation from and mistrust toward the state institutions could play a role. One religious leader in Jalal-Abad said that *"migrants who lost their jobs and were forced to return to Kyrgyzstan resent the state and the society in general. They come to the mosque to ask God for help."*[72]

As noted in Phase I assessment, religious institutions and ideas have come to play an increasingly important role in the public life in Kyrgyzstan. Apart from catering to social and economic issues affecting various layers of population, they have built significant levels of trust. A study run by the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University[73] has shown that religious organisations are the most trusted entities among socio-political institutions in the society: 43% of surveyed Kyrgyz citizens said that they have full confidence in religious organizations, followed by the armed forces of the Kyrgyz Republic (35.2%), mass media (24.7%), the President (23.5%) and international organizations (23.1%).

The shifting ideological currents in the general religious sphere thus may exert powerful impact. In this Phase of the assessment, interviewed officials and experts have concentrated on the spread of radical religious ideologies among the vulnerable groups. Experts point to young people and ethnic minorities as the categories that are currently particularly vulnerable to the appeal of radical ideologies spreading in Kyrgyzstan.

Marginalization and isolation of a certain part of young population and their interest in religion creates favourable conditions to promote and disseminate radical religious ideas. Expressing one's resentment through religiously-charged language and imagery is becoming increasingly common among young people. Radicals have targeted young people with messages, responding to this group's disillusionment with the state and community figures of authority, offering their own ideals and authority figures to be emulated.

The expert community is also concerned by a recent sharp increase in the amount of video and audio content available in Russian and Kyrgyz languages encouraging Kyrgyz young people to join jihad in Syria and Iraq. A series of video messages are published on social networks showing Kyrgyz Jihadi fighters within the ranks of extremist organizations in the Middle East addressing their compatriots back in Kyrgyzstan.[74] Recent studies have demonstrated that the principal consumers of extremist material in the social media are school children, students and unemployed young people.[75]

Religious extremist organizations provide their follow-

70 Interview with a senior official in one of the state institutions in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
71 FDG with security services officials in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
72 Interview in Jalal-Abad (07 April 2017).
73 Жаран кантип иденттешет?, edited by Kusein Isayev, Maxprint, Bishkek 2016, p. 169.
74 «Обращение к братьям с Қырғызстана из благословленного земля шаама» [Address to brothers in Kyrgyzstan from the blessed land of Sham], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUrxgyWrKEM&t=117s. (accessed 13 March 2017); «Абу Уккаша - Бизди жихатка ыймаңыбыз алып келди», https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXN0rPNOx5I (accessed 23 April 2017).
75 US State Department and Search for Common Ground. Smysly, obrazy i mediakanaly, sposobsnvuyushchie radikalizatsii molodezhi Kyrgyzstana [Meanings, images and media channels contributing to radicalization of the youth in Kyrgyzstan] https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/.../Action-Research_Outcomes_FINAL_RUS.pdf (accessed 02 July 2017).

ers with ready-made templates (frameworks) that enable every member to legitimise their radical decisions and actions. Philosophical foundations of radical groups are built around a set of ideological attitudes. The state of isolation of a radical, their attitude to the outside world as well as decisions they make and actions they take are expressed through specific concepts.

Based on the analysis of the contents of the media used for recruitment it is possible to see the tendency for a deliberate incorrect interpretation and use religious terms to justify violent extremism. This strategy results in strong determination of adherents, as noted by an interviewed religious leader: *"They go to Syria not for the money and not because they were 'black-listed'. They follow the call of their hearts. They sell their cars, houses, other property to go there. They know that there is death at the end of this path. They go for religious reasons*".[76]

2.2.1.3 Question of the risk of radicalization among ethnic minorities

Some studies raised the issue of the radicalization risk among ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan. The 2016 Mercy Corps research paper demonstrated that the Uzbek section of the population in southern Kyrgyzstan perceived that they were treated unfairly and that their economic opportunities were severely limited.[77] According to the expert Bakyt Dubanayev, socio-economic problems are indeed the root cause of radicalization of Uzbek youth in the south of the country. His research also shows that ethnic Uzbeks are less integrated socially and economically and are more vulnerable to radical messages.[78]

In interviews with experts and officials we raised the question of specific factors that could play a role in radicalization of ethnic minorities. However, due the limited scope of the assessment we were not able to draw conclusions on the gravity of various factors.

Some experts take the view that radicalization among ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan has ideological grounds. For example, an unofficial leader in Jalal-Abad[79] believes that one of the reasons for radicalization of ethnic Uzbeks is the spread of Salafi ideas.[80] Following some meetings with unofficial community leaders it became apparent that other ethnic minorities are also exposed to Salafi influences.

On the other hand, growing radicalization among the ethnic Uzbeks has been also linked by some interviewed experts and officials to the unresolved socio-economic problems faced by ethnic minorities. One religious leader in southern Kyrgyzstan noted that minorities "*have very few channels of communication with the state authorities. They do not come into contact with the state. They get in touch with the state only when they need to obtain some certificate or pay taxes.*" [81]

2.2.2. Tajikistan

2.2.2.1. Categories of population vulnerable to radicalization

Experts tend to agree that Tajik migrant workers are being recruited in Russia. According to Lieutenant-General Andrey Novikov, head of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, just a year ago skilful propaganda in

76 Interview with a religious leader in Jalal-Abad (07 April 2017).
77 Vulnerable to Manipulation, Interviews with Migrant Youth and Youth Remittance-Recipients in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Mercy-Corps-Kyrgyzstan-Vulnerable-to-Manipulation-Youth-Report-2016.pdf
78 Azattyk.https://www.azattyk.org/a/28216406.html (accessed 16 September 2017).
79 Interview with a religious leader in Jalal-Abad (07 April 2017); «На юге Кыргызстана началась явная салафизация. Шейхи Кувейта и Катара привозят квоты для бесплатного обучения в Мединском университете, - К. Маликов» [K. Malikov: Conversion to Salafism is openly under way in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Kuwait and Qatar sheikhs give out quotas for free education in the Madinah University] http://kg.akipress.org/news:1385759?from=mportal&place=last.
80 During interviews it was noted that some spiritual leaders preaching Salafism receive financial support from countries where Salafi theology predominates for building mosques and madrassas in their mahallas.
81 Interview with a religious leader in Jalal-Abad (08 April 2017).

social networks stood out as the most widespread recruitment technique but more recently there was a noticeable drop in this type of activity. This is the result of effective measures taken by the security services and law-enforcement agencies. While investigating specific criminal cases it was revealed that recruiters have now moved their activities to WhatsApp, Viber, Skype and other messengers.

General Novikov highlighted three categories of the population, potentially susceptible to recruitment:

- Young people (due to lack of life experience and an inherent inability to assess the consequences of their actions);
- Migrant workers (since they live under constant economic and physiological stress);

Prisoners (owing to the fact that common criminals are detained together with those who were convicted of extremist offences).[82]

A recent study, published in Dushanbe, presents a profile of youth vulnerable to radicalization. It concludes that the phenomenon specifically affects young people who do not have sufficient knowledge of the fundamental principles, genuine values and purposes of Islam. They are easily brainwashed, they fall more readily for deceitful propaganda. According to experts, this group includes young people between 14 and 35, with the sample concentrated in the cohort ranging from 18 to 27 years of age.[83]

It is worth stressing that the distinguishing feature is the insufficient religious education. This does not preclude the involvement of young people with generally high general education. British researchers Edward Lemon and John Heathershaw claim that *"almost 50% of the fighters are well-educated graduates with degrees from secular universities"*. They mention Nasim Nabotov as an example: he studied economics at Russia's prestigious Moscow State University before dropping out and going to Syria to fight. They also point out that a 2016 report by the World Bank found that 69% of a sample of 3,803 Daesh fighters completed at least secondary education.[84]

2.2.2.2. General grounds for potential radicalization

The interviewed experts and officials in Tajikistan have tackled the question of how the general grounds for radicalization in the country could contribute to the potential radicalization of returning migrants. Interviewed independent experts as well as those working in government emphasise that the phenomenon of radicalization is not new and it is an ongoing process. In any society, there are dissatisfied individuals, those who disagree, among other things, with the way religious matters are treated. As a rule, they note that dissatisfied people are ready and willing to demonstrate their discontent, which at times can take radical forms. In this Phase we considered two specific factors: deteriorating economic situation and the changes in the religious activities of the population.

Economic situation. The main economic impact of the Russian crisis on migrants from Tajikistan and their households was the sharp drop in money transfers from Russia which could give rise to dissatisfaction among some groups of the Tajik people.[85] Migrants' remittances from Russia have been of crucial significance for the economic development of Tajikistan, at least in the last 10 years. The decline in remittances

82 Sheludiakova M. Sindrom zhertvy: kto, gde i kak verbuyet trudovyh migrantov [Victim syndrome: who, where and how recruits migrant workers], http://ru.sputnik-tj.com/analytics/20170428/1022180947/verbovka-migranty-rossiya-terrorizm-zhertva.html

83 Kholiknazar Khudoberdy. Respublika Tajikistan v borbe protiv terrorizma i religioznogo ekstremizma v period gosudarstvennoy nezavisimosti [Republic of Tajikistan: combating terrorism and religious extremism after the independence]. Dushanbe. Irfon publishing house, 2016, pp.108-109.

84 Lemon E., Heathershaw J.: How can we explain radicalisation among Central Asia's migrants? https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/edward-lemon-john-heathershaw/can-we-explain-radicalisation-among-central-asia-s-migrants

85 See also the socioeconomic chapter for extended discussion of the impact of the economic downturn on migrants' welfare.

had a negative impact on the state of the country's economy. But rural areas were especially hard hit, being home to over 70% of the population of Tajikistan. The main problem in this part of the country is youth unemployment. The weakening of the national currency, the somoni, against the US dollar (from 4.77 somoni to 1 US dollar on 1 January 2014 to 8.49 somoni to 1 US dollar on 11 May 2017 at the exchange rate of the National Bank of Tajikistan) was accompanied by a steady rise in prices for all commodities while wages failed to grow at the same rate, contributing to the worsening economic situation of the population of Tajikistan.

Key response measures taken by the government involved securing external and internal funding. However, financial support from abroad could not replace the significant sums of remittances from Russia and the government had to mobilize domestic resources. However, experts believe that, while intended as an appropriate and justified measure, the rise of taxation may have been perceived as an excessive burden on private companies. As a result, many small and medium businesses retreated into the "shadow" economy, hid under various criminal protection schemes or simply closed down leading to a narrowing of the overall tax base. In the long run, experts warn that an excessive tax burden may cause discontent among this economically active part of the population.

Ideological grounds. Since the late perestroika years (1988–1991) and declaration of independence, in parallel with similar developments throughout the post-Soviet area, the Tajik society has undergone a religious renaissance. It manifested itself in a dramatic surge in the numbers of worshipers regularly attending mosques as well as the numbers of working mosques, in mass pilgrimage and in departure of young people to Muslim countries with the intention to do religious studies. According to Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vitaly Naumkin, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies,, the phenomenon of religious renaissance is omnipresent: "It is under way in the orthodox part of Russia too where the Orthodox Church is strengthening its influence. Naturally, the same parallel process is happening in the Muslim parts of the former Soviet republics".[86] Naumkin concludes therefore that the phrase "threat of Islamization" is misleading and factually incorrect because there is nothing wrong with Islamization itself, if it is understood as the process of the spread of Islam and the rise in religious belief. His view is shared by British researchers Edward Lemon and John Heathershaw who deny any direct link between the religious renaissance in Central Asia and the religious radicalization, stating that *"there is little evidence that socially conservative Muslims are more likely to be politically radical than more secularised Muslims"*.[87]

Experts also point out the crucial positive role that religious leaders and media play in addressing concerns of the population. According to the experts at the Centre for Islamic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, in a 2010 sociological survey 52% of respondents named their mullahs as the principal providers of religious education. In 2016 in a similar sociological study only 6% mentioned local mullahs as a source of knowledge about Islam. Nowadays, the first port of call to serve religious needs are specialised internet sites, followed by satellite television channels and social networks.

86 Naumkin V. Terrorizm prikryvaetsia islamskimi odezhdami [Terrorism hides under Islamic dress], https://lenta.ru/articles/2017/03/10/naumkin_ran/
87 Lemon E., Heathershaw J.: How can we explain radicalisation among Central Asia's migrants?https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/edward-lemon-john-heathershaw/can-we-explain-radicalisation-among-central-asia-s-migrants

3. STATE MEASURES AND PROGRAMMES FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF MIGRANTS

3.1. STATE MEASURES AND PROGRAMMES FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION IN KYRGYZSTAN

3.1.1. Strategic framework for preventing and countering radicalization in Kyrgyzstan

3.1.1.1. Cooperation with regional and international organizations

Kyrgyzstan's main policies for preventing and countering extremism and terrorism are developed and implemented within various international frameworks. The regional Plan of Action to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted on 30 November 2011 in Ashgabat) is an instrument that underpins counter-terrorism measures put into effect by the Kyrgyz authorities. The project is being coordinated by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA).[88]

Kyrgyzstan is a member of regional organizations, such as CSTO and SCO. Overall, Kyrgyz authorities share the opinion of their colleagues in the SCO and CSTO that terrorist organizations aim to destabilise the situation in Central Asia and that Kyrgyzstan should work together with the above-mentioned regional actors.[89]

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Center determine the main directions of cooperation. Work continues on developing the required legislative framework in this area and an integrated information database.[90]

Interviewed officials acknowledge the database as an important tool for tracking persons who represent security threat: "Creating unified information databases of terrorists, extremists and other individuals convicted for serious crimes is one of the crucial projects. These people should not be allowed to cross borders of our countries freely, without any registration and control, and continue committing criminal offences."[91]

Although the CSTO and SCO cooperation has been termed useful by the respondents, some reservations have expressed reservations about the implications of closer cooperation with the Russian authorities on

88 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy (accessed 28 May 2017).
89 Путин о планах террористов: ИГ готовит планы по дестабилизации Центральной Азии и России [Putin on terrorists' plans: IS is preparing plans for destabilization of Central Asia], http://ca-news.org/news:1388171?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 10 June 2017).
90 В Ташкенте спецслужбы ШОС одобрили проект конвенции по противодействию экстремизму [In Tashkent SCO security services approved a draft convention on counter-terrorism] http://ca-news.org/news:1373457?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 30 March 2017).
91 В странах СНГ появится единая база террористов и экстремистов [CIS will have a unified database of terrorists and extremists], http://knews.kg/2017/05/v-stranah-sng-poyavitsya-edinaya-baza-terroristov-i-ekstremistov/ (accessed 30 June 2017).

countering extremism and terrorism threats it is necessary that would go beyond the CSTO and involve joining a much broader international coalition.[92] Some experts recommend that Kyrgyzstan needs to build its independent capacity for dealing with threats of extremism. According to A. Dubnov, "the genuine threat posed by the expansionist IS (Daesh) is being used to make Russia's neighbours in Central Asia believe that they will not overcome that threat without Russian military assistance".[93]

The following sections review the key elements of the domestic strategic, legislative and operational framework applied by the Kyrgyz Republic to prevent and counter radicalization and violent extremism.

3.1.1.2. Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Countering Extremism and Terrorism

The principal policy document developed for fighting extremism and terrorism is the Programme of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2017-2022.[94] The Programme is an important tool for planning state activities in the field of preventing violent extremism, assessing the measures undertaken so far, identifying factors underlying radicalization and defining the approach to be followed in the mid-term perspective.

The document recognizes the limitations of the measures undertaken to reduce the risk of radicalization among migrant workers by noting that "insufficiently productive approach adopted by the Migration Service to address the problems of migrant workers made young people a vulnerable target for international extremist and terrorist movements". In particular, the Programme identifies as areas of need the insufficient capacity for tracking the volume and composition of increasing external and internal migration as well as underdeveloped system for registration and monitoring of nationals in other countries.

The Programme identifies a set of external and internal factors contributing to the growing threat of spreading the ideology of extremism and terrorism. The external factors include returning fighters, propaganda of ideas of religious extremism and terrorism from abroad in the internet and on social media and implantation of external religious extremist ideologies in the country. In turn, the list of internal root causes of radicalization includes:

Internal root causes of radicalization as defined in Kyrgyzstan's State Programme on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2017-2022

- corrupt practices;
- inefficient solutions to social problems;
- issues with human rights protection;
- unresolved consequences of past conflicts;
- unemployment;
- deficiencies in the education system and in local government;
- limited integration of ethnic minorities;
- immaturity of common civic identity;

92 Путин: Около 9 тыс боевиков из России и стран Центральной Азии воюют в Сирии [Putin: Almost 9 thousand fighters from Russia and Central Asian countries are fighting in Syria], http://ca-news.org/news:1376153?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 26 June 2017).

93 Используя угрозу ИГИЛ, Центральной Азии внушают, что без российской военной помощи им не справиться, - эксперт А.Дубнов [A. Dubnov, expert: ISIL threat is used to convince Central Asia that they will not cope without Russian military assistance], http://ca-news.org/news:1372714?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 28 March 2017).

94 The Programme was adopted by Resolution No. 394 of the Government of the KR on 21 June 2017. Official website of the Government of the KR, http://www.gov.kg/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/prilozhenie.docx (accessed 26 July 2017).

- fragmented religious community;
- insufficient control over a number of religious establishments and clerics;
- religious illiteracy of the population;
- inability of imams to propose well-evidenced counter-narrative to extremist ideology.

The Programme on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2017-2022 identifies the following conditions for spreading extremist and terrorist ideas specific to Kyrgyzstan:

- radical religious movements merging with organised crime;
- recruitment in prison settings;
- persisting numbers of the population and vulnerable groups of migrant workers inadequately socialised and poorly integrated in the new environment;
- growing numbers of minors, women, young and older people becoming involved in extremist activities.

The main purpose of the Programme is stipulated as follows: *"to ensure the rule of law and human, social and state security through an enhanced system of effective prevention and countering of extremism and prevention of terrorist threats in the Kyrgyz Republic."*

To achieve this purpose, the following specific objectives have been set:

1. To enhance the work of governmental and non-governmental agencies in preventing extremism and terrorism.
2. To improve practices employed by special services and law enforcement agencies in preventing and fighting manifestations of extremism and terrorism.
3. To improve legal mechanisms and cooperation in the area of countering extremism and terrorism.

The Programme states that the combination of political, socio-economic, cultural and religious factors influences the shaping of radical ideas among socially vulnerable groups of the population. However, analysing the Programme it becomes apparent that counter-extremism and counter-terrorism measures specified in the document are mainly aimed at addressing ideological aspects of the problem. For instance, a particular emphasis is placed on the following measures:

- enhancing awareness-raising activity in the area of countering extremism and terrorism;
- reducing risks of radicalization in the field of religious education and missionary work;
- raising the level of knowledge and religious literacy;
- improving prevention work with migrant workers and diasporas;
- monitoring, analysis and active countering of extremist and terrorist ideas.

3.1.2. State measures for preventing and countering radicalization

When considering the state policy in the field of preventing radicalization, we look at two key elements: security and integration measures.

3.1.2.1. Security measures

In Kyrgyzstan the main security agency in charge of developing a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy as well as coordinating activities of anti-terrorism government agencies is the Anti-Terrorism Centre at the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic (SCNS KR).[95] Recently an inter-agency working group was set up to draft the State Programme for countering extremism and terrorism in the Kyrgyz Republic.[96]

Legislative changes. In recent years some amendments have been made to Kyrgyzstan's counter-terrorism and counter-extremism legislation. They introduced and/or aggravated administrative and criminal liability for some crimes, such as smuggling minors to armed conflict zones, incitement to ethnic, racial, religious or interregional hatred, humiliation of national dignity in the internet, etc. One of the significant changes that was made to the Law of the KR "On citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic" providing for existing citizens to be deprived of their nationality for undertaking training abroad aimed at acquiring skills and knowledge to commit terrorist or extremist offences as well as for participating in armed conflicts or military operations in a foreign country.[97] In response to the threat of radicalization in prisons, some targeted measures have been taken in collaboration with international organizations. The State Service for the Execution of Punishment of the Kyrgyz Republic (prison authority) has been implementing projects aimed at social reintegration of Kyrgyz prisoners. In Bishkek and Karakol a pilot post-prison probation project was launched with 10 ex-prisoners selected in each city.[98] UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Kyrgyzstan published the Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, the first UN technical guidance covering radicalization leading to violence and militant extremism in prison setting.[99]

According to the UNODC, the work to prevent violent extremism and radicalization in prisons is impeded due to:

- Lack of staffing positions and trained staff (i.e. lack of psychologists, sociologists, educators, theologians) to work with prisoners;
- Poor infrastructure and detention conditions;
- No proper risk assessment and classification of the prisoners;
- Lack of social rehabilitation programmes.[100]

Criticism of the state security measures has also been voiced by human rights organizations, which believe that the implementation of these measures at times infringes on citizens' rights. They stress that migrants returning to their homeland may be particularly vulnerable as they frequently do not know their rights and are in need of dedicated legal assistance. Respondents representing human rights organizations also reported cases of ethnic Uzbeks experiencing harassment by law enforcement agencies more often than others.[101]

95 Statute on the Anti-Terrorism Centre at the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic, Centralised Legal Information Database of the KR, http://cdb.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/94285 (accessed 28 June 2017).
96 В Правительстве обсудили вопросы противодействия экстремизму и терроризму в стране [Government discussed the issues of countering extremism and terrorism in the country], http://www.gov.kg/?p=90885&lang=ru (accessed 30 April 2017).
97 Official website of the President of the KR, http://www.president.kg/files/docs/Laws/v_sfere_protiv-ya_terr-u_i_eks-u_2_08_16.PDF (accessed 28 May 2017).
98 Около 20 бывших заключенных, осужденных в том числе за убийство, обучились основам бизнеса, - глава ГСИН [Prison Authority Chair: About 20 ex-prisoners, convicted for murder among other offences, learnt basics of business], http://kg.akipress.org/news:1372748?from=mportal&place=last (accessed 30 March 2017).
99 UNODC. Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf (accessed 26 June 2017).
100 UNODC. Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Prison Settings, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/unodc_presentation_eng.pdf (accessed 26 June 2017).
101 FGD with representatives of human rights organisations in Bishkek (10 April 2017).

Interviewed human rights activists referred to a case of the violation of criminal procedure rules. They pointed to the criminal case of Rashot Kamalov, imam in the central mosque in the town of Kara-Suu, Osh Region, convicted for extremist propaganda, to illustrate the shortcomings of the state activities in the area of countering violent extremism:

Lack of an official list of banned extremist materials in the country, violations in commissioning and conducting expert assessments, lack of approved experts in religious matters, disregarding defence's arguments and delivering guilty verdicts, creating a negative image of accused/convicted individuals in society.[102]

3.1.2.2. Integration measures

Kyrgyzstan's policy for ethnic and religious group integration is based on two dedicated strategic documents: the Concept for strengthening the unity of the nation and inter-ethnic relations in the Kyrgyz Republic[103] and the Concept of the state policy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the religious sphere for 2014–2020.[104] In addition, activities aiming at preventing the dissemination of radical religious materials have been undertaken as part of implementing the National Sustainable Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2013-2017. The Strategy acknowledged that the growing numbers of believers and their religious illiteracy are the main reason for the proliferation of religious extremist materials.[105] To rectify the situation in the 2016-2017 school year history of religious culture lessons were introduced in 10 schools in Kyrgyzstan. But after the textbook used to teach this subject came under criticism from the general public, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Education is relaunching the consultation process in 2017.

Moreover, measures were undertaken to raise the level of awareness of radicalization risks of the crucial population groups. The Yyman Fund set up in 2014 with support of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic runs advanced training courses for the members of the Muslim clergy. However, interviews with community and religious leaders as well as experts suggest limited effectiveness of these actions in addressing the roots of radicalization of the most vulnerable groups (such as women or ethnic minorities).

One issue is communication that has not been adequately tailored to these groups' needs. According to a security expert, in formulating and implementing the state de-radicalization policy it was not recognised that extremist organisations use entirely different channels to spread their ideology and recruit new followers – they target specific groups of the population. They actively work with vulnerable groups, such as unemployed youth, single women, orphaned children and ethnic minorities. Highlighting the limited efficiency of the current state counter-extremism and counter-terrorism policy, the expert recommends that to de-radicalize certain members of the society the same channels should be engaged as the ones used by recruiters.[106]

In turn, interviewed religious leaders point out that

102 Human Rights Movement Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan, Как в Кыргызстане борятся с религиозным экстремизмом [Fighting religious extremism in Kyrgyzstan], http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/267916?download=true (accessed 23 March 2017).

103 «Утверждена Концепция укрепления единства народа и межэтнических отношений в Кыргызской Республике» [Concept for strengthening the unity of the nation and inter-ethnic relations in the Kyrgyz Republic is approved], http://www.president.kg/ru/news/ukazy/1878_utverjdena_kontseptsiya_ukrepleniya_edinstva_naroda_i_mejetnicheskih_otnosheniy_v_kyirgyizskoy_respublike/

104 Подписан Указ «О Концепции государственной политики Кыргызской Республики в религиозной сфере на 2014-2020 годы» [Decree "On the Concept of the State Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Religious Sphere for 2014-2020" is signed]; http://www.president.kg/ru/news/ukazy/4901_podpisan_ukaz_o_kontseptsii_gosudarstvennoy_politiki_kyirgyizskoy_respubliki_v_religioznoy_sfere_na_2014-2020_godyi/

105 Распространение религиозно-экстремистских материалов можно объяснить ростом числа верующих и их религиозной безграмотностью, - отчет по НСУР [National Sustainable Development Strategy Report: Proliferation of religious extremist materials is likely to be linked to the rising numbers of worshipers and their religious illiteracy], http://www.for.kg/news-429318-ru.htm (accessed 31 May 2017).

106 Interview in Bishkek (11 April 2017).

government agencies engage only with "official" informal leaders but a large number of informal community leaders who continue to distance themselves and their communities from the rest of the society remain out of sight of the authorities. For example, ethnic minorities are controlled by their own informal leaders and theologians who are not represented in the SAMK governance structure. Religious women-leaders who establish women's religious associations are also overlooked by those in charge of implementing the state policy.

Another barrier to the full implementation of the state counter-extremism policy is the low level of confidence in the state authority among the Muslim community. Sometimes even official spiritual leaders are doubtful whether counter-extremism and counter-terrorism measures are justified. Not all Islamic groups and movements share official concerns over the danger posed by radical religious ideology.

A positive contribution is made to address the religious situation by the Community Prevention Centres set up at the local level. They function as an umbrella organisation, comprising an elders' court, youth organizations, women's council and rural district elders' council. According to the head of one of these centres in the Kara-Suu district, Osh Region, while the staff at the centre work hard to prevent extremism, they lack financial incentives as currently they do not receive any salary.

"Together with the qaziyat and hatibiyat we organise meetings for school children with former fighters who now repent their actions. They (the police) hand over to us all cases except for the criminal ones. We do their work for free. Lawyers normally charge 6000 som for administrative cases but we provide our services free of charge. That is why people come to us. We succeeded in reconciling 26 out of 28 families who filed for a divorce. The police will not be able to settle their differences."[107]

3.1.3. The role of the Spiritual Administration of Muslim of Kyrgyzstan in prevention of radicalism

The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK) is a pivotal institution for the prevention and fighting against extremism and terrorism, in particular through addressing ideological grounds of radicalization. As we already indicated in Phase I assessment, spiritual leaders of Kyrgyzstan continue to visit Kyrgyz migrants in Russia.

"The members of the Council of Ulema regularly travel to Russia to meet with migrants. These visits are agreed with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Spiritual Administrations in Russia. Ulema call on migrants to obey the laws of the host country."[108]

According to the Qazi[109] of Jalal-Abad, imams play an important role in settling border and ethnic conflicts. On numerous occasions imams stopped Kyrgyz young people from attacking Uzbek border guards. Once they were able to convince inhabitants of the Kazhar village in the Ala-Buka District, Osh Region, to allow the return of a family, some members of which allegedly were in Syria.[110]

However, interviews with religious leaders and experts suggest that the Muftiate has a limited capacity to deal with the emerging risks. One issue is insufficient control over the curricula of religious education establishments, which are mainly funded from abroad.

107 Interview in the Kara-Suu district, Osh Region (08 April 2017).
108 Interview with a senior official in one of the state institutions in Bishkek (11 April 2017).
109 Head of the local SAMK office.
110 Interview in Jalal-Abad (8 April 2017).

Each madrasa or Islamic university is affiliated to some jamaat or religious leader. Even the Kyrgyzstan Islamic University, the only institution of higher Islamic education in the country, relies on external funding. Since the majority of Islamic education institutions are run as independent establishments, for many years the Muftiate is unable to reform the system of Islamic education as requested by the government.[111] Not a single madrasa in Kyrgyzstan is accredited to conduct educational activities.[112] This has led to the loss of control by official religious bodies, and in the words of one respondent in Jalal-Abad, *"because the Muftiate cannot control jamaats, some jamaats started to exert control over the Muftiate"*.[113]

Another issue negatively affecting the religious situation in the country that was raised by interviewed religious leaders is the growing influence of Tablighi Jamaat, which is believed to open the way toward spread of Salafism. This is seen on a number of levels, ranging from the impact on religious leaders to the influence on believers, including returned migrants. Firstly, even *official* imams abandon their mosques and leave for "daavat" (following the calling) to other countries, e.g. India or Bangladesh. One imam-hatip (head of the town SAMK administration) from the Osh Region said that he "*wanted to dismiss one imam who abandoned his mosque* (responsibilities) *and went to Pakistan. But immediately I received a telephone call from the Muftiate in his defence.*"[114]

Secondly, based on the findings of our field research, returned migrants often follow daavat (calling) in search of spiritual and moral self-education and mainly resort to Tablighi Jamaat's networks. This may pose a risk as in the course of our study it became apparent that some radical organizations and movements (Hizb ut-Tahrir and Salafists) actively use these networks and channels to disseminate their ideas. These movements extensively use Tablighi Jamaat's networks apparently to enjoy the privileges and immunity granted to Tablighi Jamaat by the government and the Muftiate.

The imam in one of the mosques in the south of the country shared his observations on this issue by saying: "*Salafists and Hizb ut-Tahrir followers come to the mosque pretending they are from Tablighi Jamaat and start their agitation. Many imams, not very well educated in religious matters, think Salafists are in fact members of Tablighi Jamaat and let them preach in their mosques.*"[115]

However, this issue has not been acknowledged universally as a risk factor. On the one hand, some imams in the south of the country are critical of the SAMK's position, believing that it does not prevent the spread of Salafism in Kyrgyzstan. An imam in a town in Osh Region believes that the sense of impunity gives the Salafis more confidence.

"*They (Salafis) are free to spread their ideology. They were released from custody even after they attacked the Akimiyat in Nookat in 2005. Back in the day Salafis were sending me threats: they left a message on my car that they would kill me.*"[116]

At the same time, the debate is ongoing in Kyrgyzstan on whether it is worthwhile to introduce a state policy with regard to Tablighi Jamaat. Despite the fact that some officials in the security services express their concern that this movement is "a primary school for extremists", the government persists in calling Tablighi Jamaat an effective weapon for fighting radicalism. As

111 Религиозное образование в Кыргызстане: медресе нуждаются в срочной реформе [Religious education in Kyrgyzstan: madreses in need of urgent reform] http://bulaninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Report-in-Russian-final.pdf (accessed 30 May 2017).
112 Ни одно медресе не получало лицензию на образовательную деятельность [Not a single madrese in Kyrgyzstan is accredited to conduct educational activity].http://24.kg/obschestvo/46915_niodno_medrese_nepoluchalo_litsenziyu_naobrazovate (accessed 11 March 2017).
113 Interview with a religious leader in Jalal-Abad (08 April 2017).
114 Interview in the Osh Region (08 April 2017).
115 Interview in one of the towns of the Osh Region (08 April 2017).
116 Interview in one of the towns of the Osh Region (08 April 2017).

stated in Phase I assessment, Kyrgyz authorities do not consider Tablighi Jamaat to be a threat to the society; on the contrary, in their opinion, to some extent it shields the citizens from exposure to radical groups and movements.

3.2. STATE MEASURES AND PROGRAMMES FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION IN TAJIKISTAN

3.2.1. Strategic and legal framework

3.2.1.1. International cooperation

Tajikistan is an active participant in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Fight against international terrorism is one of the major activities of the Organization. The most recent documents that specify, in particular, the content and nature the CSTO anti-terror activities are the Statement of the Heads of Member States of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on Fight against International Terrorism of 21 December 2015[117] and the Collective Security Strategy of the Collective Security Treaty Organization until 2025 adopted on 14 October 2016.[118]

Another venue for cooperation is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan Kholiknazar Khudoberdy points out: "Since 1998 the Shanghai Five countries ... have been working towards joining efforts in the fight against new challenges and threats such as terrorism, extremism and separatism". He adds that this was first announced in the Joint Statement of the Heads of State at the Almaty Summit on 3 July 1998.[119]

The framework for cooperation of the SCO in the area of preventing and countering violent extremism was first laid down in the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001;[120] The operational mechanisms for interstate cooperation were then worked out in two comprehensive documents: the Agreement between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of 7 June 2002[121] and the Concept of Cooperation between the SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism of 5 June 2005.[122] The issue was accorded an increasingly high priority at consecutive summits of the Organization at which the following strategic documents were adopted:

- Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism adopted at the SCO Summit in Yekaterinburg on 15-16 June 2009;[123]
- Programme of Cooperation of the SCO Member States on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism adopted at the SCO Summit in Yekaterinburg on 15-16 June 2009;[124]
- Programme of Cooperation of the SCO Member States on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2013–2015 adopt-

117 http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5857
118 http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=8382
119 Kholiknazar Khudoberdy. Respublika Tajikistan v borbe protiv terrorizma i religioznogo ekstremizma v period gosudarstvennoy nezavisimosti [Republic of Tajikistan: combating terrorism and religious extremism after the independence]. Dushanbe, 2016, p. 23.
120 Ibid, p. 27.
121 Ibid, p. 35.
122 Ibid, p. 38.
123 Ibid, p. 42.
124 Ibid, p. 42.

ed at the SCO Summit of the Heads of State in Beijing on 6–7 June 2012.[125]

3.2.1.2. Domestic framework

Counter-extremism measures in the Republic of Tajikistan are based on a range of legal acts, of which the primary regulation is the Law "On Fighting Terrorism" of 16 November 1999. The Law stipulates that "the legal framework for fighting terrorism in the country is set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, this act, other legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan and international treaties to which the Republic of Tajikistan is a party".

Key legal acts underlying Tajikistan's counter-extremism measures

As discussed at length in Phase I of the assessment, the principal statutes and other acts of the Republic of Tajikistan that govern the fight against radicalism, extremism and terrorism include the following:

Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On the Fight against Extremism" of 8 December 2003;

Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism" of 25 March 2011;

Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Combating Human Trafficking and Providing Support to Victims of Human Trafficking" of 26 July 2014.

In response to the risks associated with the external and internal factors of radicalization, Tajikistan has elaborated a strategic framework for preventing and countering violent extremism. On 12 November 2016 the President of the Republic of Tajikistan issued the Decree *"On the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2016–2020*". The head of the department for the protection of rights at the Prosecutor General's Office stressed that the document was developed on the basis *"of a thorough analysis of the factors and trends that concern extremism and the radicalization of society, which lead to terrorism within the country's borders"*.[126] The strategy recognized that a combination of social and ideological issues underlie the process of radicalization and identified young people aged 18 to 27 as the most vulnerable to recruitment, mandating work on blocking extremist online content and setting up anti-extremist websites. Another priority group for work was law enforcement and military personnel who continue to be exposed in their line of duty to contacts with radicalized persons. Civil society representatives welcomed the adoption of the strategy, which calls for cooperation of the state with NGOs, experts and the public.[127]

3.2.2. Coordination of efforts on prevention of religious radicalism

Until 2016 actions taken by various Tajik government bodies aimed at preventing religious radicalism and extremism, including preventing active involvement of the citizens of Tajikistan in armed operations of such groups as the Daesh, Jabhat al-Nusra, etc., were rather fragmented and isolated.

The changed nature and scale of religious radicalization among migrant workers and in Tajik society in general, peaking in 2014–2015, called for the need to adapt preventive measures to the new situation and

125 Ibid, p. 45.
126 Bahrom N., «Tajikistan moves to new phase of counter-terrorism strategy», 10 January 2017, Caravanserai, http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/01/10/feature-01 (accessed on 22 November 2017)
127 Ibid.

challenges. One of the principal aspects of this adaptation was to overcome the fragmentation of actions taken by different agencies and bodies in the prevention of religious extremism.

In the specific context of Tajikistan this necessitated that government agencies work in a much more coordinated way to support country efforts on fighting radicalism, extremism and terrorism. The Prosecutor's General Office of the Republic of Tajikistan was appointed as the key coordinating authority even before 2016. Pursuant to the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Prosecution Authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan", the Law Enforcement Coordinating Council was established at the Prosecutor General's Office.

In 2015 the Coordinating Council specifically discussed the measures taken to prevent religious radicalism, terrorism and extremism at several of its meetings. In March 2016 at the meeting of the Coordinating Council a number of ministries and agencies presented a report on the work undertaken to prevent these negative phenomena. In addition, by its decision the Coordinating Council established a permanent law enforcement command centre in charge of preventing Tajik nationals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations.

The position of the Prosecutor's General Office of the Republic of Tajikistan was further asserted when it was instructed to lead on the elaboration of the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for 2016–2020 that was approved by the Decree of the President of Tajikistan.

3.2.3. Main approaches to prevention work

Similar to previous years, practical measures for the prevention of religious radicalism were based on two main approaches: a restrictive-repressive (security) approach and a non-restrictive-repressive (non-security) approach.[128]

3.2.3.1. Security approach

Continuing earlier efforts, the Tajik authorities maintain the focus on the security measures to counter violent extremism. An essential part of the measures to prevent religious radicalism was to stem the attempts to smuggle, use and disseminate religious literature and other material classified as radical and extremist in Tajikistan. In his speech, addressing the members of the upper chamber of parliament, the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan stated that 230 websites promoting terrorism and extremism were blocked in 2016.[129]

The security approach also mandated another important line of work: to strengthen the border with Afghanistan in order to stop preachers and followers of radical ideologies and movements from entering Tajikistan.

The Committee on Religious Affairs, Regulation of National Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies under the Government of Tajikistan also played its part in the implementation of the security approach. Work is ongoing to ensure proper procedures are followed when registering religious associations and opening new mosques. They should be set up, registered and run in full compliance with the current legislation, in particular with the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations". If it becomes apparent that a mosque was established in breach of the law or operates outside the Statutes of the parent religious association, certain measures

128 See Phase I assessment for the discussion of the two approaches.
129 https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20170216/genprokuror-v-pyat-raz-menshe-tadzhikov-stalo-voevat-za-ig

can be taken, all the way to its complete closure.

3.3.3.2. Integration approach

Extensive awareness raising work has become a major line of government action under the integration approach. For example, along with restrictive and repressive measures, the law enforcement agencies actively engaged with young people and school children especially to explain the nature of movements and organisations designated as radical, extremist and terrorist in Tajikistan and demonstrate how unlawful their activities are.

The Committee on Religious Affairs, Regulation of National Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies under the Government of Tajikistan also makes an extensive effort to raise public awareness in the country as well as among migrants in Russia. The main part of this work is to explain the state policy on religion with emphasis on prevention of religious radicalism and extremism exerting an influence on the country's population. According to the staff interviewed at the Committee, their outreach activities are carried out on a systemic basis and overall results can be considered satisfactory, at least in that they were able to reach large parts of the general public.

The Committee has been able to conduct large-scale and successful awareness raising campaigns thanks to a well-developed structure. In 2010 it was established as a standalone government agency, which evolved out a department of the Ministry of Culture. Many members of its staff have formal and informal religious education, so they have a good grasp of Islamic matters. The Committee publishes the monthly "Religion and Society" magazine with a circulation of five thousand copies. According to the members of its editorial board , it is in high demand, each edition sells out completely. Should additional financial support be provided, its circulation can be increased to make it available to migrant workers in Russia. The Committee also produces leaflets featuring Koran ayats (verses) aimed at preventing radicalism and extremism and distributes them among the general public. In 2016 the Committee on Religious Affairs produced the brochures "ISIL: jihad or killing of Muslims?" and "Actual Islam and terrorist organizations" and published them in three languages — Tajik, Uzbek and Russian. The Committee also published the book "Islam against Terrorism".

As part of its efforts for the prevention of religious radicalism and extremism, in collaboration with the Council of Ulema at the Islamic Center of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Committee prepares so called "model sermons" that reflect its official stand on certain topical issues and regularly distributes them among 300 imam-khatibs of large mosques with the intention that imam-khatibs use them in preparation of their own sermons.

Awareness raising work is also conducted in another important format: officials from the Committee on Religious Affairs, representatives of the Council of Ulema at the Islamic Center and experts from the Academy of Sciences and universities appear on television and in radio programmes exploring the issues of the prevention of religious radicalism and extremism.

As another popular form of preventive action, joint working groups that included members of staff from the Committee on Religious Affairs, the Committee on Youth, Sport and Tourism and other agencies, were set up to reach out to young people, especially in student communities. These working groups visited student halls of residence in the evenings on a regular basis and organised discussion on relevant topics, answered questions from students, etc.

Radicalism prevention work outside of Tajikistan was not as intensive. For instance, joint working groups consisting of experts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employ-

ment and the Committee on Religious Affairs travelled to Russia twice in 2016 to meet with citizens of Tajikistan residing in Russia with the purpose of raising their awareness of radicalization issues. Another important form of the prevention of religious radicalism and extremism is engaging with those individuals who already received religious education outside of the CIS countries or are only intending to go to the Arab and other countries for this purpose.

List of respondents

KAZAKHSTAN - Men

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Country of origin	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assis-tance
1	Rishat	Tajikistan	22	married	secondary	builder	no	2	1	Taraz	no
2	Dinakhmed	Tajikistan	62	divorced	secondary	trader	no	1	1	Taraz	no
3	Azad	Tajikistan	50	married	secondary	builder	2014	5	1	Astana	no
4	Alisher	Tajikistan	41	married	secondary	builder	2013	15	1	Astana	no
5	Adolyat	Tajikistan	31	married	secondary	builder	2015	16	2	Astana	no
6	Rokhim	Tajikistan	22	single	secondary	builder	2016	6	2	Kostanay	no
7	Tokhir	Tajikistan	31	single	secondary	loader	2016	6	2	Kostanay	no
8	Dovlat	Tajikistan	25	single	secondary	loader	2016	6	2	Kostanay	yes
9	Fayzamurod	Tajikistan	48	married	secondary	loader	2015	2	2	Kostanay	no
10	Muzaffar	Tajikistan	23	single	secondary	builder	2016	6	2	Kostanay	no
11	Rakhmat	Tajikistan	21	cohabiting	secondary	builder	2016	6	1	Kostanay	no
12	Farkhod	Tajikistan	34	2 wives	secondary	trader	no	6	1	Almaty	no
13	Rakhmankul	Uzbekistan	40	married	secondary	builder	no	5	1	Shymkent	no
14	Bakhtier	Uzbekistan	40	married	University degree	welder	2013	6	1	Shymkent	no
15	Nasim	Uzbekistan	37	married	secondary	cook	no	17	4	Astana	yes
16	Azat	Uzbekistan	39	married	secondary	cook	no			Astana	yes
17	Farid	Uzbekistan	25	married	secondary	builder	2016	3	1	Shymkent	no
18	Serik	Uzbekistan	45	married	secondary	carpenter	no	5	2	Shymkent	no
19	Bakhram	Uzbekistan	29	married	secondary	builder	2013	6	1	Saryagash	no
20	Usman	Uzbekistan	41	married	secondary	tiler	2015	5	1	Saryagash	no
21	Rizat	Uzbekistan	36	married	3 years at university	stonemason	2015	5	1	Saryagash	no
22	Shavkat	Uzbekistan	30	married	vocational college	stonemason	2016	4	1	Saryagash	no
23	Ruslan	Uzbekistan	41	single	secondary	general la-bourer	no	1	1	Shymkent	no
24	Aymen	Uzbekistan	55	single	primary	shepherd	no	1	1	Shymkent	no
25	Aslan	Uzbekistan	30	divorced	vocational college (healthcare)	dental assis-tant	no	4	1	Shymkent	no
26	Yuldash	Uzbekistan	34	married	secondary	builder	2014	5	1	Shymkent	no
27	Nizam	Uzbekistan	42	married	secondary	builder	2016	6	2	Shymkent	no
28	Bakhodir	Uzbekistan	38	married	secondary	builder	no	4	1	Shymkent	no
29	Rakhman	Uzbekistan	32	married	secondary	builder	2016	5	2	Shymkent	no
30	Arif	Uzbekistan	47	married	secondary	builder	2015	6	2	Shymkent	no
31	Fayzulla	Uzbekistan	24	single	vocational college	builder	no	4	2	Shymkent	no
32	Kubat	Kyrgyzstan	34	married	vocational college	manager	2015	4	1	Shymkent	no
33	Azamat	Kyrgyzstan	36	married	secondary	trader	no	4	1	Almaty	no
34	Ruslan	Kyrgyzstan	35	married	secondary	trader	no	1	1	Almaty	no
35	Bakyt	Kyrgyzstan	33	single	secondary	general la-bourer	2012	1	1	Astana	yes

KAZAKHSTAN - Women

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Country of origin	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assis-tance
1	Malika	Tajikistan	25	married	secondary	sales assistant	2015	3	1	Astana	yes
2	Mavlyuda	Tajikistan	45	widow	secondary	cleaner	no	5	1	Taraz	no
3	Rufina	Tajikistan	49	divorced	secondary	carer	2016	7	1	Kostanay	no
4	Lola	Uzbekistan	50	divorced	secondary	trader	no	2	1	Taraz	no
5	Gulzhan	Uzbekistan	19	single	secondary	sales assistant	no	4	2	Shymkent	no
6	Aygul	Uzbekistan	19	married	secondary	waiter	no	5	2	Shymkent	
7	Valentina	Uzbekistan	47	divorced	secondary	cleaner	no	3	1	Kostanay	no
8	Elvira	Uzbekistan	23	single	secondary	hotel receptionist	no	3	1	Shymkent	no

KYRGYZSTAN - Men

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Ethnicity	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assis-tance
1	Alisher	Uzbek	27	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2015	2	1	City of Osh	yes
2	Fazliddin	Uzbek	50	married	secondary	businessman	2016	5	1	City of Osh	yes
3	Almaz	Kyrgyz	31	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2014	6	2	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
4	Bakhtier	Uzbek	25	single	incomplete secondary		2016	4	2	City of Osh	yes
5	Aziz	Uzbek	33	married	secondary vocational	builder and driver	2015	4	1	City of Osh	yes
6	Nurlan	Kyrgyz	24	single	secondary vocational	builder	2015	5	3	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
7	Farkhot	Uzbek	23	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2013	7	2	City of Osh	yes
8	Bektur	Kyrgyz	27	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2016	4	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suy District	yes
9	Asan	Kyrgyz	22	married	secondary vocational		2015			City of Osh	yes
10	Ulan	Kyrgyz	35	married	University degree	builder	2015	5	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
11	Melis	Kyrgyz	44	married	University degree	builder	2014	8	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
12	Kenesh	Kyrgyz	30	married	University degree	builder, loader	2013	3	1	City of Osh	yes
13	Aybek	Kyrgyz	46	married		builder	2014	5	1	City of Osh	yes
14	Sanjar	Uzbek	28	married	secondary	builder, driver	2015	7	1	Osh Region, Nookat District	yes
15	Sadyk	Uzbek	50	married	University degree	builder	2014	9	1	Osh Region, Nookat District	yes
16	Bakyt	Kyrgyz	28	married	University degree	builder	2015	7	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	no
17	Islam	Uzbek	40	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2015	7	1	City of Osh	no
18	Mirbek	Kyrgyz	31	married	secondary	builder	2015	8	2	City of Osh	yes
19	Dastan	Kyrgyz	25	single	secondary	street cleaner	2014	4	1	City of Osh	no
20	Sukhrob	Uzbek	29	married	incomplete secondary	sheet metal worker	2016	4	0	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
21	Aktan	Kyrgyz	22	single	secondary vocational	builder	2015	9	2	Batken Region, Batken District	no
22	Sagynbek	Kyrgyz	33	married	secondary	builder	2014	7	0	Osh Region, Alay District	no
23	Kayrat	Kyrgyz	32	single	incomplete secondary	builder	2014	7	2	City of Osh	no
24	Urmat	Kyrgyz	27	married	secondary	loader	2016	7	2	City of Osh	yes
25	Aziz	Uzbek	27	single	secondary	builder	2014	3	0	City of Osh	yes
26	Ulukbek	Uzbek	30	divorced	7 grades at school	welder	2016	8	1	City of Osh	no

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Ethnicity	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assis-tance
27	Mayrambek	Kyrgyz	28	married	secondary	cook	2015	10	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	no
28	Fayzullo	Uzbek	26	single	incomplete secondary	taxi driver	2015	6	1	City of Osh	yes
29	Tokhir	Uzbek	26	married	secondary	cook	2014	6	0	City of Osh	no
30	Rasul	Kyrgyz	26	married	secondary vocational	builder	2015	8	0	City of Osh	no
31	Nurbek	Kyrgyz	21	single	5 grades at school	general labourer	2016	5	2	City of Osh	no
32	Emil	Kyrgyz	22	single	secondary	loader	2015	8	1	City of Osh	yes
33	Shukhrod	Uzbek	22	divorced	secondary vocational	student, also worked as a cook	2013	3	2	City of Osh	yes
34	Umid	Uzbek	35	single	incomplete secondary	driver, general la-bourer at a building site	2016	10	1	City of Osh	no
35	Ruslan	Kyrgyz	27	single	incomplete secondary	street cleaner	2013	7	1	City of Osh	yes
36	Shafkhat	Uzbek	30	married	incomplete secondary	baker	2016	5	1	City of Osh	no
37	Jomart	Kyrgyz	33	married	secondary	builder	2014	4	1	City of Bishkek	yes
38	Azamat	Kyrgyz	29	single	secondary	car interior designer	2016	5	3	City of Bishkek	no
39	Beknazar	Kyrgyz	23	married	University degree	advertising agent	2016	7	2	City of Bishkek	no
40	Seit	Kyrgyz	24	single	secondary	horse trainer	2016	6	2	City of Bishkek	no
41	Joldosh	Kyrgyz	21	single	secondary	builder	2016	4	2	City of Bishkek	no
42	Abror	Uzbek	38	married	secondary	builder	2014	4	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
43	Askar	Kyrgyz	33	married	secondary	builder	2014	7	3	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
44	Nurdin	Kyrgyz	32	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2015	12	2	City of Osh	yes
45	Botir	Uzbek	26	married	incomplete secondary	loader	2014	5	2	City of Osh	yes
46	Sabyr	Kyrgyz	36	married	secondary vocational	builder	2013	5	2	Jalal-Abad Region, Suzak District	yes
47	Anarbek	Kyrgyz	57	married	incomplete secondary	street cleaner	2013	10	5	Osh Region, Kara-Suu Dis-trict	yes
48	Zhasur	Uzbek	30	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2014	4	1	City of Osh	yes

KYRGYZSTAN - Women

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Ethnicity	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold mem-bers	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assistance
1	Mukadas	Uzbek	45	married	secondary vocational	cook	2014	3	1	City of Osh	yes
2	Ayperi	Kyrgyz	47	married	secondary vocational	cook	2015	4	1	City of Osh	yes
3	Rano	Uzbek	50	married	secondary vocational	sales assistant	2016	4	2	City of Osh	yes
4	Merim	Kyrgyz	24	divorced	secondary, incomplete higher	cleaner, sales assistant and waitress	2015	4	2	Osh Region, Uzgen District	yes
5	Munara	Kyrgyz	40	married	secondary vocational	cleaner, sales assistant	2014	4	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
6	Feruza	Uzbek	27	married	secondary vocational	housewife	2014	5	1	City of Osh	no
7	Kanyshay	Kyrgyz	28	married	secondary	waitress	2014	5	2	City of Osh	yes
8	Zuura	Kyrgyz	23	married	secondary vocational		2013	10	2	Osh Region, Nookat District	yes
9	Ak-Maral	Kyrgyz	23	divorced	incomplete secondary	did not work	2012	3	0	Jalal-Abad Region, Suzak District	yes
10	Mavlyuda	Uzbek	28	married	secondary vocational	did not work	2015	6	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
11	Aziza	Uzbek	40	married	secondary	ticket inspec-tor	2015	4	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	yes
12	Dinara	Kyrgyz	24	married	secondary vocational	cleaner	2015	5	0	City of Osh	no
13	Cholpon	Kyrgyz	53	widow	secondary	dishwasher	2014	1	0	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	no
14	Bermet	Kyrgyz	24	married	secondary	sales assistant	2014	7	2	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	no
15	Nurgul	Kyrgyz	25	married	secondary	cleaner, sales assistant	2015	10	1	Osh Region, Kara-Suu District	
16	Ozoda	Uzbek	26	divorced	incomplete secondary	sales assistant	2016	7	2	City of Osh	no
17	Aygul	Kyrgyz	27	single	secondary	sales assistant	2016	1	0	City of Bishkek	no
18	Nazgul	Kyrgyz	26	married		sales assistant	2015	5	2	City of Osh	yes
19	Asel	Kyrgyz	38	divorced	University degree	cook	2015	3	1	Jalal-Abad Region, Suzak District	no

TAJIKISTAN - Men

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assistance
1	Alisher	28	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2014	7	2	Qabodiyon	yes
2	Fozil	32	married	University degree	builder	2013	6	2	Farkhor	yes
3	Bakhtiyor	26	married	University degree	plumber	no	8	1	Bokhtar	
4	Bakhtiyor	28	married	Incomplete higher	security guard	2015	11	3	Vakhdat	no
5	Kamol	31	married	University degree	driver	2014	11	5	Vakhdat	no
6	Bakhrom	25	married	incomplete secondary	painter decorator	2015	5	1	Vakhdat	no
7	Fayzullo	25	married	incomplete secondary	general labourer	2014	11	2	Rudaki	no
8	Isfandiyor	31	married	Incomplete higher	painter decorator	2014	5	1	Rudaki	no
9	Rustam	33	married	University degree	builder	2015	9	2	Dushanbe	no
10	Rasul	25	married	incomplete secondary	driver	2015	3	2	Vakhdat	no
11	Akram	33	married	secondary	builder	2015	5	1	Rudaki	no
12	Fakhriddin	27	married	University degree	car mechanic	2014	9	1	Qurgontep-pa	no
13	Shukhrat	26	married	incomplete secondary	general labourer	2014	7	2	Rudaki	no
14	Sodikchon	32	married	secondary	security guard	2016	4	1	Dushanbe	no
15	Karomatullo	26	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2014	7	2	Rudaki	no
16	Aziz	43	married	University degree	builder	2014	3	2	Gonchi	no
17	Iskandar	36	married	secondary	builder	2012	14	1	Istravshan	yes
18	Radzhab	38	married	secondary	confectioner	2015	5	1	Istravshan	yes
19	Bekhruz	24	single	secondary	builder	2014	9	1	Istravshan	no
20	Abdukhalim	27	married	secondary	loader	2012	12	2	Istravshan	yes
21	Akmal	49	married	secondary	welder	2015	4	1	Istravshan	yes
22	Bakhtovar	34	married	secondary	sales assistant	2014	5	1	Bokhtar	no
23	Sarvar	29	married	incomplete secondary	builder-plas-terer	2016	13	1	Bokhtar	no
24	Firdavs	31	married	incomplete secondary	builder, driver, welder	2016	18	2	Bokhtar	no
25	Daler	30	married	secondary	builder, car washer	2016	8	1	Bokhtar	no
26	Dodarbek	29	married	Incomplete higher	builder	2013	13	0	Bokhtar	no
27	Jamshed	33	married	incomplete secondary	builder	2015	13	3	Bokhtar	no
28	Timur	28	married	secondary	builder, securi-ty guard, driver	2015	9	2	Bokhtar	no
29	Ibrahim	35	married	University degree	welder	2014	5	0	Shaartuz	yes
30	Dilovar	27	married	secondary	builder	2016	7	2	Shaartuz	yes

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assistance
31	Abdurakhim	28	married	Incomplete higher	car mechanic, cook, sales assistant	2013	6	2	Shaartuz	yes
32	Abror	30	married	secondary	cook	2016	6	1	Shaartuz	yes
33	Akobir	25	married	secondary	builder	2016	8	2	Shaartuz	yes
34	Bakhodur	29	single	secondary	builder	2016	15	4	Qabodiyon	yes
35	Davron	21	married	secondary	builder	2015	10	1	Qabodiyon	yes
36	Orzu	33	married	secondary	builder	2015	5	1	Qabodiyon	yes
37	Pakhlavon	30	married	incomplete secondary	builder, green-house worker	2016	5	1	Qabodiyon	yes
38	Talbak	24	married	secondary	builder, green-house worker	2016	9	2	Qabodiyon	yes
39	Eshon	41	married	University degree	builder in a country cot-tage	2013	9	1	Kulyab	yes
40	Eraj	47	married	University degree	builder	2014	6	1	Kulyab	yes
41	Abbos	36	married	secondary	builder	does not know	4	1	Kulyab	yes
42	Azamjon	29		secondary		2013			Kulyab	
43	Vokhid	26		incomplete secondary		2013			Kulyab	yes
44	Ilkhom	26	married			2014	12		Kulyab	yes
45	Mavlon	34	married	secondary		203	13	4	Kulyab	yes
46	Nozim	33	married			2014	5		Kulyab	yes

TAJIKISTAN - Women

No.	Name (all names were changed)	Age	Marital status	Education	Occupation in migration	Re-entry ban to Russia (year)	House-hold members	Workers in family	Study region	IOM assistance
1	Shabnam	45	married	secondary	housework	2015	7	1	Kulyab	yes
2	Surayo	56	widow	secondary	housework	deported in 2011	14	3	Kulyab	yes
3	Mekhri	23	married	secondary	confectioner	2015	5	1	Bokhtar	no
4	Shakhlo	31	married	incomplete secondary	cleaner	2016	10	1	Bokhtar	
5	Kanoat	26	married	secondary vocational	confectioner	2014	6	2	Bokhtar	no
6	Nargis	25	married	secondary	nanny, sales assistant	2012	5	2	Rudaki	no
7	Dilbar	33	married	secondary	confectioner	2016	5	1	Khodjent	no
8	Risolat	36	divorced	incomplete secondary	confectioner	2015	2	1	Is-travshan	yes
9	Madina	39	married	incomplete secondary	dishwasher	2014	6	3	Is-travshan	yes
10	Shoira	45	married	secondary	dairymaid	2015	4	1	Gonchi	yes
11	Manzura	37	married	secondary	housework	2015	5	1	Gonchi	yes
12	Lyutfiya	28	divorced	incomplete secondary	street cleaner	2014	5	1	Gonchi	her mother
13	Rangina	33	married	secondary	cleaner	-	6	1	Gonchi	no
14	Lola	38	married	secondary	confectioner	does not know	5	2	Is-travshan	yes
15	Dilnoza	30	married	University degree	confectioner	2014	4	1	Bokhtar	no
16	Marifat	35	divorced	secondary vocational	housework, cleaner	2015	6	1	Shaartuz	yes
17	Malokhat	35	married	secondary	cook	2015	5	2	Shaartuz	yes

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